Burden of proof and its related issues: a study on evidence before international tribunals by Kazazi, Mojtaba
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/157956
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 06:23:05 ]
"Burden of proof and its related issues: a study
on evidence before international tribunals"
Kazazi, Mojtaba
Abstract
NA
Document type : Thèse (Dissertation)
Référence bibliographique
Kazazi, Mojtaba. Burden of proof and its related issues: a study on evidence before international
tribunals.  Prom. : Verhoeven, Joe
UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN
Faculte de Droit
BURDEN OF PROOF
AND
ITS RELATED ISSUES
A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals
par
Mojtaba KAZAZI
'"'•cuLre
Dissertation doctorale
en vue de I'obtention
au grade de Docteur en Droit
CATh. iOt/IMw
Promoteur: Prof. Joe VERHOEVEN
GENEVE
1992

BURDEN OF PROOF
\
and ^
ITS RELATED ISSUES
A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals
PART ONE
CONCEPT AND GENERALITIES
Ch. I. Concept and Generalities
PART TWO
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Ch. XL Claimant's Duty: Actori Incumbit Probatio
Ch. ni. Collaboration of Parties: Respondent's Role
Ch. rV. Authority and Duties of International Tribunals
with Respect to the Burden of Proof
Ch. V. Rules of Burden of Proof as General Principles of
International Procedure
PART THREE
PARTICULAR ISSUES CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Ch. VI. Presumptions and Burden of Proof
Ch. Vn. Practical Aspects of Collaboration of Parties
Ch. Vni. Standard of Proof
Ch. IX. CONCLUSIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE
CONCEPT AND GENERALITIES
CHAPTER I. CONCEPT T^D GENERALITIES 1
A. Introduction 1
1. The Nature and Similarity of the Rules in
International Procedure 1
2. Terminology : A General Problem in
International Law . 5
B. The Cbncept of Burden of Proof in Common Law and
Civil Law Countries . 8
1. Common Law Countries 9
2. Civil Law Countries 11
C. The Nature of 'Burden of Proof in International
Procedure ..... 13
D. 'Burden of proof and 'Presentation of Pleadings
and Evidence' 17
1. The Approach of Common Law Countries
Distinguished 18
2. Burden of Evidence in International
Procedure . 21
3. Distinction Between 'Burden of Proof and
'Presentation of Pleadings and Evidence' 25
E. The Scope 3 0
1. Necessity of Selection Among the Jurisprudence
of International Tribunals 3 0
a. General Remarks 30
b. Iran - United States Claims Tribunal 32
pagel
2. The Scope of "burden of proof" ...... 37
a. 'Pleadings' and 'Burden of Proof . . 38
b. The Extent Of Applicability Of Jura
Novit Curia 42
3. The Issues to be Discussed in the Present
Study 52
PART TWO
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE BURDEN OP PROOF
CHAPTER II. CLAIMANT'S DUTY : ACTORI INCUMBIT PROBATIO. ... 57
Introductory Remarks ..... 57
A. Municipal Law . 58
1- Roman Law 59
2. Islamic Law 60
3o Common Law Countries 62
4. Civil Law Countries 65
5. Prize Courts ....... ... 72
B. Practice of International Tribunals ...... 74
1. Italian Conciliation Commissions. .......
a. Introductory Remarks 74
b. Italian - United States Conciliation
Commission ..... ... 76
c. Franco - Italian Conciliation
Commission . 77
d. Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission 79
2. Mexican Claims Commissions . 81
a. Introductory Remarks 81
b. Practice of the Commissions 82
page2
b. Practice of the Commissions 82
3. The Permanent Court of International Justice 8 6
a. General Observation 86
b. Eastern Greenland Case 87
c. Lotus Case
d. Mavrommatis Concessions 90
e. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
Cases 93
4. International Court of Justice 96
a. Corfu Channel Case 9 6
b. Colombian-Peruvian Asylxim Case .... 99
c. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (1953) 103
d. Other Cases 104
5. Examples from Ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunals . 106
a. In The Matter of The Diverted Cargoes 106
b. Ambatielos Claim 108
i. Sximmary 108
ii. Burden of Proof on the Question of
Non-exhaustion of Local
Remedies 109
6. Iran - United States Claims Tribunal . . . 114
a. Tribunal Rules 114
b. General Practice of the Tribunal . . 118
i. Burden of Proof in Claims . o . 118
ii. Burden of Proof in Defence . . 122
iii. Individual Views 124
pages
CHAPTER III. COLLABORATION OP PARTIES ; RESPONDENT'S ROLE 130
A. The Concept 130
B. International Rules and Conventions 135
1. Examples 135
a. The Hague Conventions 135
b. The Permanent Court of Arbitration . 13 6
c. The Rules Prepared by the International
Law Commission 137
d. Regulations and Rules of ICSID . . . 138
2. Reflection of Difference Between Litigation
and Conciliation 139
C. International Precedents 141
1. Mexican Claims Commissions 142
2. Commission of the International Labour
Organization 145
3. Corfu Channel Case 146
4. Rann of Kutch Case 147
5. Comments . . 14 9
D. Limits 151
1. The Time 151
2. Whether the duty of Collaboration includes
Discovery 154
3. Third Parties and Collaboration 160
4. L\imp Sxim Settlement Agreements ...... 163
E. Concluding Remarks 164
page4
CHAPTER IV . AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS WITH RESPECT TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF . . 169
A. Relevance 169
1. The Authority of International Tribunals in
Matters of Evidence vis-a-vis the
Principle of Prohibition of Judges From
Acquiring Evidence 169
2. The Scope of Relevancy 172
3. The Effect of International Tribunals'
Authority on the Burden of Proof .... 173
B. Authority to Schedule the Production of Pleadings
and Evidence • 174
1. Number and Order of Filing of Pleadings . 175
2. Nvimber and Order of Filing of Evidence . 178
3. Oral Proceedings 182
4. Authority to Accept or Refuse Further
Pleadings and Evidence 184
C. Measures Through Which International Tribunals
Apply Their Fact Finding Power , 186
1. The General Authority Of International
Tribunals To Ask For Production Of Evidence
And To Investigate The Disputed Facts
proprio motu 186
2. Specific Measures 189
3. Limits 195
D. Authority of International Tribunals to Determine
Whether the Burden of Proof is Fulfilled . . 198
1. The Authority to Determine the Party Which
page5
Carries the Burden of Proof 198
2. Admissibility and Evaluation of Evidence 202
3. Instances of Inadmissibility 209
a. Late Piled Evidence 210
i. Article 5 6 of The Rules of ICJ 211
ii. Practice of Iran-U.S Claims
Tribunal 213
iii. Starrett Case 216
iv. Hidetomo Shinto Case 221
b. Evidence Obtained Through Settlement
Negotiations 222
i. Pepsico Case 224
ii. ISS Case 225
iii. Westinghouse Case 226
c. Evidence Obtained by Violation of
International Law 228
d. Time-Barred Evidence 235
i. Evidence of the Facts Occurring
After the Close of the Proceed
ings 236
ii. Evidence of the Events Occurring
Subsequent to the Expropriation 237
4. Weight 239
a. Probative Value of Statements of
Parties 241
b. Non-applicability of "best evidence"
Rule 245
5. The Authority to Decide the Standard of
page6
Proof 247
CHAPTER V : RULES OP THE BURDEN OP PROOP AS PRINCIPLES OP
INTERNATIONAL LAW 249
A. General Rules of the Burden of Proof ..... 249
1. The Rule actori inciimbit probatio .... 250
2. The Rule of Collaboration of Parties in
Matters of Evidence 251
3. The Authority of International Tribunals in
Matters related to Evidence 252
B. Whether the General Rules of Burden of Proof are to
be Considered as Principles of International
Procedure 253
1. Arguments Against and in Pavour of the Rule
actori incumbit probatio 253
a. Difficulty in Distinction Between
Claimant and Respondent 2 54
b. Simultaneous Submissions 257
c. Silence of the Fundamental Texts of
International Tribunals with Regard to the
Burden of Proof 259
d. Non-technical Nature of the Rules of
Evidence in International Procedure 2 60
e. The Duty of Parties of International
Proceedings to Co-operate With
International Tribunals so as to
Establish the truth of a Case . . . 260
2. The Cause of the Misunderstanding: The Parker
,page7
Case . 261
a. Summary 2 62
b. The rule of actori incvimbit probatio 263
c. The Rule of Collaboration of Parties 265
3. Equilibrixim as the Main Rule 2 67
PART THREE
Pl^TICULAR ISSUES CONCERNING THE BURDEN OP PROOF
CHAPTER VI. PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF 2 69
A. General Remarks ..... 269
B. Legal Presumption in International Procedure . 273
1. Applicability 273
a. The Existence of Legal Presumptions' . 273
b. Sources of Legal Presumptions .... 276
2. Effects on the Burden of Proof 283
3. Irrebuttable Presumptions in International
Procedure 288
C. Judicial Presumptions or Inferences in
International Procedure 293
1. Admissibility 295
2. Effects on the Burden of Proof 302
CHAPTER VII. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF COLLABORATION OF PARTIES
311
A. PRACTICE OF THE IRJ^-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL . . . 311
1. Introduction 311
2. William Shashoua v. Iran 313
3. Embassy Cases 325
pages
a. The Request for production of Evidence 32 6
b. Claimants' Response 328
c. Further Memorials of The United States 329
d. Tribunal's Pronouncement ...... 331
e. Cases No. B-4 and B-44 ....... 333
4. Case No. B-55 334
5. Levitt Case . 337
a. Facts 337
b. The Parties' Contentions ...... 342
c. The Tribunal's Findings . 343
6. George Edwards Case . 345
7. INA Corporation Case . 346
8. Shinto Case. 349
B. Sanctions For Non-Production of Evidence . . . 351
1. General Remarks ....... 351
2. Different Approaches. 354
a. Ignoring the Failure of a Party. .... 354
b. Taking Formal Note 355
c. Drawing Negative or Adverse Inferences 358
i. The Rule 358
ii. Limits and Conditions For Drawing
Adverse Inferences 3 62
CHAPTER VIII. STANDARD OF PROOF 369
A. Introductory Remarks 369
B. Prima Facie Evidence 373
1. What is Prima Facie Evidence ? 373
2. Is prima facie Evidence an Acceptable Standard
page9
of Proof? 380
a. Effect of prima facie Evidence . . . 385
b. Effect on Jurisdiction Distinguished 388
C. Different Standards of Proof 392
1. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt 393
2. Preponderance of Evidence 396
3. Discretion of the Tribunal 400
D. Effects of Difficulties 402
1. Measures Usually Applied by International
Tribunals 402
2. Documents in Possession of the Adversary . 408
3. Voluminous, Time Consximing and Costly
Evidence 411
4. Difficulty Arising from the Absence of a
Party 415
CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSIONS 418
BIBLIOGRAPHY 440
pagelO
PART ONE
CONCEPT AND GENERALITIES
CHAPTER I. CONCEPT AND GENERALITIES
A. Introduction
1. The Nature and Similarity of the Rules in International
Procedure
Contrary to municipal law, there are no detailed and
complicated rules of evidence in international procedure, nor a
supreme power to impose those rules on Sovereigns as parties to
international proceedings. Consequently, similar to other aspects
of international law, the autonomy of parties is a major factor in
determining the rules of evidence, including those on the burden of
proof. Generally speaking, Sovereigns are free to agree as they
wish with respect to the burden of proof, when establishing an
international tribunal for the peaceful settlement of their
disputes.
In practice, however, in most of the cases no specific rules
regarding the evidence can be found in the comoromis. and the
parties to an international litigation usually empower the
concerned international tribunal to determine its rules of
procedure and evidence itself. Even when the parties endeavor to
2agree on the rules in advance, the scope of their agreement is
normally limited to general questions and the rest of the procedure
is left to the discretion of the tribunal. Consequently,
international tribunals enjoy, in any event, enough freedom in
determining, interpreting or applying the rules of evidence.
In spite of this freedom of States and international tribunals
in adopting and applying the rules of procedure, generally
speaking, the principles and generalities of the rules of procedure
and evidence selected and applied in different judicial and
arbitral tribunals' are not very different from one another. In
fact,. since they are based on geineral principles and
considerations, these rules are more or less similar.
The rules of procedure adopted for or by international
tribunals are usually general rules acceptable to different legal
systems, without the details and complications of any given
municipal law. As a result, the history of the evolution and
development of international procedure to a large extent reflects
a consensus on general rules of procedure and evidence. It is also
worth mentioning in this respect that on occasions where exigencies
dictate a change in or dissolution of a major international forum,
its rules of procedure usually survive through the institution
which succeeds the previous one or through other international
tribunals. Thus, for instance, the rules of procedure of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration which were incorporated in the Hague
3Conventions of 1899 and 1907 was used in 1922 as a basis for the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In turn,
the Statute of the PCIJ became, after amendments in 19 29 as well as
further changes, the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
the successor to the previous World Court. Generally speaking, the
procedure of these two successive World Courts is in fact used as
a basis and model for many other international judicial fora, and
those areas in which other tribunals deviate from the procedure of
these models are usually trivial and limited to such changes as are
required by special circumstances.'
As regards arbitration among States, the efforts of the
International Law Commission to codify arbitral procedure resulted
in the preparation of a set of rules which were eventually adopted
by the General Assembly in 1958 as the Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure. Due to the fact that these rules contained mechanisms to
ensure the continuance of arbitration and issuance of an award even
in cases where one party refused to participate in the arbitration,
and consequently blurred to some extent the differences between
judicial and arbitral proceedings, they were not applied by
governments in settlement of their disputes. Nevertheless, the
preparation of these rules is considered a positive step towards
' See, generally, H.W.A. Thirlway, Procedure of International
Courts and Tribunals, in: Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [Instalment 1 (1981) P. 183].
4the goal of harmonizing international procedure.^
International commercial arbitration, on the other hand, while
different in some aspects from international judicial proceedings,
does not differ significantly from them insofar as procedure is
concerned. Moreover, the procedures used by arbitral institutions
are usually similar. In particular, the rules prepared by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law have been
widely accepted and applied by many arbitral organizations around
the world- The UNCITRAL^ Arbitration Rules were published by the
Commission on 28 April 1976. "They represent one of the most
important and successful contributions of UNCITRAL to the
unification of international trade law."" These rules, which are
intended for optional use in ad hoc arbitrations relating to
international trade, are not enforced by any international
^ The ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure were drafted by G.
Scell. For the text of the Rules see. General Assembly Resolution,
Doc. A/CNi4/113, 6 March 1958, and Rapport de la Commission du
Droit International, Assemblee Generale, Documents officiels:
Treizieme Session, Supplement No. 9 ( A/3859).
^ The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law was
constituted by the United Nations and became operative on 1 January
1968. The Commission consists of 36 States, and its seat is in
Vienna. The object of the Commission is "to further the progressive
harmonization and unification of the law of international trade."
Clive Schmitthoff, Schmitthoff^s Export Trade. The Law and Practice
of International Trade. 7th ed. p. 45.
" Ibid p. 420. For more information on the UNCITRAL Rules
see. generally, UNCITRAL Yearbook vol. VI:1975 and vol. VII; 1976;
and Pieter Sanders, Commentary on Uncitral Arbitration Rules in
ICCA Yearbook vol. 11-1977, pp. 172-219.
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convention and are applicable only if the parties so choose.^ In
fact, the UNCITRAL Rules could be considered a general norm that
reflects the principles and generalities of procedure with respect
to international commercial arbitration.
Thus, under these circumstances, the general rules of evidence
cannot be other than those that have usually either been accepted
by States, or in the absence of direct agreement of Sovereigns on
specific rules, those that have usually been adopted and applied in
practice by international tribunals. Needless to say, State
practice and the jurisprudence of international tribunals include
and reflect ipso facto the general principles originating from
municipal law or ideas of law, and in any event they are influenced
by the opinion of the legal writers.
2. Terminology : A General Problem in International Law
In municipal law, the national language of the appropriate
^ In 1985, the efforts of the UNCITRAL to harmonize and unify
the municipal laws related to international commercial arbitration
lead to the preparation of the UNCITRAL Model Law which is similar
in many aspects to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCITRAL
Model Law was recommended by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in its resolution 40/72 (11 December 1985) . For more
information on UNCITRAL Model Law See, generally, Pieter Sanders,
Uncitral^s Project for a Model Law on Commercial International
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 2, Interim Meeting Lausanne,
May 9-12 1984; and Howard M. Holtzmann and Joseph E. Neuhaus, A
Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. The Hague (1989), including a Foreword by Dr. Carl-
August Fleischhauer. For a comparative analysis of Uncitral Rules
and Model Law see Isaak I. Dore, Arbitration and Conciliation Under
the Uncitral Rules: A Textual Analysis (1986), PP. 145-175.
6State is used to denote legal terms and institutions without any
difficulty or hesitation. International law, on the contrary, while
like municipal law it has its own particular concepts, lacks a
particular language because of its worldwide scope.
Nonetheless, if all the concepts of international law were
unique to the domain of international law, perhaps no particular
problem would arise. Concepts such as ^ius coqens^ or
'international public policy', no matter by which language
expressed, denote only their specific international law meaning.
However, because of the absence of a specific language for
international law the terms of national laws are inevitably used
for expressing the concepts of international law.
Consequently, one cannot always be certain that a term used in
international law has there the same meaning commonly attributed to
it in the municipal law of any given country. Similarly, there
always exists a risk that a term which is used by international
tribunals for a concept is identical to a term for a municipal law
concept, without the contents being identical.^ Then "the
similarity of name, which is retained, may hide a difference in
^ This problem is a two-fold one and might occur in an
inverted from as well. For instance, for a discussion on the use of
international law concepts in municipal law (with regard to de jure
qovernment and de facto governments see Judgment of the High Court
of Rhodesia, Appellate Division 29 January 19 68, reprinted in 29
International law Reports pp. 214-215, 253-254, 386.
7content which this same name tries to express.'" The problem, which
similarly exists in comparative law,® may cause a confusion which
should be studiously avoided.
When it comes to the issues related to "evidence", there are
further difficulties. In many countries the law of evidence is
characterized by a luxuriant, complicated, and sometimes obscure
and confusing language; and the field of the "burden of proof",
which is one of the important aspects of the law of evidence, is no
exception.
In the English language the phrase "burden of proof" and in
the French language the phrase "la charge de la preuve" or "la
fardeau de la preuve" generally mean "obligation to prove",® but
' Rene David & John E.G. Brierly, Maior Legal Systems in the
World Today. 2d. ed. (1978), p.83, explaining a similar problem in
comparative law, while discussing the Romano Germanic Family.
® "There is some difficulty in recognizing^ that words and
terms such as movables (meubles) and immovables (immeubles), good
faith (bonne, foi), impossibility of performance (impossibilite
d'execution) and unjust enrichment (enrichissement sans cause) may
have a different content and are, therefore, to some extent
different concepts." Ibid.
® "Burden" means something that is borne or carried; a load.
It corresponds to "charge" in French. "Proof" or its French origin
"preuve" means any effort that attempts to establish truth or fact;
something serving as evidence, a convincing token or argument; the
effect of evidence; the establishment of a fact by evidence; "proof
is the result or effect of evidence, while evidence is the medium
or means by which a fact is proved or disproved" (F.J. Ludes and
F.J. Gilbert, Corpus Juris Secundum. A Complete Restatement of the
Entire American Law, vol. 31A, Evidence, p. 820). "Burden of proof"
means obligation to prove, or "the duty of proving a disputed
presumption, assertion or charge." See Webster^s—Nev?—Twentieth
Century Dictionary. 2nd ed. (1979); Webster^ s Third
8the legal connotations and scope of these terms in Anglo-American
law and French law are not exactly the same."-" However, there is
no difference between the connotations of these phrases when used
in international law. In international proceedings the said English
and French phrases and their .Latin equivalent "onus probandi" are
all adopted and used indiscriminately, depending on the language of
the proceedings,^^ to refer to a common meaning which is the
international law concept of the burden of proof, a concept that,
as will be explained, is not too far from its municipal law origin,
yet carries its own- particular meaning in the context of
international law.
B. The Concept of Burden of Proof in Common Law and Civil Law
Countries
While for the purposes of this study no single country is of
particular interest, English and American laws, and French law are
referred to as representative of the systems of the common law and
civil law countries, respectively .
International Dictionary (1981); Black^s Law Dictionary. 5th ed.
(1979) .
There are also differences between the Anglo-American and
French law concepts of "burden of proof" on the one hand, and that
employed in international law on the other.
Naturally, in international proceedings, the equivalent of
the phrase "burden of proof" in other languages are also used,
depending on the language of proceedings. Therefore, references to
English and French languages are only for the sake of convenience.
Needless to say, however, English and French are the languages of
two different major legal systems and are widely used in
international proceedings.
1. commoxi Law Countries
The phrase "burden of proof" is an ambiguous term in common
law countries, since it is used by the courts to refer to two
different meanings.Its primary sense relates to substantive law
and refers to "the duty of a party to persuade the trier of fact by
the end of the case of the truth of certain propositions".This
burden is also called the "legal burden",- the "persuasive
burden", "the burden of proof on the pleadings", "the fixed burden
of proof" and "the risk of nonpersuasion".'^
In common law countries, the second sense of the "burden of
proof" is related to a particular procedure of their rules of
evidence known as a ruling by the judge on submission of "no case".
12- At the end of the 19th" century, the American scholar J.B.
Thayer clarified the different meanings ^he Phrase burden ofproof in Anglo-American law. ^ Sir Rupert Cross, Cross
Evidence, 5th ed.London 1979, p.87.
Heydon, Cases and Materials on Evidence, London 1975, p.13.
" The ohrase "legal burden" is that of Lord Denningis justified bf the fact that its incidence is determined by .he
substantive law." Cross on Evidence, oo.cit., p.a/.
J.D. Heydon, oo. cit. , p. 13.
What Wigmore has called "the risk of
more often called "the burden ox persuasion" or the persuasionSSrden". F. James and G.c. Hazard, civil Procedure, 2nd ed.,
Toronto 1977, p. 241.
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or "on sufficiency of evidence. Contrary to the first burden,
the effect of which is known at the end of the trial, this burden
"makes itself felt at an early stage and is one of producing
sufficient evidence to justify the judge in leaving the issue to
the jury or, where there is no jury, to allow the hearing to
continue".^® This latter concept of the burden of proof, which is
considered as its secondary meaning, is variously called the
"evidential burden", the "burden of adducing evidence", the "duty
of passing the judge"," or simply the "burden of evidence".
It is not necessary for the proponent (the party who bears the
"At certain resting place in the trial, the judge may be
called on to say whether the condition of the evidence is such that
the case may be disposed of without running the full course"
Benjamin Kaplan and Kevin M. Klermont, Ordinary Proceedings in
First Instance : England and the United States, in International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. xvi, ch 6, p. 33. It is to be
noted, however, that the issue is rather complicated. Non-jury and
jury cases, and cases where the judge is sitting alone must be
considered separately. Furthermore, there are some differences
between the systems of England and the United States in this
regard. See ibid, pp. 33-37; Cross on Evidence, pp. 77-78; Civil
Procedure, op.cit.. pp.245-249.
Cross & Wilkins, Outline of the Law of -Evidence, 5th ed. ,
London 1980, p. 27. Thayer's definition for the second sense of the
phrase "burden of proof" was: "The duty of going forward in
argument or in producing evidence, whether at the beginning of a
case, or at any later moment throughout the trial or discussion".
Cross criticizes this definition for being much too broad because
"in addition to embracing argument as well as the adduction of
evidence" it "conflates the evidential burden with what is
sometimes called a "provisional" or "tactical" burden. See Cross on
Evidence, p. 86.
" See Cross on Evidence. pp. 87-88; Heydon, op. cit., p. 13.
Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 31A, Evidence, op.cit., p. 167.
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burden of proof) to produce two different sets of evidence to
discharge each of the burdens. "The same evidence may serve both
purposes".As to the allocation of the burdens, "the general
rules are that the evidential burden normally lies in the same
place as the legal burden, and that the legal burden of proving
facts lies on him who asserts them".^^ However, discharging the
evidential burden (the second burden) does not necessarily mean
that the legal burden (the first burden) is also discharged.
2. Civil Law Countries
Contrary to the common law countries in which the phrase
"burden of proof" is used to refer to different meanings, in French
law the term "la charge de la preuve" and its synonym "le fardeau
de la preuve" are used to refer only to the duty of parties to
prove their allegations. The instance of law according to which the
judge should primarily decide whether there is a case to answer is
unknown to the civil law. As there is no jury, the functions of the
courts are not divided between judge and jury. Consequently, there
is no distinction between adjudication of fact and law and, unlike
in the common law system, both the facts and law in a given case
Heydon, op. cit. , p. 13.
22 Ibid, p. 14.
^ "Even if the opponent says nothing and calls no evidence,
the proponent may fail to satisfy the legal burden, for the judge
may think he has made out a case to answer while the trier of fact
finds his case not sufficiently weighty to satisfy the higher legal
burden." Ibid.
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are to be decided by the judge without the participation of a jury.
The definition provided by Motoulsky is more specific about
the notion of "la charge de la preuve".^'* According to him :
"C'est la necessite, pour chacune des parties, de fonder,
sous peine de perdre le proces, par des moyens legalement
admis, la conviction du juge quant a la verite de celles,
parmi les circonstances de fait repondant aux elements
generateurs du droit par elle reclame, qui ont ete
valablement contestees par son adversaire.
Although many aspects of "la charge de la preuve" and "the
burden of proof" as conceived, respectively, in civil law and
common law countries seem to be similar, they differ on what they
actually impose on the party who bears the burden of proof.
According to Witenberg the French law is more strict in this
regard:
" Alors que la loi franqiaise impose au demandeur de
prduver, purement et simplement, sans attenuation, la loi
anglaise ne lui impose que de commencer a prouver: ce
qu'on appelle "the right to begin".
It is to be noted that some elements of Motoulsky's
definition have been criticized. See Dalloz: Reportoire de
procedure civil, p. 16.
^ Motoulsky, Principes de Realization Methodiaue du Droit
Prive, these, Lyon, 1947, No. 117; quoted in Dalloz. op. cit.
J.C. Witenberg, Onus Probandi devant les iuridiction
arbitrales, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, Tome LV,
1951, p. 324.
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C. The Nature of 'Burden of Proof in International Procedure
Burden of proof, as a fundamental obligation of the parties in
judicial and arbitral proceedings, is mainly based on the principle
of impartiality of the adjudicating body and its duty to arrive at
a decision.^'' To observe the required impartialitythe judge or
the arbitrator in international proceedings, like the trier of fact
in municipal law, is neither allowed to take stands in favour of or
against either of the parties, except in the final judgment, nor
expected to acquire and adduce evidence for or against them.
Matters such as referring the technical issues of a case to an
expert, inviting the parties to provide the tribunal with the
necessary information and documents, or taking judicial notice of
notorious facts are to be considered as generally accepted
exceptions. These exceptions demonstrate the judicial power^®
" Dalloz: Repertoire de Droit International, Tome II, Paris
1969, p. 627, Art. 2.
"Impartiality, i.e. a position above and detached from the
parties and their case, is becoming the universally recognized core
of a 'judicial organ'". Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant G. Garth,
Introduction - Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil Procedure, in
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI, ch. 6, p.
77 .
The increasing judicial control over the unfolding of
proceedings is a feature of a reform which started in the last
quarter of the 19th century in many European Civil Procedures. See,
ibid, pp. 23-32. International tribunals, however, seem to have
always applied, either on the basis of the authority entrusted to
them by the parties or as an inherent privilege, a general control
over the proceedings before them.
14
applied in both municipal and international proceedings in order to
safeguard the public character^" of the civil procedure, and do not
affect the applicability of the general principle of impartiality
of the adjudicating body which dictates that the judge or
arbitrator is not allowed to undertake to prove the parties'
allegations on their behalf.
The "principle of private application",^^ widely known and
applied in municipal procedure, is also relevant in this context.
According to this principle, the judge is prohibited from
initiating a case on his own motion, and it is only for the parties
to institute the proceedings.
The principle of party control over the proceedings,^^ too,
could be invoked as a basis for applying the notion of burden of
proof. However, the applicability of this principle in
international procedure is limited wherever international tribunals
are vested with a wide scope of authority. Yet, even so, one might
argue that the presence of Sovereigns, as parties to disputes,
before international tribunals necessitates that the principle of
party control over the proceedings be applied, or at least that it
The public character of the proceedings which in municipal
procedure relates to a particular State, in international procedure
concerns the international community as a whole.
International Encvclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI,
Ch. 1, pp. 15-16; Ch. 6, pp. 99, 255.
Ibid, vol. XVI, Ch. 6, pp. 122, 255.
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be reconciled with the notion of judicial authority of
international tribunals.
Finally, the ultimate function of judges or arbitrators,
generally speaking, is to evaluate the evidence before them in
order to make a ruling on the case. In many municipal laws, a
failure of the judge to reach a decision meets with sanctions in
the form of "both the possibility of appeal and that of criminal or
civil proceedings against the judge guilty of a denial of
justice"
Like municipal courts, international tribunals are' neither
expected nor allowed to refrain from adjudicating a case before
them by resorting to non liguet.^'* Even where non—liquet is not
expressly prohibited in their fundamental texts and rules,
international tribunals have found it their duty to try to arrive
at a decision which would dispose of the case.^^ According to Judge
Ibid, p. 63. However, in Romanist Legal Systems"in no
case can the judge make a decision extending beyond the limits of
the action of which he is seized, i.e., decide ultra petita". Ibid.
See, e.g., H.W.A. Thirlway, Evidence Before International
Courts and Tribunals in: Bernhardt(ed.), Encvclopedia of Public
International Law [Instalment 1 (1981) p. 59], where he states that
"most writers ... agree [that non liquet] is a course not open to
[an international tribunal]." See also. International Law
Commission Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 27 June 1958, Article
11, ("Le tribunal ne peut prononcer le non liquet sous pretexte du
silence ou de I'obscurite du droit a appliquer").
In the Island of Palmas the Arbitration Case, the reference
in the Arbitration Agreement to the parties' wish to "terminate"
the dispute, as well as the terms thereof presupposing that the
Island of Palmas could belong to only one of the parties, was taken
16
Tanaka, in his dissenting opinion in South West Africa Cases.
Article 38, para. 1 (C) of the Statute of the ICJ can play an
important role "in filling in gaps in the positive sources in order
to avoid non liquet decisions
Combinations of the principles referred to above may create a
dilemma for the judge. On the one hand, save for exceptional cases,
he is generally prohibited from investigating the truth of the
parties' allegations; and on the other hand he is not allowed to
pass a non-liauet judgment. It thus remains only for the parties to
the case, as is their duty, to try to convince the judge that they
have genuine claims by proving their allegations. The notion of
burden of proof deals with this duty, and involves an obvious
negative sanction, namely the risk that the issue or case will be
decided to the detriment of the party which bears the burden of
proof of an essential issue but is unable to discharge it
successfully.
The burden of proof, like some other issues related to the law
of evidence, could be considered both as a procedural presumption
to mean that the "parties intended the Arbitral Award not to
conclude by a non liquet but to decide in any case that the island
formed part of the territory of one or the other of the parties to
the dispute." 4 ILR, pp. 492-493.
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 299. Some legal writers, however,
have voiced their disagreement with the proposition that the
International Court is absolutely prohibited from pronouncing a non
liquet; see, e.g., J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of The World
Court, vol. II (1947-1965), p. 99.
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and as an instance of substantive law. It mainly deals with the
question of allocation of the duty to prove the disputed facts, and
with the character and quantum of the evidence necessary for that
purpose.
International tribunals, being naturally more concerned with
the practical aspects of the issue, have usually discussed the
rules for allocating the burden of proof and the consequences
thereof, rather than, its nature and scope. Nonetheless, if one has
to find a posteriori the underlying concept to which international
tribunals have applied their rules in this regard, then the outline
of the concept of burden of proof could be drawn, generally, as:
the obligation of the parties to prove their claims to the
satisfaction of, and in accordance with the rules acceptable to,
international tribunals.
D. 'Burden of proof and 'Presentation of Pleadings and Evidence'
The presentation of pleadings and evidence as a means of proof
is a necessary part of the duty that the proponent of the burden of
proof shoulders. However, the only relevant aspects of the issue to
be discussed in this Section are its general relationship to and
distinctions from the burden of proof; points such as by whom, how
and when pleadings and evidence should be presented will not be
addressed here.
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1. The Approach of Common Law Countries Distinguished
Generally speaking, the presentation of pleadings and evidence
for the purpose of discharging the burden of proof is a common
feature of both international and various municipal procedures.
Nonetheless, the approach of common law countries in this regard
needs to be differentiated.
As explained earlier," in common countries the phrase
'burden of proof is used to refer to two different meanings. The
second meaning, which is called, inter alia, 'evidential burden',
'burden of adducing evidence' or the 'burden of going forward', is
related to a particular feature of domestic law, and thus has not
found access to international tribunals. Nevertheless, at times,
legal writers with a common law background have unsuccessfully
tried, on the basis of their own national systems, to trace the
effects of this technical rule of Anglo-American law of evidence in
international procedure.
For instance, with regard to the practice of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, Hudson concludes that "[t]he court
has referred to the burden of proof falling on a particular party,
but without distinguishing it from the burden of going forward with
37 See Section B, supra.
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the proofSandifer also quotes Hudson with approval in this
regard.^'
However, the approach of the PCIJ could be explained by
considering the fact that in international procedure, the phrase
"burden of proof" is used to refer only to the general obligation
of parties to prove their claims and defenses, i.e., the meaning
which is comparable to the first sense of the 'burden of proof in
Anglo—American law, and not to its second meaning. In fact, a
review - of the general characteristics of this aspect of
international procedure reveals that there is no place in
international proceedings for the Anglo-American dual concept of
the burden of proof.
The second meaning of the burden of proof in Anglo-American
law which, as explained, means producing enough evidence to
convince the judge that there is a case for the defendant to
answer, seems to be alien to the international procedure,which
M. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International—Justice
(1943), p. 565.
Duward V. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals,
rev. ed., 1975, p. 132.
40 See, for instance. Rules of International Court of Justice
and its predecessor; Revised Rules of Procedure of the European
Court of Human Rights (24 November 1982); and Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal Rules (3 May 1983).
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is characterized by being free from technical rules of evidence."^
For, the international proceedings, whether judicial or arbitral,
do not include participation of a jury. Nor do they consist of two
stages, with the Court's decision to proceed to the second phase
depending on whether or not enough evidence has been produced in
the first phase.
The practice of international tribunals in this regard, in
fact, follows the pattern of civil law countries, in which the
distinction that is made in Anglo-American law between the burden
of proof and the burden of going forward does not exist, and in
which it is only at the end of the proceeding that the court
decides whether or not the burden of proof has been discharged."^
" For a discussion on the nontechnical character of the rules
of evidence as generally applied by international tribunals see,
e.g., Sandifer, op. cit. . p. 8 et sea; A.H.Feller, the Mexican
Claims Commissions 1923-1934 (1935), p. 260, para. 239.
" See. e.g., Peter Herzog and Martha Weser, Civil Procedure
in France. P. 310; "French law and doctrine makes no sharp
distinction between the burden of going forward - that is, the
burden of producing sufficient evidence to permit the court to find
in favour of the proponent of the evidence ,- and the -burden of
persuasion that is, the burden of actually persuading the court to
find in favour of the proponent of evidence. Since the court must
determine both the law and the facts and as no procedural motion is
available to test whether sufficient evidence has been introduced
to permit the court to find a certain way before the court decides
which way it will actually find, the distinction between the two
burdens is of no practical significance."
It is to be noted, however, that the above quoted passage is not
quite clear insofar as it does not differentiate between the burden
of going forward in Anglo-American procedure, which leads to the
procedural motion of whether or not there is a case for the
respondent to answer, and the duty of the proponent to produce
evidence (i.e., burden of evidence), which is required in both
Anglo-American and civil law systems in order to discharge the
burden of proof in its real sense.
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2. Burden of Evidence in International Procedure
The fact that international procedure and Anglo-American law
approach the issue of presentation of pleadings and evidence
differently does not mean that in international procedure the issue
is not related to the burden of proof. To the contrary, due to the
fact that the burden of proof is discharged by production of
evidence and pleadings, this issue is very closely related to the
burden of proof. In other words, the presentation of pleadings and
evidence is a necessary part of the process of discharging the
burden of proof, and therefore they are not two completely separate
issues.
Nevertheless, the presentation of pleadings and evidence is
still different from the burden of proof, and they are two distinct
concepts,although one is closely related to and part of the
other. It is probably because of these differences that in
international procedure, as well as in civil law countries, the
issue, is dealt with independently despite its close relation to
the burden of proof.
As to the proper name to be used for this aspect of
international procedure, it seems that there is no consensus. As in
the case of some other procedural notions which are still caught in
43 See infra, p. 21.
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the twilight between domestic and international procedure,
different names have been used in the literature of international
tribunals. Legal writers with an Anglo-American law background have
sometimes used the phrase ''burden of going forward' or other names
used for the second sense of the 'burden of proof in Anglo-
American law."^ Some international tribunals, probably following
the practice of Anglo-American law, have used the phrase 'burden of
proof while referring to the presentation of pleadings and
evidence, thereby causing confusion.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has occasionally used
the phrase 'burden of evidence'"*®, which seems to be another form
of the phrase 'evidential burden' in Anglo-American law"*"^ and does
not expressly include pleadings."*^ However, taking the recent
practice of the International Court of Justice as a basis,
See. e.g., Hudson, op. cit. , p. 565; Sandifer, op. cit. . p.
140; Herzog (while discussing French law doctrine), op. cit.. p.
310.
Parker Case' (192,6) , First Mexico- U.S.A. General Claims
Commission, reprinted in 4 R'. I. A. A.' 39; A.H." Feller, The Mexican
Claims Commissions 1923-1934 , p.'. 261. "
See, e.g.. Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of
America, Full Tribunal Decision No.DEC. 45-A20-FT, p. 6 (10 July
1986), reprinted in 11 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 271, 274.
See, e.g., E.W. Cleary and J.W.Strong, Evidence : Cases,
Materials, Problems, 3rd ed.(1981), p. 104; and 31A, C.J.S,
Evidence, p. 167.
Calling the process of presentation of pleadings and
evidence a "burden" might blur the distinction between it and the
burden of proof. Otherwise, the phrase 'burden of pleadings and
evidence', which seems to be clear and justifiable, could be used.
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application of the phrase "presentation of pleadings and evidence",
which in fact defines the issue in plain language, seems to have
been more favoured.''^
Contrary to the burden of proof which is an abstract,
subjective and complicated notion, the presentation of pleadings
and evidence , is an objective and tangible issue, which
international tribunals can more easily regulate and check in order
to facilitate their difficult task of evaluating evidence and
deciding cases. Further, while the task of proving their claims is
incumbent upon the parties, concerns for justice and truth as the
supreme objects of every international tribunal require that the
issue not be entirely left to the parties' discretion. Therefore,
international tribunals have usually found it justified to
intervene in this aspect of the burden of proof by not only
regulating the time, order and other formalities related to the
presentation of pleadings and evidence, but also by directing the
parties to produce specific information and evidence that the
tribunal finds necessary to be filed.
This justified intervention by international tribunals, which
by nature is rather a supervision or assistance in the presentation
of pleadings and evidence, takes place in two ways :
See, e.g., Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua CNicaraaua v. United States of America, Merits,
Judgment of 27 June 1986, Para. 31, I.C.J. Reports 1986, P. 26.
50 See generally Ch. VII, infra.
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First. necessary provisions to that effect are usually
incorporated in the statutes and rules of international
tribunals. These provisions often envisage a general
guideline with regard to the pleadings and evidence to be
filed by the parties, and the order thereof. They also
provide the tribunal with the authority to determine, on the
basis of the general guidelines, different aspects of the
presentation of pleadings and evidence such as time limits,
extensions, the language of the proceedings, the order in
which the parties will file their pleadings and evidence or
will be heard, and other formalities in this connection.
Second, international tribunals apply general provisions of
their rules, together with their discretionary power in
accordance with the circumstances of each individual case in
order to direct the parties in their presentation of pleadings
and evidence. In this process international tribunals take
into account, as an important factor, the parties' wishes and
capabilities.
There could be no doubt as to the necessity and utility of the
measures taken by international tribunals in this regard. As
emphasized by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua
Case, "[t]he provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court" and
presumably of other international tribunals "concerning the
See, e.g., Article 44 of ICJ Rules, according to which any
agreement between the parties which does not cause unjustified
delay shall be taken into account.
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presentation of pleadings and evidence are designed to secure a
proper administration of justice, and a fair and equal opportunity
for each party to comment on its opponent's contention.
3. Distinction Between 'Burden of Proof and 'Presentation of
Pleadings and Evidence'
The distinction between the burden of proof and 'the
presentation of pleadings and evidence' is demonstrated by
considering the different effect that they may have on the
proceedings. Although 'the presentation of pleadings and evidence'
is a necessary step for discharging the burden of proof, it is not
always enough for achieving that purpose. For, whether or not the
tribunal is convinced of the truthfulness of a claim depends on the
contents of the presented pleadings and evidence rather than the
mere presentation thereof. In other words, presentation of
pleadings and evidence does not necessarily vindicate the
proponent's allegations. Therefore, even though, a party has
submitted all the evidence possible, the tribunal may still
conclude that the burden of proof has not been discharged.
Another aspect of the distinction between the burden of proof
and the presentation of pleadings and evidence arises from their
nature. The presentation of pleadings and evidence is a procedural
" Military and Paramilitary Activities in _and against
Nicaragua CNicaraqua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment
of 27 June 1986, Para. 31, I.C.J. Reports 1986, P. 26.
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matter, and the method of its application may therefore vary from
one tribunal to another, subject to the provisions of its rules of
procedure. The burden of proof, on the other hand, is a general
principle of international procedure which is based on substantive
law and is applied more or less uniformly by international
tribunals. Further, the burden of evidence being a procedural
issue, it may shift from the proponent to the other party during
the proceedings; but the burden of proof as a fundamental
obligation does not shift, and remains on the party which rightly
bears it.
The distinction between the burden of proof and presentation
of pleadings and evidence is not limited to international
procedure, but applies equally in municipal procedure, including
the Anglo-American Law as well.^^ There, too, the presentation of
pleadings and evidence does not necessarily discharge the burden of
proof; it is a procedural matter and, contrary to the burden of
proof, shifts between the parties during the proceedings.^"^
Notwithstanding the distinction discussed above, it might seem
that because of the close relation between the burden of proof and
'the presentation of pleadings and evidence', and the fact that the
" There is a further distinction in Anglo-American law: it is
only the judge who deals with the presentation of pleadings and
evidence with which the jury is not concerned. See, e.g.. Cross on
Evidence. op. cit..p. 90.
See. e.g., ibid., pp. 87,93; E.W. Cleary and J.W. Strong,
Evidence. op. cit., pp.103-104.
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party which bears the burden of proof usually carries the burden of
presentation of pleadings and evidence as well, using the two
phrases interchangeably could not cause severe misunderstanding.
However, apart from the necessity of precision in legal texts,
which as a general rule requires the appropriate application of
terms, there are at least two problematic areas in which the term
"burden of proof" could not be used instead of "the duty of
presentation of pleadings and evidence"
First, on exceptional occasions when the party bearing the
burden of proof does not also bear the burden of presentation of
pleadings and evidence, using the term "burden of proof" for the
opponent's duty could be misleading. For instance, if in order to
prove his case the claimant relies on documents which are
undoubtedly in possession of the respondent, then it might be right
to say that the claimant carries the burden of proof but the burden
of presentation of evidence is on the respondent. However, it will
not be right to say that the burden of proof is on the•respondent.
For, it is obvious that the respondent could not be charged with
the burden of proof for the benefit of the claimant.
Second, international tribunals that have used the term
'burden of proof where they meant the duty of presentation of
pleadings and evidence have caused confusion and doubts as to the
applicability of the burden of proof rules as general principles of
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international procedure. The presentation of pleadings and
evidence, being usually subject to restrictive rules in municipal
law, is a more limited concept than the burden of proof, and
international tribunals have rightly declined to apply the
restrictions of municipal law in international procedure. However,
by misusing the phrase 'burden of proof when the 'presentation of
pleadings and evidence' has been more appropriate, some
international tribunals have invited otherwise unnecessary argument
about their real intention.
To illustrate the problem, the Parker Case (1926), decided by
the first Mexican-USA General Claims Commission, could be referred
to as a leading example. In the Parker Case, while discussing the
inadmissibility of technical rules of evidence of municipal law
before international tribunals, the Commission stated, inter alia,
that "[a]s an international tribunal, the Commission denies the
existence in international procedure of rules governing the burden
of proof borrowed from municipal procedure.""
However, what the Commission actually meant by 'burden of
In the realm of comparative law, too, the issue may cause
ambiguity: On the one hand lawyers in the Anglo-American system are
accustomed to use the phrase 'burden of proof for both its real
sense and the presentation of pleadings and evidence. On the other
hand, when dealing with the writings of Anglo-American lawyers,
lawyers with a Civil Law background may take it for granted that
the phrase 'burden of proof has been used there in its real sense.
See Chapter V, infra.
" R.I.A.A. vol.IV, p. 39.
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proof was 'burden of presentation of pleadings and evidence' which
would impose the technical rules of evidence of either the United
States or Mexico on the Commission, and not the burden of proof in
its real sense. This inference seems obvious by reading through the
whole text of the Commission's decision, and especially from what
the Commission stated immediately after the above-quoted passage :
"On the contrary, it holds that it is the duty of the
respective Agencies to cooperate in searching out and
presenting to this tribunal all facts throwing any light
on the merits of the claim presented.
As Cheng has rightly concluded, "[f]rom the context of this
passage, it is clear that the Commission used the term "burden of
proof" in the sense of a duty to produce evidence, and to disclose
the facts of the case."^' Nevertheless, the confusion resulting
from improper use of the term "burden of proof" by the Commission
has led to a situation where the Parker Case is occasionally quoted
as authority with respect to the proper sense of the burden of
proof, which was not meant by the Commission
Ibid.
59
60
Bin Cheng, General Princiiples of Law as Applied ^
International Courts and Tribunals (1953), reprinted 1987, p. 328.
For more discussion in this respect See Ch. V, infra.
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E. The Scope
1» Necessity of Selection Among the Jurisprudence of
International Tribunals
a. General Remarks
As discussed in Section A above, the general rules of evidence
consist of those that have usually either been accepted by States,
or in the absence of direct agreement of Sovereigns on specific
rules, those that have usually been adopted and applied in practice
by international tribunals. However, given the relatively long
history of international tribunals, their diversity and variety,
particularly after the two World Wars, exploring the general rules
of evidence as adopted or applied by numerous international
tribunals may prove to be difficult. Thus it is necessary that from
among the numerous tribunals and the large quantity of their
decisions, the main trend be traced and focused on, with the
assistance of milestones which mark the major developments in the
field.
For this purpose, the decisions of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and most
importantly the International Court of Justice, which is founded on
the experience of its predecessor, are among the significant
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milestones to be considered in this regard. Further, without
placing too much emphasis on treaties or decisions which are too
old, as they might not reflect recent developments in international
law, other important international tribunals or ad hoc arbitrations
are not to be neglected.
On the other hand, decisions of the fora that are closely
related to municipal jurisdictions, such as the Court of Justice of
the European Community, have to be excluded. While the EC Court is
an important international tribunal, it is closely related to the
municipal laws of the Member States, it has specific features such
as the presence of the Advocate-General, and possesses powers
usually accorded to municipal- courts of law.^' Consequently,
because of the special nature of the Court, the scope of its
jurisprudence would have been too narrow for the purpose of a
general study on evidence before international tribunals. It has
proved difficult, on the other hand, not to make some references to
the wealth of jurisprudence of the European and American courts of
human rights with respect to evidence and the standard of proof.
These references too, however, should be treated cautiously as they
For instance, the Court may on its own motion summon a
witness (Art. 47 of the Rules of Procedure of EC_ Cpurt)_; it is
empowered to impose pecuniary penalties on duly notified witnesses
who fail to appear before the Court dbid. Art. 48); it can issue
letters rogatory for examining a witness or expert by a competent
national judicial authority of a Member State (Arts. 1-2,
Supplementary Rules of the EC Court); it is able to provide legal
aid (Art. 6 of the Rules of Procedure and Art. 4 of the said
supplementary Rules) ; and it can exclude an adviser or lawyer from
the proceedings (Art. 35 of the Rules of Procedure).
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are also related to one specialized area of international law where
the points at issue are sometimes similar to issues before criminal
domestic courts, and where the subject of the claim affects the
procedure and in particular the evidence.
b. Iran - United States Claims Tribunal
As the widest ranging international claims tribunal since
World War II, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is a proper subject for
the study of international procedure.
On 19 January 1981 the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the Government of the United States of America, through
the intermediacy of the Government of Algeria, adhered to a
declaration which secured the release of both the 52 U.S. nationals
held hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Iran and the Iranian assets
frozen by the U.S. Government in U.S. banks (whether within or
outside the United States' territory)
Moreover, among other interdependent commitments made by the
two Governments, they undertook to bring about the settlement and
termination, through binding arbitration, of all litigation as
between either Government and the nationals of the other.Thus,
" See the "Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
S and Popular Republic of Algeria", reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.,
pp. 3-8.
63 Ibid, General Principle B, p. 3.
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in a second declaration which is referred to as the Claims
Settlement Declaration,^ an international arbitral tribunal (the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) was established for this
purpose.
The Iran- United States Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal)
consists of nine members, one-third of whom are appointed by each
of the two Governments, and the remaining third of whom are
selected by mutual agreement of the party-appointed arbitrators.^
As the Claims Settlement Declaration allows cases to be decided by
either the Full Tribunal or a panel of three members," the
Tribunal functions through three Chambers• and a Full Tribunal.
While the Full Tribunal includes all the 9 members of the Tribunal,
each Chamber consists of an Iranian arbitrator, an American
arbitrator, and a third country chairman. The seat of the Tribunal
is in The Hague^^ and its official languages are English and Persian.®^
^ The full title of this document is: "Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic—of—Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran". This Declaration, like the other, was signed on 19 January
1981. For the full text of these Declarations, see, e.g., 1 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. p.9.
" The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is delimited by a number of
restrictive provisions. For the relevant provisions, see paragraphs
1 to 3 of Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
Article III (1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
" Ibid.
68 Article VI(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration,
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Since 1981, the Tribunal has been active in adjudicating
claims and disputes referred to it by the Governments of the United
States and Iran. As of October 1991 most of the approximately 4000
claims originally brought before the Tribunal have been either
adjudicated, settled by the parties and terminated by awards on
agreed terms, or withdrawn. The remaining cases before the
Tribunal, which is still an ongoing institution, include; a few
"group B" and "group A" cases, which are respectively the official
claims of the two Governments against each other, and cases for
interpretation or alleging violation of the provisions of the
Algiers Declarations; and approximately 100 cases involving large
claims of natural and juridical persons.
The Tribunal has been the subject of many articles and
reviews.There are two regular publications (Iranian Assets
See Article 17 of the Tribunal Rules, reprinted in 2 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. p. 420.
On 17 May 1990 the United States and Iran filed a
settlement agreement with the Tribunal that terminated, inter alia,
the remaining 2,388 claims of less than $ 250,000 brought before
the Tribunal by the United States on behalf and for the benefit of
its nationals. See Award No. 483-Claims of Less Than US
$250,000/86/B38/B76/B77-FT (22 June 1990), reprinted in 25 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R.
328-338.
Most of these claims are those brought against Iran by dual
nationals of Iran and the United States.
See. e.g., Rahmatullah Khan, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal: Controversies, Cases and Contribution (1990), and John A.
Westberg, International Transaction and Claims Invoivinq Government
Parties; Case Law of the IRan-United States Claims Tribunal(1991) .
The articles on or about the different aspects of the Tribunal's
practice are too numerous to be referenced here. However, an
UNIVERSITE cath. louvain
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Litigation Reporter and Mealev^s Litigation Reporter) that each
report twice monthly on developments at the Tribunal and provide
the text of important opinions and briefs submitted to the
Tribunal, as well as the decisions of the Tribunal. Moreover, the
decisions of the Tribunal and some selected Orders are reprinted in
Iran- U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports. published by Grotius
Publications Limited. To date 23 volumes, covering all decisions of
the Tribunal rendered through 1989, have been published under this
series.'^
The Tribunal, established by a treaty between Iran and the
United States, is by nature an example of an international tribunal
set up by States in order to settle their disputes in accordance
with international law. The fact that, in addition to claims within
the domain of public international law, the Tribunal has been
charged with the adjudication of claims relating to international
trade as well does not affect the international character of the
updated list of them is usually attached to the Annual Report of
the Secretary-General of the Tribunal. The Annual Report may be
obtained directly from the Registry of the Tribunal in The Hague.
Further, a selective bibligraphy, prepared by Nassib Ziade and
published in ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal (vol. 2,
1987, P. 534) , is reprinted in both John A. Westberg, op. cit. , PP.
379-392 and Rahmatullah Khan, op. cit., PP. 328-343.
The basic texts concerning the work of the Tribunal,
including the two Algiers Declarations and other official documents
relating.to the establishment and operations of the Tribunal, are
to be found in Volume 1 of the Reports. The Provisionally Adopted
Tribunal Rules of 10 March 1982 are also reprinted in Volume 1, and
the final version of the Tribunal Rules, which are slightly
different, in Volume 2 of the Reports.
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Tribunal. Nonetheless, it was probably in recognition of this
special character of the Tribunal that the States which established
it accepted the UNCITRAL Rules as the basis for the rules of
procedure of the Tribunal. In spite of the many justified
criticisms about the Tribunal's awards and its practice in
general'''^, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal is considered an
important contribution to international law, and it is bound to
have an impact on the evolution of international arbitration and
the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.
The UNCITRAL Rules, originally drafted for optional
application in ad hoc arbitrations on international, trade and
adopted, with the necessary modifications, as the Tribunal Rules,
have been put to the test in an international tribunal that deals
with claims subject to public international law. But apart from
that, the exceptional diversity of the cases and issues referred to
the Tribunal, its long standing and duration, the composition of
its panels, and the fact that its two constituting States belong to
two major and different legal systems of the world, are among the
reasons that make the study of the application of the rules of
evidence by the Tribunal worthwhile and useful, and that have thus
warranted the emphasis placed on the awards and other
pronouncements of the Tribunal in the present study.
S^, e.g., Rahmatullah Khan, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal: Controversies. Cases and Contribution (1990), PP. 258-
266.
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2. The Scope of "burden of proof"
The scope of the 'burden of proof may be viewed from two
different aspects. In a general sense, it might be so broad as to
include those parts of the proceedings which should be taken into
account and focused on by the adjudicating body when it is
necessary to ascertain whether or not the party which bears the
burden of proof has been able to discharge it. In this sense the
scope of the 'burden of proof embraces the issues related to the
'evidence' and 'pleadings', as means of proof.
It is also possible to view the scope of the burden of proof
in a sense more related to 'evidence', and more particularly to
issues connected to the instance of the burden of proof. Here again
the related issues could be identified by starting, as a point of
departure, from the fact that 'evidence' and 'pleadings' are
general means of proof and that they are accordingly related to the
burden of proof.
In both aspects of the scope of the burden of proof two
specific questions, to be mentioned and discussed hereinbelow, are
of particular interest:
First,.whether 'pleadings' should be considered as part of the
scope of the burden of proof; and,
second, whether the scope of the burden of proof is limited to
issues of facts or should include issues of law as well.
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a. 'Pleadings' and 'Burden of Proof
As a result of the liberal attitude of international tribunals
towards the issue of admissibility of evidence, the party who bears
the burden of proof is provided with more opportunities to prove
the truth of his claim in international proceedings. However, the
questions still remain as to, first, whether or not the pleadings,
including the assertions of the parties, are also to be accepted as
evidence and second, whether or not the pleadings affect the burden
of proof.
As to the first question, while it is more related to the
value to be attributed to the pleadings than to whether they are
considered as evidence, the answer rightly appears to be generally
negative. International tribunals, for obvious reasons, have
refused to accept the unsupported statements of the parties as
evidence. As stated by the British-Mexican Claims Commission of
1926, "if an international tribunal were to accept all ...
allegations without evidence, it would expose itself to the not
unjustifiable criticism of placing jurisdiction as between nations
below the level prevailing in all civilized States for jurisdiction
as between citizens".
As to the question of whether or not pleadings affect the
Further Decisions and Opinions of Commissioners, Claim of
W. Allen Odell, p. 63; See also Chapter V, infra.
39
burden of proof, the answer is different. The content of pleadings
usually covers a broad spectrum of different matters. It includes
statements of the relevant facts, statements of law, submissions,
admissions or denials of facts alleged by the other party,
observations, arguments, contentions, etc.^® Therefore, while it is
not acceptable to argue that pleadings as a whole should be
considered as evidence, it is also difficult, to argue that none of
the above matters could be characterized as evidence.
Pleadings, similar to evidence, are presented by parties in
their effort to discharge generally the burden of proof they
already shoulder, or to prevent the burden of proof from falling on
them. In other words, the efforts of parties to discharge the
burden of proof mainly crystallize in presentation of evidence as
well as pleadings. Therefore, pleadings, whether or not qualified
as evidence, cannot be ignored when determining whether a party has
been able to discharge the burden of proof.
Nonetheless, it seems that the importance of evidence has
eclipsed that of the pleadings, with the consequence that pleadings
have not been adequately referred to in discussions about the
burden of proof. Sandifer, for instance, seems somewhat to exclude
the pleadings from the scope of burden of proof, on the basis of
See Article 49 of ICJ Rules of Courts, in _ICJ Acts and
Documents No.4. p. 125; and Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges
Bengzon and Jimenez de Arechaga to the Order of the International
Court (18 August 1972) in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, I •C. J.
Reports 1972. PP 184-186.
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the differences between the "system of pleadings" and "rules of
evidence":
"Burden of proof, in the strictly technical sense of the
term, is a concomitant of a maturely developed system of
pleadings and of a well-defined body of rules of evidence
allocating the duty of bringing forward the evidence to
substantiate the contentions developed by the pleadings
and prescribing the character and quantum of evidence
required to fulfill this duty, both during the pleadings
and upon the submission of the case to the court for
decision"
According to Mani, burden of proof "represents a specific
crystallization of the general obligation of the parties to present
evidence".'^® This definition, too, seems to limit the subject-
matter and scope of the application of the burden of proof only to
presentation of evidence above, without including the pleadings.
In both definitions quoted above the emphasis is on the
evidence because it is submitted for the purpose of proof. On the
other hand, pleadings are also submitted for the purpose of proof.
Therefore, it is hardly justifiable that pleadings, though
different from evidence, should be treated differently as far as
the burden of proof is concerned. Practically, too, it is difficult
to distinguish between the oral and written pleadings of parties,
and the evidence contained therein for the purpose of proof, i.e.,
between a document presented as evidence and explanations provided
concerning that document.
77 Sandifer, op. cit., p. 123.
V.S.Mani, International Adjudication ; Procedural Aspects,
p. 202.
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It is true that international tribunals, similar to municipal
fora, may have to apply separate rules for presentation of
pleadings and for that of evidence by the parties. This, however,
does not alter the fact that both pleadings and evidence are
parallel devices resorted to by the parties to discharge their
respective burden of proof, and that it is the accumulated effect
of those devices taken altogether which counts and is to be
evaluated by the tribunal. As noted by the arbitrator in the Island
of Palmas Arbitration Case, the value and weight of "any assertion
can only be estimated in the light of all evidence and all the
assertions made on either side, and of facts which are notorious
for the tribunal".''^
On the other hand, it should not prove impossible to find
cases in which the burden of proof is discharged by presentation of
pleadings. For instance, in international proceedings many of the
jurisdictional pleas of the parties are usually resolved by
resorting to arguments and rules of interpretation. Or,
occasionally a claim could be proved by relying on the facts which
are of public knowledge or could be judicially noticed. Then too,
while allegations of parties in their favour need to be proved,
when they admit a fact which is detrimental to their own positions
this is usually considered as sufficient proof.
•79 Island of Palmas Arbitration Case,^ United—States—aM
Holland; Permanent Court of Arbitration, 4 April 1928; reprinted in
Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, No.4, rep.ed.
1981, p. 480.
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Moreover, it is to be noted that ^presentation of evidence'
and 'burden of proof, though closely related, are still not
identical. Thus, not taking account of pleadings limits the scope
of burden of proof to the presentation of evidence alone, and blurs
the difference between the two distinct concepts.
Accordingly, it seems more correct and less complicated to
define the burden of proof as 'the obligation of parties to prove
their claims and defenses to the satisfaction, and according to the
rules, of the tribunalwithout differentiating between evidence
and pleadings. Such a general definition, which places both
evidence and pleadings equally within the scope of the burden of
proof, is generally in accord with the practice of international
tribunals as well as municipal fora.^'
b. The Extent Of Applicability Of Jura Novit Curia
i. In municipal law the scope of the burden of proof is
80 See Section D, supra.
The importance of 'arguments' in determining the disputed
facts has been emphasized, inter alia, by the ICJ in the Nicaragua
Case; "One of the Court's chief difficulties in the present case
has been the determination of the facts relevant to the dispute.
First of all, there is marked disagreement between the parties
not only on the interpretation of the facts, but even on the
existence or nature of at least some of them. Secondly, the
respondent State has not appeared during the present merits phase
of the proceedings, thus depriving the Court of the benefit of its
complete and fully argued statement regarding the facts." Nicaraqiaa
V. United States of America, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 198 6,
Para. 57, I.C.J.Reports 1986. P. 38.
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limited to issues of fact, and it is generally the duty of the
Court to know and apply the law.^^ In common law countries this
distinction is furthered by the separation of the functions of the
judge and jury, which dictates the general rule that "questions of
law must be determined by the judge and questions of fact must be
determined by the jury With respect to foreign law, however,
there is a difference between the approach of common law countries
and civil law countries. In common law countries, "foreign law" is
usually considered to be a question of fact rather than a question
of law. Thus it needs to be proved by the party who relies on such
a law.^'^ Yet, "foreign law" is among the exceptions to the general
rule that issues of fact shall be decided by the jury, since it is
usually to be decided by the judge. In civil law countries,
generally speaking, foreign law is within the domain of application
of jura novit curia but that does not prevent the courts from
seeking assistance in that respect, proprio motu, from experts.
11. It is not as easy in international procedure as it is in
See, e.g.. Corpus Juris Secundum vol. 31A, op. cit., p. 173;
and Fran9ois Rigaux, Droit International Prive. Tome 1, Theorie
generale, Deuxieme ed. refondue (1987), p. 297.
82
Cross. op. cit. , p. 65.
84 In English Courts "[t]he burden of proof rests on the party
asserting that foreign law differs from English law." Ibid, p. 634.
85 For instance, in England and Wales "foreign law is a
question of fact which, since 1920, has to be decided by the
judge." Ibid 63 3.
86 See, e.g., Frangois Rigaux, op. cit., p. 300.
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municipal law to determine whether the parties should provide the
relevant tribunal with evidence on the law they believe should be
applied, or whether their pleadings and evidence should be limited
to the evidence of alleged facts. The issue of applicability of
-iura novit curia was generally addressed by the ICJ in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction cases:
"The Court as an international judicial organ, is
deemed to take judicial notice of international law, and
is therefore required in a case falling under Article 53
of the Statute, as in any other case, to consider on its
own initiative all rules of international law which may
be relevant to the settlement of the dispute. It being
the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the
. relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the
burden of establishing or proving rules of international
law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the
law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.""
The principle recognized by the Court in the above Case was
confirmed recently in the Nicaragua Case, where the Court, citing
its.own observation in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, stated as
follows;
"For the purpose of deciding whether the claim is well
founded in law, the principle iura novit curia signifies
that the Court is not solely dependent on the argument of
the parties before it with respect to the applicable law
(cf. "Lotus". P.G.I.J.. Series A. No. 10. p. 31), so that
the absence of one party has less impact."
Legal writers, too,. on the basis of the practice of
" Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, Para. 17, I.C.J. Reports 1974. p. 9; see also Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, Para. 18, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 181.
Nicaragua v. United States of America. Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 29, ICJ Reports 198 6, P. 24.
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international tribunals, have generally favoured the applicability
of the principle of jura novit curia in international
proceedings.®^ But two exceptions are usually recognized, as
follows:
First; Municipal law is not within the limit of jura novit
curia in international procedure, and it is to be proved by the
painty relying on such a law in an international proceeding.'^ It is
not practical to expect the judges and arbitrators to possess an
extensive knowledge of each of the different municipal laws which
may become relevant in an international proceeding.
Second; Rules of customary international law constitute
another area in which the principle of lura novit curia is not
fully operative. While "[i]n principle a court is presumed to know
the law and may apply a custom even if it has not been expressly
pleaded",'' the burden of proving the existence of a custom, if
necessary, remains on the party relying thereon.'^
See, e.g., H.W.A Thirlway, Evidence Before International
Courts and Tribunals, op. cit. , at 59; J. C. Witenberg, La Theorie
des Preuves Devant Les Juridiction Internationales, Recueil des
Cours 1936 II, p. 33-; Fitzmaurice, II The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice(1986), p. 531.
See, generally, Witenberg, op. cit. , p. 34; Thirlway, ibid;
and J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox, International Arbitration, Law and
Practice (London 1959) p. 144.
" Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th
ed. (1990), P. 11.
See e.g. , ibid; Lotus Case. PCIJ. Ser. A. no. 10, P. 18; and
Asvlum Case, ICJ Reports 1950, P. 276.
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Moreover, a distinction should be made in this regard between
general or international customs, the rules of which are more
easily accessible, and local customs, with respect to which members
of international tribunals are not usually expected to have a
comprehensive knowledge. It is incumbent on the party who is
relying on an alleged local custom to prove it. As it has been
pointed out, in order to prove a custom it is sufficient to prove
its existence.'^ The probative value of a custom follows and need
not be proved.
In the Asylum Case,^^ where the Colombian Government had
relied "on an alleged regional or local custom peculiar to Latin-
American States"^^ the Court, in limiting the scope of jura novit
curia, determined that the burden of proving the alleged regional
custom rested on the Colombian Government, and concluded that the
Government had not been able to prove the existence of such a
custom. According to the court:
"The Party which relies on a custom to this kind must
prove that this custom is established in such a manner
that it has become binding on the other Party. The
Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by
it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage
practiced by the States in question, and that this usage
is the expression of a right appertaining to the State
" See Joe Verhoeven, La reconnaissance internationale dans la
pratique contemporaine. Paris (1975), at 826.
Ibid.
See Colombian-Peruvian Asvlum Case, Judgment of 2 0 November
1950, ICJ Reports 1950 p. 270.
Ibid p. 276.
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granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial
State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the
Court, which refers to international custom "as evidence
of a general practice accepted as lav."^
Later, the same opinion was reiterated by the Court in the
Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the—United—States—jji
Morocco. In that Case the United States was relying, inter alia, on
custom and usage as a foundation for its consular jurisdiction.
The Court, after quoting the above-mentioned passage from the
Asvlum Case, made a similar conclusion:
"In the present case there has not been sufficient
evidence to enable the Court to reach a conclusion that
a right to exercise consular jurisdiction founded upon
custom or usage has been established in such a manner
that it has become binding on Morocco."'^
In a common statement of their dissenting opinion Judges
Hackworth, Badawi, Levi' Carneiro and Sir Senegal Rau objected,
inter alia, to the conclusion of the Court in regard to the weight
given to evidence in the Case, but not to its underlying premise
concerning the allocation of burden of proof.™
" Ibid pp. 276-277.
98 According to the Government of the United States: "The
Submissions and Conclusions presented by the French Government in
this case should be rejected on the ground that the French
Government had failed to maintain the burden of proof which it
assumed as party plaintiff and by reason of the nature of the legal
issues involved." Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United
States of America in Morocco, (France v. United States of America),
ICJ, Judgment of 27 August 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 180.
ICJ Reports 1952. p. 200.
'00 ICJ Reports 1952. pp. 219-220
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In his dissenting opinion in the Nottebohm Case, Judge
Klaestad found the Court's opinion in the Asylum Case to be equally
applicable in regard to the question concerning the proof of a
custom derogating from the principle of State sovereignty, in a
situation where there allegedly exists a custom or rule of positive
international law limiting the right of a State to protect a
naturalized subject.
With regard to international customs, however, the principle
of jura novit curia does apply and international tribunals may
apply a general custom which has not been pleaded by the parties.
As was explained by Judge De Castro, in his opinion in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case:
"International customary law does not need to be proved;
it is of a general nature and is based on a general
conviction of its validity fopinio jurist. The Court must
apply it ex officio; it is its duty to know it as
guaestio iuris; iura novit curia. Only regional customs
or practices, as well as special customs, have to be
proved" .
101 ii[T]he Court, in the Asylum case,... based itself on the
principle of State sovereignty and held that a party which relies
on a custom derogating from that principle must prove' that the rule
invoiced is in accordance with a constant and uniform State practice
accepted as law. The same method would seem to be applicable in the
present case.... The Government of Guatemala would have to prove
that such a custom is in accordance with a constant and uniform
State practice accepted as law (Article 38, para. 1(b) of the
Court's Statute). But no evidence is produced by that Government
purporting to establish the existence of such a custom." Nottebohm
Case (Second phase), ICJ Reports 1955. p.3 0; see also dissenting
opinion of Judge Read in the same Case, pp. 39-41, and that of M.
Guggenheim (Judge ad hoc) p. 55.
Fisheries Jurisdiction ("United kingdom v. Iceland) , Merits,
Separate Opinion of Judge De Castro, I.C.J. Reports 197 4, P. 79. "A
(continued...)
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yet, it is not always easy to differentiate a local custom from a
general one, and the precedents in this regard reflect the same
problem.
ill. In practice, however, the situation may be different.
Usually, the characteristic conservatism of lawyers of different
legal systems causes them to make sure not to take any unnecessary
risks for issues of law in the litigation by leaving the issues of
law entirely at the discretion of the tribunal. Thus, normally, in'
their pleadings the parties not only endeavour to substantiate
issues of fact but address and try to clarify issues of law as
well. It is fairly common in international proceedings for the
parties to rely on and cite examples from the practice of
international tribunals, publications of scholars, and State
practice as evidence of international law. On some occasions,
issues of law are hardly separable from issues of fact. For
instance, in an expropriation case the claimant State would
normally try to demonstrate that the acts of the respondent
government are in violation of international law. For that purpose
claimant may have to^ discuss what constitutes expropriation in
international law', ' and the appropriate compensation therefor.
"^(...continued)
distinction should be observed between two categories of customs.
Traditionally jurists and canonists have distinguished in ordinary
law between notorious customs well known to all and particular
customs; the latter, being exceptions, had to be proved." Ibid.
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Nor is it rare for parties to find it necessary even to
provide legal opinions from eminent jurists and scholars, in
support of their respective positions in a pending litigation, as
to the state of the international law or the interpretation
thereof. In some of the cases before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
apart from filing legal opinions, it has been the practice of both
States parties to invite renowned scholars in the relevant fields
to present their views personally on contentious issues of law in
the Hearing sessions before the Tribunal.
On the other hand, regardless of the extent to which the
principle of jura novit curia is applicable in international
procedure, international tribunals can, and usually do, benefit
from the views of the parties. As an example, reference could be
made to the Haus Case, in which the Tribunal, faced with
complicated issues of law, did not hesitate to ask the parties to
provide it with their comments.'® It is interesting to note that
the tribunal's questions were not limited to municipal law, but
related to the extent of the applicability of international law as
well.'°^
103 See Haus International, Inc., and The Islamic Republic Of
Iran, Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 313, 316.
The Tribunal ordered the Claimant to file a Memorial
addressing the following questions:
"1. What law determines the relationship between Haus ... and
Meaplan ... created by (i) the 'Architect's Agreement'... and (ii)
the 'Joint Venture Agreement'... between Haus and Meaplan, both of
those agreements read together? Under that law, did those
(continued...)
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The fact that this invitation by the Tribunal for an exchange
of views between the parties took place well after the close of the
Hearing, and at the stage where comments from parties have rarely
been admitted in other cases, let alone encouraged, demonstrates
the necessity of the questions and the importance of the comments.
In fact, as was observed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, in spite
of the applicability of iura novit curia in international
procedure, "the views of the parties to a case as to the law
applicable to ' their,., _dispute are very material, particularly ...
when those views are concordant."'®^ ..
Thus, it may be concluded that, while generally speaking the
law need not be proved before international tribunals, the adage
-i-ux"a novit curia is not totally applicable either. In practice, the
parties, on the one hand, usually find it necessary to discuss the
international law they believe to be applicable in the case; and
'°^ (... continued)
agreements create a partnership or other of association.
2. If a partnership or other form of associa.tion was created under
the applicable law, has Haus by itself the right under that law, or
under international law, to assert a claim before the Tribunal for
damages allegedly sustained by the partnership or association? If
so, has Haus the right by itself to assert a claim (i) for 100-s of
the damages sustained by the partnership or association or (ii) for
only Haus' pro rata share of such damages?" Ibid.
The Tribunal also received a submission from the Agent of the
United States, and responses were filed by both Respondents in the
case, i.e., TRC and the Government of Iran. Ibid.
Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 29, ICJ Reports 1986, P. 25.
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the tribunal, on the other hand, without imposing the burden of
proof on any particular party, while taking note of the position of
each party,decides on the law at its own discretion. In
determining the law, international tribunals take account of the
information provided by the parties, as far as deemed appropriate,
but they are not limited thereto.
As to the question of whether an international tribunal would
be entitled to dismiss a case on the ground that the issues of law
have not been proved, perhaps distinction should be made between
litigation and arbitration. Save for some exceptions, such as
municipal laws and local customs, it will be difficult for an
international court, such as the ICJ, to place the burden of
proving the law on parties. In international arbitral tribunals,
however, the situation might be different and, depending on the
circumstances, including the nature of the case, qualifications of
the arbitrators and terms of the compromis, the parties may bear
the burden of providing the arbitrators with the law to be applied
on the proceedings.
3. The Issues to be Discussed in the Present Study
a. The scope and subject-matter of the 'burden of proof and
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland^ , Merits,
Judgment, Para. 17, I.C.J. Reports 1974. p. 9; see also Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, Para. 18, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 181.
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its related issues, as was explained, could be as broad as to
include all the issues related to 'evidence' as well as
'pleadings', and issues of fact as well as some issues of law. In
other words, the topic of 'burden of proof may be considered a
window from which to view and study the process of adjudication of
disputes before international tribunals. It is to be noted,
however, that it is impossible to provide, in a single volume, a
thorough study of all procedural aspects of the work of
international tribunals, which has been referred to as the
"Antarctica of international law",and furthermore that not all
of the issues need much explanation or comment. Accordingly, for
the purpose of the present study we have preferred to choose and
concentrate upon only some of the more important and relevant
issues.
It is equally important to note, on the other hand, that the
nature of the issues relating to evidence, as well as the
generality that as a characteristic of international procedure
accompanies it, make it difficult to provide a comprehensive and
detailed discussion of these issues in the way that traditionally
issues are dealt with in dissertations.
107 realm of the procedure of international tribunals is
the Antarctica of international law. A few explorers have skirted
about its shores; others have surveyed portions of it with more or
less thoroughness. Not until its little known territory has been
conquered, region by region, will it be possible for some future
scholar to draw a complete and revealing map of the entire
continent." A.H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions 1923-1934,
(New York 1935), p. vii.
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b. One of the preliminary issues within the scope of the
burden of proof is the question as to which party bears the burden
of proof and should assume the duty of providing the 'evidence' and
pleadings, as means of proof, to the tribunal. In any given case
there are different claims and counterclaims which usually involve
many material issues, and in each issue the question arises as to
the allocation of the burden of proof. The form and order of
presentation of pleadings and evidence, and the question of the
standard and quantity of proof required to convince the trier of
fact that an allegation is true, are equally important.
Moreover, in order to fulfill their task efficiently
international tribunals usually apply certain general rules with
regard to the time and order of pleadings and evidence, as well as
their admissibility and evaluation. Even in cases where parties to
an international dispute agree upon the rules of procedure, they
usually leave enough room for the tribunal's discretion or
flexibility. The general rules applied by international tribunals
and their discretionary power to regulate the issues related to the
burden of proof are, therefore, within the scope of the burden of
proof.
Further, while the main responsibility for discharging the
burden of proof always remains on the proponent, he may be entitled
to receive some assistance from the tribunal or, on some particular
occasions, even from the opposing party. Naturally these issues,
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too, are included in the scope of the burden of proof.
c. The main aspects of the burden of proof can also be more
easily identified by considering the fact that in each litigated
case three main actors (i.e., claimant, respondent and the judge or
arbitrator who is to decide the case) are actively involved, and
that each of these actors plays a particular role with respect to
the burden of proof. Accordingly, a study on the burden of proof
should include the roles fulfilled by these three actors- The
general aspects of burden of proof concerning the three actors are
discussed in Part Two, and some particular aspects with relation to
them are discussed in Part Three, as follows:
i. Considering that some of the-preliminary issues concerning
the 'burden of proof and 'burden of evidence' have already been
discussed in Chapter I,
- Chapter II is allocated to the claimant's role, who bears
the main task with respect to the burden of proof, and the duty
incumbent upon him.
- In Chapter III general aspects of the collaboration of
parties in matters of evidence will be discussed.
- In Chapter IV the authority and duties of international
tribunals with regard to the burden of proof are analyzed.
- Chapter V, as the last chapter of Part Two, is allocated to
a discussion on the rules of the burden of proof and the question
of whether or not there are any rules in that respect that could be
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considered general principles of international procedure.
11. After studying the general aspects in Part Two, some
particular issues related to the.burden of proof shall be studied
in Part Three, which includes Chapters VI to VIII, as follows:
- Chapter VI, as the first chapter of Part Three, deals with
'presumptions' and the affect they may have on the burden of proof.
Presumptions are an issue related to the duty of claimant, and thus
Chapter VI is to be considered in conjunction with Chapter II.
- Chapter VII takes up the practical aspects of collaboration
of parties and the issue of possible sanctions, such as drawing a
'negative inference', against non-production of evidence. These
issues are related to the collaboration of parties and thus are to
be considered in conjunction with Chapter III.
-Finally, Chapter VIII examines the standard of proof to be
applied in international proceedings and the discretion of
international tribunals in that regard. The issue of the standard
of proof, while based on the duty of the party who carries the
burden of proof to satisfy the tribunal as regards the truthfulness
of its allegation, is within the range of the authority and duties
of international tribunals with regard to the issue of the burden
of proof, and is thus to be considered in conjunction with Chapter
IV.
PART TWO
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE BURDEN
OF PROOF
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CHAPTER II
CLAIMANT'S DUTY : ACTORI INCtlMBIT PROBATIO
Introductory Remarks
The task of proving the disputed facts .in a given case is
clearly incumbent upon the parties, and the authority vested or
inherent in international tribunals with regard to the issues
relating to evidence does not generally go as far as to affect the
fundamental obligation of parties to prove their allegations.^ On
the other hand, despite the fact that pursuing claims through
litigation before international tribunals is considered a peaceful
means of settlement of disputes,^ the adversarial system of
proceedings requires that the duties of each party in this regard
be clarified. Therefore, probably the most important question to be
discussed in connection with the burden of proof is, by whom the
^ The authority and obligations of international tribunals
with regard to the burden of proof are discussed separately; see
Chapter IV, infra.
^ " As the Permanent Court of International Justice said in
its Order of 19 August 1929 in the case of the Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District nf Gex. the judicial settlement of interna
tional disputes is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly
settlement of such disputes between the Parties. (P.C.I.J., Series
A, No- 22, at p.13)." Worth Sea Continental Shelf. Judgment, para.
87, I.C.J. Reports 1969. p. 47.
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burden should be discharged. As stated by Judge Zekia in his
separate opinion to the Judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights, in the Irish Case. "[w]hat is material... is not whether a
burden of proof does exist or not -it is an elementary rule of
Justice that it does exist . . . -but by whom and how much onus
should be discharged."^
A. Municipal Law
Many principles of international law are derived from or
based upon rules of municipal law. Even in the field of the law of
evidence, where it is usually emphasized that international
tribunals are not bound by the restrictive rules of evidence of
municipal law, still the conceptual notions come from municipal
law. Moreover, according to Article 3 8 of the Statute of the ICJ,
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" and
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations" are among the means to be
applied by the Court for the determination of rules of internation
al law." Therefore, in order to study the development of a rule
of international law, its history and origin should not be
neglected.
^ 58 ILR. p. 300.
" It may be argued that Article 3 8 concerns only the
substantive rules of international law. Even assuming so, Article
3 8 is still relevant with respect to the rules on the burden of
proof which, like some other aspects of the law of evidence, relate
not only to the adjective law but to the substantive law as well.
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1- Roman Law
The history of this aspect of the burden of proof goes far
back into ancient times. "In ancient Roman law, the principle of
burden of proof expressed itself through different maxims, such as
gui affirmat non ei qui neaat incumbit probatio—(onus of proof
is on him who affirms, and not on him who denies) and actori
incumbit probatio (the claimant carries the burden of proof)'.
Surprisingly, however, the Roman law principles which
recognized the claimant's obligation to prove his claims has not
been consistently applied in municipal laws ever since. In Europe,
during the period between the fifth and eleventh century, in fact
the reverse version of the Roman law principles were applied, the
defendant generally having the obligation, or the right, as it was
then felt, of proving his innocence or good right. In fact the
principle actori incumbit probatio was rediscovered in the twelfth
century, and once again, "on principle the burden of proof rested
on the plaintiff factori incumbit probatio, actore non probante
reus absolvitur), but each party had to prove specific positions.
^ V.S. Mani, International Adjudication : Procedural Aspects
fl980), p. 202. "Le terme 'onus probandi'(ou 'onus probationis')
est d'origine romaine, cf. Dig. XXXI 22 in fine; Cod.—Just.. IV. 19,
15 (a.293); IV,30, 10 (a.293). Synonyme est I'usage de necessitas
probandi. cf. Dig. XII 3, 21; Cod. Just. _IV 19, 2(a.215); IV 19,
15(a.294)." J. C. Witenberg, Onus Probandi devant les Juridiction
arbitrales. in RGDIP (Paris), 3'serie, t. XII, vol. 55, 1951, p.
322n.
6 History of European Civil Procedure, in International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol.xvi, Ch.2, p. 9.
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instead of just his own good right. This was a great change and so
was the disappearance of the old proof-Judgment.
In any event, both the civil and common law systems are marked
by the influence of the Roman law rules in this respect.^
2. Islamic Law
In Islamic law, as a general rule the burden of proof is on
the claimant.' There, the justification for this rule comes from
two grounds:
"i> The existing situation is presumed to be the
original and normal state of affairs, and it
is up to the plaintiff to establish the contrary.
ii> A person summoned before the gadi (or arbitrator) is
presumed to be free of liability"."^
In fact the rule originates from a famous and uncontradicted
hadith" quoted from the Prophet, according to which "al-
^ Ibid, p. 19.
^ See, e.g., Mani, op. cit., p. 202.
See, e.g., Seyyed Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad, Ayeen Dadrasi
[Civil Procedure], in: Great Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 2, pp.
280-287, (in Persian); M.J. Jafari Langaroudi, Encyclopedia of
Islamic Judicial Sciences. Tehran (1981), pp. 253-255 (in Persian);
Subhi Mahmasani, The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Persian
translation from original Arabic by E. Golestani), pp. 287-296,
also in English translation by Farhat I Ziadeh, Leiden (1961).
Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle
East: A Study in Shari^a and Statute Law. London (1984), p. 60.
" Hadith is a constituent part of the Sunna as an agreed
source of Islamic Law. The Sunna is defined as "the exemplary
behaviour of the Prophet embodied in a compendium of sayings and
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bavvinat^ala al-mudda ^i/wa 1-vamin 'ala man ankar" .
The first part of the above Arabic phrase expresses no more
than the notion of "Actori Incumbit Onus Probandi";it differs,
however, from Roman law in the second part where it places the
burden of taking oath on the party who denies a claim.
Consequently, in practice, if the respondent does not admit the
claim and the claimant is unable to adduce evidence, the latter may
ask that the respondent's denial be heard under oath (yamin). If
the respondent accepts to swear and declares under oath that the
claim against him is groundless, the claim will be dismissed. On
the other hand, if the respondent refuses to take the oath^"* to
corroborate his denial, then the claim is considered proved and
deeds of the • Prophet fhadith) illustrating and sometimes
complementing the Our'an. Some deeds are not directly attributed to
the Prophet but include His implicit approval of conduct of others
with His knowledge." Samir Saleh, op.cit., p. 14; see alsoM.J.
Jafari Langaroudi, Islamic Law, Tehran (1979), p. 39, (in Persian).
Unofficial translation: "It is incumbant- on claimant to
provide evidence, and on the party who denies a claim to take
oath."
According to the above-mentioned rule, what is incumbent on
the claimant is "bavvinat". "Bavvinat" in a restricted sense means
"oral testimony", which is only one of the forms of evidence in
Islamic law. However, in the Our'an and other Islamic texts, "bayy-
inat" has frequently been used to mean "evidence", and in fact here
also it includes all other forms of evidence as well as witness
testimony. See, e.g. M.J. Jafari Langaroudi, Islamic Law, op.cit.,
pp. 138-139; Encyclopedia of Islamic Judicial Sciences, op. cit. , pp.-
345-347; Samir Saleh, op.cit., p. 61; S.M. Mohaghegh Damad, op^
cit.. p. 286.
The other possible option for the respondent is to turn the
oath back upon the claimant, and ask him to swear instead of the
respondent.
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will be decided in favour of the claimant.'^
It is to be noted, however, that the respondent's obligation
to take the oath at the request of the claimant is not necessarily
a deviation from the general rule expressed in the first part of
the above-mentioned hadith. It is rather a clarification in order
to show that the respondent's oral testimony under oath is
admissible evidence which could be invoked by claimant, and that
respondent's statements under oath or his failure to take the oath
are both valued as conclusive evidence in favour of or against
respondent, as the case may be.
3. Common Law Countries
a. In England, as a general rule " the legal burden of proving
facts lies on him who asserts them. This rule exists "because
he who involves the State's aid through its Judicial system, with
consequent trouble and expense to others, should justify his
conduct by assuming the initial difficulty it entails. The rule
tends to avoid harassing and vexatious litigation.
The result of the application of the above general rule is
See, generally, S.M. Mohaghegh Damad, op. cit. . p. 287;
M.J. Jafari Langaroudi, Encyclopedia of Islamic Judicial Sciences,
op. cit. , pp. 339-438 ; Samir Saleh, op.cit. , pp. 61,441.
J.D. Heydon, Cases and Materials on Evidence (1975), p. 14.
Ibid.
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that " as a matter of common sense, the legal burden of proving all
facts essential to their claims normally rests upon the plaintiff
in a civil suit or the prosecution in criminal proceedings."^^ But
in practice there are many factors which may affect or qualify the
application of the general rule. For example, the difficulty of
proving a negative fact or situation where facts are peculiarly
within one party's knowledge may have to be treated differently.
Similarly, when a party relies on a common fact, it is usually on
the other party to disprove its existence." In sum, while the
general rule answers most questions, the particular rules based on
"broad reasons of expedience and fairness""'' deal with exceptions.
b. In the United States, the basic rule for allocation of the
burden of proof is the same as in England; in general, that is, the
party who is making affirmative allegations regarding a disputed
fact or issue bears the burden of proving such fact or issue
throughout the case.-' Accordingly, the claimant has the burden of
proof with regard to the elements of his cause of action, and the
respondent has the burden of proof with regard to any affirmative
Sir Rupert Cross, Cross on Evidence, 5th ed. , London 1979,
p. 97.
Heydon, op.cit. . p. 17. This particular rule "justifies the
result in Constantine Case which held that the burden of proving
that frustration is self induced rests on the party who denies
frustration." Ibid.
Ibid, quoting from Wigmore, Para. 2486.
Edward W. Cleary and John W.Strong, Evidence: Cases,
Materials, Problems, 3rd ed., (1981) p. 103.
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defenses or counterclaims that he asserts. There is no major
difference as to the application of the above-mentioned general
rule under common law, equity or statutory pleading, and usually
the party asserting an affirmative position on an issue has the
burden of proof as to such issue.The same rule has equally been
applied by the United States International Claims Commission ^ and
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.^"*
As regards the negative allegations, the general rule applies
as well; that is the party asserting a negative proposition has the
burden of proving it. The only exception which has been allowed by
some authorities is when the facts are peculiarly within the other
party's knowledge.--'' However, "the asserted exception as to
negative allegations peculiarly within the adverse party's
knowledge is said to relate to the burden of evidence and does not
affect the burden of proof properly so called.
It is also worthy of mention that in the United States the
application of the burden of proof is considered to be "primarily
a matter of policy based on experience" and it is accepted by some
See, Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 31A Evidence, paras. 104-
109, (pp. 168-184) .
See, e.g., Knesevich Claim, in 21 ILR p. 154.
See, e.g. , European Mortqaqe Series. . . , 13 April 1959, in 30
ILR p. 126.
Corpus Juris Secundum. op. cit. , pp. 181-182.
Ibid, p. 182.
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courts that "the state has practically unrestricted power to make
uniform and impartial changes in the rules of evidence as to the
burden of proof. As to the practice of courts, some legal
writers, on the basis of the reported decisions involving problems
of allocation of the burden of proof, have concluded that con
siderations of policy, fairness and probability have been used as
bench marks for allocation of particular material elements in
cases
c. In India, the general principle for allocation of the
burden of proof has been defined by the Evidence Act of 1872 as
follows :
" Whosoever desires any Court to give judgment, as to any
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of
facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any
fact, it is said that the burden of proof is on that
person.
4. Civil Law Countries
a. In France, before enactment of the New Code of Civil
Procedure in 1981, there were no general statutory rules for
Ibid, p. 167.
E.W. Cleary and J.W. Strong, Evidence, op. cit. , pp. 71-76.
What is meant by "probability" is "a judicial, i.e., wholly non-
statistical, estimate of the probabilities of the situation with
the burden being put on the party who will be benefitted by a
departure from the supposed norm." Ibid, p. 75.
Mani, op. cit. , pp. 202-203.
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allocation of the burden of proof except for Article 1315 of the
Civil Code which provides that he who asks for the fulfillment
of an obligation must prove it, and reciprocally, he who claims to
be free from an obligation must prove the payment or the fact which
has extinguished his debt. Article 1315, though embodied in the
Civil Code chapter on contracts and related only to the proof of
obligations, has been considered to express a general principle,^'
and its rules "have been extended by way of expansive
interpretation to all other situations not covered by a specific
statutory provision.
Article 9 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, however,
presumably following the jurisprudence of the courts and the
opinion of the legal writers, in 1981 established a statutory basis
for the allocation of the burden of proof as a general rule.^^
According to Article 9, "each party is under a duty to prove in
Article 1315: Celui qui recalme I'execution d'une
obligation doit la prouver. Reciproquement, celui qui se pretend
libere, doit justifier le payement ou le fait qui a produit
l^extinction de son obligation.
Dalloz, Repertoire de procedure civil, op. cit., p. 14.
Peter Herzog and Martha Weser, Civil Procedure in France
(The Hague, 1967) p. 310. See also Christian Dieryck, Procdure et
Moyens de Preuve dans 1^Arbitrage Commercial International, in:
Revue de 1^Arbitrage. No. 2 (1988), P. 275, ("Ces principes [the
principles expressed in Article 1315] se retrouvent pratiquement
dans tous les pays et leur premiere codification connue remonte aux
adages connus du droit romain: onus probandi incumbit actori et
reus in exceptione fit actor.")
" Art. 9: II incombe a chaque partie de prouver conformement
a la loi les faits necessairs au succes de sa pretention. Nouveau
code de procedure civile; Dalloz (1983), p. 5.
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accordance with the law those facts which are necessary for the
success of his claim. The rule enshrined in Article 9, being
part of the basic principles of a trial, is also applicable in
domestic arbitration in France.
b. In Belgium, as in other civil law countries, the party who
claims to the contrary of an existing or acquired situation, which
is in favour of the other party, bears the burden of proof.
Article 870 of the Code Judiciaire, in a simple and general
formula, states the general principle for allocation of the burden
of proof between the parties in civil cases: "Chacune des parties
a la charge de prouver les faits qu'ell allegue."^'' Reference
should also be made in this regard to Article 1315 of the Civil
Code which provides as follows:
"Celui qui reclame I'execution d'une obligation, doit la
prouver. Reciproquement, celui qui se pretend libere, doit
The English translation of Art. 9 of the New Code of Civil
Procedure is quoted from: Jean-Louis Delvolve, Arbitration—in
France, p. 100.
See paragraph 2 of Article 1460, New Code of—Civil
Procedure.
See Pierre Rouard, Traite Elementaire de Droit Judiciaire
Prive, La Procedure Civile, Tome Quatrieme, Les Preuves (1980), pp.
9-14 .
The rule of Article 870 of the Code Judiciare is applied,
inter alia, by Conseil d'Etat. S^, for example, Nemeth, Belgium,
Conseil d'Etat, 26 June 1973, where it was held that a person
claiming the benefit of provisions relating to stateless _perscpns
had the burden to prove that he had lost his original nationality
ill ILR. pp. 384-387).
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justifier le payement ou le fait qui a produit 1'extinction de
son obligation."^''
On the other hand, Article 871 of the Code Judiciaire
emphasizes that the parties are obliged to collaborate for the
administration of proof. According to that article the Judge is
empowered to order the parties to produce the proof at their
disposal.^' This, however, neither affects the obligation defined
in Article 870, nor shifts the burden of proof.
c. In Iranian civil law, which is based generally on Islamic
law and inspired in some parts by the Codes of civil law countries
such as France, Switzerland and Belgium, the basis for the
allocation of the burden of proof is statutory. Article 1257 of the
Civil Code, adopted in 1935 and surviving the subsequent amendments
of the Code in 1983, provides :
"Whosoever claims a right must prove it and if the
defendant, in defence, claims a matter which requires
proof it is incumbent upon him to prove that
matter.
See,- e.g. , N. Verheyden-Jeanmart, Droit de la Preuve (1992),
PP. 37 ss.
"Le Judge peut neanmoins ordonner a toute partie litigante
de produire les elements de preuve dont elle dispose" (art. 871
C.J.) .
Pierre Rouard, op. cit. , ibid.
Translated from Persian.
69
The above Article provides by itself a firm and clear basis
for the allocation of the burden of proof. Yet, it is complemented
by another principle which could be translated as "presumption of
non-liability". This principle presumes everybody to be free of
liability in civil cases until proved otherwise, and in fact is
another version of "presumption of innocence" which is applied in
criminal lawsuits. .
The presumption of non-liability is embodied in Article 355 of
the Iranian Code of Civil Procedure''- and, as will .be explained
below, in a decision which according to the Iranian law serves as
an obligatory precedent for the courts in similar cases, it has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court atricto sensu in favour of
respondents.
The said decision was made in a case in which the claimant was
seeking reimbursement of a sum of money, which had been paid to the
respondent through a bank, plus costs. The Court of First Instance
held that the fact that the respondent had received the money could
not be considered evidence that he owed that amount to the
claimant, and rejected the claim. The Court of Appeal, on the other
Article 356: "Being free of liability is a principle;
therefore, if someone claims a right or a debt against another, he
has to prove it; otherwise based on this principle the Jud^ent
will be issued to the effect that respondent is free of liability."
Translated from Persian.
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hand, relying on Article 265 of the Civil Code, reversed the
judgment of the Court of First Instance and ruled in favour of the
claimant. At the request of the respondent. Chamber 6 of the
Supreme Court considered the case and ruled that the Court of
Appeal was not justified in invoking Article 265 of the Civil Code,
due to the requirement of a presumption of non-liability; thus it
quashed the judgment and returned the case to the Court of Appeal,
to be decided by a different chamber.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held, again, that in
accordance with Article 265 of the Civil Code'a person who pays a
sum of money to another person is • entitled to reimbursement
thereof, and since, because of the general rule embodied in Article
356 of the Civil Code, non-liability did not require proof, the
burden was on the respondent to prove that the claimant owed him
the disputed amount. On the basis of that premise the Court of
Appeal concluded that since it was proven that the respondent had
received the money but had failed to prove the claimant liable, he
was required to reimburse the amount of the relief plus legal costs
to the claimant.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal, however, was not
Article 265: "If anyone gives a property to another, he
obviously has not done so without consideration; therefore, if a
person gives property to another person while he is under no
obligation to do so, he can ask for the return of such property."
Gholam H. Vafai, Commercial Laws of the Middle East: Iran, Civil
Code, Oceana Publications Inc, 1982.
UNIVERSITY CATH. LOUVAIH
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eventually approved by the plenary session of the Supreme Court,
which found Article 2 65 irrelevant to the case because, contrary to
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the point at issue was not
whether or not the money had been paid to the respondent to be held
in trust. According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the
presumption of non-liability in the case in question, or any other
case, was that the respondent would be presumed free of liability
and the burden of proof would be on the claimant. Thus, the Supreme
Court held that the Court of Appeal had reasoned in reverse and had
presumed the claimant to be free' of liability, whereas the
respondent had not brought a lawsuit against the claimant and the
burden was on the claimant to prove that the money had been paid to
the respondent to he held in trust for the claimant.'^
d. The general rule applies in other civil law countries as
well. For instance, in Holland, if the rules of law which apply to
the case "attach a certain legal consequence to the existence of
certain facts, he who claims to be entitled to this consequence
must prove the facts. Similarly, in Germany "each party must
prove the facts which gave rise to the rights on which the party
^ Decision No. 1995 dated 3.7.1341 (25.9.1962), reprinted in
Collection of Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1328-1342, vol. 2,
pp. 450-453, Keyhan Legal Archive, Tehran 1353 (in Persian).
p. A. Stein, Civil Procedure, in: Introduction to Dutch Law
for Foreign Lawyers (1978), Ch. 14, 231-263, at 246. "However,
there is some doubt whether the complicated question of the burden
of proof can be solved by a rule of law adopting such a simple
formula." Ibid.
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relies.
In the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America,
"most codes repeat the classic Roman rules: The burden of
proof generally rests on the plaintiff, but it falls on
the defendant with respect to the defenses and objections
which the latter makes. Indeed several Codes of the area
continue to reproduce the old Roman aphorisms in the
positive Code provisions."'''^
In Socialist countries, too, the concept of burden of proof
and its allocation is applied. As an example of the general
approach in this regard, Yugoslavia could be mentioned. In
Yugoslavia a complaint, in addition to other requirements, must
include the facts on which the claimant relies and "the evidence
to be adduced to substantiate the claim.
5. Prize Courts
Prize courts, though municipal by nature, have traditionally
United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Manual of German Law fl953^
p. 59, quoted in Sandifer, op. cit., p. 126. The same basic rule
applies in Italy and Mexico. Ibid.
"See e.g. El Salvador art. 253-254, Nicaragua art. 1079-
1080, Panama art.687, Uruguay art. 329", Enrique Vescovi, Ordinarv
Proceedings in First Instance: Iberian Peninsula and Latin America,
in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI, Ch. 6
(211-249) at 234.
Edmund Wengerek, Ordinarv Proceedings in First Instance:
Socialist Countries, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law, vol. XVI, Ch. 6, (141-188) at 153-154. The basic rules with
regard to the complaint are similar in other socialist countries,
see ibid 154. "Attention should be drawn to the specific
requirement of some Socialist Codes that all factual allegations
must be true." Ibid 155.
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dealt with issues of interest or related to international law.
Thus, as a further example of the approach of the municipal law,
reference to the practice of Prize courts would be appropriate. 49
The principle of actori incumbit probatio has been applied,
inter alia, by the prize courts of different countries. In a
judgment issued by the prize court of Alexandria^" the practice of
these courts has been summarized as follows :
"The burden of proof is upon the claimant. This is a
principle unanimously admitted by the Prize Courts of all
countries. In order to satisfy capture, _it is enough
that a belligerent has grounds for suspicion. It is for
the claimant to prove positively that the property in the
goods still rests with him, establishing the actual
nature of the transaction between him and the consignee
of the goods, and the manner in which the contract was
Another example of the issues of interest to international
law is "product liability". In a collection of reports prepared for
a conference on Product Liability in Europe, among other aspects of
product liability cases, the issue of the allocation of the burden
of proof has been discussed. A review of the different reports of
scholars and practitioners who have contributed to_ the said
collection reveals that even in an exceptional issue like product
liability, in which there exists an overall trend towards assuming
the manufacturer's liability, still in all the reported countries
the principle of actori incumbit probatio is applied in general and
at least as a point of departure. Of course, with the assistance of
"presumption", claimants in product liability cases have been
relieved from some of the otherwise heavy, and sometimes
impossible, burden of proof which is usually required in normal
tort cases. See, generally, Product Liability in—Europe: A
Collection of Reports prepared for the Conference on Product
Liability in Europe held in Amsterdam on 25th and 2 6th September
1975, under the auspices of the Association Europeene d'Etude
Juridiques et Fiscales. For more explanations with regard to the
effects of presumptions on the burden of proof, see Chapter VI,
infra.
The Zamaler, Egypt, Prize Court of Alexandria, 29 September
1949.
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concluded, as well as the payment of price,
The same views have been expressed by the Supreme Court of
Bermuda in similar language
"A claimant enters appearance and files his claim and the
onus is on him to show by affirmative evidence that the
reasonable suspicion was unfounded, and that there is no
cause to justify condemnation.""
In another judgment of the Prize Court of Alexandria it is
observed that "the burden of proof is on the claimants according to
national law, the principles of international law, and case-law in
matters of prize.
B. Practice of International Tribunals
1. Italian Conciliation Commissions
a. Introductory Remarks
These Commissions were established pursuant to Art. 83 of the
16 ILR. p. 578.
" In the Matter of Ten Registered Letters EX Eastbound
Aircraft, Bermuda, Supreme Court (in Prize : No. 156 of 1941), 4
June 1949.
" 16 ILR. p. 585. "It is for the Claimants to show by
affirmative evidence what was the actual destination of the goods
to which they lay claim." Ibid.
See The Flvinq Trader, Egypt, Prize Court of Alexandria, 2
December 1950; in 17 ILR, p. 443.
15
1947 Peace Treaty with Italy." "Each Conciliation Commission
consisted of one representative of the State concerned and one
representative of Italy, each having equal status. If the
Conciliation Commission was unable to reach an agreement within
three months after the dispute had been referred to it, either
Government could ask for a third member to be added to the
Commission, that member to be selected by mutual agreement of the
two Governments from the nationals of a third country. "In
spite of their name, the Commissions were given powers analogous to
those of Arbitral Tribunals", and only States had access to them."
With respect to the burden of proof, as will be seen from
examples, discussed herein-below, from the practice of the Franco-
Italian, Italian-United States, and Anglo-Italian Conciliation
55 "The peace treaties signed in Paris on February 10, 1947
between the "Allied and Associated Powers" on the one hand and
Germany's former wartime allies Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy
and Romania, on the other were intended as a first step towards
realizing a general system of peace treaties." Ellinor van
Puttkamer, Peace Treaties.of 1947, in: Bernhardt (ed) , Encvclopedia
of Pubic International Law [Instalment 4 (1982) p. 118]. It might
also be interesting to note that while except for Norway, all the
21 States .-which attended the Conference, signed the treaty with
Italy, only 12 States signed the treaty with Bulgaria and Hungary,
11 States signed the treaty with Romania and 10 States signed the
treaty with Finland. See ibid. For more information on the peace
treaties, see the above-mentioned article in ibid pp. 117-124.
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Conciliation Commissions
Established Pursuant to Art. 83 of Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947,
in: Bernhardt (ed), Encvclopedia of Pubic International Law
[Instalment 7 (1981) p.51]. "Only France, Greece, the Netherlands,
United Kingdom and the United States availed themselves of their
right to establish such commissions." Ibid.
57 Ibid p. 52.
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Commissions, the Commissions usually required the claimant
government to prove the material issue in dispute. On the other
hand, when necessary, the Commission exercised enough flexibility
in order to find a reasonable solution under the circumstances of
each case.
b. Italian - United States Conciliation Commission
In the Batchelder Claim, while rejecting the claim of a
United States national in respect of the personal property
allegedly removed during the war from claimant's villa, the
Commission stated that :
"[I]t is necessary for the claimant, or the Government
claiming on his behalf, to submit proof that such loss
occurred as a result of the war or, at least, to submit
sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the
war and the loss that the burden of rebuttal would be
shifted to the Italian Government. In the instant case,
an examination of the evidence submitted by the claimant
leads to the conclusion that there is in the record
neither proof that the loss was caused by the war nor
evidence sufficient to oblige the Italian Government to
prove the contrary.
In another case fGraniero Claim) the point at issue was,
Batchelder Claim CThe Kirinkuoiska and the Thele), 2 6 July
1954, in: 2 2 ILR. pp. 864-867.
Ibid, p. 865.
Graniero Claim. 20 January 1959, in: 3 0 ILR pp. 451-454.
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inter alia, whether the claimant, who was a national of both Italy
and United States and claimed compensation for damage to real
property owned by her in Italy, had been treated as enemy under the
laws in force in Italy during the war. The agent of the United
States alleged that "Claimant and her husband were placed in a
concentration camp and were otherwise ill-treated by the Fascist
authorities."^' The Italian Agent submitted that no concrete proof
had been presented to the effect "that measures were actually taken
against the claimant sufficient to establish 'treatment as
enemy'..."" The Commission held that the burden of proof was on
claimant to establish by clear and convincing proof that she was
treated as enemy. According to the Commission:
"In any event, the claimant has the burden of
establishing treatment as enemy and she must do so by
clear and convincing proof. Even if she were not able to
produce any document of her internment she should have
explained her failure to do so. Even if it is assumed
that she was placed in a concentration camp, there is no
evidence that she was so placed because of her American
nationality.""
c. Franco - Italian Conciliation Commission
As an example of the practice of the Franco-Italian
Conciliation Commission, the French State Railway Claim could be
mentioned. This was a claim brought against Italy under Article 75
Ibid, p. 451,
" Ibid, p. 452.
" Ibid, p. 453.
78
of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Italy for reimbursement of the costs of repair and
restoration of the damaged rolling stock belonging to the French
State Railways, that were found in Italy after the war and returned
to France.®^
In this case the Commission addressed the question of the
burden of proof in a number of instances. First, as to identifying
the property and its ownership, the Commission held that the
provisions of the Treaty regarding the burden of proof must be
followed, and on the basis of Article 75, paragraph 7, of the
Treaty concluded that "[t]he burden of identifying the
property as well as that of proving ownership falls on the claimant
Government. Second, with respect to the dispute regarding the
number of damaged wagons which were returned, the Commission,
observing that "the wagons, vans and carriages were identified and
the ownership thereof was recognized by Italy at the moment when
she came to return them" concluded that the burden was on the
French Government to prove the number returned.®^
Third, as to the burden of proving whether the rolling stock
had been removed by force or duress, the Commission found, on the
_French State Railways Claim. Franco-Italian Conciliation
Commission, 10 March 1953 (Bolla, Perier de Ferral, Sorrentino) :
Recueil des Decisions, part 4, p. 152; 2 0 ILR. pp. 481-491.
2 0 ILR. p. 488.
Ibid.
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thatbasis of Article 75 (paras. 6 and 7) of the Treaty,
paragraph 7 had provided a presumption in favour of the claimant
Government and accordingly the burden of proving that the property
was not removed by force or duress rested on the Italian
Government.
d. Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission (1952)
In the Grant-Smith Claim/^ the Commission found it justified
to reverse the burden of proof from claimant to respondent. During
the Second World War, the Italian Navy seized at Antibes, France,
a yacht (called Gin and Angostura) belonging to a Mrs. Grant-Smith.
"On 1948, the British Government applied on behalf of the owner to
the Italian Government for the return of the yacht under paras. 1
and 2 of Article 78 of the Treaty."'^" When the Italian Government
replied that the yacht had been destroyed, the British Government
" Article 75(6) provides that' "rolling stock shall be regarded
as having been removed from the territory to which it originally
belonged". .According to the Commission, "the presumption imposed by
Article 75 (6) in connection with rolling stock is not juris et-de
jure but juris tantum, in view of the clear provision of the
following paragraph (7) ('the burden of proving that the property
was not removed by force or duress shall rest on the Italian
Government'). This paragraph makes no exception for rolling stock."
Ibid, p. 489.
68 Ibid.
Grant-Smith Claim fthe Gin and Angostura) , 4 March 1952, 22.
ILR. p. 972.
™ 2 2 ILR, p. 967.
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submitted a claim for compensation to the commission.The Italian
Government contended, inter alia, that the burden was on the
British Government to prove that the yacht had been subjected to
measure of control by Italy. In the words of the Commission:
"Although the Italian Government admits that it was the
Italian Navy which took possession of the yacht at
Antibes and brought it to Italy , it is argued that such
seizure would not in itself satisfy the conditions of
Article 78, para. 9(c), since they also require that
Italy should in her territory have subjected the yacht to
a specific measure of control; it would, therefore, be
for the British Government, according to the general
principles of law, to furnish proof that such a measure
had been imposed."
The Commission, however, relying on the fact that "the yacht,
seized in French waters by the Italian Navy and brought by them to
Italian waters, was not there placed by the Italian authorities at
the free disposal of the owner"'^, did not agree with the Italian
Government and found it justified to reverse the burden of proof.
According to the Commission:
"The circumstances in which the ship was captured and
later disappeared justify, in the present case, according
to the general principles of law, a reversal of the onus
of proof as to the cause of its not being found [seeing
that the Treaty cannot possibly have intended] that such
onus of proof should be thrown upon the owner of the
ship. It was therefore for the Italian Government, whose-
Navy captured the yacht. . . , to prove that the ship,
contrary to all the probabilities, was not a victim of an
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 972. "Moreover, according to the Italian
Government, the fact that the property could not be found would not
suffice to found an action under Article 78, para. 4(a), but proof
that destruction took place as a result of the war would also be
required." Ibid.
Ibid.
81
act of war."
2. Mexican Claims Commissions
a. Introductory Remarks
"The historical role of mixed claims commissions began with
the Jay Treaty (1794) . Since the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899
and 1907, considerable numbers of mixed claims commissions have
been established "between the United States and some European
States on the one side, and the Latin American' States on the
other. . .
These commissions, similar to "the mixed arbitral tribunals
created after the First World War, the "conciliation commissions"
established between some of the victorious and defeated States
after the Second World War, and finally the Arbitral Commission on
Property, Rights and Interests in Germany", provide a comprehensive
arbitration practice.
Ibid.
Rudolf Dolzer, Mixed Claims Commissions in: Bernhardt
(ed.), Encvclopedia of Pubic International Law [Instalment 1 (1981)
p. 147].
Hans von Mangoldt, Development of ^Arbitration and
Conciliation Treaties and Arbitration and Conciliation—Practice.
since- the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 in : J.Gillis Wetter,
the International Arbitral Process, vol. V, p. 274, quoting from
Judicial Settlement of International Disputes 43 2-487 (Max Plank
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Springerverlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1947).
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Mixed claims commissions were usually "established after
events akin to civil war, and sometimes only after the application
of direct force against the opponent State... They were therefore
primarily, and in some case exclusively, entrusted with the
settling of claims arising out of measures undertaken by the
defeated party in course of war, or of claims due to injury to
foreign nationals in events akin to civil war-in some cases even on
application by the individual directly affected."^
While between the years 1900-1918 about 30 commissions were
established, after World War 1 the number of such commissions
generally decreased, except for claims against Mexico which were
dealt with by nine mixed claims commissions up to 1939.^^
b. Practice of the Commissions
In his study on the "Law and Procedure of International
Tribunals", Ralston states that : "Undoubtedly the burden of proof
falls upon the claimants before commissions as in other cases,
except in so far as such burden may be removed by the provisions of
the protocol.On the other hand, A.H. Feller, who has profoundly
studied the law and procedure of the Mexican Claims Commissions,
does not agree with Ralston. Feller states that he "cannot believe
Hans von Mangoldt, op. cit. , 275.
78 See Dolzer, ibid.
P. 220.
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that such is "undoubtedly" the rule and would consider it highly
undesirable if it were.""" However, while, Feller supports his
disagreement with Ralston by mentioning that Ralston has quoted
only one case" in support of his opinion, it seems that his own
conclusion, too, is more or less based on the Parker Case and the
cases decided on that basis.
The Parker Case, which was decided by the United States
Mexican General Claims Commission in 1926, is the leading case in
the jurisprudence of the Mexican Claims Commissions with respect to
the burden of proof. As Feller rightly notes, the important aspects
of this case, which will be discussed in Chapter V in more detail,
relate to the firm precedent it has established with regard to the
duty of the agents of both governments to provide the Commission
with all the evidence at their disposal.
Nonetheless, the Parker Case is not silent with regard to the
duty of claimant as the party primarily responsible for discharging
the burden of proof, either. In fact, the Commission first
acknowledges that "ordinarily it is incumbent upon the party who
alleges a fact to introduce evidence to establish it" and then.
A. H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions 1923-1934 (New
York 1935), p. 261n.
81. I' Feuilleton Case, British-Venezuelan Commission of 1903,
Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations, p. 406", ibid.
82 Ibid.
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given the circumstances, the Commission finds it justified to
emphasize that "this rule does not relieve respondent from its
obligation to lay before the Commission all evidence within its
possession to establish the truth, whatever it may be.""
At the same time, the Commission was careful not to rely too
heavily on the duty which the respondent Government was thereby
presumed to bear, and in some cases, in spite of the respondent's
failure to produce evidence in its possession, the Commission found
that the burden of proof had not been discharged by the claimant.
For example, in U.S.A. fMelczer Mining Co. 1 v.. United Mexican
States, it was stated that :
"... It may be taken for granted that Mexico could have
furnished evidence with respect to the amount and value
of the property taken. And it may therefore be assumed
that such evidence as could have been produced on this
point would not have refuted the charge in relation
thereto which is made in the memorial. However, even
though this assumption be justified, the Commission would
not be warranted in awarding the amount claimed for the
pipe line. The evidence produced by the United States is
altogether too uncertain.
On the other hand, it is to be emphasized that both Ralston
and Feller are right and their conclusions are not contradictory.
" R.I.A•A., Vol.IV, p. 39."On the other hand, the Commission,
rejects the contention that evidence put forward by the claimant
and not rebutted by the respondent must necessarily be considered
as conclusive." Ibid.
R. I. A. A. , Vol. IV, Decisions of Claims Commissions: Mexico-
United States, p. 485. See, also, Mexico Citv Bombardment Claims
fGreat Britain) v. United Mexican States (Decision No. 12, 15
February 1930), reprinted in R.I.A.A. VOL.V, (pp. 76-90) at 82-83.
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In fact, the comment of Feller only supplements the conclusion of
Ralston, for a study of the practice of the Commissions shows that,
in deciding whether or not the burden of proof in the cases before
them had been fulfilled, the Commissions took into account both the
duty of claimant to prove its claim and the ability of respondent
to place at the disposal of the Commission the evidence within its
possession. How far the Commissions have been successful in
applying this dual requirement in a balanced manner needs to be
examined in each particular case taken separately.
Perhaps the conclusion made by the Mexican General Claims
Commission in the Costello Case could be considered a statement
summarizing the position of the Mexican Claims Commissions in this
regard. In that Case, dismissing the claim because of the
unsatisfactory evidence provided by claimant, the Commission said.
"As was pointed out in the opinion of the Commission in
the Archuleta case, Docket No. 175, the Commission must
reach a conclusion on the strength of the evidence
produced by both parties. Evidence furnished by the
respondent Government must of course be^ considered both
with respect to what it may show against contentions
advanced in defense to the claim and with respect to what
may be revealed in support of such contentions. But the
mere fact that such evidence is meager cannot in itselfjustify an award in "the absence of concrete^ and
convincing evidence ' produced by the claimant
Government.
85 U.S. A f Lily J. Costello et.al.l v. United Mexican States
reprinted in: R.I.A.A. vol.IV, Decisions of Claims Commissions;
Mexico-United States, p. 505. also, e.g., Pomeroy/s El Paso
Transfer Company ru.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, ibid 555.
86
3. The Permanent Court of International Justice
a. General Observation
A review of the jurisprudence of the PCIJ reveals that as
regards matters of evidence, the Court's general approach was: to
establish and rely on the facts which were not in dispute between
the parties/® to narrow and specify the disputed facts which were
relevant to the pending case, and finally to weigh and determine
the disputed relevant facts by discussing the parties' arguments
and documents, and other means and information available to the
Court. This process, by itself and combined with the collaboration
of parties in providing the Court with information and documents,
considerably reduced the need for the Court to address the rules of
evidence, and consequently the Court "showed little inclination to
concern itself with the technical aspects of the question of burden
of proof."'*''
Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the following examples,
the Court generally applied the basic rule for allocation of the
See, e.g.. Series A, Judgment No.7, Case Concerning Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, p. 75, ("The two parties
agree in regarding the Godulla Company as a 'company controlled by
German nationals' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Geneva
Convention.); and Series A. Judgment No. 1, The S.S. "Wimbledon"
ca.se, p. 18, (The facts as stated in the course of the proceedings
and in regard to which there appears to be no disagreement between
the Parties, may be summarized as follows...).
87 Sandifer, op. cit., p. 132.
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burden of proof and required the party claiming a fact to prove
it; otherwise the Court decided to the detriment of that party on
that issue.
b. Eastern Greenland Case
This was a claim instituted by the Danish Government against
the Norwegian Government concerning the legal status of an area of
Eastern Greenland which both Denmark and Norway claimed to be
subject to their territorial sovereignty. In its judgment of 5
April 1933, the Permanent Court of International Justice decided
the case in favour of the Danish Government.
During the proceedings the Norwegian Government contended that
in the treaties relied upon by Denmark as evidence of the
willingness of other States to recognize her sovereignty over
Greenland, as well as in the legislative and administrative acts of
Denmark in the 18th century relating to Greenland, the word
"Greenland" had not been used in a geographical sense.The Court,
however, applying a rule of burden of proof which is common the in
the municipal laws of many countries, and according to which the
party who alleges something against the normal state of affairs
88 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, PCIJ, series
A/B, No. 53 (1933). For a summary of the PCIJ judgment see, I. Von
Munch, Eastern Greenland Case, in: Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of
Pubic International Law [Instalment 2(1981) p.p. 81-84]
See, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, PCIJ,
series A/B, No. 53 (1933), P. 49; 6 ILR, pp. 100-101.
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bears the burden of proof, decided that the burden of proof in that
regard was on Norway, regardless of the fact that Norway was in
effect the respondent in the case. According to the Court:
"This is a point as to which the burden of proof lies on
Norway. The geographical meaning of the word 'Greenland',
i.e., the name which is habitually used in maps to
denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the
ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of
the Parties that some- unusual or exceptional meaning is
to be attributed to it, it lies on that Party to
establish its contention. In the opinion of the Court,
Norway has not succeeded in establishing her
contention.
The Court repeated the same conclusion with regard to the term
'Greenland' as used in the commercial treaties which were in
guestion:
"The natural meaning of the term is its geographical
meaning as shown in the maps. If it is argued on behalf
of Norway that these treaties use the term 'Greenland' in
some special sense, it is for her to establish it, and
it is not decisive in this respect that the northern part
of Greenland was still unknown"^'
c. Lotus Case
Another case decided by the PCIJ in which the issue of
allocation of the burden of proof surfaced and was discussed was
the Lotus Case.^-
Ibid.
Ibid.
The Case of the S.S.Lotus, France v. Turkey, 7 September
1927, PCIJ, Series A. No.9. (Because of a typographical error in
its cover page, this Judgment is sometimes referred to as "No. 10".
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On 12 October 1926 France and Turkey signed a special
agreement referring to the Permanent Court of International Justice
their dispute arising out of the arrest and conviction of a French
navy officer who according to the Turkish Government was
responsible for the collision of the French mail steamer Lotus and
the Turkish collier Roz-Kourt.^^ The parties asked the Court to
decide the question whether, by instituting proceedings against
Lieutenant Demons, Turkey acted in contravention of Article 15 of
the Convention of Lausanne of 24 July, 1923, respecting conditions
of residence and business and jurisdiction, which provided that
"[s]ubject to the provisions of Article 16, all questions of
jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other contracting
Powers, be decided in accordance with the principles of
international law."^"*
The Court held that Turkey, by instituting criminal
proceedings against Lieutenant Demons, had not violated the
" As a result of the collision the Turkish vessel "which was
cut in two, sank, and eight Turkish nationals who were on board
perished." After the Lotus ^ arrival at Constantinople, Lieutenant
Demons, a French citizen, who was the officer of the watch on board
the Lotus at the time of the collision, was arrested by the Turkish
authorities and criminal proceedings were instituted against both
him and the captain of Boz-Kourt on a charge of manslaughter, by
the Public Prosecutor of Stamboul. Later, the Criminal Court of
Stamboul sentenced Lieutenant Demons to "eighty days' imprisonment
and a fine of twenty two pounds", and the Turkish captain to "a
slightly more severe penalty". fPCIJ, Series A^—No—9, PP. 10-11 ;
4 ILR. p. 154)
PCIJ. Series A, No 9 , P. 16; 4 ILR, p. 155.
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principles of international law.^^ For arriving at that conclusion
the Court had to deal with the question of the burden of proof,
which surfaced in the form of a question of law with regard to
jurisdiction. It was contended on behalf of the French Government
that the burden of proof lay on Turkey to prove that she had
jurisdiction under international law to try Lieutenant Demons. For
its part, Turkey took the view that "Article 15 allows Turkey
jurisdiction whenever such jurisdiction does not come into conflict
with a principles of international law".^® Thus, according to
Turkey the burden of proof rested on the French Government to show
that Turkey had acted in violation of the. principles of
international law by instituting criminal proceedings against a
French subject. The contention of the French Government was
rejected by the Court ;
"International law governs relations between independent
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore
emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate
the relations between the co-existing independent common
aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed".'"'
d, Mavrommatis Concessions
This case was instituted on 13 May 1924 by the Government of
the Greek Republic, which submitted to the Permanent Court of
PCIJ, Series A. No 9 . P. 3 2
Ibid P. 18.
" Ibid.
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International Justice "a suit arising out of the alleged refusal on
the part of the Government of Palestine and consequently also on
the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government, in its capacity as
Mandatory Power for Palestine, since the year 1921, to recognize to
their full extent the rights acquired by M. Mavrommatis, a Greek
subject, under contracts and agreements concluded by him with the
Ottoman authorities, in regard to concessions for certain public
works to be constructed in Palestine."'^
The claimant requested the Court, inter alia, to give judgment
to the effect that the British Government should make reparation
for the loss, estimated at £ 234,339, allegedly incurred by the
said Greek national, together with six per cent interest.^' The
main contention of the Greek Government on the merits of the
Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case was that expropriation had
taken place but the compensation due therefor had not been paid to
M. Mavrommatis.In its judgment, the Court concluded that no
loss to M. Mavrommatis had been proved, and it accordingly
dismissed the Greek Government's claim for compensation.
PCIJ , Series A, Judgment No. 5,- The Mavrommatis J erusalem
Concessions, p, 7. For a summary of the case see Karl Doehring,
Mavrommatis Concessions cases, in: Bernhardt (ed.)^ Encyclopedia of
public International Law [Instalment 2 (1981) pp. 182-185].
Judgment, op. cit. , p. 7.
^ Ibid, p. 40.
101 Ibid, pp. 44, 51.
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Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court examined
the evidence produced by the parties and, while discussing the
different issues in the case, indicated that the party who had
raised an issue was the one on whom the burden of proof would fall.
For instance, on the issue of whether or not M. Mavrommatis'
concessions had been annulled, after denial thereof by the British
Government the Court concluded that there was nothing to show that
such annulment had really taken place, and it thus rejected the
Greek Government's argument.
Similarly, on the question of "whether,- as alleged by the
Greek Government, the execution of the concessions had already been
rendered impossible for M. Mavrommatis and whether this was by
reason of the concession promised to M. Rutenburg, the Court
found the burden of proof to be on the Greek Government on both
counts. The Greek Government's contention on this issue was based,
inter alia, on "the withdrawal by the Banque Perier of its promise
to undertake the financing of the concessions and a statement to
the same effect by a British banker."'"^ Relying on the fact that
on a subsequent date M. Mavrommatis' solicitors had stated that "he
was prepared to form the company required for the execution of the
concessions", the Court rejected the Greek Government's argument
and concluded that:
Ibid, p. 42.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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"[I]t would have been incumbent on the Greek
Government to prove that, since that time,
circumstances have changed and that that which would have
been possible for M. Mavrommatis at the beginningof 1924
subsequently became impossible, and, moreover, did so in
consequence of the concession promised to M. Rutenberg,
the statement in question proves that at that time ^ M
Mavrommatis did not consider the execution of his
concessions as impossible."'"^
On the other hand, in the same case, with respect to the issue
of the validity of the concessions granted to M. Mavrommatis for
certain works to be carried out at Jerusalem, which issue was
raised by the Respondent, the Court found that under the
circumstances the burden of proof was on the Respondent (i.e., the
United Kingdom) :
"It is not contended by the Respondent that the Ottoman
authorities ever treated the Jerusalem concessions as
null, or that they took any steps to annul them; on the
contrary, the validity of the contracts was taken for
granted in all that passed between the authorities and M.
Mavrommatis after the grant of the concessions. In these
circumstances, the Court considers that it is for the
Respondent to prove that the concessions are not valid,
though it is indisputable that the reference to the
Ottoman nationality of the beneficiary in the concessions
is incorrect."'"'
e. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Cases 108
'"5 Ibid p. 43 .
106
107
After discussing the arguments put forward by the United
Kingdom in this regard the Court concluded that : "the contention of
the Respondent in regard to this point therefore fails through lack
of evidence to support it." Ibid p. 30.
Ibid p. 29.
108 These are a series of judgments issued by the PCIJ
concerning disputes between Germany and Poland arising out of the
Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922 relating to Upper Silesia and
concluded between them under the auspices of the League of Nations.
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The cases discussed above are from among those in which the
Permanent Court of International Justice has apparently discussed
the burden of proof and its allocation. However, it is to be noted
that the Court has not always found it necessary to pronounce
explicitly on which party the burden of proof rests. In fact on
many occasions, similar to the practice of other international
tribunals, the Court has only tacitly applied the basic rule for
the allocation of the burden of proof, and the consequences
thereof.
For instance, as regards the German Government's"claim for
damages owing to the alleged competition of the Chorzow factory
with the Bayerische factories, the Court simply observed that "the
damage alleged to have resulted from competition [was]
insufficiently proved.""® Also, in the same cases, with regard to
the dispute whether the estates of Prince Hohenlohe-Oehringen were
"amongst those principally devoted to serving the needs of
industrial undertakings and for this reason immune from
expropriation under Article 9(3), of the Geneva Convention",'^" the
For a summary of these judgments see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern,
German Interests In Polish Upper Silesia Cases, in: Bernhardt
(ed.). Encyclopedia of Pubic International Law [instalment 2
(1981)pp.11-114)].
PCIJ, Series A. No. 17, Judgment No. 13, Case Concerning The
Factory At Chorzow (Claim For Indemnity, the Merits), p. 56; see
also Ibid pp.. 39-40 for another example.
PCIJ, Series A. No. 7, Judgment No. 7, Case Concerning
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits), p.
65.
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Court said :
"The terse reference, without any details, to subsidence,
made by the German Agent in his oral reply, would, even
apart from the question whether this argument had been
put forward in sufficient time, not suffice to prove the
assertion made in the Application. The Respondent has
stated that he is not in a position to reply to this
argument which was not put forward during the written
proceedings.
In these circumstances, therefore, the Court can only
dismiss the Applicant's claim, for lack of sufficiently
substantiated statements.""'
Further, with regard to the same kind of dispute concerning the
estates of Count Nikolaus Ballestrem the Court considered the
applicant's objection to expropriation to be well founded."^
Moreover, in the dispute with regard to the rural estates of
the Prince of Lichnowsky, the Parties expressed different opinions
as to whether "the automatic acquisition of Czechoslovak
nationality by the Prince actually took place and if so, how this
fact may be proved.""^ After referring to the parties' views the
Court said:
"The Court is entirely free to estimate the value of
statements made by the Parties. It considers that the
fact that the Prince was, at the decisive, date,
established in a territory recognized by the Treaty of
Versailles as forming part of Czechoslovakia, is
sufficiently proved by the statements made in the Case on
the subject which have not been disputed, and by the
Prince's declaration dated January 1st, 1922, by means of
which he opted for German nationality in accordance with
Ibid p. 65.
"2 Ibid p. 56.
''3 Ibid p. 27.
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the terms of the German-Czechoslovak Convention."""*
4. International Court of Justice
a. Corfu Channel Case
In the Corfu Channel Case, the United Kingdom was
contending, inter alia, that the minelaying which had resulted in
damage to two U.K. .warships and loss of lives and injuries to
British officers and sailors -could not have been done without the
Albanian Government's knowledge. However, the Court did not agree
that the burden of proof would shift from the United Kingdom (the
claimant) to Albania (the respondent), simply on the basis of the
fact that an act contrary to international law had occurred in
Albanian territorial waters."^ The approach of the Court
demonstrates that it views the rule of actori incumbit probatio as
the basic rule to be applied for the allocation of the burden of
proof, and that there should be no deviation from that rule unless
it is well justified.
On the other hand, under the circumstances the Court allowed
the United Kingdom "a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact
114 Ibid p. 73; see also p. 68 for another example.
It is to be noted that the Court, nonetheless, found that
the circumstances had a bearing upon the methods of proof available
to establish the knowledge of that State. For a discussion on this
aspect of the Case see Chapter VI, infra.
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and circumstantial evidence",'"^ and by the help of indirect
evidence it concluded that "the laying of the minefield which
caused the explosions of October 22nd, 1946, could not have been
accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.""''
The Court further held that acts of omission by Albania, which
had neither notified the existence of the minefield nor warned the
British warships, engaged the international responsibility of
Albania, and that Albania thus had a duty to pay compensation to
the United Kingdom."^
The issue of burden of proof, however, was a controversial one
between the members of the Court. Judge Alvarez, states in his
individual opinion, that "every State is considered as having known
or as having a duty to have known, of prejudicial acts committed in
parts of its territory where local authorities are installed.
Judge Alvarez considers this to be neither a presumption nor a
hypothesis, but the consequence of sovereignty. Accordingly, he
concludes that the burden is on the State which alleges that it was
unaware that acts contrary to international law had been committed
Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports
1949, p. 18.
Ibid p. 22.
Ibid pp. 22-23.
I.e.J Reports 1949 , p. 44.
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within its territory or waters, to prove that this was the case.™
Judge Badawi Pasha, on the other hand, believes that "the
failure of Albania to carry out an international obligation must
. ..be proved, and it must also be proved that this was the cause of
the explosion."'^' He disagrees with Alvarez and others who "are of
the opinion that a general obligation exists for States to exert
reasonable vigilance along their coast and that the failure of
Albania to act with due diligence was, in the absence of knowledge
on her part, the reason that the minefield remained undiscovered
and that it caused the explosion."'-- According to Judge Badawi
Pasha, "such a general obligation does not exist and cannot exist",
and "even assuming that it does exist, the causal nexus between the
failure to carry out the obligation and the explosion remains to be
shown. "'22
The issue was also addressed by Dr. Ecer in his dissenting
opinion. According to him :
"The conclusion that Albania was cognizant of the
minelaying is in reality a presumption of fact. It is not
sufficient to annul the legal presumption of
international law according to which States act in
conformity with international law."'^"^
Ibid.
'2' Ibid, p. 65.
'22 Ibid.
'23 Ibid.
'2^* I. C. J Reports 1949 , p. 127.
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He also argues that even assuming that Albania had known of the
minelaying, "it would still be necessary to establish the facts
determining her duty to take action". But he concludes that those
facts were neither discussed nor established during the
proceedings.
b. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case
In the Asvlum Case, between Colombia and Peru,'^® one of the
two disputed questions referred to the Court was whether Colombia,
as the State granting asylum, had the right to qualify, by a
unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru, the offence of
the person seeking asylum.'-'^ In support of its contention in this
regard the Colombian Government, inter alia, invoked "American
international law in general", and in addition to the rules arising
from agreements signed by both governments relied "on an alleged
regional or local custom peculiar to Latin-American States."'^
Before examining this part of the question, the Court first
found it necessary to determine that the burden of proving the
Ibid.
126 See Colombian-Peruvian Asvlum Case, Judgment of 2 0 November
1950, ICJ Reports 1950. pp. 270-278.
127 second question submitted to the Court was whether or
not "the Republic of Peru, as the territorial State [was] bound in
the case... before the Court, to give the guarantees necessary for
the departure of M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre from the country,
with due regard to the inviolability of his person." Ibid p. 278.
128 Ibid p. 276.
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alleged regional custom rested on the Colombian Government; and
after considering the arguments and evidence produced in that
regard, it concluded that the Government had been unable to prove
the existence of such a custom.'^'
The opinion of the Court as to the duty of the party alleging
the existence of a local custom to prove its existence was
reiterated in subsequent cases.
Another part of the Asylum Case in which the question of
burden of proof was discussed was the counter-claim. In order to
put an end to the dispute, by way of counter-claim the Government
of Peru requested the Court to declare that asylum was wrongfully
given because it was contrary to certain provisions of the
Convention on Asylum signed at Havana on 20 February 1928.'^^ The
129
. See ibid pp. 276-277.
See, e.g., Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United
States in Morocco (France v. United States of America) , Judgment of
27 August 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 200. •See, also, joint
dissenting opinion of Judges Hackworth, Badawi, Levi Carneiro and
Sir Benegal Rau, ibid pp." 219-220'.
According to the Government of the United States: "The Submissions
and Conclusions presented by the French Government in this case
should be rejected on the ground that the French Government had
failed to maintain the burden of proof which it assumed as party
plaintiff and by reason of the nature of the legal issues
involved." Ibid p. 180. See, also, Nottebohm Case (Second phase),
ICJ Reports 1955, dissenting opinion of Judge Klaestad p. 30,
dissenting opinion of Judge Read, pp. 3 9-41, and that of M.
Guggenheim (Judge ad hod p. 55.
. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November
1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 280.
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counter-claim was based on two different grounds which
corresponded, respectively, to Articles 1(1) and 2(2) of the Havana
Convention.
With regard to the first basis of the counter-claim, the Court
stated that the burden of proving that the refugee was accused of
"common crimes" was on Peru, which alleged that the asylum had been
given wrongfully :
"Under Article I, paragraph I, 'It is not permissible for
States to grant asylum ... to persons^ accused or condemned for
common crimes ....' The onus of proving that Haya de la Torre
had been accused or condemned for common crimes before the
grant of asylum rested upon Peru."'^-
As a- second basis for the counter-claim the Government of Peru
relied on the alleged disregard of Article 2(2) of the Havana
Convention, which provides as follows: "Asylum may not be granted
except in urgent cases and for the period of time strictly
indispensable for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in
some other way his safety."'" In this regard, after analyzing
Article 2 of the Havana Convention which lists "the conditions
under which asylum ' granted ... shall be respected by the
territorial State the Court found paragraph 2, quoted above,
to contain the most important of those conditions, and on that
basis found the burden of proof to be "incumbent upon the
'32 Ibid p. 281.
'33 Ibid p. 282.
'34 Ibid.
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Government of Colombia to submit proof of facts to show that the
above-mentioned condition was fulf illed.
The fact that the Court required the Government of Colombia to
prove an allegation which seemed to be the basis of the counter
claim submitted by the Government of Peru should not be regarded as
a deviation from the basic rule of the burden of proof. For,
because of the existence of the Havana Convention and Article 2(2)
thereof, the counter-claim was in fact a preliminary objection to
the original claim of Colombia. In other words, the Government of
Peru could have objected to the claim by stating that the grant of
asylum which was the basis of the claim lacked the conditions
required under Article 2 (2) of the Havana Convention.
Consequently, the Court, presumably noting this point, rightly
decided that the burden of proof was on the Colombian
Government.It is to be noted, however, that occasions such as
Ibid.
136 Court finally found, by ten votes to six, that "the
grant of asylum by the Colombian Government to Victor Raul Haya de
La Torre was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2
('First'), of that Convention." Ibid, p. 288. The dissenting
opinion of Judge Read, which is shared by Judge Zoricic, another
member of the Court, shows that a different approach to the issue
of the burden of proof would have been possible in regard to the
counter-claim. According to Judge Read; 1. Neither the Colombian
Government nor the Government of Peru was able to prove the extreme
arguments put forward by each; 2. Under the circumstances, the
Colombian Government was not bound to establish more than a prima
facie case to prove the existence of a period of political
disturbance in Peru (rather than proving directly the urgency of
the grant of asylum); 3. Colombia had established a prima facie
case to that effect and the Court should have found that the grant
of asylum was an "urgent case" within the meaning of the
Convention. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, in Ibid, pp. 316-
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that mentioned above demonstrate that the issue of the burden of
proof is a delicate matter and that its allocation is not as easy
a task as it might at first appear.
c. a?he Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (1953)
In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case the Court was requested, in
accordance with Article 1 of the Special Agreement signed on 29
December 1950 between France and the United Kingdom, to decide
whether the islets and rocks of the Minquiers and Ecrehos belonged
to the United Kingdom or France.'" In Article 2 of the said
Agreement the parties had agreed that written proceedings would be
"without prejudice to any question of the burden of proof.
After mentioning the parties' submissions, the Court summarized its
task in the Case as follows :
"Having thus been requested to decide whether these groups
belong either to France or to the United Kingdom, the Court
has to determine which of the Parties has produced the more
convincing proof of title to one or the other of these groups,
or to both of them. By the formulation of Article 1 the
Parties have excluded the status of res nullius as well as
that of condominium.
The Court then expressed its views concerning the question of
331.
'37 The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, Judgment of 17 November
1953, ICJ Reports 1953 p. 47.
Ibid p. 49 .
Ibid p. 52.
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the burden of proof, and provided a formula in that regard which
was nothing more than what has been called, in the present study,
inter alia, "the basic rule" for allocation of the burden of proof.
The Court said :
"In Article II the Parties have stated their agreement as
to the presentation of the Pleadings "without prejudice
to any question as to the burden of proof", a question
which it is for the Court to decide. Having regard to the
position of the Parties, both claiming sovereignty over
the same territory, and in view of the formulation of the
task of the Court in Article I, and the terms of Article
II, the Court is of opinion that each Party has to prove
its alleged title and the facts upon which it relies.""*"
In his individual opinion which was appended to the unanimous
Judgment of the Court in favour of the United Kingdom, Judge Levi
Carneiro expressed another aspect of the basic rule for allocation
of the burden of proof. According to him, "it is for the Party
interested in restricting the application of an established rule or
of a recognized fact to prove that such a restriction is valid."''*'
d. Other Cases
Apart from the cases already discussed, reference could be
made to the Temple of Preah Vihear Case and other cases adjudicated
by the ICJ. In the Temple of Preah Vihear Case the Court expressly
stated that the rule to be applied for the distribution of the
burden of proof is that each party should prove the facts and
Ibid.
Ibid p. 99; see, also, p. 98.
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contentions put forward by that party, and that there is no
difference between the claimant and respondent in this regard. The
Court said :
"As.concerns the burden of proof it must be pointed out
that though, from the formal standpoint, Cambodia is the
plaintiff having instituted the proceedings, Thailand
also is a claimant because of the claim which was
presented by her in the second Submission of the Counter-
Memorial and which relates to the sovereignty over the
same piece of territory. Both Cambodia and Thailand base
their respective claims on a series of facts and
contentions which are asserted or 'put forward by one
Party or the other. The burden of proof in respect of
these will of course lie on the Party asserting or
putting them f orward . "
In his dissenting opinion in the same case. Sir Percy Spender
emphasized the applicability of the basic rule of the burden of
proof.
In his dissenting opinion in the second phase of the Nottebohm
Case, Judge Read recalled with approval that in the Mavrommatis
Jerusalem Concessions Case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice had "settled the rule that the burden of proof is on the
142 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, pp.
15-16,
"...I am satisfied that France never acted upon the faith
of any representation which may be inferred from Thailand's
conduct.
It is not sufficient to assert that she did, the evidence must
establish it . The burden of proof lies upon Cambodia and, in my
view, she has failed to discharge the burden."ICJ Reports 1962, p.
144. See also Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spender and
Fitzmaurice to the Judgment of 21 December 1962, South West African
Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South—Africa),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 473.
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party, that alleges the nullity of a legal act under the national
law, to prove it."''^
In his dissenting opinion, on the merits of the Case
Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India), Judge Quintana observes that "the existence of a right in
international relations is a fact which, when contested, must be
proved by the party which invokes it." According to him: "That is
an elementary principle of procedure."'''-'' In his Separate Opinion
in the Western Sahara Casef197 51, Judge De Castro states, in
different words, the same principle as follows:
"Morocco's assertion of rights of sovereignty over
Western Sahara called for the examination, as a question
of fact, of the way in which those rights had been
acquired and whether they still subsisted at the time of
colonization.
It was thus for Morocco as the claimant to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court when and how the Moroccan
Empire had acquired Western Sahara.
5. Examples from Ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunals
a. In The Matter of The Diverted Cargoes
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 36. See also Dissenting Opinion of M.
Guggenheim, Judge "ad hoc" in the same case, ICJ Reports 1955, pp.
57, 58, 64, 65.
ICJ reports 1960. p. 89.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,
Separate Opinion of Judge De Castro, I.C.J. Reports 1975, P. 153.
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In the Matter of the Diverted Cargoes, an arbitration between
Greece and Great Britain in 1955,'""' the parties were in
disagreement about the dollar/ sterling exchange rate to be applied
on the amount of $ 2,057,698 which was due to Greece "in respect of
the cargoes shipped on America whose original f.o.b. price was
expressed in dollars" and which were taken over by the British
Government during the Second World War.'"*^
The sole arbitrator (Cassin) who decided the case guoted with
approval Delbez CT.e droit international public positif, vol. II, p.
591), who states that "[a]s regards the burden of proof, it falls
upon the State which claims from another State the performance of
an obligation to establish the' existence and the amount of the
2 2 ILR, pp. 820-839.
148 Some of the relevant facts of the case are as follows:
During the Second World War the British Authorities "with the
consent of the Royal Hellenic Government, took over the cargoes
belonging to the latter so as to use them in the best interests of
the Allied war effort... On February 11, 1942 the two Governments
signed an Agreement governing the disposal of the diverted cargoes
and the financial consequences thereof" (22 ILR, p. 820) . After the
end of the war the two Governments, in accordance with Section C of
the Agreement, engaged in negotiations and, inter—3-li^ / ^1951
agreed on the sterling equivalent of $ 2,057,698 to be paid to
Greece. In the meantime, however, the pound sterling was devalued
by the British Government and "the parity with the dollar, whxch
for many years before the war had been 4.03, was reduced to 2-80
ribid, p. 823). "This event gave rise to a fresh dispute about the
Sterling value of cargoes of all descriptions bought in dollars and
on board the ships directed from their original destinations to the
Greek ports" Clbidl . It was held, finally, that the rate of
exchange to be used was the rate in force at the date of payment
(Ibid, p. 824) .
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claim."'''' On that basis, the arbitrator concluded that the
applicable rules of proof to the pending case were as follows :
"Specifically, when there is a contractual claim for sum
of money, the claimant State must satisfy the judge or
international arbitrator that the currency in which it
demands payment is really that which was provided
for in the agreement and, also prove that a money of
account, different from the money of payment, should by
virtue of the agreement determine the amount of the
claim, that is, the quantity of the currency of payment
with which the debtor State must credit the creditor so
as to discharge its debt."'^°
b. Ambatielos Claim 151
i. Summary
This was a claim of a Greek national, Nicolas Eustache
Ambatielos, which was taken up by the Greek Government against the
British Government by way of diplomatic protection.'" Based on the
1886 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Greece and Britain,
and the Protocol annexed thereto, on 9 April 1951 "Greece applied
to the International Court of Justice for a declaration that it had
22 ILR. p. 825.
Ibid• Application of these rules lead the arbitrator to
decide that the rate of exchange in force at the date of payment
should be used.
__ Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom) , Arbitration
Commission, 6 March 1956 (Arbitrators: Alfaro, president; Bayge,
Bourquin, Spiro Poulos, Thesiger) : RIAA. vol.12, pp. 83-153; 23
ILR. pp. 306-340.
For a summary of the Case and its previous development see
Norbert Wiihler, Ambatielos Case, in : Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia
of Pubic International Law [Instalment 2 (1981) pp. 13-15].
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jurisdiction to decide the Ambatielos case 'sitting as an arbitral
tribunal', or at least to confirm Britain's obligation to submit
the dispute to a commission of arbitration."'^^
On 1 July 1952 the International Court of Justice found, by
thirteen votes to two, that it was without jurisdiction to decide
on the merits of the Ambatielos claim and, by ten votes to five,
that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the United Kingdom was
under an obligation to submit to arbitration.'^'^ In a second
judgment issued on 19 May 1953 the Court held, by ten votes to
four, that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to submit to
arbitration.
Accordingly, a five-member commission of arbitration was
established on the basis of an agreement dated 24 February 1955,
between Greece and the United Kingdom and finally, on 6 March 1956,
the Commission dismissed the claim on the merits.
ii. Burden of Proof on the Question of Non-exhaustion of Local
Remedies
The question of the burden of proof was addressed more than
Ibid 13-14.
154 Ambatielos Case fGreece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.28; ILR, 1952 , Case No. 96.
155 ji^j;\batielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom) , Obligation to
Arbitrate, ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 10 ; 2_3 ILR, p. 547.
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Ibid 13-14.
154 Ambatielos Case fGreece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.28; ILR, 1952 , Case No. 96.
155 ji^j;\batielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom) , Obligation to
Arbitrate, ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 10 ; 2_3 ILR, p. 547.
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Relying on the views of legal writers and judicial precedents,
the Cominission easily concluded that the ineffective remedies would
not count.However, the problem was to find a way to determine
whether or not a specific measure of internal law, which had not
been locally exhausted, could be considered effective.
As regards Claim A, which was a claim for compensation for
breach of the contract of sale by the Government of the United
Kingdom, the failure attributed to Mr. Ambatielos was that before
the English Court he had not called the witnesses who were-probably
essential to establish his case. Specifically, the central issue
was whether or not the testimony of a Major Laing would have caused
the English judge to issue a decision favourable to Mr. Ambatielos
on the case.'^'
The Commission could have approached this question with a view
to allocate the burden of proof between the parties. In that case
the question before the Commission would have been: given that the
burden is generally on the defendant State to prove the non-
exhaustion of local remedies by the claimant, which party bears the
According to the Commission: "The views expressed by
writers and in judicial precedents ... coincide in that the
existence of remedies which are obviously ineffective is held not
to be sufficient to justify the application of the rule. Remedies
which could not rectify the situation cannot be relied upon by the
defendant State as precluding an international action. 23 ILR, p.
334.
159 2 3 ILR, pp. 336-337.
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burden of proof as regards the effectiveness of the remedies
concerned. Or, in other words, the question would have been whether
it was on the defendant State to prove that local remedies were
effective, or on the claimant State to prove that the remedies
invoked were ineffective.
The answer to that question would differ, depending on whether
or not the issue of the effectiveness of the local remedies was
considered independent from that of their existence and
availability. If the former issue was to, be considered as an
independent one, then the burden of proof would be on the State
which claimed that those remedies were ineffective (i.e., the
claimant State). On the other hand, if the issue was considered to
be part of the issue of the existence and availability of the local
remedies, then it was on the Government of the United Kingdom
(i.e., the defending State) to prove that effective remedies
available to Mr. Ambatielos had not been exhausted.
What actually happened in the Ambatielos Case was that neither
of the parties was able to convince the' Commission of the
truthfulness of its contention in this regard; and the Commission,
being unable to decide the issue on the basis of the evidence
before it, instead of applying the rules of the burden of proof,
resorted to a solution which might seem unusual even in the
circumstances of the case. Relying on the ruling of the arbitrator
113
in the Finnish Vessels Case , the Commission decided that the
only possible test was to assume the truth of the facts on which
the claimant State based its claim.This assumption, plus the
Commission's finding that contrary to the Greek Government's
contention, Mr. Ambatielos was not prevented from calling Major
Laing as a witness before the English Courts, lead to a decision
against the Greek Government whose statements of facts had been
assumed to be true .
• Ironically, only a few years later, the same question became
an issue again in a dispute between the same States before the
European Commission of Human Rights.'®^ Only this time the European
Commission did not hesitate to decide the issue on the basis of the
rules for allocation of the burden of proof, and found that the
burden of proof with regard to the ineffectiveness of the local
remedies was on the applicant government. According to the
160 Finnish Vessels in Great Britain during the War (Finland
V. Great Britain!: Annual Digest 1933-1934, Case No.91, pp. 237-
23 8, at 24 0.
161 2 3 ILR, p. 335.
'^ 2 The approach of the Commission with regard to an issue
which could have been resolved through the application of the rules
for allocation of the burden of proof, apart from its questionable
basis, demonstrates the vast authority enjoyed by international
tribunals with respect to the issues concerning evidence, including
disposition of the burden of proof.
163 Re Application No. 299/57 fGovernment of the Kingdom of
Greece v. Government of the United Kingdom—of—Great—Britain—and
Northern Ireland!, European Commission of Human Rights, 12 October
1957, 25 ILR, p. 27.
114
Commission :
"In accordance with the generally recognized principles
of international law, the exhaustion of a domestic remedy
is... not required if the applicant party can prove that
in the particular circumstances such remedy will probably
prove ineffectual or inadequate. It should therefore be
ascertained whether the Greek Government has furnished
proof of such probability in connection with the facts
relating to the cases listed in the Appendix to its
Application.
6. Iran - United States Claims Tribunal'®-"'
a. Tribunal Rules
According to Article III (2) of the Claims Settlement
Declaration: "The Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance
with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by
the parties or by the tribunal to ensure that this agreement can be
carried out."'®^
With respect to "evidence", the relevant article in the
UNCITRAL Rules is Article 24, which starts in paragraph 1 with the
generally accepted principle concerning the burden of proof: "each
25 ILR. p. 30.
For a general introduction on the Tribunal see supra,
Chapter I, P. 32.
See 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. p. 10.
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party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to
support his claim or defence."'"
The reports published in this regard in the UNCITRAL Yearbook
do not reveal much about the legislative history of the rules. In
the preliminary draft of the rules,instead of the present
article 24, article 22 deals with the Hearing and Evidence
generally, and paragraph 5 thereof provides the arbitrators with
the greatest possible freedom on issues relating to evidence.'®'
However, the preliminary draft makes no direct reference to the
issue of the burden of proof. Consequently, the comments made by
different institutions on the preliminary draft contain no
proposals on the issue of the burden of proof, either.
There is also no trace of the present Article 24(1) in either
of the two revised drafts prepared by the Secretariat of
167 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, p. 79.
See Report of the Secretary-General: preliminary draft set
of arbitration rules for optional use in ad hoc arbitration
relating to international trade fUNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)
(A/CN.9/97) in United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Yearbook vol. VI, pp. 163-180.
Ibid, p. 176. The text of Article 22(5) of the preliminary
draft reads : "Arbitrators shall determine the relevancy and
materiality of the evidence offered. Conformity to legal rules of
evidence shall not be necessary." The text of this paragraph was
subsequently changed.
170 Ibid. 180-186.
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UNCITRAL,'"" or in the report of the Committee of the Whole II,
which was established by the Commission to consider the revised
draft.Nor has professor Sanders, who served as the special
consultant to the Secretariat on the subject, provided any
explanation in this regard in his Commentary on the rules.
Nonetheless, following certain changes, the final draft which was
adopted by the Commission contains paragraph 1 of Art. 24 in its
present form. ™
On the other hand, the general principle contained in Article
24(1) is so widely accepted that it is hardly surprising that its
incorporation in the rules took place easily and without any
challenge. At the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal too, the
inclusion of this principle in the Tribunal Rules was not
challenged. In 1981, when the Tribunal set out to draft its rules
of procedure on the basis of the UNCITRAL Rules, pursuant to
Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration the United
States, Iran, and members of the Tribunal made many suggestions for
1 '^ See, Report of the Secretary-General: revised draft set of
arbitration rules for optional use in ad hoc arbitration relating
to international trade fUNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) (A/CN.9/112) 7
November 1975, and also its addendum fCommentary on the draft
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, A/CN.9/112/Add.1,12 December 1975), in
UNCITRAL Yearbook vol. VII, 1976, pp. 157-166.
For the text of the Report, see Ibid pp. 66-82.
See Prof. Pieter Sanders, op.' cit. , at 203.
174 See, Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of its ninth session (New York,
12 April-7 May 1976) (A/31/17) in: UNCITRAL Yearbook vol. VII, 1976
pp. 2 2 and 25.
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amendments with regard to the different articles of the UNCITRAL
Rules. No proposals, however, were made in regard to paragraph 1 of
Article 24 of the UNCITRAL Rules. As a result, this part of the
Rules (and in fact the whole of Article 24) remained unchanged and
was adopted first in the Provisionally Adopted Tribunal Rules and
finally in the Tribunal Rules.
Consequently, the concept of burden of proof is embodied in
Article 24(1) of the Tribunal rules which provides that: " Each
party shall have th-e burden "of proving the facts relied on to
support his claim or defence". This. paragraph contains the
generally accepted rule of the burden of proof, and apart from its
general impact on the process of adjudication as a whole, it has
^j-gquently been referred to and discussed in Tribunal awards. The
Tribunal has applied the concept not only in the course of
adjudicating the merits of the cases before it, but also when
making determinations on its jurisdiction. Equally, any motion or
request should have been proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal
by the demanding party, otherwise the request has usually been
denied.
The Tribunal's attitude towards Article 24(1) has been summed
up in the Full Tribunal's Award in Case A-20, where it is stated
that Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Tribunal Rules reflects
175 See, generally. Minutes of the Tribunal's 7th, 20th and
81st meeting.
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"generally accepted principles of international arbitration
practice and contributes to the effective resolution of cases
before the Tribunal."'''®
b. General Practice of the Tribunal
As a by-product of its unique structure, the Tribunal has
become an ideal venue for encountering the legal thoughts of
different legal systems. The main stream is brought about by the
Iranian lawyers who are inspired by the civil law system as well as
Islamic law, and the American lawyers, with their comrapn law
background.''''' However, the third party arbitrators, from Sweden,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Finland and
Argentina, have increased the flavour and variety of attitudes in
the Tribunal.''''
i. Burden of Proof in Claims
In many cases, the Tribunal has based its decisions on the
basic rule of burden of proof. A few examples will suffice to
Decision No. DEC. 45-A20-FT, paragraph 10, reprinted in 11
Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 271-282, at 274.
It goes without saying that the "Iranian and American
lawyers" include not only the Iranian and American Arbitrators but
also numerous lawyers from both nations, who have laboured on the
task of preparing, presenting and defending the cases before the
Tribunal.
™ For a list of Members of the Tribunal, see 23 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. p. 1 ix.
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demonstrate the Tribunal's practice in this regard.
In H.A. Spaldina. Inc., and Ministry of Roads aj^
Transportation of the Islamic Republic of Iran , after discussing
the parties' contentions, the Tribunal rejected the Claimant's
claim because it had not been able to meet' the burden of proof.
179
In CMI International. Inc. and Ministry of Roads and
Transportation et.al., the Tribunal concluded, with reference to
Article 24 paragraph 1, of the Tribunal Rules, that "the burden of
proving entitlement to lost profits as a lost—volume seller is on
the Claimant."'^'-'
See Award No. 212-437-3 (24 February 1986), para. 35,
reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 22-34, at 33^ ("Consequently,
the Tribunal concludes that claimant had not carried its burden of
proving its claim. To the extent the claim is based on alleged
performance of services of which Respondents received the benefit
Claimant has not satisfied the Tribunal either that such services
were performed.or, if"any were rendered, requested hy Respondents
so as to- create a justified expectation of compensation. Insofar as
the claim is based .on explicit contractual rights, the Tribunal
notes that one contract may have been concluded but that there is
no evidence proving damages resulting from a^ny breach of the
contract. Therefore Claimant's claim is dismissed"). See also,
e.g., Benny Diba and Wilford J. Gaulin v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 444-940-2, para. 29, reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 268, at 274.
Award No. 99-245-2 (27 December 1983) , reprinted in 4 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, pp. 263-271 at 268. See also, e.g., Grune and Stratton,.
Inc V. Iran. Award No. 359-10059-1, para. 21 et seq., reprinted in
18 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 224, at 228-230, where the Tribunal dismissed
the claim because the claimant could not meet the requisite burden
of proof.
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In Kimberlv-Clark Corp. and Bank Markazi Iran, et.al. the
Tribunal dismissed a claim because claimant had failed to prove the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.'''
As regards the nationality of claimants, the Tribunal has'
consistently held that the burden of proof is on claimants as a
jurisdictional requirement established by Article VII of the Claims
Settlement Declaration. For instance, in Lili Tour v. Iran, the
Tribunal concluded as follows:
"It was the particular burden of the claimant to
initially substantiate her claim with adequate supporting
evidence, . . . Although the tribunal provided the Claimant
with adequate opportunities to file the relevant
evidence, the Claimant did not produce any evidence that
would have substantiated her U.S. nationality..."'^^
See Award No. 46-57-2 (25 May 1983) , reprinted in 2 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, pp. 334-344 at 338 ("With respect to the second claim
the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that we have
jurisdiction. While the Claimant contends that the Bank prevented
Sha-Peyk from making payments due, it has presented no persuasive
evidence that Sha-Peyk was the agent of an Iranian principal,
rather than a broker.* The Tribunal therefore finds that the claim
against Bank Markazi arising out of the Sha-Peyk transaction is
outside of our jurisdiction."
II* The Tribunal notes that even had such an agency relationship
been proved. Claimant presented no evidence that the problems were
caused by respondent Bank Markazi, rather than shipping
difficulties or United States economic sanctions").
Award No. 413-483-2, 1 March 1989, p. 4 , reprinted in 21
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 25, at 27. See also, e.g., David Harounian v. The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 450-447-3,
para, 11 (27 November 1989), reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 282,
284 ("It was the particular burden of the Claimant to substantiate
his claim with supporting evidence of his United States nationality
during the relevant period") ; and Alex Ariad v. the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Award No. 508-413-3, para. 10 (22 April 1991),
reprinted in —Iran-U.S. C.T.R.—,—.
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Also, in Creditcorp International, Inc., et.al._ v. Iran Carton
Company. the Tribunal dismissed the claims because the Claimants
had failed " to bear the burden of proving that the Claim in this
Case [was] a claim of a national of the United States, as required
for the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction."'^^
Similarly, in T.inda J. Motamed et.al. v. Iran the tribunal
noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that the Claimants bear the
burden of proof with respect to their nationality during the
relevant period. Then, since the claimants in that case had not
been able to file any evidence that would verify their alleged U.S.
nationality, their claim was dismissed for lack of proof. 185
In George W. Drucker. Jr. v. Foreign Transaction—Company
et.al., in order to prove (as required by Article VII, paragraph 2,
of the Claims Settlement Declaration) his continuous ownership of
and control over the South Gulf Trading Company, the company on
whose behalf he had brought claims against the Respondents, the
Claimant produced certain documents including affidavits and a copy
of a contract dated 1974 and concluded between the Claimant and a
Dr. Saheb. But Dr. Saheb, who was the majority shareholder of South
Gulf, stated that "the 1974 agreement was in fact drawn up in 1981
Award No. 443-965-2, 12 October 1989, para. 6., reprinted
in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 265, 266.
Award No.' 414-770-2, 3 March 1989, para. 6, reprinted in
21 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 28, 29.
Ibid.
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for the purpose of permitting the claims of South Gulf to be
brought to the Iran-U.S. Claims TribunalThe Tribunal, not
being in a position to determine whether the agreement was
concluded in 1974 or in 1981, considered it "significant that the
Claimant [had] not been able to submit a single document, other
than that agreement, dated prior to 1981 evidencing any connection
between the Claimant and South Gulf."'^'' On that basis, the
Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had failed to prove adequately
his ownership and held that it lacked jurisdiction in the Case
"because of the Claimant's failure to meet his burden of proof of
ownership.
ii. Burden of Proof in Defence
On many occasions, the Tribunal has found the burden of
proof to be on the respondents, with respect to the claims made in
their defence. In R.N. Pomerov et.al. and Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Tribunal rejected the defence of the Iranian
Navy because it had not met its burden of proof. The Tribunal said:
"[T]he Navy has not produced any evidence in support of
its contention that Pomeroy Corporation breached its
duties under the. Contract by failing to supply qualified
personnel or failing to point out defects in the work of
other contractors. By failing to establish even a prima
facie case for contract breach, the Navy has not met its
See Award No. 379-121-2 (22 July 1988), para. 34, reprinted
in 19 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 257, at 269..
Ibid. para. 35.
Ibid.
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burden of proof on this defence, and it must be
rejected."'^''
In T^onald Stuart Koehler and the Islamic Republic of Iran,
after it was established that the Claimant was entitled to the
salary and other benefits payable to him under the terms of his
contract of employment, the majority of the Tribunal found that it
was on the respondent to prove that it had paid the salary and
other benefits to the claimant.'^" While implicitly agreeing to the
principle underlying the majority's argument, the Iranian
arbitrator of the Tribunal disagreed with its application in the
instant case. According to him, the fact that the phrase "payment
for settlement of account" appeared on none of the payments but the
last one, shows that the final payment was of a special nature. On
this basis, he concludes that "the Chamber should not ... have
required the Respondent to prove that the salary had been paid in
conformity to usual practice, thereby disregarding the phrase
'settlement of account'".
In a Partial Award issued in Rj Reynolds Tobacco Company
and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Tribunal
Award No. 50-40-3 (8 June 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R, pp. 372-386, at 382. ^ also Pomproy Corporation and
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No.51-41-3 (8
June 1983), reprinted in ibid, pp. 391-400, at 399.
190 Award No. 223-11713-1 (16 April 1986), para. 33, reprinted
in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 337-347, at 344.
Dissenting Opinion of M. Mostafavi, reprinted in, 10 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, pp. 348-351, at 349.
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found the burden of proof to be on the Respondent with regard to an
amount that the Respondent claimed should be deducted from
Claimant's claim. The circumstances of this conclusion are
described by the Tribunal as follows;
"It has not been alleged that ITC objected within a
reasonable time period to Reynolds' statement of account •
of 31 October 1979 or to the subsequent invoice of 9
November 1979. In fact, there is no evidence that these
specific amounts were disputed until Claimant indicated
that it intended to bring this claim before the Tribunal.
In view of this, the burden is now on ITC to demonstrate
any facts supporting its contention that US $
1,886,161.43 should be deducted from Claimant's claim.
ITC, however,, has not offered sufficient evidence on this
point".
Later, in Pic of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Development
Corporation et.al., the Tribunal referred to the above-quoted Award
in reiterating that point:
"The failure to dispute an account for a lengthy period
of time at least places a burden on [Respondent] to
demonstrate that the account was not accurate.""^
iii. Individual Views
While the views of third-party arbitrators have normally been
expressed in the Awards of the Tribunal as the majority views,
national arbitrators have frequently filed dissenting or separate
opinions in which they have voiced their own views with regard to
Partial Award No. 145-35-3 (6 August 1984), reprinted in
7 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 181-201, at 190-191, also, e.g., Time
Incorporated v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al. , Award No. 13 9-
16602 (29 June 1984), reprinted in 7 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 8, at 11.
Award No. 176-255-3 (26 April 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, pp. 144-178, at 164.
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the issues involved in the pending case, including the question of
burden of proof. In fact, the burden of proof is one of those
issues on which the national arbitrators have most frequently
focused in their dissenting opinions.
For instance, in August 1982, at the outset of its activity,
the Tribunal rendered decisions regarding four issues which were in
dispute between Iran and the United States, in connection with the
establishment and operation of the one-billion-dollar Security
Account''^ provided for in paragraph 7 of the Algiers
Declaration.'^ 5 Qn issue I, which concerned the disposition of
interest earned on the Security Account,a 5 to 4 majority of
the Tribunal found that neither the views of Iran nor those
'94 Iran v. TTnited States, Case A/1 (Issues I, III and IV) , 30
July 1982 (Full Tribunal: ^agergren, president BelletMang,Kashani, Holtzmann, Shafieie, Aldrich, Mosk, Sam, Arbitrators)
r-P.nrinted in 1 Iran- U.S. C.T.R, pp. 189-197.
'95 Pursuant to paragraph 7, one billion dollars in Iranian
funds were transferred to a Security Account to be
sole purpose of securing the payment of, and paying, claims againsirin in Accordance with the claims settlement agreement." 1^0JJ°ver
^ran was obligated to make new deposits in the
necessary, in order to maintain a minimum-balance of $ 500 million
in the account. See 1 Iran-U.S-.—C.T.R, pp • 5 6.
'96 Ibid, pp. 189-192.
19'' The dissenting members include three Iranian Arbitrators
and Judge Lagergren, the president of the Vrtt '^-one-L^?
him the interest accrued should be shared in equal part , ^SeTng added to the Security Account and the ^ the
Iran so long as Iran fulfills its obligations to replenish the
account " See Dissenting Opinion of President Lagergren on theiSsue of tKT" Disposition of Interest Earned on The Security
Account, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp.
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of the United States'^"^ were convincing, and, in an attempt to
avoid denial of justice, tried to freeze the situation pending the
parties' further agreement.^™
As a protest, the three Iranian members of the Tribunal did
not sign the Tribunal's Award, and in a joint separate opinion, two
of them expressed their views to the effect that the interest
earned on the Security Account was the property of Iran and was to
be remitted directly to Iran.^"' According to them, the Tribunal
should have settled the issue by relying on the basic rule of the
burden of proof, as follows:
"The general principle of law, actori incumbit probatio.
r&us in excipiendo fit actor, which finds expression
notably in Article 356 of the Iranian code of civil
procedure and in Article 1315 of the French code civil,
imposes the burden of proof of an obligation on the party
invoking it. Once the nature of and entitlement to the
198
199
According to Iran all interest was to be transferred to
Iran as it accrued because, inter alia, "it never agreed to allow
more than 1 billion of its property to remain in the Account,
and... any interpretation of the Algiers Declarations which would
result in the Account's exceeding the sum would impermissibly place
an obligation on Iran to which it, as a sovereign State, had not
explicitly consented." On this basis Iran asserted that the burden
of proving any such consent was on'the United States. See 1 Iran-
U.S. G.T.R. pp. 189-190.
The United States contended, inter alia, that "all interest
to be retained in the Security Account [should be] available, like
the principal, to secure and pay awards against Iran by the
Tribunal," Ibid 19 0.
Iran v. United States. Case A/1, note 205, supra; ibid pp.
191-192. —
Opinion of Members Dr. Mahmoud M. Kashani and Dr. Shafie
Shafieie on the Issue of Disposition of Interest Earned on the
Security Account, filed 29 September 1982, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R, pp. 203-214, at p. 209.
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interest had been defined in Article 4, paragraph (d) , of
the Escrow Agreement, it remained to determine whether
Iran, as the owner of the assets and as such entitled to
receive them, had renounced its rights of ownership and
had committed itself to the addition of the interest to
the principal given as security. The burden of proving
this rested exclusively with the United^ StatesGovernment, who were alleging the existence ^of just such
a renunciation and just such a commitment.
It is also to be noted that in their individual opinions, the
American arbitrators of the Tribunal, too, have often relied on the
issue of the burden of proof and its effects on the claims in
question.^"^
The Iranian arbitrators have frequently complained that the
Tribunal has not applied the basic rule of the burden of proof
properly. For instance, in Ravgo Waaner Equipment Company v. Star.
T.ine Iran Company, the Iranian arbitrator held that the award was
seriously deficient because, he believed, the majority of Chamber
Three of the Tribunal had adopted "a reverse application of the
principle actori incumbit onus probandi" in having concluded that
the Respondent company was prima facie controlled by the
Government.-^ In Flexi-Van case, the Iranian arbitrator dissented
Ibid.
203 See, e.g.. Award No. 50-40-3, op.cit., (note 203 supra),
Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, (13 June 1983) p. 8,
reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 386, at 389; and^ TTI tra _Systems
Incorporated v. Iran, Award No. 89-84-3, Dissenting Opinion ot
Richard M. Mosk to Final Award (7 December 1983) p. 2, reprinted in
4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 80, at 80.
Mr. Jahangir Sani's Reasons for not Signing the Decision
Made by Mr. Mangard and Mr. Mosk in Case No.17, Award No, 20-17-3(15 December 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 415-424, at
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from the Order on the method of proof of nationality of
shareholders of United States corporations because, according to
him, the method adopted by the Tribunal would relieve the claimant
from its burden to prove is allegations.^®^
3. The American arbitrators, on the other hand, have sometimes
complained that the Tribunal has applied the basic rule of burden
of proof too vigorously on claimants. The portion of the Sea-Land
Case in which the Tribunal dealt with the issue of the damages
claimed by Sea-Land in respect of moveable property is a good
example in this regard. In that Case, although the Tribunal
accepted the Claimant's assertion that some of the equipment was
left in Iran, it dismissed the claim because the Claimant had not
been able to prove that the Respondents had access to or benefitted
420. Mr. Sani also finds it difficult "to see how, from a
procedural point of view, it is found possible to find, say,"B"
liable in a case in which "A" is said to have committed an act,
simply because "B" has not been able to disprove the claim against
"A". Ibid.
See Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., v. The Islamic Republic of
Ir^, Case No. 36, Chamber One, Dissenting Opinion of Member
Mahmoud M. Kashani Regarding Order of 15 December 1982, reprinted
in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 463, 464, ("It is obvious that the burden of
proof of an allegation is on the contender. This is a well
established rule of law recognized by all legal systems whether
municipal or international, actori incumbit onus probandi. ...
Burden of proof is on the Claimant not only because he is just a
Claimant, ..., but also because he is the one most most accessible
to information.... The Tribunal is not authorized to indiligently
relieve Claimant from its burden to prove its allegations in order
to facilitate attainment of its contested claims." For the text of
the Order of 15 Decemberr 1982 see ibid PP. 455-463.
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from that equipmentThe American arbitrator, however, disagreed
with the majority of Chamber One because he believed as follows:
"To require Sea-Land to do more than prove that the
material was taken into the PSO Port and could not be
brought out is to place upon it a virtually impossible
burden of proof, considering the nature of the equipment
and the circumstances surrounding its loss."^'"
Moreover, according to him, the majority's ruling in respect of the
alleged expropriation of Sea-Land's bank account in Iran "reverses
universally recognized rules concerning burdens of proof before
international tribunals.
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Ports and Shipping Organization, Award No. 135-
33-1, p. 33, reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 149-175, at 173.
Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to Award on
the Claims and Concurring as to Dismissal of Counterclaims, p. 6,
reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 175-218, at 178.
™ Ibid, p. 55, reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, p. 208. See
also ibid pp. 210, 211, 212.
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CHAPTER III
COLLABORATION OF PJiRTIES : RESPONDENT S ROLE
A. The Concept
In the previous chapter the broad basic rule with regard
to the allocation of the burden of proof was discussed. According
to that rule each party has to prove its own claim or defence.
Although that rule is the most important rule of the burden of
proofs it is not the only one in that respect. Another important
rule, which complements the broad basic rule, is the rule for
collaboration of parties in presenting evidence to international
tribunals.
The idea of the peaceful settlement of disputes before
international tribunals is largely based on the premise of co
operation of the litigating parties. The parties are expected to
co-operate with each other at different stages of the proceedings
and on numerous issues. Their wide-ranging co-operation include
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matters concerning the compromise, choosing or setting up the
tribunal, selection of judges, procedure, etc. They are usually
even bound to co-operate in preserving the status quo and refrain
from actions that would aggravate the dispute.^ The aspects of the
parties^ co-operation to be discussed here, however, are limited to
those related to the burden of proof, ie., co-operation in placing
all material facts before the tribunal.
It would be misleading to rely solely on the rule actori
incumbit probatio . with respect to the burden of proof in
international procedure. The flexibility and truth—seeking nature
of the international procedure, as well as the fact that there is
usually no possibility of appeal from the decisions of
international tribunals, require that both parties try to shed
light on the issues in dispute. As rightly concluded by Georges
Scelle, in his renowned report on arbitral procedure prepared for
and approved by the International Law Commission, "il est .. . un
principe certain, c^est que les Etats en litige ont 1^obligation de
collaborer de bonne foi a 1'administration de la preuve."^ This
principle is equally applicable in international commercial
See. e.g.. Article 33(3) of Geneva General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 26 September 1928
and 28 April 1949, reprinted in: Karin Oellers-Frahm and Norbert
Wiihler, Dispute Settlement in Public International Law: Texts and
Materials, Heidelberg (1984), p. 68. .
= Arbitral Procedure, Document A/CN.4/18 Rapport par Georges
Scelle, in : Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950,
vol. II, p. 134.
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arbitration
Mani also finds that the duty of collaboration is a general
obligation of parties which follows from the consent of States
whereby they agree to submit their claims for adjudication.^ As to
the necessity of the parties'^ collaboration, he points out that
"[a]djudication cannot take place in vacuum/ it can function
properly only if the parties are willing to co-operate with the
tribunal by furnishing it with all necessary and relevant facts by
way of evidence."^ On that basis he concludes that it is the
obligation of parties to present adequate evidence to the tribunal
"so as to enable it to arrive at a viable and fair resolution of
the conflicting claims."^
It is true that discharging the burden of proof is the
claimant's responsibility. But, it should also be noted that in
international litigation, where the events to be proved usually
relate to many years prior to the time of the proceedings.
3 see, e.g. J. Van Coinpernolle, L'Arbitrage, dans les Relations
Commerciales Internationales: Questions -de Procedure in: Revue de
Droit Internaional et de Droit Compare (Institut Beige de Droit
Compare), No. 2 (1989), PP. 114-115. "...Les deux parties ont au
surplus 1'obligation de collaborer, selon le pricipe de la bonne
foi, a 1'administration de la preuve, tout particulierement en
matiere arbitrale" (sentence no. 1434 de 1975, Clunet, 1976, 978 et
obs, quoted in ibid.
V. S. Mani, International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects,
p. 198.
5 Ibid.
® Ibid pp. 198-199.
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fulfilling this duty is far from easy . Moreover, in international
proceedings, where the interests and honour of nations might he
involved, the decisions of international tribunals could not be
based solely on the technical aspects of the mles of evidence
apart from their impact on the truth of a case. It is for this
reason, indeed, that the legal writers have emphasized the
nontechnical nature of the rules of evidence in international
proceedings.
The supreme aim of international proceedings, in spite of the
fact that the outcome of the proceedings in some cases might seem
unjust, is indeed the preservation of peace through establishing
justice and truth. Therefore, while the party who has initiated the
proceedings bears the burden of proving its claim, the other party
has some duties as well. The adversary not only should not attempt
to cover up the truth, but is expected to co-operate, up to some
extent, with the claimant for revealing the truth.
The rule of collaboration complements the rule of actori
incumbit probatio, and in cases where the full application of the
latter may result in some unreasonable consequences or impede the
due process of the proceedings, the rule of collaboration plays a
balancing role. The rule can be equally useful where the claimant
and the respondent are not precisely identified or, as it happens,
parties have tried to minimize the effect of the rule actori
incumbit probatio, by providing in the compromis that their
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arrangements v/ith respect to the written pleadings are without
prejudice to the rules of burden of proof.
The duty of respondent pursuant to the rule of collaboration,
contrary to that in some municipal law systems, does not end by a
mere general denial of the claimant's allegations. The respondent
should provide explanations and documents which are within his sole
possession to the international tribunal.
It should, however, be emphasized that it is not only the
respondent who bear the duty to observe the rule. In fact, similar
to the basic rule of the burden of proof which requires each party
to prove what it claims, the rule of collaboration is to be
observed by both parties. Consequently, both parties can benefit
from the rule with respect to their claims, counter-claims and
defenses.
Generally speaking, the rule of collaboration is applicable in
domestic jurisdiction too. But it is far more important in
international proceedings where parties are required willingly to
submit the documents at their disposal to the adjudicating
tribunal.^
In fact "because of the importance of having international
controversies resolved on the basis of the facts of the situation
as nearly as they may be determined, parties to internationaljudicial proceedings have a more extensive obligation to produce
all evidence within their control than that normally imposed upon
litigants in municipal proceedings." Sandifer, op.cit., p. 112.
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B. International Rules and Conventions
1. Examples
The duty of parties to co-operate for presentation of evidence
is emphasized in many Conventions concerning international
arbitration or conciliation as well as the statutes and rules of
procedure of international tribunals.
a. The Hague Conventions
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 provide for
collaboration of parties in presenting evidence to the
international commissions of inquiry envisaged in those
conventions. According to Article 12 of the 1899 Convention,
"The Powers in dispute engage to supply the international
commission of inquiry, as fully as they may think
possible, with all means and facilities necessary to
enable it to be- completely acquainted with and to
accurately understand the facts in question.
Since the phrase "as fully as they may think possible" would
provide a wide discretionary power to the States in presenting
evidence to the Commission, in 1907 some changes were made in the
^ J. Gillis Wetter, The International Arbitral Process vol.V,
at 19 6 (reproduced from the Hague Conventions and Declarations of
1899 and 1907, edited by J.B.Scott, New York 1915).
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clause In order to turn it into a stronger obligation. Thus. in
Article 23 of the 1907 Convention (which is the corresponding
article to Article 12 of the 1899 Convention) the word "Powers" at
the beginning of the phrase was changed to "Parties", presumably to
widen the scope of application of that article, to parties other
than governments, and also the following sentence was added at its
end :
"They undertake to make use of the means at their
disposal, under their municipal law, to insure the
appearance of the witnesses or experts who are in their
territory and have been summoned before the
commission.
b. The Permanent Court of Arbitration
The rules of procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
as is well known, are included in the Hague Conventions of 18 99 and
1907. The 1899 version of the Courtis rules is silent with respect
to the collaboration of parties. Article 75 of the 1907 Convention,
however, provides a specific undertaking for the arbitrating
parties "to supply' the tribunal, as fully as they consider
possible, with all the information required for deciding the
case
Moreover, the Court's "Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation
' Ibid.
Ibid. 218.
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for Settlement of International Disputes Between Two Parties of
Which Only One is a State" emphasizes^ inter alia, the parties'
obligation to co-operate with the conciliation commission where
both parties have agreed that their dispute be submitted to such a
commission. Article 10 of the above-mentioned Rules provides as
follows:
"The parties undertake to facilitate the work of the
Commission and particularly to furnish it to the greatest
possible extent with all relevant documents and
information."^^
c. The Rules Prepared by the International Law Commission
Article 15 of the Draft Convention of the International Law
Commission on Arbitral Procedure (1953) provides that :
"The parties shall co-operate with the tribunal in the
production of evidence and shall comply with the measures
ordered by the tribunal for this purpose. The tribunal
shall take note of the failure of any party to comply
with its obligation under this paragraph.
This provision reappears, with some changes, in Article 18(2) of
the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the International
Law Commission (1958) and the General Assembly which provides as
follows :
"The parties shall co-operate with the tribunal in
Ibid 6 2 (reproduced from a text provided by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration).
Report of the International Law Commission. Official
Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No.9,
Document A/2456, p.9-11.
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dealing with the evidence and in the other measures
contemplated hy paragraph 1. The tribunal shall take note
of the failure of any party to comply with the
obligations of this paragraph.
d. Regulations and Rules of "The Center for the Settlement of
International Investment Dispute" (ICSID)
Article 33(3) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) of ICSID, with language very
similar to that of Article 18(2) of the Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission, provides
that :
"The parties shall co-operate with the Tribunal in the
production of evidence and in the other measures provided
for in paragraph (2) . The Tribunal shall take formal note
of the failure of a party to comply with its obligations
under this paragraph and of any reasons given for such
failure.
Further, Article 34 of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional
Facility) Rules provides a much wider scope for co-operation of
parties, where they have agreed to refer their dispute to
conciliation, as follows:
"The parties shall cooperate in good faith with the
13 Report of the International Law Commission, Official
Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement
No.9, Document A/3859 p.5-8. The French text of Article 18(2) reads
as follows: "2. Les parties doivent collaborer avec le tribunal a
la presentation des preuves et aux autres mesures prevues _au
paragraph 1. Le tribunal prend acte du refus de I'une des parties
de se conformer aux prescriptions ordonnees a cette fin."
ICSID Regulations and Rules, reproduced in The International
Arbitral Process, op.cit.. vol.IV, p.522.
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commission in order to enable the Commission to carry out
its functions ^ and shall give their most serious
consideration to its recommendations."^^
Article 18 of the ICSID Fact-Finding (Additional Facility)
Rules also sets out similar obligations for parties to a fact-
finding proceeding :
"The parties undertake to facilitate the work of the
Committee and to supply it with all means and facilities
necessary to enable it to become fully acquainted with,
and or accurately understand, the facts in question.
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
parties in particular undertake to supply the Committee
to the greatest possible extent with all relevant
documents and information, as well as to use the means at
their disposal to allow the Committee to visit the
localities in question and to summon and hear witnesses
or experts
2. The Impact of Difference Between Litigation and Conciliation
The rules, regulations and conventions already referred to are
not unique in providing for parties' collaboration. Similar clauses
are incorporated in many other treaties, conventions and procedures
Ibid. vol.V, pp. 16-17 (reproduced from ICSID Document
ICSID/11). Article 34 continues as follows; "Without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing, the parties shall: (a) at the
request of the Commission, • furnish all relevant documents,
information and explanations as well as use the means at their
disposal to enable the Commission to hear witnesses and experts
whom it desires to call; (b) facilitate visits to and inquiries at
any place connected with the dispute that the Commission desires to
undertake; and (c) comply with any time limits agreed with or fixed
by the Commission." Ibid.
16 Ibid, pp.51-52.
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concerning international tribunals and conciliation commissions.
It should be noted, however,• that while the collaboration clause is
repeated in almost all the conventions involving international
conciliation, inquiry or fact-finding commissions, it is not
expressed in that form with respect to many international judicial
or arbitral fora.
For instance, the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact
of Bogota) of 13 April 1948 provides for the cooperation of
parties, to the fullest extent possible,with respect to the
Commission of Investigation and Conciliation. But it is silent as
regards the parties' co-operation before the Arbitral Tribunal,
This, however is not to be interpreted to mean that the
collaboration of parties is not required in contentious proceedings
before international tribunals. The reason for the absence of the
collaboration clause with respect to some of the international
tribunals, rather, seems to be rooted in the existing difference
between litigation and conciliation on one hand, and the
distinction between the power vested in international tribunals and
conciliation commissions on the other.
See, e.g., Treaty of 15 September 1914, United States of
America-France, Art.5, reprinted in: Dispute Settlement in Public
International Law, op.cit.. p.168; and Treaty of 15 September 1914,
U.S.A-Great Britain, Art. Ill, ibid 169.
See Article 23 of the Pact of Bogota reprinted in : Dispute
Settlement in Public International Law, op.cit., p.139.
S^ ibid. 141-143.
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It is true that both litigation and conciliation are means of
peaceful settlement of disputes. But parties are usually less
enthusiastic in providing evidence in a conciliatory proceeding
than in a contentious one. As regards authority, both institutions
usually lack enough power to compel presentation of evidence. Yet,
while conciliation commissions might for different reasons fail,
including lack of access to material pieces of evidence,
contentious proceedings are deemed to resolve the dispute at issue
since international tribunals cannot issue non-liquet judgments. As
a result, it seems that it has become customary for the parties to
international litigations to empower the arbitral or judicial
tribunals with the authority to ask for documents and information,
which is a right based on the duty of parties to collaborate,
instead of envisioning just a collaboration clause that leaves the
commissions at the mercy of parties.
C. International Precedents
If the conventions and rules concerning international
tribunals are not always specific about the necessity of parties'
co-operation, the practice of international tribunals, ipso facto,
confirms the applicability of that principle in international
procedure. International tribunals have found that the
collaboration of parties is a duty rooted in the honour of nations
and respect for justice, as well as a natural and proper duty for
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counsels before international tribunals
As to the reflection of the rule in the decisions of
international tribunals, however^ it should be noted that, similar
to many other rules of evidence, the duty of collaboration may be
observed in the proceedings without necessarily being mentioned in
the decisions of the tribunals. In fact, it is not usually an issue
to be addressed by international tribunals, unless special
circumstances necessitate it. Nonetheless, awards in which the rule
has been referred to or discussed are not wanting.
1. Mexican Claims Commissions
In its well-known Parker case, the United States - Mexican
General Claims Commission found it necessary, for the future
guidance of the Agents, to set out its views with respect to the
necessity of parties^ collaboration. The Commission first made it
clear that it would not be bound by any technical rule of evidence
of municipal law and then went on to state the rule that it deemed
applicable in international procedure :
" [I] t is the duty of the respective Agencies to^ cooperate
in searching out and presenting to this tribunal
facts throwing any light on the merits of the claim
presented. The Commission denies the "right" of ^ the
respondent merely to wait in silence in cases where it is
20 See George Pi naon fFrance^ v. United Mexican States (1928) ,
French-Mexican Commission, RIAA, vol.V, pp.327-466, at 413; and
Parker Case, RIAA, vol.IV, p.39.
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reasonable that it should speak.
In the continuation of the above passage, the commission
summarily expressed its opinion on the relation between the
collaboration rule and the rule of actori incumbit vrobatio ,
According to the Commission :
" While ordinarily it is incumbent upon the party who
alleges a fact to introduce evidence to establish it, yet
before this Commission this rule does not relieve the
respondent from its obligation to lay before the
commission all evidence within its possession to
establish the truth, whatever it may be."^^
The Commission further explained that its expectation for
parties^ collaboration was rooted in the fact that the parties
before it were sovereign States. While on that basis the Commission
encouraged the Agents to provide the documents at their disposal,
it warned them that under some circumstances the failure to produce
a document peculiarly within the knowledge of a party might be
taken into account by the Commission
R. I. A. A. vol. IV, p. 39. "To illustrate, in this case the
Mexican Agency could much more readily than the American Agency
ascertain who among the men ordering typewriting materials from
Parker and signing the receipts of delivery held official positions
at the time they so ordered and signed, and who did not." Ibid.
Ibid.
^ "For the future guidance of the Agents of both Governments,
it is proper to here point out that the parties before this
Commission are sovereign Nations who are in honor bound to make
full disclosures of the facts in each case so far as such facts are
within their knowledge, or can reasonably be ascertained by them.
The Commission, therefore, will confidently rely upon each Agent to
lay before it all of the facts that can reasonably be ascertained
by him concerning each case no matter what their effect may be. In
any case where evidence which would probably influence its decision
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The duty of collaboration was further discussed by a different
panel of commissioners later in the Lillie S. KlinQ Case, where the
Commission recalled with approval and confirmed the views expressed
in the Parker case.^^ Then, referring among other things to the
fact that other Commissions had dealt with the question similarly,
the Commission concluded as follows:
"Counsels in an international arbitration are of course
zealous in producing all possible evidence and argument
in defense of the acts of a government which they
represent. It is natural and proper that they should do
so. That is of course their duty to their Governments and
to themselves, and it is their duty to the tribunals
before which they appear which should have all possible
assistance in formulating sound judgments.It must be
generally assumed that any available proof to support a
government's contention will be produced."
The general principle established by the United States-Mexican
General Claims Commission with respect to the necessity of
collaboration of parties was followed by the French-Mexican
Commission as well. There, the negative attitude taken by the
Mexican Agent with regard to the documents presented by the French
Agent caused the Commission to discuss the necessity of
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the claimant or of the
respondent Government, the failure to produce it, unexplained, may
be taken into account by the Commission in reaching a decision."
Ibid.
Lillie S.Klina rU.S.Al v. United Mexican States. R.I.A.A
vol. IV, p.582.
25 Ibid 583.
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collaboration of parties before the Commission in its first
award.In the Pinson Case, the presiding Commissioner, Professor
Verzijl, after quoting with approval from the related passages of
the Parker Case, emphasized the importance of "international
relations" and "observation of justice" as further bases and
purposes for collaboration of Agents. According to him:
"En effect, les relations internationales sont d'une
importance telle, et 1'observation de la justice dans
leur developpement est tellement necessaire, que ce
serait un crime contre I'humanite' de vouloir abaisser
les proces internationaux de leur plan eleve sur le
niveau ou se deroulent malheureusement tant de proces
entre particuliers.
2. Commission of the International Labour Organization
The views expressed in the Parker case with respect to the
collaboration of parties have been supported by other international
tribunals and commissions as well. For instance, in its Report of
25 February 1963 with respect to the complaint by the Government of
Portugal Concerning the Observance by the Government of Liberia of
the Forced Labour Convention (of 1930), the Commission appointed
under Article 2 6 of the Constitution of the International Labour
The French-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission under the
presidency of Verzijl pursued its views on the issue in other cases
before the Commission as well. See, e.g., Palbo Naiera (of the
Lebanon) Case where the Commission, in its decision of 19 October
1928, characterizes the attitude of the Mexican Government as
"purely negative since they adduced no evidence whatever against
the former Turkish nationality of the Claimant..." 4 I.L.R. . p.302.
RIAA. vol. IV, p.413.
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Organization,^^ stated as follows, after quoting from the Parker
Case:
"In a case of a Commission appointed under^ Article 26
..., these considerations of general principle are
reinforced by the specific obligation of all Members of
the Organization under Article 27 of the Constitution to
'place at the disposal of the Commission all the
information in their possession which hears upon the
subject-matter of the complaint'. The Commission cannot
disregard an allegation because it has not been fully
proved if the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the respondent Government and that Government^ does not
think it appropriate to make a frank and full disclosure
of them."^
3. Corfu Channel Case
The limits of the obligation of parties before international
tribunals to produce evidence were discussed in an indirect way in
Article 26(1) of the Constitution of the International
Labour Organization Relating to Complaints Concerning the
Observance of Ratified Conventions provides that : "Any of the
Members shall have the right to file a _complaint with the
International Labour Office if it is not satisfied that any other
Member is securing the effective observance of any Convention which
both have ratified in accordance with the foregoing articles." 3^
I.L.R.. p.354.
36 ILR, p. 379. For the views of a similar forum see, e.g.,
Marias v. Madagascar, (Communication No. 12/49), United Nations
Human Rights Committee, 27 March 1983, in: 78 ILR p. 28 at 38-39:
("With regard to the burden of proof the Committee has already
established in its views in other cases (e.g. R. 7/30)_ that the
said burden cannot rest on the author of the communication alone,
especially considering that the author and the State Party do not
always have equal access to the evidence and that frequently the
State Party alone has access to relevant information. It is
implicit in Article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol that the State
Party has the duty to investigate in good faith all allegations of
violation of the Covenant made against it and its authorities, and
to furnish to the Committee the information available to it.")
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the Corfu Channel Case, where the International Court of Justice
was dealing with the complaint of the United Kingdom against
Albania^ concerning the minefield discovered in Albanian
territorial waters that had caused damages to British warships
The Court concluded, on the basis of international practice, that
"a State on whose territory ... an act contrary to international
law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation", and
that a reply that said State is ignorant of the circumstances of
the act and of its authors is not sufficient. "The State may",
according to the Court, "up to a certain point, be bound to supply
particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and
Inquiry at its disposal"
4. Rajin of Kutch Case
As another example for the applicability of the collaboration
rule before the international tribunals, the Indo-Pakistan Western
Boundary Case Tribunal can be mentioned. In April 1965 the dispute
concerning the boundary between India and Pakistan in the Gujarat-
West Pakistan region resulted in an outbreak of hostilities. On 30
June 19 65 the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan
concluded an agreement in which the parties agreed to a cease-fire
Corfu Channel Case. Judgment of 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports
1949, P. 12; 16 ILR. p. 155 et sea.
I.C.J. Reports 1949, P. 18. It is interesting to note that
on one occasion the parties submitted documentary evidence jointly.
Ibid P. 8.
148
and, in the event of failure of the direct negotiation between the
Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the
border, to submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal.
However, the Ministerial Conference did not take place and the
parties referred the dispute to the Tribunal provided for in their
agreement
In spite of the tense situation under which the Tribunal was
constituted, the parties co-operated satisfactorily with each other
and the Tribunal in production of evidence. For instance, a
delegation from each country visited the other country "for the
purpose of inspecting and obtaining copies of maps and documents in
Government archives", and "both Parties through direct
communications continuously requested the production of maps and
other documentary evidence from each other and assisted one another
in searching for and producing such evidence.
The arbitrators were so impressed by the parties' co-operation
with respect to production of evidence that they found it necessary
The text of the Agreement of 30 June 1965 is reprinted in
RIAA. vol. XVII, pp.7-8.
" Ibid.
34 Case Concerning the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of
Kutch^ Between India and Pakistan, Award of 19 February 19 68,
reprinted in vol. XVII RIAA (pp. 1-572) at 10. The Tribunal was
composed of Gunnar Lagergren, Chairman, and Nasrollah Entezam and
Ales Bebler, Members.
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to record their appreciation in the Introduction of the Award.
5. Comments
As Sandifer points out^ the standard mentioned by the Mexican
Claims Commission in the Parker case according to which each Agent
is expected to present "all of the facts that can reasonably be
ascertained by him concerning each case no matter what their effect
may be" is a high one. He doubts "whether it is generally accepted
as an obldgation by parties to international proceedings and
adhered to in practice by their representatives.
The same hesitation has been voiced by A.H. Feller^ who has
studied the law and procedure of the Mexican Claims Commission.
Discussing the Parker case. Feller points out that "[t]o the
cynical observer of the habits of lawyers all this may seem nothing
more than a pious wish."^^ He too wonders whether it is possible
that lawyers, "even when representing governments in international
disputes ", will co-operate in searching out and presenting all
facts in the way envisaged in the Parker Case.
35 "The Tribunal wishes to pay tribute to the spirit of co
operation and courtesy prevailing between the Parties. They have,
in unique measure, assisted the Tribunal and one another in the
production and search for the unusually rich and complex
documentary evidence." Ibid p.11.
Sandifer, op. cit. , p. 115.
" A.H.Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions, p. 262.
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As Feller himself concludes, "a final answer to this question
is hardly possible"; yet he points out that the impression he
gained from a study of the cases before the Mexican Claims
Commissions was that the agents generally complied with that
duty.^^ A similar impression is also gained from a study of the
cases adjudicated, so far, by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. There,
too, while a precise answer would prove difficult and would require
a detailed case-study, it may generally be said that neither the
Agents of the two governments nor counsels for the parties before
the Tribunal ever expressly objected in principle to the necessity
of parties' co-operation. In fact, on occasions, the Agents and
their legal advisers have relied upon the parties' duty of
collaboration before international tribunals for different
purposes.
By way of example. Case No. A-25 concerning Iran's application
to the Full Tribunal for the revocation, setting aside and
annulment of the award in Case No. 3 9 could be mentioned. In that
Case, Iran was arguing, inter alia, that the refusal of Chamber
Two, in Case No. 39, to consider some of the submitted documentary
evidence on the ground that it was filed too late was
inappropriate.^^ In support of its argument, among other reasons,
Iran also stated that the documents in dispute should have been
38 Ibid.
Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Case
No. A-25, Full Tribunal, Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the National Iranian Oil Company (filed 15 November 1989).
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disclosed by the Claimant in the first place. According to Iran
"This was not a situation where the Claimant could claim
prejudice by virtue of surprise. To the contrary^ the
Claimant was certainly aware of these filings but chose
to hide them from the Tribunal, This action was directly
contrary to the duty which international law places on
parties to produce relevant documents"
D. Limits
1. The Time
The most important result of the rule of collaboration is that
the adversary i.e., claimant or respondent, is obligated to provide
the tribunal with the documents which are in its sole possession.
As regards the practical effect of the rule, however, the question
arises as to the time, within the proceedings, from which the duty
of collaboration commences. Looking at the issue from a different
angle, the same question may be based on the quantity of proof
required to be provided by the claimant before the duty of
collaboration is established on the respondent.
Ibid at 161. After filing of the Application on 3 0 August
1989 by Iran,.the"Full Tribunal' issued and Order through which the
parties were invited to address in their Memorials the specific
interpretive questions and other issues raised by the Application.
(See the Order dated 11 October 1989 reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 283-284.) In the same Order a Hearing was scheduled to be
held on 10 January 1990. In the meantime, however, Iran and Philips
Petroleum Co. Iran, i.e. the claimant in Case 39, were able to
agree on a settlement, and on 3 January 1990 a joint request was
filed requesting that the Tribunal render an Award on Agreed Terms
in Case No. 39. The Settlement Agreement provided, inter alia, for
the withdrawal of Case A-25. The Tribunal issued the Award on
Agreed Terms on 10 January 1990 (See Award No.461-39-2, reprinted
in 21 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 285-293), and terminated the proceedings in
Case A-25 on 16 January 1990 (see ibid 302).
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But whether the emphasis is put on "the time" or "the
quantity"^ it is equally a question whose answer is far from easy.
Since the probative value of evidence in every given case is
determined, not by the parties, but by the tribunal and usually at
the final stage of the proceeding, any standard chosen for this
purpose would consequently be merely subjective. Nevertheless, the
following general propositions seem to be relevant:
First, it is an established rule that if claimant does not
provide any evidence at all, there is no duty for the other party
to do so. In Anglo-American law, from which seemingly the rule of
collaboration has originated,if the claimant is not able to
show at the early stages of the proceedings that it has a solid
case, the judge will announce that there is no case to answer, and
neither will the case be referred to the jury nor will the
respondent be required to provide any evidence. 42
Second, as to the order of production of evidence, it is also
an established rule in both municipal and international procedure
that respondent does not have to initiate the production of
evidence before the claimant does. Otherwise, it would contradict
the principle of actori incumbit probatio to which the rule of
collaboration is merely complementary, not a substitute. Thus,
See, generally, J.C. Witenberg, Onus Probandi devant les
Jurisdiction Arbitrales, Revue General de Proit International
Public. tome LV, 1951.
42 See, Ch.I (B-1), supra,
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since it is the claimant who, as the party who bears the burden of
proof, should go forward with the evidence, the respondent's duty
of collaboration cannot commence until such time that claimant
presents the documents at his own disposal.
Third, not only should claimant initiate the production of
evidence but the evidence he provides should be of some value. The
minimum standard for proof known in many municipal or international
jurisdictions is prima facie evidence. Therefore it is fair to
conclude that respondent should not be expected to provide any
evidence before claimant presents at least prima facie evidence in
favour of his case. This conclusion matches with the analogy made
by Witenberg with respect to the duty of claimant and respondent in
English law which, according to him, is the source of the prima
facie rule. There, too, the duty of respondent does not start
unless claimant provides some prima facie evidence.
Fourth, the rule of collaboration is not to be imposed on a
party unnecessarily. Thus, if claimant is able to prove its case
without any assistance from respondent it should do so. Or if the
documents which are useful for claimant's case are not exclusively
in respondent's possession and it is possible for claimant to
receive them through other sources, claimant cannot insist that
they should be produced by respondent.
It is needless to add that the above observations are valid
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only In situations whejre the production of evidence Is. Imposed on
respondent as an obligation; otherwise respondent (In the sense of
the party who Is responding to a claim) is in principle free to
provide voluntarily all evidence at its disposal before claimant
produces prima facie evidence.
2. Whether the duty of Collaboration includes Discovery
"Discovery" is a specific term for a pretrlal device in common
law countries^ through .which 'a party tries to gain access to all
the facts, documents and information in the exclusive knowledge or
possession of the adversary While the effect of "discovery",
similar to the duty of collaboration, is the disclosure of some
facts and Information, the striking features of "discovery" in
American law which make it distinguished from the duty of
collaboration before international tribunals are its generality,
broad scope and mechanics.
In American law "discovery" is usually used for disclosure of
Corpus Juris Secundum of the American Law defines
'discovery' as follows: "Discovery is the disclosure of facts,
deeds, documents, or other things in the exclusive knowledge or
possession of one party, which are necessary to the party seeking
discovery as a part of a cause of action or defense in an action
pending, or to be brought in another court, or as evidence of his
rights or title in such proceedings." 27 C.J.S, Discovery, para.l.
While the above is the definition of discovery in eguity, it has
been defined similarly under statutory provisions as well. See Ibid
para. 20.
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all the facts and Information in possession of the adversary. Its
scope is broad in that inquiry may be made into "any matter^ not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action" and the mechanics through which discovery could
be achieved include a vast range of devices sanctioned by law.'^^
Contrary to discovery which could be used prior to the trial,
the duty of collaboration in international procedure, as explained
earlier, is not triggered unless the party who claims a fact
provides some prima facie evidence. Nevertheless, based on the
analogy of the English Law, • Witenberg • concludes that the
application of the duty of collaboration in International procedure
yields results similar to those of discovery in English law.
According to him:
"Lorsgue le document invoque se trouve entre les mains de
1'adversaire, celui-ci peut se voir enjoindre de le
produire par la commission agissant, soit proprio motu
soit sur requete de la partie. C'est une application du
principe de 1'obligation pour les parties de collaborer
F. James, Jr. & G.C.Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure p.180,
quoting Fed.R.Civ. p. 26 (b) (1).
According to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "[tjhe devices
for discovery include the deposition, which may be taken through
oral questioning or through written questions and may be taken of
either a party or a nonparty witness; interrogatories to a party,
which are questions put in writing to a party; production of things
(including documents) and entry upon property, to inspect, copy or
photograph, or conduct tests; physical or mental examinations of
parties or persons "under legal control of a party; and requests
for admissions, which require a party to admit propositions of fact
tendered in a written request. The matters that may be inquired
into through these devices are governed by rules as to scope of
discovery. The enforcement of discovery, which helps make these
devices practically effective, is governed by sanction rules." Ibid
179.
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a la preuve on du droit anglais de "discovery". La
procedure de ••discovery" se rapproche de 1'action M
exhibendum des articles 809 et 810 du Code Civil
allemand, procedure qui, inconnue du droit frangais, tend
a s'Y introduire
Witenberg is referring generally to the situation where a
party provides the documents or information in his possession in
response to an order of the concerned tribunal Two different
situations, however, should be differentiated in this respect:
First, the Tribunal may find it necessary, vroprio motu, to ask for
documents and information in possession of a party. Second, it may
happen that the tribunal does so at the request of the other party.
There is not much similarity between the first situation, which is
a matter related to an international tribunal's power, and
discovery. The second situation, on the other hand, is the result
of application of both the duty of collaboration and the tribunal's
power together/ and considering the outcome, it does bear a
resemblance to "discovery".
The two situations referred to above are reflected differently
in the constituent instruments of international tribunals. While
the international tribunals' power to ask for production of
evidence at their own discretion is usually provided for in their
statutes or rules, the situation where they order a party to
produce documents and information at the request of the other party
J. C. Witenberg, op.cit. , p. 333. (Footnote omitted)
Ibid.
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is rarely specified. Even in exceptional cases where there are
provisions to that effect^ contrary to "discovery" in American law,
it is limited to a document or information specifically asked for
by a party, and there is usually no mechanism to force the
unwilling party to produce the requested document.
In this respect, the Rules of Procedure of the Common Market
Trihunal^^ contains a rather unique provision for production of
documents in the possession of the adversary. Article 6 of the
Rules of Procedure of 22 November 1973 of the above-mentioned
Tribunal provides that :
"(1) Where any paper or document relied upon by a party
is not in the possession of that party but in the
possession of the other party, the first party may in
writing, through the Registrar, request the production of
a copy of any such paper or document.
(2) Within fourteen days of the receipt of the request
the other party shall produce to the Registrar a copy of
the paper or document required to be produced. In the
event of failure to produce the paper or document, the
Registrar shall reserve the matter for the consideration
of the Tribunal.
As another example, the Procedural Rules of the Indo-Pakistan
Western Boundary Case Tribunal, which was constituted pursuant to
the Agreement of 3Q June 19 65 to determine the dispute concerning
the boundary between India and Pakistan in the Gujaratprovides
Established by the Treaty for East African Co-operation of
6 June 1967.
Reprinted in: Dispute Settlement in Public International
Law. OP.cit.. p. 471-472.
The text of the Award of the Tribunal is reprinted in:
RIAA. vol. XVII, pp. 1-572.
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as follows with respect to "discovery and inspection":
" A party may, hy notice in writing, call upon the other
Party to make available to it for inspection any document
which is or is likely to be in the possession or under
the control of such other Party; and thereupon such other
Party shall, if the document is in its possession or
under its control, provide adequate and expeditious
facilities to the Party to take inspection and copies of
the document and, on request of such Party and at its
cost shall furnish to it such number of photostat copies
as it required and also produce the document before the
Tribunal. If the document is not in the possession or
under the control of the other Party, an affidavit shall
be filed to that effect before the Tribunal
The above arrangements are exceptional and are not found in
the rules of procedure of many other international tribunals.
Nonetheless, the lack of reference to the situation where a party
may seek the tribunal's assistance for securing evidence in the
possession of the adversary does not mean that parties are actually
barred from making requests to that effect. In practice, however,
parties to cases before international tribunals are disinclined to
make such requests unless absolutely necessary.
The obvious reasons for the. fact that such requests are not
made very often could be the uncertainty as to its fruitfulness,
the undue delay it may cause in the proceedings, and, probably the
most important of all, the cautious approach of international
tribunals vis a vis those requests. As a recent example, mention
can be made of the cases before the Iran—United States Claims
Tribunal, where among hundreds of cases adjudicated by that
RIAA. vol. XVII, p. 9
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tribunal, only in few cases were requests made hy one of the
parties for presentation of evidence by the other party.
With respect to "discovery" of documents in its common-law
sense, generally speaking, it is fair to conclude that it is not
available in international procedure.International tribunals,
generally being powerless to compel production of evidence, have
normally refrained from issuing orders of discovery, particularly
when such a power has not been specifically granted to a tribunal
by the parties On the'., other, hand, while nothing can stop
parties from agreeing on such a mechanism, references to
"discovery" of that nature are rare in a comvromis and in other
52 See Ch. VII infra.
See. e.g., H.W.A. Thirlway, Evidence Before International
Courts and Tribunals, in: Bernardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [Instalment 1 (1981) p. 60]. With respect to
arbitration, it has been pointed out that, "[t]he real problem in
international arbitration is discovery. There is no discovery in
international arbitrations. The best course is to obtain your proof
independently. Arbitrators can be asked to draw inferences which
will help you if your opponent is totally uncooperative. However,
this will be up to the arbitrator." International Arbitration and
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution; Remarks by Arthur W.
Rovine in: American Society of International Law, Proceedings of
the 7 9th Annual Meeting. New York, April, 25-27,1985 (1987) at 333.
See, e.g., Lehigh Vallv R.R. Co. and Others v. Germany, 6
ILR pp.425-42 6. In that case the American Agent requested the
United States-German Mixed Claims Commission to issue subpoena for
the purpose of taking oral evidence. The Commission, however,
rejected the request because the Agreement establishing the
Commission had not authorized it to issue subpoenas for witnesses
or to administer an oath. Ibid.
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constituent instmiinents of international tribunals.
3. Third Parties and CollaJx>ration
Principally, there is no obligation in international procedure
for States not parties to a case to provide evidence, unless there
is an agreement to the contrary. There are multi-party agreements
that obligate the signatory States to provide the evidence in their
possession in case of a legal dispute between other members. Even
in those agreements, however, there is usually no sanction for that
obligation, and similar to the parties^ own duty of collaboration,
it is rather a moral obligation subject to the discretion of
States.
"Tnter-vention" of a third party, which is recognized as a
right in the ICJ Statute, might be considered as a form of
cooperation, but the direct or indirect interest which usually is
the basis, and indeed the condition, of intervention characterizes
the intervening government as a party to the pending case. On the
other hand international procedure lacks the device known in
municipal law through which a third party could be forced to
intervene in the proceedings of a case, in order to answer to
For instance, "something similar [to discovery] was provided
for in Art. IV, Para. 3 of the Alabama Claims Treaty between the
United States and Great Britain." Thirlway, Evidence—Before
International Tribunals. op.cit., Note. 53, supra.
See Articles 62 & 63 of the Statute of the I.C.J.
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Article 3 4(2) of the Statute of the I.C.J. empowers the Court
to ask for and receive information relevant to cases before it from
the public international organizations.^^ On that, basis^ Article
69 of the Rules of Court sets out in more detail the procedure for
application of that particular power of the Court. It provides,
inter alia, that " [t]he Court may, at any time prior to the closure
of the oral proceedings, either proprio motu or at the request of
the other parties... request a public international organization...
to furnish, information relevant to a case before it."^^ It also
envisages a situation where "a public international organization
sees fit to furnish, on its own initiative, information relevant to
a case before the Court..." and specifies that the "Court shall
retain the right to require such information to be
supplemented...
Furthermore, where in cases before the Court "the construction
of the constituent instrument of a public international
organization or of an international convention adopted thereunder"
is involved, the Registrar, on the instruction of the Court,
" See Article 34(2) of the Statute of the I.C.J. It should
also be noted that according to paragraph 4 of Article 69 of the
Rules of Court, the term "public international organization"
denotes "a;n international organization of States."
Article 69 (1) ,
Article 69 (2) .
Article 34(3) of the Statute.
Article 6 9 (3) of the Rules of Court.
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"shall so notify the public international organization concerned
and shall communicate to it copies of all the written
proceedings"^^ and the organization, within the time-limit fixed
hy the Court, may submit "its observations in writing.That is,
however, a situation of a limited nature and apparently envisages
only the right of submitting "observations" rather than "evidence".
Mention should also be made of the Procedural Rules of the
Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, which includes a
specific provision for the inspection of the original copy of any
document in the possession of third parties, as follows:
"Evidence: The Tribunal will be the judge of the
relevance and the weight of the evidence presented to it.
If the Tribunal, whether on the request of a Party or
otherwise, considers it necessary to inspect the original
of any document, which is in the possession of or under
the control of a Government other than the Parties, or of
any person other than a citizen of India or Pakistan
residing in India or Pakistan, respectively, the Tribunal
may request such Government or person to make the same
available to the Tribunal
It also provides for the right of cross-examination of deponents of
affidavits, submitted to the Tribunal by a party, by the other
party.
62
63
64
65
Article 34(3) of the Statute.
Article. 69(3) of the Rules of Court.
riAA, vol. XVII, p.9. "The Tribunal will direct how and by
whom the costs in this connection are to be borne." Ibid.
Ibid.
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As seen from the above text, apart from the Tribunal^s power
to forward requests to third parties, no further practical
procedure has been envisaged. Nor is there a reference to any
sanction for nonconformity with such requests of the Tribunal.
4. Lump Sum Settlement Agreements
As another example for the application of the collaboration
rule, reference should be made to the lump sum settlement
agreementsIt is usually provided in these agreements that the
State which settles claims against it by payment of a lump sum is
also obligated to provide the national claims commission of the
other State with the evidentiary documents in its possession
The most recent example of these agreements is the Agreement of 13
May 1990 concluded between the United States of America and Iran
through which more than two thousand eight hundred claims of U.S
nationals against Iran were settled. While providing, inter alia,
for a full and final settlement of all claims of less than $
250,000 against Iran, the Agreement envisages that the settlement
amount received by the United States shall be distributed between
See, e.g., Richard B Lillich, International Claims; Their
Adjudication by National Commissions (1962), p.47.
See. e.g.. Agreement of 27 September 1948 between
Switzerland and Yugoslavia, Art.9, reprinted in: Richard B. Lillich
and Burns H. Weston, International Claims; Their Settlement by Lump
Sum Agreements (1975), at 17; Agreement of 19 January 1960 between
Sweden and Poland, Art. 6, in ibid at 3 2 0; and Agreement Between
The Austrian Republic and the Polish Peoples' Republic Concerning
the Settlement of Certain Financial Questions, Art. 9, in ibid at
365.
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claimants through the U.S Claims Commission. In this Agreement,
Iran has agreed to furnish the United States Claims Commission,
within three month of receiving a request and for a period up to
three years, available information and documents related to those
claims.
E. Concluding Remarks
The duty of parties to co-operate in placing material evidence
before international tribunals is a part of the wider and more
general obligation which requires the litigating parties before
international tribunals to co-operate on a wide range of issues
both before and after commencement of the proceedings. States are
not obligated to allow their disputes to be submitted to judicial
settlement without their consent.Thus, the general obligation
of co-operation, being a prerequisite for the success of peaceful
settlement of disputes, cannot be imposed on States; rather, it is
built on their own consent when they freely submit to an
See, Art. XI of the Settlement Agreement in Claims of Less
Than US$ 250,000, Cases Nos. 86, B38. B76, B77 (13 May 1990) . This
Agreement together with a Joint Request for Arbitral Award—on
Agreed Terms were submitted to the Tribunal by the Agents of both
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on 17 May 1990,
and lead to Award No. 483-Claims of Less Than US$ 250,000 /86/B38/
B76/B77-FT, reprinted in 24 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., ...
The necessity of consent for judicial settlement of disputes
between States is a generally accepted principle and is recognized
in international jurisprudence. See, e.g., Aipplicabilitv of Article
VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 15 December 1989, Paras.
37-38, I.C.J. Reports 1989, PP. 190-191.
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international jurisdiction.
As was shown, the necessity of parties' co-operation in
matters of evidence is reflected in the 2rules of procedure and
jurisprudence of international tribunals and is supported by
doctrinal views. Consequently it should be considered as a general
principle applicable before international tribunals in matters of
evidence, particularly when parties to litigations are States with
respect to their own rights.
On the other hand, the duty of parties to co-operate in good
faith in matters of evidence does not shift the burden of proof, as
it is not the purpose of the rule to relieve the claimant of his
obligation to prove his claims. It is only after the claimant has
apparently done his best and all in his power for securing evidence
and has actually produced some prima facie evidence in support of
his case, that the duty of the respondent to produce the evidence
exclusively in his possession commences.
The respondent, in his turn, should not in any way impede or
block the claimant's efforts for production of documents by
remaining silent or not appearing at the proceedings. As an obvious
weakness of the rule, its application is largely based on the
respondent's presence in the proceedings and if respondent, as has
happened in many cases before the International Court of Justice,
chooses not to appear, then among the consequences of non-
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appearance would be the inapplicability, to a large extent, of the
collaboration rule.
Non-appearance of the respondent, however, is not the only
possible obstacle which may impede the application of the
collaboration rule. The major problem in that regard is, in fact,
the non-availability of specific sanctions at the disposal of
international tribunals to enforce an unwilling party to produce
information and documents even if the respondent is taking part in
the proceedings. This is a delicate question which needs to be
dealt with separately, especially as its effect is not exclusively
limited to the collaboration rule but extends to situations where
international tribunals require a party to produce evidence, not at
the request of the adversary but proprio motu.
It is to be noted, however, that the lack of specific measures
to enforce the collaboration of parties does not affect the
credibility of the collaboration rule as a general principle of
international procedure. One can still wonder, as Feller does,^^
whether expectation for collaboration of parties is more than a
pious wish. However, in international procedure not all rules are
sanctioned by specific measures such as those provided for under
the complicated and technical rules of municipal law. Not that all
Accordingly the question of sanctions will be dealt with
after discussing the powers and duties of international tribunals
with respect to the burden of proof. See Ch. VII, infra.
71 A.H.Feller, The Mexican Claims Cominission , p.262.
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the States would refuse to observe a rule of international
procedure simply because there is no sanction for it. As already
discussed, the impression gained from the practice of the Mexican
Claims Commissions and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, as
examples of two multi-case international tribunals - one belonging
to the past and one contemporaneous- confirms that the agents of
the States before those tribunals have generally co-operated in
matters of evidence.
The conclusion may be different where —in a new phenomenon or
development which is the result of the emergence of huge
multinational companies— private companies and individuals are
allowed by States (as parties to a treaty establishing an
international tribunal) to have recourse to the international
tribunal created by them. In those cases, considerations such as
honour of nations or duties of States towards the international
community are not fully involved. Nonetheless, even in those
situations the fear of antagonizing the arbitrators may encourage
the parties to demonstrate good faith gestures in matters of
evidence.
Another encouraging measure is the fact that rules of
procedure of some international tribunals provide for "revision" in
case of discovery of new documents The delay and costs that
See. e.g., Article 61 of the Statute and Article 99 of the
Rules of Court of the ICJ.
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repeating a proceeding can cause may in balance prevent parties
from withholding material evidence.
Finally, it is to be noted that the present situation of the
collaboration rule is in accord with its nature. In other words,
the reason why States and international tribunals have refrained
from incorporating rigid rules for enforcing or sanctioning the
duty of collaboration is probably that its nature, as a task which
is to be fulfilled in good faith, is such that either 2.t should be
complied with willingly or otherwise it is not possible to enforce
it at all. If that is true, then it is perhaps for the best that
the duty of collaboration remains, as it does now, in the twilight
zone of international procedure. Nonetheless, the valuable
assistance that a proponent of the burden of proof may receive
through application of this rule, and its effect on the burden of
proof, should not be undermined.
CHAPTER IV
AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS WITH
RESPECT TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Relevance
The aspects of the burden of proof which concern the
roles of claimant and respondent were discussed in the previous two
Chapters, respectively. The present Chapter is thus devoted to the
aspects of the burden of proof which pertain to the role of
international tribunals in that respect.
1. The Authority of International Tribionals in Matters of Evidence
vi s-a-vis the Principle of Prohibition of Judges From Acquiring
Evidence
Generally speaking, judges and arbitrators', whether in
municipal or international fora, are to decide cases on the basis
of the evidence submitted by the parties. They are basically not to
.produce evidence themselves, in favour of or against either of the
parties, since that would be contrary to the high degree of
impartiality they are required to maintain.
Prohibition of judges and arbitrators from acquiring evidence,
as a principle of municipal law, is expressed in the civil
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procedure codes of some countries.That principle provides a solid
basis for the broad basic rule of the burden of proof with respect
to the duty of claimant to prove its allegations, as well as being
indispensable in securing the neutrality of judges and arbitrators.
On the other hand, if it is strictly imposed on judges and
arbitrators it may cause unreasonable and unjust results in the
proceedings, and that needs to be avoided too.
The solution adopted by municipal law for this problem is to
recognize some acceptable exceptions to the prohibition rule by
allowing limited freedom to judges and arbitrators to investigate
the disputed facts by applying some specific measures whenever they
find it necessary under the circumstances of a given case. For
example, asking questions of the witness brought by a party or
referring issues of a technical nature to an expert is not
considered acquiring evidence in favour of a party, though in fact
it may look like it or even result in it.^
This authority of judges and arbitrators needs to be applied
^ For instance. Article 358 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
Iran provides, inter alia, that: "No court shall collect evidence
for the litigants, but shall examine the evidence either produced
or introduced by them." Code of Civil Procedure of Iran. Translated
by M. Sabi.
Thus, the above-mentioned Article 358 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of Iran continues in its second part as follows: "The
investigation which the court carries out during the proceedings of
a case for arriving at issues such as the inspection of a location,
interrogation of witnesses and those who have authenticated a
document, or reviewing the records of the trial and the like, shall
not be considered as collection of evidence."
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cautiously and prudently and in no way mitigates the importance of
impartiality. On the other hand, impartiality is not to be confused
with inaction, or indifference. Rather, judges and arbitrators are
required to preserve their impartiality while playing an active
part in the proceedings for the purpose of establishing the facts,
no matter in favour of which party it may be.
The liberalism of international law and the inherent flexibil
ity of international procedure, too, naturally favour the authority
of international tribunals to investigate, proprio motu, the facts
at issue. If in municipal law the authority of judges was only
gradually established, international procedure was free of those
restrictions from its outset.^ In international procedure the
judges and arbitrators principally enjoy a vast authority with
respect to matters of evidence and play an important role in the
proceedings. Yet, similar to municipal law, their authority is not
to be applied in a way that may endanger their impartiality.
The intervention of international tribunals in matters of
evidence is to take place impartially and with due regard to the
fundamental principles of equality of parties and the necessity of
providing parties with full opportunity to present their claims and
defenses. The misapplication of this delicate task, which is
usually fulfilled satisfactorily by knowledgeable and experienced
3 See, e.g., the Jay Treaty of 1794, the Hague Conventions of
1899 Sc 1907, and the Statute and Rules of the ICJ and its predeces
sor.
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judges and arbitrators, is not only prejudicial to the rights of
parties in a particular case but harmful to the regime of
international judicial and arbitral settlement of disputes, as a
whole.
As has been repeatedly mentioned in the legal literature,
justice not only should be done, but should be seen to be done.
Therefore, impartiality always comes first, and it is logical and
fair to conclude that the authority of international tribunals with
respect to matters of evidence is only to be applied to the extent
compatible with impartiality.
2. The Scope of Relevancy
The authority of international tribunals includes a wide range
of measures each of which may, generally speaking, somehow affect
the burden of proof. For instance the authority of international
tribunals to determine, complement or interpret the rules of
procedure'* may indirectly affect the rules to be . applied by the
tribunals with respect to the burden of proof.
* See, e.g. , Article 11 of the Arbitration Rules for the Court
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
reprinted in J. Wetter, The International Arbitral Process, vol V,
at 89; Article 19 and 21 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of
International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is a
State (1962), reprinted in ibid at 57; Article 9 of Model Rules on
Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the International Law Commission
(1958), reprinted in ibid at 232; and Article 55 of the European
Convention of Human Rights of 1950 which provides that: "The Court
shall draw up its own procedure."
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Among the wide range of authority exercised by international
tribunals with respect to different aspects of proceedings,
however, only those that have a direct bearing on the burden of
proof are to be discussed in this Chapter; the rest are excluded
for the sake of brevity and relevance.
3. The Effect of International Tribunals' Authority on the Burden
of Proof
The authority of international tribunals, even if applied with
utmost impartiality, affects the burden of proof. For it may lead
to clarification of some aspects of a given case to the detriment
or benefit of the proponent. Moreover, in order to answer a
question as to whether or not the party who carries the burden of
proof in a particular case has fulfilled its duty, not only the
facts proved by the parties but those established as a result of
measures applied by the tribunal itself are taken into account. It
is, in other words, on the basis of the accumulated effects of the
claimant, respondent, and tribunal's efforts altogether, that the
question of whether claimant has met the burden of proof is
decided.
The interrelated effects of the tribunal's investigation and
the efforts of proponent should not be overlooked either. As a
result of the fact-finding measures applied by the international
tribunals, proprio motu. the proponent of the burden of proof may
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find its duty relatively easier or more difficult, as the case may
be.
In sum, the effects of the fact finding power of international
tribunals are to be considered somewhat as their contribution with
respect to the burden of proof and thus as part of a study of the
aspects of the burden of proof before international tribunals.
B. Authority to Schedule the Production of Pleadings and Evidence
International tribunals, particularly those which like the
I.C.J. are. of a permanent nature as well as the multi-case arbitral
tribunals, usually have to determine the scheduling for submission
and exchange of briefs and evidence by the parties.^ These
schedulings, including the directions made by international
tribunals with respect to the number, order and time of filing of
the pleadings and evidence, provide a framework within which the
burden of proof should be fulfilled by the proponent.
It is to be noted, however, that in scheduling the submission
of memorials and evidence international tribunals usually consider
the views of the parties and take into account any agreement they
may have made in that respect as much as possible. In the case of
the International Court of Justice, for instance, it is provided in
the Rules of Court that the President "shall ascertain the views of
^ I.C.J., Rules of Court, Article 44.
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the parties with regard to questions of procedure"'^ through their
agents, and the Court shall make the necessary orders "in the light
of the information obtained by the President"/ and taking into
account "any agreement between the parties which does not cause
unjustified delay.
lo Number and Order of Filings of Pleadings
As far as written statements are concerned, usually claimant
proceeds, and respondent follows with their first submissions of
pleadings, which do not necessarily contain the evidence or the
whole evidence that they intend to produce. Thereafter, it is
usually for the concerned tribunal to decide whether or not further
written statements are required and to schedule the submission of
evidence by the parties.
In this respect, distinction is made in the I.C.J. Rules
between a case begun by means of an application and a case begun by
the notification of^ a special agreement.' As regards the first
group, the pleadings consist of a Memorial by the applicant and a
Counter-Memorial by the respondent, with the possibility of filing
"a Reply by the applicant and a Rejoinder by the respondent if the
® I.C.J., Rules of Court, Article 31.
Ibid, Article 44.
' Ibid.
' Ibid. Article 45 and 46.
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parties are so agreed, or if the court decides, proorio motu or at
the request of one of the parties, that these pleadings are
necessary.
With respect to cases instituted by the notification of a
special agreement, the number and order of pleadings shall be
subject to the parties' agreement "unless the Court, after
ascertaining the views of the parties, decides otherwise."'^ If,
however, as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 4 6 of the Rules of
Court, the special agreement contains no provision concerning the
number and order of pleadings, and if the parties have not
subsequently agreed to that effect, "they shall each file a
Memorial and Counter-Memorial, within the same time-limits" and
"[t]he Court shall not authorize the presentation of Replies unless
it finds them to be necessary."'^
I
The rules adopted in other international tribunals or in
arbitral model rules of procedure are not too different from those
incorporated in Articles 45 and 46 of the Rules of the I.C.J. as
explained above. For instance, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
contemplate a "statement of claim" by claimant (Art.18), a
Ibid. Article 45.
" Ibid. Article 46 (1).
Ibid. Article 46 (2) .
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"statement of defence" by respondent (Art.19)'^ and further written
statements, subject to the decision of the tribunal (Article 22).
With respect to the number and order of pleadings, it has been
the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to provide claimant
and respondent with the opportunity to file a Reply (in response to
the Statement of Defence) and a Rejoinder in response to claimant's
Reply, respectively, after filing the Statement of Claim and
Statement of Defence.This method, which consists of two rounds
of pleadings for each party, starts with the Statement of Claim by
claimant and ends by filing the Rejoinder by respondent.
It should be added, however, that the above-mentioned order,
which is to be considered as the basic and normal method applied by
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in relation to pleadings, is
frequently affected by the circumstances of particular cases. For
example, in approximately 3,000 so-called "small claims",'^ which
If the respondent wishes to submit a counter-claim it should
be submitted together with the statement of defence, or "at a later
stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides
that thedelay was justified under the circumstances..." UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, Article 19 (3).
See, e.g.. Case No.195, Chamber One, Aarostruct Interna
tional. Inc.. V. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Order of 17 February
198 6; Case No. 214, Chamber Three, Dadras International v. Iran,
Order of 20 June 198 6; Case No. 394, Chamber One, Merrill Lynch &
Co. Ltd.. V. Iran. Order of 23 May 1986; and Case No. 55, Chamber
Two, Amoco Iran Oil Company v. Iran, Order of 9 April 1986.
15 These claims were unofficially referred to at the Tribunal
as "small claims" because in each claims the relief sought was less
than $ 250,000. These claims were presented by the United States to
the Tribunal in accordance with Article III (3) of the Claims
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were claims filed by the United States on behalf and for the
benefit of its nationals against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Tribunal provided the United States with the opportunity to file a
supplement to each Statement of Claim.'® Or, in more than 100 major
cases filed by dual nationals of Iran and the United States against
Iran, the Tribunal, realizing the sensitivity of the Government of
Iran to these cases, applied a much more flexible approach in
scheduling for submissions by Iran."
2. Niomtoer and Order of Filings of Evidence
Two slightly different methods have been developed and applied
in international procedure with respect to the number and order of
filings of evidence, depending on whether or not it is obligatory
that the evidence be submitted together with the written statements
of the parties. The distinction between the two approaches is
illustrated if, for instance, the Rules of the I.C.J., are compared
to those of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Article 50 (1) of the
Rules of the I.C.J, provides that "[t]here shall be annexed to the
Settlement Declaration.
See, e.g., Case No. 10708, The Government of the United
States of America, on behalf and for the benefit of William R.
Leckemby v. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Order of 4 April 198 6;
and Case No. 11083, The Government of the United States of America,
on behalf and for the benefit of Peters Productions, Incorporated
V. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Order of 2 June 1986.
See. e.g., Cases Nos. 390, 391 and 392, Chamber One, Lilly
Mvthra Fallah Lawrence v. Iran. Order of 9 February 1988; and Cases
Nos. 278 and 331, Chamber Two, Hoshancr Mostofizadeh v. National
Iranian Oil Company et. al.. Order of 16 December 1988.
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original of every pleading certified copies of any relevant
documents adduced in support of the contentions contained in the
pleading." In the Rules of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, however,
claimants and respondents have only been advised to annex to their
statements the whole or either of the following: 1. Such documents
as will serve clearly to establish the basis of their claim or
defence. 2. A reference and summary of relevant portions of such
documents. 3. Quotations of relevant portions of such documents.^®
If at the preliminary stage of the proceedings the
international tribunals' power for scheduling and determining the
number and order of filings of evidence might be limited due to the
agreement of the parties or the predetermined rules of procedure,
the situation is quite different after the filing of written state
ments by the parties. For, whether or not the parties file their
evidence together with their written statements, after that stage
up to the end of proceedings, the scheduling, order, number and
admission of the evidence is usually left by the parties to the
discretion of the tribunal. This power of international tribunals
has eventually either a favourable or an adverse effect, as the
case may be, on the burden of proof since, to say the least, it may
extend or limit the manoeuvrability of the proponent.''
See Articles 18 and 19 of the Tribunal Rules, reprinted in
2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 405, at 423.
" The subject, however, is not to be discussed here in detail
as only the effect of the tribunals' power and not the power itself
is related to the subject of the present study. Nonetheless, by way
of example the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is
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The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal applied its powers with respect
to matters of evidence more flexibly in the early stage of its
work, taking into account the prevailing circumstances, and
particularly the hardship that the Government of Iran was facing as
a result of being party to thousands of cases before the Tribunal.
However, as time went by, the Tribunal realized the necessity of
adhering to a more or less uniform and rigid procedure to be
applied in all cases except for exceptional circumstances. On that
basis, the practice of the Tribunal has basically been to direct
claimants and respondents to file their evidence at two stages, as
follows:
First, within a specified time-limit, "copies of all written
evidence on which they will seek to rely and a legal brief,
explaining the evidence and clarifying the issues in [the] case,
together with a list of all documentary evidence submitted by them
and the location in the record ( by tab or exhibit number) of each
document.
Second, within a few months' time-limit "after the date of the
filing of the respondent's submissions ... copies of any
documentary evidence on which it will seek to rely in rebuttal of
previously presented evidence together with a supplemental list of
referred to summarily.
Case No. 184, Granger Associates v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran. et.al.. Order dated 2 December 1985.
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such rebuttal evidence and the location of each such document in
the record.
As to the order of filing of evidence, the Tribunal has acted
differently. In most cases the order for submission of pleadings
has been adopted for filing the evidence as well; namely claimant
to start the submission of evidence and respondent to be the last
after two rounds of submissions for each of the parties.
Occasionally, some of the Chambers of the Tribunal have favoured
the simultaneous filing of evidence by both parties, to be followed
by simultaneous filing of rebuttal evidence by them within a
reasonable time-limit Or, in some cases, the Tribunal has
instructed the parties to file their first round of submission of
Ibid. The claimant's failure to comply with the Tribunal's
Order at this stage would cause the Tribunal to consider the
exchange of written pleadings closed; see, e.g.. Case No. 300,
Central Cleveland International Bank, v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran. Order of 4 May 1988.
See. e.g., Case No. 184 Chamber One, Order dated 2 December
1985; Case No. 412 and 415, Chamber three, Zaman Azar Nourafchan,
et.al.. V. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Order dated 27 December
1989; Case No. 251, Chamber Two, George Edwards v. The—Islamic
Republic of Iran, et.al.. Order dated 4 June 1986; Case No. 55,
Chamber Two, Amoco Iran Oil Company v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran. et.al.. Order dated 9 April 1986; and Case No. B1 (claim 4)
Full Tribunal, The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of
America. Order dated 7 October 1986.
^ See, e.g.. Case No. 490, Chamber One, Itel Corporation v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et. al.,, Orders
dated 12 February 19 86 and 14 July 1986; and Case No. 452 Chamber
One, Trans America ICS. Inc.. v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, et.al.. Order dated 13 December 1985.
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evidence consecutively, but their rebuttal simultaneously
3. Oral Proceedings
A similar development marks the Tribunal's practice with
respect to the order and number of submissions of parties on oral
proceedings. While in the early years of the Tribunal's activity
the oral procedure was more flexible and was left to be decided
according to the circumstances of each particular case, as time
passed and the pre-hearing and hearing sessions were repeated the
Tribunal found it appropriate to regulate the sessions by
notifying, in advance, the parties in each case of certain
decisions regarding the conduct of the Hearing.
The main general items which have almost routinely appeared in
the Tribunals' Orders in that respect are as follows:
"1. No new documents may be introduced in evidence prior to the
Hearing unless the Tribunal so permits and unless the request for
their introduction is filed at least two months before the Hearing.
2. At the Hearing, any party is free to ma]<:e any arguments it
wishes, but new documents may not -be introduced in evidence unless
See. e.g.. Case No. 444, Chamber One, Inaersol-Rand Company
V. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et.al.. Order dated 12 September
198 6; Case No. 490, Chamber One, Itel Corporation v. The Government
of The Islamic Republic of Iran. Order dated 10 July 1986; Case No.
445, Chamber Three, Mitra Leasing Corporation v. The Islamic
Republic of Iran, et.al.. Order dated 7 March 198 6; and Case No.
210, Chamber Three, William J.Levitt v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, et.al.. Order dated 17 March 1989.
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the Tribunal so permits, which permission should not be anticipated
except for evidence in rebuttal of evidence introduced at the
Hearing.
3. With respect to witnesses, the Tribunal reminds the parties of
the requirements of Article 25 of the Tribunal Rules.^ 4.
The Tribunal will decide whether to authorize, post—hearing
submissions only at the end of the Hearing. In the interest of the
efficient conduct of the arbitration, the Tribunal will be
reluctant to authorize such submissions unless they are clearly
essential.
It is also to be noted that in some important and complicated
cases the Tribunal has set the scheduling for submissions of
written statements and evidence as well as the date of the Hearing
and the issues to be addressed therein after discussing it with the
Article 25(2) of the Tribunal Rules requires each party to
communicate to the arbitral tribunal and to the other party "the
names and addresses of the witnesses he intends to present, the
subject upon and the languages in which such witnesses will give
their testimony" at least thirty days before the hearing. With
respect to rebuttal witnesses, Note 2 to Article 25 provides a
slightly different procedure.
Case No. 68, Chamber Two, Howard Needles Tammen and
Berqendorft, v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of—Iran,
et.al.. Order dated 3 December 1985. See, also, e.g.. Case No.
10514, Chamber One, Leonard and Mavis Daley v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, Order dated 4 March 1987; Case No. B-9, Chamber Two,
Iranian National Airlines Co., v. U.S. Financial Services, Order
dated 12 March 198 6; Case No. 381, Chamber one, Uiterwyk
Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
et.al.. Order dated 6 march 1986; and Case No. 940, Chamber Two,
Hover Naft International.et.al.. v. the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Order dated 15 March
1989.
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representatives of the parties and the Agents of the United States
and Iran in an informal session.These sessions have usually-
resulted in agreements between the parties as to the time and order
for submission of briefs and evidence, and have accelerated the
pace of the proceedings.^^
4. Authority to Accept or Refuse Further Pleadings and Evidence
The time-limits set by international tribunals for filing the
briefs and evidence by the parties do not bind the tribunals
themselves completely. International tribunals possess the power,
in the absence of the parties' agreement to the contrary, to extend
the time specified for submission of pleadings and evidence, or
actually to refuse to consider pleadings and evidence not filed
within the specified time-limits.
This authority of international tribunals is specified in the
rules or statutes of some international tribunals. For instance,
Article 52 of the Statute of the I.C.j provides "[t]hat after the
Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time
See^ e.g., Cases Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, Chamber One.
See, e.g., Case No. 56, Chamber Three, Amoco International
Finance Corporation, v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, et.al.. Order dated 11 December 1985, where it is stated that
the parties' differences with respect to the scheduling were
discussed at a meeting at the Tribunal and that with the agreement
of the parties the Tribunal decided to make certain modifications
in respect of the future proceeding, in the case. In some of these
informal meetings the party-appointed arbitrators were not present.
Ibid.
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specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any further oral
or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the
other side consents." Moreover, even in cases where this aspect of
the international tribunals' authority is not specifically referred
to, international tribunals have not hesitated in applying this
authority, when necessary.
The Rules of Procedure of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal provide the Tribunal with the power to set and to extend
time-limits for submission of pleadings and evidence by the
parties. The Rules do not, however, specify that the Tribunal
should refuse to accept untimely submissions. Nonetheless the
Tribunal, acting presumably according to the circumstance of each
occasion, has not been faced with any difficulty in that regard and
has applied its discretion in accepting or refusing late filed
evidence.
Generally speaking, on the basis of the general impression
gained from the practice of the Tribunal in this regard it can be
concluded that in most of the cases the Tribunal has accepted late
29 See Notes 30 & 31 infra.
For instance, in Case No. 256, August F. Benedix, Jr.
et.al., V. Iran, Chamber One of the Tribunal denied the Responde
nt's request for extension of time to file its evidence regarding
Claimants' nationality, but stated that it "will consider any
documents filed by the Respondent prior to its deliberations, which
will take place in due course" (Order of 10 February 1987). Chamber
Three of the Tribunal acted similarly in Cases Nos. 844 and 816.
(Vera-Jo Miller Arveh v. Iran. Order of 20 February 1987).
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filed evidence but has provided the other party an opportunity to
answer and rebut that evidence.^' As concluded by the Full Tribunal
in its Interlocutory Award in Case-B-1, "given the practice of this
and other tribunals, ...the defence should not be barred on the
grounds of having been raised in an untimely fashion.
C. Measures Through Which International Tribunals Apply Their Pact
Finding Power
1. The General Authority Of International Tribunals To Ask For
Production Of Evidence And To Investigate The Disputed Facts
proprio motu
In the field of international law of evidence, the power of
international tribunals to ask for production of evidence or to
investigate the facts at issue Tjroprio motu is not disputed. The
Statute of the I.C.J provides, inter alia, that "[t]he Court may,
even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any
document or to supply any explanations'";^^ and that "[t]he Court
may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission,
See, e.g.. Case No. 389, Chamber Two, Westinqhouse Electric
Corporation. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force,et.al..
Order of 2 9 August 1986.
Case No. Bl, Full Tribunal, The Islamic Republic of Iran v.
The United States of America. ITL 60-Bl-FT, 4 April 1986, reprinted
in 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 207.
Article 49 .
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Qj- other* oirganization that it itiay select, with the task of cairiryinij
out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion."^ These rights, which
are reiterated and expanded in the Rules of the Court,reflect a
common feature of the authority of international tribunals which is
usually specified in their rules of procedure.
As another example, the Rules of the European Court of Human
Rights (in Article 40) empower the Court to obtain proprio motu
"any evidence which it considers capable of providing clarification
on the facts of the case", to "decide to hear as a witness an
expert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence or
statements seem likely to assist it in the carrying out of its
task" or to "ask any person or institution of its choice to obtain
information, express an opinion or make a report, upon any specific
point.
The fact finding power of international tribunals appears to
be inherent and thus even in cases where it is not specifically
34 Article 50.
See, e.g., Articles 61, 62, 66, 67, and 68 of the Rules
of the I.C.J.
Revised Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human
Rights of 24 November 1982, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Rule 40. S^,
also. Article 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights of 1980 which provides that Court
with similar authority, reprinted in; Dispute Settlement in Public
International Law, op. cit., at 320; and Articles 21 and 22 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Economic Community of 17 April 1957 and Articles 45 and 47 of the
1982 Rules of Procedure of the same Court, reprinted in; ibid, at
375 and 386-387.
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referred to in their rules of procedure, they are entitled to
require parties to produce evidence and to investigate the disputed
facts at their own initiation. However, theoretically the parties
always remain empowered to agree to the contrary in order to limit
the fact finding power of a tribunal if they choose so. In
practice, however, such instances are rare and parties usually
emphasize the power of the tribunal.
Nevertheless, the parties' autonomy in this respect is
sometimes mentioned in the statute or rules of procedure of
international tribunals. For instance Article 43 of the ICSID
Convention with respect to the arbitral tribunal contemplated in
chapter 4 of that Convention provides as follows:
"Except as the parties otherwise agree the Tribunal
may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the
proceedings, (a) call upon the parties to produce
documents or other evidence, and (b) visit the scene
connected with the dispute, and conduct such inquiries
there as it may deem appropriate."^^
On the other hand, the parties' right to limit the power of
the tribunal being obvious, the first sentence of the above-
mentioned Article . 43 does not appear in Rule 3 3 of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules which, among other things, repeats the contents
Emphasis added.
lonvention
.nd Nationc
ibid pp. 604-616.
C on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States a tionals of Other States of 18 March 1965, reprinted in
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of paragraphs (a) and (b) above with a slightly different
wording.^'
In practice, instances in which parties have agreed to limit
the power of international tribunals with respect to matters of
evidence are rare and, in fact, the power of international
tribunals in that respect has usually been emphasized in the
international conventions and statutes and rules of international
tribunals
2. Specific Measures
There are numerous measures through which international
tribunals may appropriately apply their fact finding power.
S^, also. Articles 35 and 36 of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules.
See, e.g., 1. Agreement of Yaounde' between the Economic
Community, the Associated States of Africa and Madagascar, Protocol
No. 8 on the Statute of the Arbitration Court of the Association,
Articles 20 and 21, reprinted in: K. Ollers-Frahm and N. Wiihler,
OP. cit. , at 409; 2.. Decision of the Committee of Ministers of the
Benelux Economic Union Determining the Statute of the Arbitral
College of 3 November 1960, reprinted in ibid at 419; 3. Treaty for
East- African Co-operation of 6 June 1967, Statute of the Common
Market Tribunal, Art. 15, reprinted in ibid at 469; 4. Protocol
"J", of Treaty of 3 June 1972, with Respect to the Court of
Arbitration of the West African Community, Articles 8 and 9,
reprinted in ibid at 481; 5. International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), Rules for the Settlement of Differences of 9
April 1957, Article 8, reprinted in ibid at 492; and 6_. Anglo-
German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Rules of Procedure of 4 September
1920, Articles 26 and 21, reprinted in ibid at 703.
Reviewing the nature, instances of application and other
aspects of these measures is beyond the scope of the present study.
Accordingly, here only brief references are made to each of these
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The most comprehensive among these measures is the power of
international tribunals to ask the parties to furnish relevant
documents and information at their disposal. This measure is
applied frequently by international tribunals as a general means of
inquiry.
International tribunals may also ask for production of
specific documents or information deemed necessary under the
circumstances of a given case. Usually, this may happen when the
documents provided by a party are not complete or refer to other
non-filed documents that the tribunal considers relevant. In some
instances, international tribunals prefer to draw up a suitable
questionnaire for both or one of the parties. It also happens that
a party is requested to provide necessary explanations in order to
clarify his position on a specific issue or document. Further, it
is a common practice of international tribunals to put questions to
parties during the course of oral proceedings, too.
As regards witnesses, international tribunals are not
principally allowed to call witnesses of their own. Nor do they
normally have the power to compel the presence of a witness at the
request of parties. They are, however, free to ask general or
specific questions from witnesses introduced by the parties or to
require them to provide more explanations. International tribunals
measures.
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are more liberal than many municipal jurisdictions as to the
characterization of who might be a witness. Thus, interested
parties may occasionally be heard as witnesses, though the weight
to be given to their statements evidently will not be the same as
that given to an independent witness.
Using expert witnesses is also becoming a common practice in
the proceedings before international tribunals, particularly when
the pending cases involve technical issues. These types of
witnesses, usually professional firms of different disciplines, are
helpful to the tribunal and the parties, and may alleviate the need
of referring the case to independent experts by the tribunal at a
later stage. Similar to witnesses, expert witnesses are subject to
questioning by the members of the tribunal, who may ask for
clarifications of the views expressed by the expert witnesses and
the scope of their thoroughness and reliability.
Another fact finding measure available to international
tribunals is descente sur les lieux or site inspection. Members of
international tribunals may, through application -of this measure,
visit and examine the subject or the place of dispute personally.
Site inspection or visit to the place, though a direct and valuable
source of information for international tribunals, is not
applicable in many international litigations, including most
commercial disputes. It is however an important means of proof in
border disputes between States, and international tribunals have
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usually benefitted from resorting to site inspection in this type
of dispute/^
Referring the technical issues of a case to independent
experts appointed by the tribunal is a measure often used in
international proceedings/^ There are usually specific references
to the power of international tribunals in this regard in their
constituent instrument or compromis. By way of example reference is
made to Article 27(1) of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Rules, which
empowers the Tribunal to "appoint one or more experts to report to
it, in writing, on specific issues to be determined by the
tribunal."'*^ The Tribunal has so far appointed experts only in a
few cases, the more important instances being:
-Valuation of the property rights in a construction project,
involving complex accounting matters;'*^
42 A study of the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
reveals _ that the Tribunal has not issued any order for site
inspection in its past 10 years of work. However, in a few cases,
the experts appointed by the Tribunal have visited the relative
sites and projects in Iran by their own initiative. As another
substitute for site inspection, occasionally, parties produced
slides, photographs and even films taken from.the sites related to
a pending, dispute and showed them during the course of the hearing
of the case as a part of their pleadings.
See, e.g., Corfu Channel case , I.C.J Reports 1949. p.237
(16 ILR 155).
See also. Article 50 of the Statute, and Article 67 of the
Rules of Court of the ICJ.
See. Starrett Housing Corporation. et.al. . v. The
Government of The Islamic Republic of Iran, et.al... Award No. 314-
24-1, 14 August 1987, reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.112, at 116
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-technical questions related to the construction of a dam;'*'^
—annual production of crude oil expected at a certain date from
some oil fields in Iran/'^
Different aspects of referring issues to experts include
determination of terms of reference/® providing the expert with
documents and information by the parties through written
submissions and oral sessions, site inspection, etc. In a
complicated case, this process may take as long as a few years, and
in each stage the parties may face problems touching upon the scope
of authority of the experts and the admissibility or timeliness of
the documents and information provided by the parties.
While usually the experts are appointed before the close of
the proceedings and at a stage where the parties will have the
chance to comment on or challenge their opinion, the practice of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal shows that the Tribunal has
et. sag.
See Richard D. Harza. et.al., v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, et.al., Award No. 2 3 2-
97-2, 2 May 1986, reprinted in 11 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.76 at 112.
see Cases Nos. 2 0 & 21, Chamber One, Arco Exploration. INC.,
and Sun Company. Inc. , v. National Iranian Oil Company. The Islamic
Republic of Iran, Order dated 13 June 1990. (These cases are still
pending before the Tribunal.)
In Case No. 24 the Tribunal initially considered seeking
assistance from an expert in the field for drawing up the terms of
reference.
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exceptionally sought assistance from accountants during the
deliberation process without notifying the parties. This practice
may seem to have some resemblance to Article 9, para. 1, of the ICJ
Rules of Court, which allows the Court to appoint either proprio
motu or on a request, "assessors to sit with it without the right
to vote." There, however, it is allowed by the Rules of Court, and
the assessors are appointed publicly and with the knowledge of
parties. Thus, in the absence of specific authorization by the
parties, unless absolutely necessary the practice of seeking advice
from experts during the deliberation process should not be applied,
for it deprives the tribunal of the benefit of the parties' views
regarding both the experts' appointment and opinion. It could also
be viewed by the parties as an unauthorized delegation of some of
the most important functions of the tribunal. It should be possible
to avoid such an extraordinary extension of the tribunal's power by
reviewing the cases well in advance of the close of the hearing and
through a careful preparation for the final decision.
Inquiry from third parties not involved in the case is another
measure occasionally applied by international tribunals. For
instance, the ICJ is empowered, by both its Statute and Rules, to
request public international organizations to provide information
relevant to cases before it.'*' Note 5 to Article 15 of the Iran-
See Article 3 4 (2) of the Statute and Article 69 (1) of the
Rules of the ICJ. Article 34 (3) of the Statute and Article 69 of
the Rules of the ICJ envisage a situation where a public
international organization sees fit to furnish, on its own
initiative, information relevant to a case before the Court.
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U.S. Claims Tribunal Rules too provides for the possibility of
assistance to be given to the Tribunal by persons not parties to a
pending case.^°
Finally, mention should be made of 'judicial notice', as a
measure that though different in nature from others referred to
above, may still be categorized among the fact finding measures
available to international tribunals and affecting the burden of
proof. While the scope of application and the facts to be
judicially noted by international tribunals could be subject to
argument, the concept of judicial notice itself is undoubtedly
admitted in international procedure and is applied by different
tribunals including the International Court of Justice. Moreover,
as was stated by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the
Court "as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take
judicial notice of international law..."^'
3. Limits
On which occasions and how far should international tribunals
According to Note 5, "[t]he arbitral tribunal may, having
satisfied itself that the statement of one of the two Governments -
or, under special circumstances, any other person - who is not an
arbitrating party in a particular case is likely to assist the
tribunal in carrying out its task, permit such Government or person
to assist the tribunal by presenting oral or written statements."
I.C.J. Reports 1947. p. 9, para. 18.
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apply their power to elucidate the issues before them? This is a
subtle question which cannot be dealt with by a general answer.
The issue, in fact, has often been one of the grounds for
differences of opinion among judges of international tribunals. In
his Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase),
Judge Fitzmaurice argues that due to the non-possibility of appeals
or other recourse in international proceedings the Court should
have investigated the issue of the Canadian nationality of the
Barcelona Company that the parties had not raised. According to
him:
"The parties should have been requested to present a full
argument on the subject. It was not enough, in my
opinion, to proceed on the basis that since neither party
had contested the Canadian nationality of the Barcelona
Company, and both had proceeded on the assumption that
the Company was Canadian, the Court was not called upon
to speculate otherwise. Such an attitude may be quite in
order in domestic courts where, normally, appeals or
alternative procedures exist. It is not appropriate to
international proceedings in which, almost always, there
are no possibilities of appeals or other recourse. In
this field the principle of caveat actor can be carried
too far, when the point involved is not at all merely
incidental but could be of major importance for the
outcome of the case."^^
If factors such as those mentioned by Judge Fitzmaurice favour
the application of international tribunals' fact finding power,
concerns of risks of interfering with the parties' duty with
respect to the burden of proof are to be considered against it.
Judge Bustamante, in his Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Traction
52 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited.
Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1970, P. 84;
4 6 ILR. p. 258.
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Case (Preliminary Objections), recognizing the relation between the
power of international tribunals to ask for production of evidence
and information and the duty of the proponent of the burden of
proof, provides a convincing argument in favour of the use of
international tribunals' power. After criticizing the Court for not
requiring the parties, proprio motu, to furnish it with relevant
document or information concerning specific issues of the case.
Judge Bustamante states :
"I naturally accept that in each case the onus of proof
is placed on one of the parties, but it is also true that
the overriding interests of justice give the Court the
faculty of taking such steps as are possible to induce
the parties to clarify what is not sufficiently clear."
It should be emphasized that the issue of the scope and limit
of application of international tribunals' power to investigate the
facts before them touches upon one of the important and challenging
aspects of international adjudication.. The application of this
power rightly and on appropriate occasions requires experience,
knowledge, and an overall grasp and understanding of international
procedure. The practice of international tribunals shows that in
this respect no uniform conduct is possible. Therefore it is best
that the question be dealt with in accordance with the
circumstances of each individual case.
53 Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Company,—Limited,,
Separate Opinion of Judge Bustamante, I.C.J. Reports—1964, P. 84;
46 ILR. p. 91.
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D. Authority of International Tribunals to Determine Whether the
Burden of Proof is Fulfilled
1. The Authority to Determine the Party Which Carries the Burden
of Proof
It is undisputed :that international tribunals are to determine
the party which carries the burden of proof (i.e., the proponent),
i,n order to decide whether or not it has been able to fulfill its
duty. This usually happens at the end of the proceedings, in the
process of evaluation of evidence, and it is done with due
consideration to the rules of the burden of proof.
The inherent power of international tribunals to determine the
party which bears the burden of proof in any given issues is
necessary for their proper functioning..It need not be mentioned in
the statute or rules of international tribunals and usually it is
not referred to. Nevertheless, in exceptional cases there is a
specific reference to this issue in the rules of procedure of some
international tribunals.
For instance, Article 19 of "the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement
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of International Disputes Between Two Parties of which Only One is
a State (1962)" provides as follows :
"The Tribunal shall determine the procedure and the
duration of the proceedings. It shall be free to
designate the party on which the burden of prc^f lies and
likewise to evaluate the evidence produced."
Questions may arise as to the purpose and scope of the above-
mentioned Article and similar provisions in rules of procedure of
international tribunals, and as to whether its mention has any
significance. It may also cast doubt on the time that the tribunal
should specify the proponent of the burden of proof.
It should be noted, however, that assuming any extra
significance for such provisions would entail unreasonable
consequences. Provisions such as Article 19 should not be
interpreted in a way that would mean that a given international
tribunal is authorized to ignore the established and widely
recognized rules of the burden of proof, and that it could
determine the proponent of the burden of proof arbitrarily.
Moreover, while the parties are entitled to agree on the rules
for determination of the burden of proof, and they sometimes do so
in the comoromis or their special agreement, it is not reasonable
to assume that they may authorize the international tribunal which
would take cognizance of their dispute to ignore the established
Reprinted in J. Gillis Wetter, the International Arbitral
Process, vol. IV , p. 57.
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rules of the burden of proof. Apart from depriving the parties of
a reasonable assessment as to the outcome of the case, on which
basis they might be able to reach an out-of-court settlement,
interfering with the established rules of the burden of proof would
probably affect the acquired rights of the parties, and would cause
difficulty in defending a gi^ven case.
In fact, on occasions where the parties to an international
litigation have included an agreement with respect to the burden of
proof in the compromis or rules of procedure of a given
international tribunal, their main concern has been to preserve the
normal rules of the burden of proof, rather than changing or
reversing them."
" See, e.g.. Article V of the Agreement for Arbitration
between_ Argentine and Chile: "The order in which the questions
appear in this Agreement (Compromiso)...shall be without prejudice
to any burden of. proof." Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentine v.
Chile, 1976), in: 52 ILR, p. 109. In his inaugural statement, the
president of the Tribunal, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, referring to
this provision of the Compromiso. stated that the parties had been
able to agree on the order of speaking in the oral hearing on the
understanding that "the order of speaking will not in any way
prejudice any question of the burden of proof that may arise in the
case ..." (Ibid, pp, 265 & 267). See also. Article II of the
Special Agreement between the Government of Belgium and the
Government _of the Netherlands which starts with the following
phrase: "Without prejudice to any question as to the burden of
proof, the Contracting Parties agree..." Case Concerning
Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) ,
Judgment of 20 June 1959, I.C.J. Reports 1959. P. 211; and Article
VI of the Special Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A and
the Government of Canada which provides that the procedure with
regard to the written pleadings would be "without prejudice to any
question as to the burden of proof.." Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Case. Judgement of 12 October 1984,
I.C.J. Reports 1984. P. 254.
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Therefore, it seems obvious that clauses such as the above-
mentioned Article 19 do not provide international tribunals with a
wider authority than what they usually possess with respect to the
burden of proof. If the parties to an international litigation
wish that the issue of the burden of proof be treated in a
different way, they should so specify. Otherwise, a general clause
would only emphasize the inherent power and the duty of the
tribunal to deal with the issue of the burden of proof in
accordance with the generally accepted rules thereof.
Having said that a general reference in the compromis to the
power of the international tribunal with respect to the burden of
proof has no significance, it is to be emphasized that the
authority of international tribunals per se may affect the burden
of proof. This could happen because of the circumstances of a given
case, the nature of the tribunal itself, or the power of
international tribunals to acquire evidence proprio motu. Thus, the
statement of the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of
18 January 197 8 in the Irish case, with respect to the burden of
proof, should be considered in that context. The Court said:
"The Court will not rely on the concept that the burden
of proof is borne by one or other of the two governments
concerned. In the case referred to it, the Court examines
all the material before it, whether originating from the
Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if
necessary, obtains material proprio motu."
In the Minauiers Case, where the parties had agreed upon the
56 58 ILR. pp. 263-264
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order of the written pleadings in the compromis but had expressly-
stated this to be "without prejudice to any question as to the
burden of proof" the Court found on that basis that it was "a
question . . . for the Court to decide " and concluded that "each
party [had] to prove its alleged title and the facts upon which it
[relied]"
Fitzmaurice draws attention to the advantages that the
defending party may acquire as a consequence of the rule that the
burden of proof "will normally., though not always necessarily, rest
on the plaintiff or applicant State in the case...", and to the
fact that "in the present state of international law, this may, on
account of the burden of proof, make the whole difference between
winning and losing the case...".^® On that basis he welcomes the
approach of the ICJ with respect to the allocation of burden of
proof in the Minguiers Case "as an indication that the Court, in
deciding any question of burden of proof, will look not only to any
relevant instruments, such as the compromis if there is one, but to
the general nature of the case itself and the realities
involved."^'
2. Admissibility and Evaluation of Evidence
" ICJ Reports. 1953. p. 52.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 2 The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, p. 576.
Ibid.
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The inherent flexibility of the international judicial
procedure, and its tendency to be free from technical rules, of
evidence applied in municipal law, provides the "evidence" with a
wider scope in international proceedings. In municipal law usually
there are some restrictions, imposed on the parties, as to what is
admissible and what is inadmissible by the courts as evidence.'60
In some countries, means of proof are exclusively laid down by
law, and courts are not allowed to accept as evidence any proof
other than those specified.^' This, however, does not per se cause
restrictions, as usually • the means of proof referred to
categorically by law cover almost all forms of oral and written
evidence.The limitation is more felt when the law determines a
fixed probative value for a particular form of proof or provides
that, in some actions, only a particular form of proof could be
60
61
62
See, e.g., Separate Opinion of Judge Zekia, Ireland—v_^
United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights, in 58 ILR, p. 300;
and Reaina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Harmohan
Singh, England, -Divisional Court, 21 January 1981, in 78 ILR, pp.
507-512.
For instance. Article' 1258 of the Civil Code of Iran
provides that: "The various kinds of evidence for proving claims
are as follows: 1. Confession. 2. written documents. 3. Testimony.
4. Indications. 5. Oaths." G.H. Vafai, op. cit., p. 126. also,
Dalloz. Repertoire de procedure Civil, Para. 123., p. 16, and Para.
169, p. 21.
See Note 50, supra.
According to the previous Articles 1306 &1307 of the Civil
Code of Iran no claim of more than 500 rials could be proved by
oral or written testimony only. This Article was abolished in 1983.
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accepted and precludes the other forms of proof as inadmissible.^
Moreover, in municipal law, proof is sometimes subject to a time
element. For instance, for proving the validity of a contract, the
evidence to be accepted by the courts is that legally valid when
the contract was made, if different from that of the time of
litigation.
Although these restrictions are being reduced following a
general trend, for decline of formalism in the rules of evidence,®*^
they are still to be found^in the municipal laws of different legal
systems. International tribunals, to the'contrary, seem to have
frequently enjoyed the privilege of deciding for themselves what
could be admissible as evidence; and this has provided them with
the chance to approach the issue more liberally.
In the Jay treaty of 1794, which is considered as a starting
point for the modern development of international arbitration,^"'
^ "Hearsay evidence as well as an unauthenticated documentary
evidence, for instance, might be excluded and not heard or
produced". Separate Opinion of Judge Zekia, op. cit., ibid.
According to Article 3 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
Iran: "The evidence introduced for establishing a contract or a
unilateral contract or an obligation shall be subject to the laws
which were existing at the date they were concluded, unless
otherwise expressly mentioned in the law." M. Sabi, op. cit.
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XVI,
Ch.7, p. 3 3 et sea.
" See The International Court of Justice, United Nations
publications. Sales No. 831.20, 9th ed. p.l; and H.J.Schlochauer,
Jay Treatv (1794), in : Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [Instalment 1 (1981) pp. 108-111]
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the United States and Great Britain authorized the mixed
commissions created by the Treaty to consider all forms of
evidence, conceivable at that time, without having to observe
restrictions arising from the rules of evidence of the two
countries. The commissioners were empowered, inter alia , "to
examine all such persons as shall come before them, on oath or
affirmation, touching the premises; and also to receive in
evidence, according as they may think most consistent with equity
and justice, all written depositions, or books, or papers, or
copies, or extracts thereofThese provisions which were
included in Article VI of the Jay Treaty "continued to serve as a
model for further arbitration treaties between the United States
and Great Britain until 1899, when provisions concerning interna
tional arbitration procedure were codified at the Hague Peace
Conference.
This trend, as a characteristic of international tribunals,
has also been maintained and reiterated in Rule 40 of the revised
rules of procedure of the European Court of Human Rights of 24
November 1982. According to that Rule, the Court is empowered to
"obtain any evidence which it considers capable of providing
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 19 Nov. 1794,
known as the Jay Treaty, reprinted in Dispute Settlement in Public
International Law, op.cit., 1984, p. 163.
69 Ibid p. 161.
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clarification on the facts of the case",™ and is also entitled to
"decide to hear as a witness or expert or in any other capacity any
person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in
carrying out of its task."'^'
The opinion of- the European Court of Human Rights in this
regard was expressly declared in its judgment in the Irish Case, in
which the Court said:
"The Court is not bound, under the Convention or under
the general principles applicable to international
tribunals, by strict rules of evidence. In order to
satisfy itself, the court is entitled to rely on evidence
of every kind..."''^
Similarly, no restrictions have been imposed on the Inter
national Court of Justice, as regards the admissibility of evi
dence, in the Statute or Rules of the Court.While the freedom of
the Court in admitting and evaluating evidence does not mean that
everything produced as evidence should be accepted, it provides the
Court with the power to be as flexible as necessary in each case.
Thus, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court did not accept the press
™Reprinted in Dispute Settlement in Public International Law,
op. cit.. p. 249.
Ibid.
Ireland v. United Kingdom flrish Case) , European Court of
Human Rights, 18 January 1978; reprinted in 58 ILR. p. 279.
Even Article 52 of the Statute of the Court should not be
viewed as an exception, for it only emphasizes the Court's power to
either refuse or accept evidence untimely presented by one party
and objected to by the other. See Statute of the Court, Art. 52,
in: I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 4. at 81.
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articles and extracts from books "as evidence capable of proving
facts", but regarded them "as material which can nevertheless
contribute, in some circumstances, to corroborating the existence
of a fact, i.e., as illustrative material additional to other
sources of evidence."^'*
Generally speaking, international tribunals have not committed
themselves to the restrictive rules of evidence of municipal law,
have found themselves justified to receive every kind and form of
evidence, and have attached to them the probative value they
deserve under the circumstances of a given case. According to
Sandifer, "in the absence of the provision of a specific ground of
exclusion in the arbitral agreements, there is no rule of law that
can be invoked as binding a tribunal to exclude particular evi
dence"
Accordingly, "evidence" has found a more extended sense than
what it usually denotes in municipal law and, as Rosenne has
rightly concluded, "the restrictions upon admissibility of evidence
sometimes encountered in municipal procedure (and connected with
the system of jury trial) have no place in international adjudica
tion, where the relevance of facts and the value of evidence
Military and Paramilitarv Activities in and against
Nicaragua CNicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment
of 27 June 1986, Para. 62, I.C.J.Reports 1986, P. 40.
Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals, rev.
ed., 1975, p. 189.
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tending to establish facts are left to the entire appreciation of
the Court. This observation, which is made with reference to the
practice of the International Court of Justice, is also true with
respect to the practice of international tribunals as a whole .
In spite of the active presence of common law countries in
international judicial and arbitral proceedings, the rules applied
in those countries with respect to the admissibility of evidence
have had little impact on the international law of evidence.
Instead, "the practice of international tribunals in the admission
of evidence has developed a pattern comparable to that of the
liberal system of procedure of the civil law countries."'"
Apparently, the absence of a jury in the judicial system of civil
law countries, and the complexity of the rules of admissibility in
common law countries could be mentioned among the factors that
have caused that result.
In sum, what the International Court of Justice declared in
its judgment in the Nicaragua Case could be viewed as a summary of
international tribunals' position in this regard. In that Case, in
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court,
rev. ed., 1985, p. 557.
Sandifer, op. cit. , p. 176. On that basis and "[b]ecause of
the absence in international judicial procedure of restrictive
rules of expulsion based upon the intrinsic relevance, competence,
or materiality of evidence", Sandifer finds it preferable to use
the term admission instead of admissibilitv which is "distinctly
Anglo-American in origin and has a technical significance not
applicable to the broad rules of international procedure." Ibid
179.
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order to indicate how the requirements of Article 53 of its Statute
were to be met, the Court stated as follows:
[The Court] is not unaware that...within the limits of
its Statute and Rules, it has freedom in estimating the
value of the various elements of evidencethough it is
clear that general principles of judicial procedure
necessarily govern the determination of what can be
regarded as proved."''^
The general principle of admissibility of evidence before
international tribunals has a specific impact on the incidence of
burden of proof and relieves the party which submits the evidence
from proving the admissibility. Consequently, if admissibility of
the evidence which is-duly submitted within the time—limits fixed
by the international tribunal is challenged, the burden of proof is
incumbent upon the party challenging the evidence to prove, on
specific grounds, that it is not admissible.^'
3. Instances of Inadmissibility
While the freedom of international tribunals in admission and
evaluation of evidence, as a settled issue of international
procedure, is not disputed, "their activity in this regard is
nevertheless governed by a large number of general principles of
Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 60, I.C.J.Reports 198 6, P. 40.
79 See Sandifer, op.cit., p. 179.
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law recognized by States in foro doinestico. These general
principles, in fact, consist of the rules that have usually been
applied by international tribunals in admission and appraisal of
evidence, including rules regarding issues such as "judicial
notice", "presumptions", "the probative value to be attributed to
the testimonial or documentary evidence", and "the incidence of
burden of proof Consequently, in the absence of specific
restrictive rules agreed upon by the parties in relation to
admission and evaluation of evidence, international tribunals are
to be guided by the sound practice of international tribunals, as
a whole, in that respect.
The practice of international tribunals in this regard, as
already explained, shows a tendency to accept all possible means by
which the disputed facts could be proved. Nonetheless, there are
instances in which international tribunals have refused to accept
evidence submitted by the parties. These occasions, which will be
studied summarily below, are in fact to be considered as exceptions
to the general rule of admissibility of evidence before interna
tional tribunals.
a. Late Piled Evidence
Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by
International Courts and Tribunals, London, (1953), reprinted in
1987, Grotius Publications, p. 303.
" See, generally, Cheng, op.cit.. pp. 303-335.
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In international procedure, most instances of inadmissibility
of evidence usually arise out of situations where evidence is filed
late and after the close of written proceedings. The importance of
the ability of -the adjudicating body to decide the case on the
basis of all the relevant facts requires that all evidence before
the tribunal be considered and taken into account regardless of the
stage of the proceedings and time at which evidence was submitted
or filed. On the other hand, it is neither feasible nor helpful to
allow each of the parties to a case, with contradicting positions,
to choose the time for production of evidence itself, and leave the
tribunal at their mercy. Therefore a balance should be struck
between these two concerns. The reconciliation of the two would
mean admission of evidence filed late by one party, unless it is
either prejudicial to the fundamental principle of equality of
parties or it is produced to cause undue delay in the proceedings.
i. Article 56 of The ICJ Rules
Thus, Article 56(1) of the ICJ Rules provides, inter alia,
•that "[ajfter the closure of the written proceedings, no further
documents may be submitted to the Court by either party except with
the consent of the other party or as provided in paragraph 2 of
this Article." While silence of the other party is held to signify
its consent, "[i]n the absence of consent, the Court, after
hearing the parties, may, if it considers the document necessary.
82 Ibid.
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authorize its production."" In any event, the other party shall
have an opportunity to comment upon the newly produced document and
to submit documents in support of its comments.^ If, however, the
other party objects to the production of new evidence and the Court
also does not find its production necessary, then no reference may
be made during the oral proceedings to the contents of the new
document "unless the document is part of a publication readily
available.
Fitzmaurice mentions two examples from the Court's practice in
that regard under the provisions of the previous Article 48 of the
Rules of Court.In one, (the Minguiers Case^ , both parties had
filed evidence after the close of the written proceedings, but
neither of them objected to documents so produced by the other
party.In the other, (Anglo-Iranian Oil Case') . where documents,
not timely filed in the Registry nor subjected to the procedure for
late filed evidence, were read out at the oral hearing, "the acting
President gave a warning that unless the provisions of [the then]
Article 4 8 were observed, the Court might ignore documents thus
Article 56 (2) .
^ See Article 56 (3).
See Article 56(4), According to Article 56(5), "[t]he
application of the provisions of this Article shall not in itself
constitute a ground for delaying the opening or the course of the
oral proceedings." I.C.J. Acts and Documents No.4, p. 129.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, op. cit. , pp. 577-578.
" Ibid 577.
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produced or referred to."^^ As a recent example from the practice
of the Court, reference should be made to the Nicaragua Case, where
the Court emphasized on the necessity of presenting evidence within
time-limits.*'
ii„ Practice of iran-U.S Claims Tribunal
In spite of the fact that there exists no provision similar to
Article 56 of the ICJ Rules in the Rules of the Iran-U.S Claims
Tribunal, on occasion the Tribunal has excluded evidence on record
on the ground of being filed late. The practice of the Tribunal in
this regard has undergone a development similar to that in other
issues related to evidence, namely, acting more flexibly in the
first years of the Tribunal's activity but becoming gradually more
and more severe. In some cases the Tribunal went so far as to warn
the parties beforehand that "no further extension of time will be
granted without specific or compelling reasons",or even that
Ibid 578.
89 "The Court is bound by the relevant provisions of its
Statute and its Rules relating to the system_ of evidence,
provisi-ons devised to guarantee the sound administration ofjustice-, while respecting the equality of the parties. The
presentation of evidence is governed by specific rules relating to,
for instance, the observance of time—limits, the communication of
evidence to the other party, the submission of observations on it
by that party, and the various forms of challenge by each party of
the other's evidence..." Nicaragua v. United States of—America,
Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, Para. 59, I.C.J.Reports—19 86, PP.
39-40.
See. e.g., Case No. B-74, Chamber Three, Ministry—of
Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Government of the
United States of America. Order of 17 March 1989.
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"arguments and evidence not complying with the express terms of
[its] Order will be rejected unless the Tribunal finds a specific
and compelling reason for the failure to comply.""
Among the presumed reasons for that development in the
practice of the Tribunal, changes of its members, a heavy workload,
and the pressure of claimants for speedy proceedings could be
named. It should be noted, however, that regardless of why evidence
is found to be inadmissible, such an approach gives an impression
of emphasis on formalism, and detracts from the credibility of the
Tribunal's awards; therefore, it should be avoided whenever
possible.
The radical effect of the somewhat inflexible approach taken
by the Tribunal in its later years of activity in regard to late
filed evidence has been reduced by its accepting frequent requests
for extension of time-limits set by the Tribunal for filing
evidence.®^ Even on. occasions where the Tribunal finds that no
" See, e.g.. Case No. 45, Chamber,_Thr.ee, Mariorie Suzanne
Ebrahimi v. Iran, Order of 23 May 1990.- This phrase appears only at
the end of many Orders from Chamber Three of the Tribunal, and it
has not been vigorously applied. The exceptional circumstances,
however, should be distinguished. See. for instance. Cases Nos.
12458 and 10502 regarding claims of the United States on behalf of
its nationals against Iran, Orders of 30 June 1989, in each of
which Chamber Two of the Tribunal stated, after changing the date
previously set for the Hearing, that "[i]n view of the procedural
history of [the] Case the Tribunal will not permit the filing of
any further documents, nor the calling of any witnesses."
In response to a letter of the Agent of the Islamic Republic
of Iran (filed on 19 February 1987 in Case No. 11723) objecting to
the practice of the Tribunal in refusing some of the extension
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strong and compelling reasons justifying a further extension is
invoked and denies the request, it usually advises the requesting
party to file its evidence forthwith.'^ In some cases, while
denying the request for extension of time-limits, the Tribunal
emphasized that it will consider any documents filed prior to its
deliberations
From the Tribunal's point of view a proper course of action
requests, the Tribunal stated, inter alia, that: "The Tribunal has
been very liberal',, in granting extensions in the past. This
certainly applies to the present Case, where the Tribunal has
granted five extensions with the effect that the respondent had
altogether 18 months to submit its Statement of Defence. In view of
the general issues of Tribunal practice that are mentioned in the
Respondent's submission of 19 February 1987, it may be useful for
the parties' and the agents' guidance to point out that, in future,
the Tribunal, taking into account the reduced case load, the time
many cases have been pending and the need to advance cases to the
Hearing stage, will have to apply stricter standards with the
effect that extensions will have to be denied more often."
See, e.g.. Case No. 88, Chamber Three, Control—Data
Corporation v. Iran, Order of 29 April 1987; Case No. 10297,
Chamber Three, The Government of the United States of America, on
behalf and for the benefit of Ronald L. Haynes, v. —Islamic
Republic of Iran, Order of 7 November 1986; and Case No. 164,
Chamber Three, Jacqueline M. Kiaie, et.al., v. Iran, Order of 13
June 1988.
See, e.g., Case No. 256, Chamber Two, August F. Benedix,
ir., et.al.. v. Iran; and Cases Nos. 390, 391 and 392, Chamber One,
Lilly Mitra Fallah Lawrence v. Iran, Order of 9 February 1988. In
some cases, after denying the extension, it was stated that the
Tribunal intended to proceed with deliberations of the^ case, as
soon as its working schedule would permit, on the basis of the
evidence then before the Tribunal, and that it would defer that
course of action only if it was informed that settlement negotia
tions were going on and had reached a stage which would justify a
postponement of the proceedings. See, e.g., Case No. 626, Chamber
Three, Kem International Company v. Iran, Order of 18 February
1988; and Case No. 844, Chamber Three, Vera-Jo Arveh v. Iran, Order
of 20 February 1987.
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for the filing party, with respect to the new evidence, would have
been to ask for permission for its production and to file it only
if the Tribunal so permits. In cases when both parties have
requested leave to submit new documentary evidence the Tribunal has
agreed.'® Equally, when one party was allowed to submit new
evidence, a subsequent request to that effect from the other party
has been treated favourably."
ill. Starrett Case
In order to show how complicated and important the issue of
admissibility can be in some cases, reference should be made to the
Starrett Case as a leading example in the Tribunal's practice.
This was a case arising from the alleged expropriation by the
Government of Iran of the claimants' property rights in a project
to build several high rise apartment buildings in Tehran. In this
"With reference to the document filed by the Agent of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 28 October 1985, the
Tribunal points out that no such specific submission was authorized
or invited during or after the pre-hearing conference. However, it
is open to either party at any time to make such written requests
to the Tribunal(Case No. 184,' Chamber One, Granger Associates v.
Iran. Order of 7 November 1985.)
See, e.g.. Case No. 68,. Chamber Two, Howard Needles Tammen
and Bercrendorff v. Iran, Order of 14 January 1986.
^ See, e.g.. Case No. 284, Chamber Two, Otis Elevator
Company, v. Iran. Order of 14 July 1986.
See Award No. 314-24-1, 14 August 1987, Starrett Housincr
Corporation, et.al., v. The Government of The Islamic Republic of
Iran, Bank Markazi Iran and Bank Mellat, reprinted in 16 Iran- U.S.
C.T.R., pp. 112-237.
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case, which involved one of the lengthiest proceedings in the
history of the Tribunal,®^ "admissibility" often became an issue.
Two of these occasions will be referred to here as follows:
First: The expert appointed by the Tribunal did not consider
certain materials submitted by the respondents after the dates set
by him. In a letter to the parties, the expert indicated that he
regarded part of such materials as new documents and facts for
which the time had passed.'™ Respondents requested the Tribunal to
urge the expert to examine those materials and take them into
account in his valuation.'®' This was at the time that the expert
had already submitted to the parties for comment a draft of his
final report. The Tribunal rejected the request on the grounds that
it had not received and had no knowledge of the contents of the
expert's draft report and the material submitted to him. Moreover,
the Tribunal considered it inappropriate at that stage "to
interfere with the expert's exercise of discretion concerning the
material he should examine in making his report.""^ Nevertheless,
The prehearing in this case was held in early 1982 as the
first•session of Chamber One of the"Tribunal, to be followed.by a
f ive-day. hearing .in February .of 1983. The subsequent development of
the case, including referring the case to an accounting expert,
lead to another six-day hearing in January 1986, and in spite of
claimant's efforts and the fact that the case had been active since
1981, the final Award of the Tribunal in this case was not issued
before 14 August 1987.
See the expert's letter of 19 December 1985; and the
Tribunal's Order of 10 February 1986.
101 See Respondents' submission of 31 January 1986.
Order of 10 February 1986.
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the Tribunal stated that its denial of Respondents' request was
without prejudice to their right to renew it after the expert had
filed his final report.
In his final report, which was subsequently submitted to the
Tribunal and parties, the expert explained that he had disregarded
the materials, among other reasons, for not being relevant to his
valuation premises. The respondents renewed their request for the
admissibility of the materials at issue, and the Tribunal rejected
the respondents' request. But the Tribunal also held that in the
event that it "determines not to accept the expert's valuation
premises, it may determine that various additional data should be
considered, which might include some or all of the materials.""'^
In its Award, however, the Tribunal accepted the expert's valuation
premises and reaffirmed its decision as to the inadmissibility of
the materials submitted by respondents.'®^
Second; As part of their comments on the expert's final
report, respondents submitted a number of exhibits as well as
several affidavits, and reports by accountants.'"^ Respondents'
comments and documents were filed within the time-limit set by the
Ibid.
104 See the Tribunal's Order of 22 December 1986, and para. 249
of Award No. 314-24-1, reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189.
Para. 249.
See, generally, Respondents' Comments on the Expert Final
Report (15 December 1986).
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Tribunal, which happened to be shortly before the Hearing held for
hearing the expert.'®^ At the Hearing the claimants objected to the
admissibility of the documents attached to Respondents' comments,
which had not previously been submitted to the Tribunal or the
Expert.The respondents, on the other hand, insisted that they
should be allowed to refer to the documents that they had submitted
in order to substantiate their comments. The Tribunal deferred its
decision on the question of whether to admit those documents in
evidence, and joined it to the merits.'®'
In its Award of 14 August 1987, noting that the Parties had
been invited in accordance with Article 27, para. 3, of the
Tribunal Rules"" to comment on the Expert's report, the Tribunal
decided that "among the documents in question, those documents
expressing opinions are admissible, but those which constitute new
evidence or contain new facts are inadmissible."'" In making its
decision the Tribunal noted "that the new material was submitted
"At the request of either party the expert, after delivery
of the report, may be heard at a hearing, where the parties shall
have the opportunity to be present and to interrogate the expert.
At this hearing either party may present expert witnesses in order
to testify on the points at issue...." ( Article 27, para. 4, of
the Tribunal Rules).
Para.. 250 of the Award, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 190.
Ibid.
"Upon receipt of the expert's report, the arbitral tribunal
shall communicate a copy of the report to the parties who shall be
given the opportunity to express, in writing, their opinion on the
report." (Article 27, para.3, of the Tribunal Rules).
Para. 251 of the Award, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., 190.
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shortly before the Hearing, that extensive opportunities had been
provided by the Expert for timely submission, and that no plausible
explanation was given for the late filing."''^ According to the
Tribunal, its decision "allows the parties to express an opinion on
the Expert's Report, thereby assisting the Tribunal in considering
the Expert's valuation, while it also ensures that the other Party
will not be unfairly prejudiced by untimely filed documents not
previously submitted to the Parties and the Expert.""^
The Tribunal further decided that "an affidavit or report
based on evidence or facts presented for the first time raises the
same problem as new evidence or facts, and therefore such
affidavits or reports are not admissible.""'^ On that basis the
Tribunal found some of the affidavits presented by the respondents
admissible and took judicial notice of an Act of the Iranian
Parliament which was included in the new documents, but did not
admit in evidence the other documents filed by the respondents
shortly before the final Hearing and objected to by the
Claimants."^
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. After the Hearing, the respondents filed further
documents with respect to an adjustment made by the expert at the
beginning of the Hearing, and, also in order to show that some of
the documents, contrary to the expert's assertion, had been
previously submitted to him on time. The claimants requested the
Tribunal not to consider these documents. The Tribunal, however,
did not need to reach the question of admissibility of these
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iv. Hidetomo Shinto Case
Another case in which the issue of admissibility of late-filed
evidence was addressed by the Tribunal in relative detail is the
Hidetomo Shinto Case. In its Award in this case, the Tribunal found
it necessary to consider the timeliness of the arguments and
evidence presented late at different stages by the parties. 116
First ; As to the new arguments raised by the claimant which
had resulted in a post-hearing round of submissions by the
parties, the Tribunal stated : "Under ordinary circumstances the
Tribunal would reject these late arguments and evidence, adhering
to its well established practice of allowing no new substantive
submissions so close to the date of the Hearing that the opposing
party has little or no time to respond. Here, however, it should be
noted that the change in the Claimant's argument came about as a
result of a document submitted by Iran a mere three weeks prior to
the Hearing. In such a context the Claimant had little choice but
to address this filing at the Hearing. Thus the Claimant's right to
documents because of its decision on the merits of the issue.(See
para. 252 of the Award, reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., p. 191).
116 This was a case brought by the United States before the
Tribunal on behalf of Hidetomo Shinto, an American national, who
was alleging that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its controlled
entity, Mahat Company, had failed to pay certain compensation and
benefits owed to him under an employment contract with Mahat.
See Award No 399-10273-3, (31 October 1988), reprinted in 19 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 321.
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raise these new arguments at the time of the Hearing cannot be
questioned.
Second : The Tribunal admitted the newspaper articles and
other documentary evidence presented by the Claimant at the Hearing
and later by the respondent for two reasons;
1. The Tribunal had expressly authorized the submission of those
documents in order to clarify the ambiguities in the record.
2. All of the documents were in the public domain."*
Third ; Another issue of timeliness before the Tribunal in
this case was in respect of the claimant's unauthorized filing in
response to Iran's authorized post-hearing submission. In that
regard the Tribunal held as follows:
" This submission was not authorized by the Tribunal in
its...Order. The Tribunal notes, however, that the
official Order filed with the submission was initially
requested from the Respondent, which informed the
Tribunal that such Order could not be located. On this
basis the Claimant has supplied the Order and thus it
should not be rejected as new evidence not previously
requested by the Tribunal. Consequently, the Tribunal
finds that it should be admitted.""'
b. Evidence Obtained Through Settlement Negotiations
Settlement negotiations, between the parties to a dispute, are
Ibid P. 328 (para. 28).
See ibid para. 29.
Ibid para. 30.
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usually held in good faith and on the basis of the understanding
that, in case of failure of the negotiations, positions taken in
the course of such settlement negotiations, and information and
documents generated solely for that purpose, will not be used
against the, parties in any pending or future litigation. Even in
cases where parties have reached a provisional agreement, they have
usually provided that unless and until their agreement is final,
the parties will not refer to or divulge the contents of their
agreement in any proceedings.'^®
This principle has been adopted by some States as a rule of
pj-ocedure to be applied in litigation. For instance, the Special
Agreement of 29 March 1979 between the United States and Canada
provides, in Article V (1), as follows :
"Neither party shall introduce into evidence or argument,
or publicly disclose in any manner, the nature or content
of proposals directed to a maritime boundaries
settlement, or responses thereto, in the course of
negotiations or discussions between the Parties
undertaken since 1969."'^'
In cases where there is an agreement between the parties, like
that quoted above, it is improbable that they would try to
introduce into evidence the documents or information obtained
120
121
See, e.g., Award on Agreed Terms No. 29-92-1, General
Electric Co. v. Pars Appliance MFG. Co., Article 7 of the
Settlement Agreement, reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.^ 135; and
Award on Agreed Terms No. 157-87-SC, Nchp/ Dillon v. Ministry—o^
Mines and Industries of Iran, Article 6 of the Settlement
Agreement, reprinted in 7 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 268.
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, P. 254.
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through settlement negotiations. Even if they do so, it should not
prove difficult to exclude evidence so produced by invoking the
contractual obligation of that party. The issue is more complicated
where there is no contractual obligation in that regard between two
litigant parties who have previously held settlement negotiations,
and one of them files documents and information obtained through
the settlement negotiations as evidence against the other party in
the proceedings.
It seems, however, that even in the absence of a contractual
obligation, it is highly questionable whether such information and
documents could be admissible. The question surfaced in some of the
cases before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and was
addressed by the Tribunal in some of its Orders and Awards. Some of
these instances will be discussed below.
i. Pepsico Case
This is the first case in which the Tribunal rendered a ruling
with respect to the issue of inadmissibility of evidence obtained
through settlement negotiations. In the Pepsico Case claimant
was relying as evidence on a letter, from an authorized representa
tive of the respondent company, in which their obligation to pay
for the accounts receivable for Pepsi-Cola soft drink concentrate
allegedly sold and delivered to the respondent companies had been
See, Award No. 260-18-1, 11 October 1986, Pepsico, Inc. v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Zamzam Bottling
Companies. reprinted in 13 Iran-U.S, C.T.R. 3-40.
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acknowledged.'^^ According to the respondents, the letter had been
written in relation to settlement discussions between the parties,
j-
and on that basis respondents argued that it was not admissible. 124
In its Award, the Tribunal held that the "letter is admissible
as a normal business communication acknowledging the current status
of outstanding accounts, and that it is not, as the Zamzam
Companies contend, an offer of settlement that the Tribunal must
ignore. As a footnote to that phrase, however, the Tribunal
stated more clearly its opinion as to the inadmissibility of evide
nce and information obtained through settlement negotiations;
"In contrast, the Tribunal determines that the Minutes of
a meeting on 6 September 1981 and the Claimant's subse
quent letter of 14 October 1981, both submitted by the
• Zamzam Companies, reflect negotiation of settlement terms
and are therefore inadmissible as evidence."
11. ISS Case
The principle, ' of the "inadmissibility of evidence and
information obtained through settlement'discussions was affirmed in
Ibid p. 28.
'24 Ibid.
'25 Ibid.
'2® Ibid. The Iranian arbitrator in the case disagreed with the
majority of the Tribunal on both the characterization of the three
documents at issue and the principle applied with regard to their
admissibility. See, Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Ameli, paras. 54-65,
reprinted in 12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 45-92, at 70-71.
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the ISS case as well.'^ In that case the respondent argued that
the amount accepted in settlement by ISS under a negotiated
Memorandum of Understanding constituted an admission on the part of
claimant to the effect that it had ceased performance earlier than
it was contending in the proceedings before the Tribunal.The
Tribunal, however, did not accept the respondent's contention and
held that the positions taken by the parties during settlement
negotiations were without prejudice to their respective rights:
"[I]n order to reach a settlement parties frequently
compromise claims they consider well-founded, as ISS
argues it did here, and positions adopted by parties
during settlement negotiations must be taken as being
without prejudice to their respective legal entitlement.
For that reason, it is not this Tribunal's practice to
permit parties.to proffer the terms of attempted
settlements or the positions underlying them as
admissions by which opposing parties should continue to
be bound.
ill. Westinghouse Case
In Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the
Government of Iran and the United States encouraged settlement of
disputes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.Pursuant to
™ See, Award No. 290-123-1, 29 January 1987, International
Schools Services, Inc., v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and
National Defence Industries Organization, reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S.
C.R.T. 65-81.
Ibid at 77.
Ibid.
"Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of
the claims described in Article II by the parties directly
concerned. Any such claims not settled within six months from the
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that provision, the parties to the Westinqhouse Case had held
unsuccessful settlement discussions in Vienna prior to bringing
their disputes before the Tribunal in The Hague. During the
proceedings before the Tribunal the respondent proposed to file, as
evidence in support of its defenses and counterclaims, written
material to describe the contents of the Vienna discussions.
In a subsequent submission to the Tribunal, the claimant
requested ..that a ' decision be taken to exclude records of the
settlement discussions between the parties that may be introduced
by the respondent as evidence, and submitted that "neither party
should be permitted to refer to or submit evidence of statements
made during the ... settlement discussions.""' According to the
claimant, the Tribunal precedents established that statements made
during settlement negotiations were inadmissible, and that the
Tribunal's practice was fully consistent with the governing
principle of . English and American law.'^^
date of entry into force of this agreement shall be submitted to
binding third party arbitration in accordance with the terms of
this agreement. The aforementioned six mon.ths' period may be
extended•once by three months at the request of either party." For
more information on the Claims Settlement Declaration see note 64,
Ch.I, supra.
Case No. 389, Chamber Two, Westinahouse Electric
Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force. Claimant's
submission of 15 December 1987.
Ibid. While in the claimant's submission authorities and
precedents from Anglo-American law were quoted, no references were
made to any international precedent except for the practice of the
Tribunal itself. As regards the rule in the civil law countries in
that respect, it was there stated that "research [had] not
disclosed any pertinent civil law precedents." Ibid.
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The Tribunal asked the respondent to file its comments with
respect to claimant's request. The respondent, objecting to
claimant's request, answered inter alia that as no evidence
regarding settlement negotiations had yet been filed by respondent
any ruling of the Tribunal at that time would lack legal
grounds.'^ Finally, the Tribunal stated its views in an Order as
follows:
"With respect to the Respondent's objection regarding the
records of the 1981 Vienna settlement negotiations
between the parties, the Tribunal notes that positions
taken by parties during settlement discussions are
motivated by their intention to arrive at a mutually
acceptable arrangement and must therefore be deemed not
to have an impact on their position in litigation. The
Tribunal would therefore normally not expect a party to
file the records of such settlement discussions. In the
event that the Respondent the Islamic Republic of Iran
Air Force nevertheless should file documents related to
the above mentioned settlement discussions, the Tribunal
will then decide on their admissibility taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances."'^^
c. Evidence Obtained by Violation of International Law
What would be the proper course of action for-an international
tribunal that faces the- situation where it is obvious or proved
that evidence furnished by one of the parties before it is obtained
See Tribunal's Order of 21 December 1987.
See Respondent's submission of 19 February 1988.
See Tribunal's Order of 7 March 1988. After the issuance
of the above Order the respondent did not pursue the issue any
further.
229
through violation of a rule of international law?
A distinguished example which helps illustrate the issue is
the merits phase of the Corfu Channel Case.^^^ In that Case, acting
contrary to the clearly expressed wish of Albania and the
International Mine Clearance Organization, the U.K. carried out a
mine sweeping operation, referred to as Operation Retail, in the
Corfu Channel on 12 and 13 November 1946. The question then arose
as to whether the evidence concerning the mines that had been found
and swept by the U.K. through Operation Retail would be admissible
against Albania.
Before the ICJ, the U.K. contended, as its main defense, that
its action was justified because the intervention had taken place
to secure possession of evidence in the territory of another State
in order to submit it to an international tribunal and thus
facilitate its task. According to the U.K. "the corpora delicti
must be secured as quickly as possible, for fear they should be
taken away, without leaving traces..."'"
The Court rejected the U.K.'s argument, however, stating that
it could only regard "the alleged right of intervention as a
manifestation of a policy of force" that "cannot ... find a place
Corfu Channel Case, Judgement of 9 April 1949, I. C. J.
Reports 1949 p. 4, and 16 ILR, p, 155.
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 34.
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in international law".While the Court recognized as extenuating
circumstances the Albanian Government's failure to carry out its
duties after the explosions, it declared that "the action of the
British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty."'^^
On the other hand, the Court admitted the evidence concerning the
mines, which had been obtained through the very act that the Court
had characterized as a violation of international law.
The Judgment of the Court has been subjected to both criticism
and support from different viewpoints. Verzijl, for instance, does
not agree with the part of the Court's Judgement that finds that
the sovereignty of Albania was violated by the U.K.'s minesweeping
operation. In his opinion, "the suspect behaviour of Albania . . .
certainly justified this specific British counter action, intended
not so much to take reprisals, as to unmask the wrong-doer".
Consequently, he is satisfied by the unanimous decision of the
Court that "its condemnation of the "Operation Retail" as a
violation of Albania's sovereignty was in itself "appropriate
satisfaction" .
Ibid 35. According to the Court " [ i] ntervention is perhaps
less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for,
from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the
administration of international justice itself." Ibid.
139 Ibid 35.
J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of the World Court, vol.
II (1966), p. 32.
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Some commentators have criticized the Court for admitting the
evidence which was obtained through violation of international
law.^"*' It has been stated that instead of relying on the evidence
concerning the mines gained in Operation Retail, the Court could
have achieved the same conclusion by applying "an absolute
presumption of the responsibility of a state for unpublicized mines
in its territorial waters... through which international traffic
transits. . .
On the other hand, as has been stated by a commentator,
"the approach of the Court is to discourage self-help in
the getting of evidence involving internationally illicit
acts, not by seeking to impose any bar on the employment
of evidence so collected, but by making it clear that
such illicit activity is not necessary, since secondary
evidence will be received and treated as convincing in
appropriate circumstances."''*^
Michael Reisman and Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiff^s
Dilemma: Illegally Obtained Evidence And Admissibility In
International Adjudication, A.J.I.L., 1982, No. 4, p. 737-753 at
748. -
Ibid. "If the absolute presumption seems ' too rigid and
strains other policies that are appropriate, the Court might have
also established an onerous rebuttable praesumptio juris. A
shifting of the burden of proof would then have required Albania to
come forward with evidence indicating that it was not responsible
for the location of the mines; inability to shift this_burden of
proof would have rendered Albania responsible for the injury. In
this fashion, the Court could have reached the same conclusion
without having had to approve, in effect, a United Kingdom
intervention into Albanian territory." Ibid, pp. 752-3.
Hugh Thirlway, Dilemma Or Chimera? Admissibility Of
Illegally Obtained Evidence In International Adjudication,
A.J.I.L., 1984, vol. 78, pp. 622-641, at 641.
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It should also be noted that the Court admitted the evidence
obtained through violation of international law under circumstances
where no objection had been raised with respect to the
admissibility of that evidence on iaehalf of Albania. The Court
nevertheless imposed sanctions on the U.K. by condemning its act.
The approach of the Court, as Thirlway rightly concludes, was thus
"both rational in itself and more in harmony with the fundamental
nature and powers of international tribunals than any exclusionary
rule would be."'"^
No general exclusionary rule of evidence, however, can be
inferred from the judgment of the Court in the Corfu Channel case,
perhaps the only safe conclusion to be drawn in this regard from
the judgment of the Court is that in the absence of a specific
reference to the power of international tribunals to exclude
evidence acquired through violation of international law, and in
the absence of an objection to the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence, international tribunals would be reluctant to
refuse these types of evidence.
Apart from the findings of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case,
it may generally be argued that admitting evidence obtained by or
through violation of international law would be against the
principle of Nullus Commodum Capers De Sua Iniuria Propria (no one
should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong-doing), which
144 Ibid.
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is recognized in many municipal systems and in international
law."*^ However since the practice of international tribunals shows
few instances where they have had to face and deal with the
question of illegally obtained evidence, the position of
international tribunals is not very well-known in this regard.
In fact, except for the Corfu Channel case there is no
prominent example in the practice of international tribunals.
Some commentators have listed the Case—Concerning—United—5 uates
ninlomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran''^ as- another example.''^
However, the fact that Iran did not appear in that case before the
ICJ, and neither Iran nor the United States put forward any
argument related to the necessity of acquiring evidence through
violation of international law in the territory of other, makes it
too speculative to rely on that case in this respect. The practice
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, too, does not reveal any instance
of inadmissibility on the basis of illegality of the means through
which the evidence has been obtained. Exceptionally, Some indirect
inferences may be found in certain international comoromis to
As regards the applicability of the principle of Nullus
Commodum... see, generally, B. Cheng , General Principles or Law as
z^polied bv International Courts and Tribunals, pp. cit. , pp.
155; and Tiooets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Award
No. 141-7-2 (22 June 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 2iy
at 228.
146 United States v. Iran, Judgment of 24 May 1980, TCJ Reports
1980 .
S^ Michael Reisman and Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiff^s
Dilemma, oo.cit. , at 748 et seq •
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issues such as mutual respect for confidential documents,'"*^ but
that does not justify the conclusion that exclusion of illicit
evidence is supported by State practice.
The fact that in international practice there is a want of
cases in which the issue of illegally obtained evidence is raiged
or addressed shows that the issue has not been recurring and thus
that international tribunals have not- had to face this question
repeatedly. It is also probable that international tribunals have
refrained from referring to instances of production of unlawfully
obtained evidence in their decisions, out of respect for
Sovereigns. The question of proof may also have contributed in this
regard, since the party alleging the illegality should naturally
first prove its claim.
Regardless of its cause, however, the near absence of
precedents on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained through
illicit acts leads, inevitably, to the conclusion that at present,
international procedure has no firm or established general rule of
evidence as to the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
The lack'of supporting precedents, on the other hand, leads equally
For instance. Article V (2) of the Special Agreement dated
29 March 1979, between the U.S.A. and Canada, reads as follows:
"Each of the Parties shall notify and consult the other prior to
introducing into evidence or argument diplomatic or other
confidential correspondence between Canada and the United States of
America related to the issue of maritime boundaries delimitation."
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, P. 254.
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to the conclusion that there is no established rule as to the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in international
procedure, either. Thus the question should be approached, in each •
case, according to the circumstances of the case, and on the basis
of the scope of the power granted to the tribunal by the States
establishing it. In other words, the issue of admissibility of
evidence acquired through violation of international law is still
an unsettled question to be dealt with in each case openmindedly
and with the help of the inherent flexibility of international
procedure. Moreover, in cases where there is the possibility that
•the issue -may arise, the parties to international proceedings may
be well-advised to take precautions in this regard in advance, and
specify in the compromis or special agreement whether or not the
evidence obtained through a violation of international law should
be admitted by the tribunal.
d. Time-Barred Evidence
The time to which evidence belongs may affect its
admissibility in two ways: first,, when the evidence of the facts
occurring- after-the close' or the proceedings is involved; second,
when the evidence relates to the events occurring subsequent to
expropriation.
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i. Evidence of the Facts Occurring After the Close of the
Proceedings
International tribunals usually do not decide on issues that
the parties have not had enough opportunity to comment upon and
substantiate. Therefore, issues related to the dispute but
occurring after the stage at which the parties to the case have
submitted their arguments and evidence usually remain' outside the
tribunal's jurisdiction, and accordingly the evidence thereof, if
submitted by one of the parties or made available to the court by
other means, is not admissible.
In the Nicaragua Case the conflict which was the subject of
the case was still continuing during the proceedings, and therefore
it became necessary for the ICJ "to decide, for the purpose of its
definition of the factual situation, what period of time, beginning
from the genesis of the dispute, should be taken into consider
ation." Following its decision in the Nuclear Tests Cases,the
Court held that
"general principles as to the judicial process require
that the facts on which its Judgment is based should be
those occurring up to the close of the oral proceedings
on the merits of the case. While the Court is of course
very well aware, from reports in the international press,
of the developments in Central America since that date,
it cannot as explained below (paragraphs 62-63), treat
such reports as evidence, nor has it had the benefit of
the comments or argument,of either of the Parties on such
149 See I • C. J. Reports 1947, p. 264, para. 3 3; p. 468, para. 34.
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reports."'^®
ii. Evidence of the Events Occurring Subsequent to the
Expropriation
In expropriation cases, whenever valuation of property becomes
necessary, international tribunals usually first determine a date
as of which the expropriation is deemed to have occurred and then,
on that basis, turn to the valuation of the property or rights at
issue. As a result of application of this method, which conforms to
acceptable and general principles of valuation and is supported by
State practice,'^' international case law'^ ^ and scholarly
opinion,the events occurring subseguent to the date of
assessment shall be ignored in the valuation, regardless of whether
they have positive or negative effects on the property being
Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 58, I.C.J•Reports 1986, P. 39.
151 See, e.g., the post-war nationalizations in the United
Kingdom in: B.A, Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law
(Cambridge, 1959), pp. 129-132.
See, e.g., Chrozow Factorv case (1928) , P.C.I.J, Ser. A, p.
47; Lighthouses arbitration (France and Greece), Award of 24-27
July 1956, P.C.I.J., reprinted in: R.I.A.A. , vol. XII, pp. 155 and
246-247 (English translation in: 23 ILR, pp. 300-302); and Starrett
Case, OP. cit. , Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1, pp. 54 and 56,
reprinted in: 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 156 & 157.
153 See, e.g., G. White, Nationalization of Foreign Property,
1961, p. 31; and Gerard Fouilloux, La nationalization et le droit
international public, (Paris, L.G.D.J., 1962), p. 425, Note 21.
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assessed.
Now the effect of that principle, as far as the admissibility
of evidence is concerned, could be the exclusion of evidence
relating to events subsequent to the date of taking. In the
Starrett case, the respondents relied on this principle in order to
justify non-production of some of the documents asked for by the
Expert appointed by the Tribunal for valuation of the construction
project at issue.'" In the Lighthouses Award the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, rather than not admitting the argument of Greece
which was based on the subsequent events, rejected it:
"[T]he damage suffered by the firm can only be assessed
by reference to data existing at the time when the
concession was taken over. Subsequent events, which were
unforeseen at that time both by the Greek Government
which seized the concession and by the firm which was
dispossessed of it, cannot be taken into consideration in
a case of a grant of compensation which ought to have
been not only determined but also put at the disposal of
a concessionaire before the latter's removal. The Greek
argument, which would take into account subsequent
events, and which would be to the advantage of Greece,
must therefore be rejected."
See cases referred to in Note. 13 4 supra. Furthermore, this
principle has been reaffirmed by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in
other cases involving valuation as a result of taking; See, e.g..
Award No. 93-2-3 (19 December 1983) American International
Group,Inc., V. The Islamic Republic of Iran p. 17, reprinted in 4
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 96-111 at 106; and Award No. 184-161-1 (12 August
1985) INA Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran p. 10,
reprinted in 8 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 380.
See Respondents' Comments on the Expert's Final Report,
pp. 37 & 159.
2 3 ILR. p. 301.
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4. Weight
The freedom of international tribunals with respect to
admission of evidence does not imply that all evidence produced by
the parties or obtained by a tribunal shall be treated equally. In
fact, the freedom of admission signifies the importance of freedom
of evaluation, through which the probative value of each piece of
material evidence shall be determined given the overall
circumstances of the case. This by itself signifies the importance
of the judges and arbitrators to whom this extensive freedom of
admission and appraisal of evidence in international proceedings is
entrusted, and the experience, knowledge, and high degree of
impartiality they should possess.
The freedom of international tribunals to evaluate evidence
and its probative value has been emphasized by both legal
writers'" and international tribunals. For instance, in the Irish
Case , the Irish Government asked the Court to exclude from its
examination some of the evidence gathered by the Commission, owing
to the origin of the said evidence.'^' The Irish Government also
requested the Court not to take account of the oral evidence of
some witnesses (referred to as Gl, G2 and G3) heard by the
See, e.g., Joe Verhoeven, "Arbitrage entre Etats ^
entreprises etranaeres; des regies specifigues?", Revue de
I'arbitrage, 1985, No. 4, p. 634.
Ireland v. United Kingdomrirish Case^ . European Court of
Human Rights, Judgment of 18 January 1978, reprinted in; 58 ILR at
279 .
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Commission, because "it was heard in the absence of the Parties and
without cross-examination...".'^' Refusing the request of the Irish
Government with respect to the admissibility of evidence, the Court
stated that it was not bound by restrictive rules of evidence;"^
rather, "the court [was] entitled to rely on evidence of every
kind, including, insofar as it deems them relevant, documents or
statements emanating from governments, be they respondent or
applicant, or from their institutions or officials".'®'
Nonetheless, at the stage of appraisal of the evidence, the
Court to some extent took account of the objections made by Irish
Government, and concluded that not much weight can be attached to
the testimony of Gl, G2 and G3. Thus, after referring to the fact-
that it had no jurisdiction "to rule on the correctness of the
procedure" followed at the hearing before the Commission with
respect to evaluation of the evidence, the Court continued as
follows :
"On the other hand,- the Court, being master of its own
procedure and of -its own rules (Article 55 of the
convention), has complete freedom in assessing not only
the admissibility and the relevance but also the
probative value' of each item of evidence before it . It
cannot attach to the evidence of Gl, G2 and G3 as much
weight as to the evidence of witnesses who have been
cross-examined. The Court looks upon the evidence of Gl,
G2 and G3 as no more than one source of information
amongst others and one which, being evidence coming from
senior British officials, falls into a similar category
Ibid.
Ibid. and p. , supra.
'®' Ibid.
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to the respective statements made by the representatives
of the two Governments to the Commission and the Court.
Although that evidence was given on oath,it was obtained
under conditions which reduce its weight.
a. Probative Value of Statements of Parties
International tribunals are free to determine the value of the
statements of parties. In the Rann of Kutch case, Pakistan relied
on a Diplomatic Note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as
an admission by India concerning the border between India and
Pakistan. However, the chairman of the tribunal evaluated that
document differently and decided that "in the context of the
related correspondence" it could not "be understood as an admission
of the alignment of the boundary. In the Nicaragua Case, the
ICJ did not agree with Nicaragua that the invocation of collective
self-defence by the United States constituted a general admission
on the part of the United States; but concluded that it was
"certainly a recognition as to the imputability of some of the
activities complained of."'^
In his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction Case (second
162 Ibid 280.
The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundarv CRann of Kutch) case
(India v. Pakistan), Tribunal Constituted under an Agreement of 30
June 1965 (Lagergren, Chairman; Entezam, Belber, Members), 19
February 1968, Opinion of the Chairman, reprinted in 50 ILR at 469.
164 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 74, I.C.J.Reports 1986. PP. 44-45.
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phase), Judge Jessup finds the statement made in the Rejoinder of
Spain a "sound point that since the personalities acting for Sidro,
Securitas and Sofina are essentially the same, their assertions
supporting each other are equivalent to self serving declarations
which have little probative value."
States have, at times, expected that their statements be
accepted as evidence. For instance, in the Island of Palmas
Arbitration Case between the United States and Holland, the United
States contended that "statements without evidence to support them
could not be taken into consideration by an international tribunal,
and that evidence is not only to be referred to but it is to be
laid before the tribunal".'®^ Holland, to the contrary, contended
that no formal rules of evidence existed in international
arbitration and that statements made by a government in regard to
its own acts were evidence in themselves and were in no need of
supplementary corroborations.The arbitrator held, inter alia,
that "(i)t was for the tribunal to decide whether allegations of
the parties were in need of evidence to support them, and whether
the evidence produced was sufficient or not".
I.C.J. Reports 1970, P. 214; 4 6 ILR. p. 388.
Island of Palmas Arbitration Case, United States and
Holland; Permanent Court of Arbitration, 4 April 1928; reprinted in
Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, No. 4, rep. ed.
1981, p. 480.
Ibid, p. 481.
Ibid.
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On the other hand, while States, as parties to international
disputes, usually have to corroborate their statements, the
possibility of accepting a statement under the circumstances of a
given case should not be excluded. The approach of the European
Court of Human Rights in this regard, as declared in the Irish
Case. may be viewed as a reconciliation between the two unjustified
extremes of either accepting or rejecting categorically the
assertions of Sovereigns. There it was pointed out that "(i)n order
to satisfy itself, the Court is entitled to rely on evidence of
every kind, including, insofar as it deems them relevant, documents
or statements emanating from governments, be they respondent or
applicant, or from their institutions or officials."
As a matter of fact, some forms of evidence, such as oral or
written testimony, are nothing but statements made under particular
circumstances and by particular individuals. The issue was well
addressed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case. In that Case the Court
took the view that statements of high-ranking .official political
figures "are of particular probative value, when they acknowledge
facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the
person who made them."™ According to the Court, statements as
Ireland v. United Kingdom flrish Case) , Judgment, European
Court of Human Rights, 18 January 1978; 58_ILR, p. 279.
™ Nicaragua v. United States of America. Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 64, I. C. J. Retjorts 1986, P. 41.
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such "may then be construed as a form of admission.""' The Court,
however, found it necessary to emphasize immediately that such
statements should be treated with caution and that its probative
value differed depending on "the manner in which they were made
public. . . " .
The ICJ set forth, the rationale for the treatment given to
statements made by the responsible authorities of the States
involved in the Case as follows:
"A member of the government of a State engaged, not
merely in international litigation, but in litigation
relating to armed conflict, will probably tend to
identify himself with the interests of his country, and
to be anxious when giving evidence to say nothing which
could prove adverse to its cause. The Court thus
considers that it can certainly retain such parts of the
evidence given by Ministers, orally or in writing, as may
be regarded as contrary to the interests or contentions
of the State to which the witness owes allegiance, or as
relating to matters not controverted. For the rest, while
in no way impugning the honour or veracity of the
Ministers of either Party who have given evidence, the
Court considers that the special circumstances of this
case require it to , treat such evidence with great
reserve."
The approach taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, in giving
Ibid.
Ibid, para . 65, I.C.J. Reports 198 6. P. 41. The Court
continued as follows: "[E]vidently, it cannot treat them as having
the same value irrespective of whether the text is to be found in
an official national or international publication, or in a book or
newspaper. It must also take note whether the text of the official
statement in question appeared in the language used by the author
or on the basis of a translation (cf. I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 10,
para. 13)." Ibid.
™ Ibid, para. 70, I.C.J. Reports 1986, P. 43; see also, para.
71 et. sea.
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evidentiary value to the statements of governments official insofar
as they were contrary to the contentions of their respective
government, was followed by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in its Judgment of 29 July 1988, in which the publicly made
statements of the officials of Honduras were relied upon against
that government.
Finally, it should also be added that any probative value to
be attached to the statements of government officials is evidently
subject to the condition that enough evidence be produced in order
to prove that the statements at issue were in fact made by the
official to whom they are attributed. Otherwise, as was stated by
the ICJ, no weight could be given to alleged statements ... of
which there is insufficient evidence."'''^
b. Non-applicability of "best evidence" Rule
The restrictive rules of evidence in municipal law, by which
international tribunals are not bound, include the rule generally
See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Para. 146, reprinted in T.
Buergenthal, R. Norris and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights—in
the Americas, at 257, ("Many of the press clippings offered by the
Commission cannot be considered as documentary evidence as such.
However, many of them contain public and well-known facts which, as
such, do not require proof; others are of evidentiary value, as has
been recognized in international jurisprudence . . . insofar as they
textually reproduce public statements, especially those of high-
ranking members of the Armed Forces, of the Government, or even of
the Supreme Court of Honduras,
175 Judgment of 27 June 198 6, para. 160.
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referred to in common law countries as the "best evidence" rule.™
While this issue touches upon admissibility of evidence, it is in
fact related to the evaluation of evidence and the probative value
to be given to "secondary evidence". The fact that international
tribunals are not bound by this rule was referred to, inter alia,
by Judge Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion in the Barcelona
Traction Case (Second Phase) in order to argue that in failing to
produce certain "Trust Deeds", Belgium was not necessarily
withholding them because they contained material prejudicial to the
Belgian case. According to him, under the circumstances of the case
secondary evidence of ' the contents of the Trust Deeds was
admissible.
Non-applicability of the "best evidence" rule, however, does
not mean that the authenticity of documents produced by one party
and challenged by the other party should not be proved. As was
stated by the dissenting arbitrator in the Ultrasvstems Case before
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal:
"Although the Tribunal does not adhere to.strict rules of
evidence, once an issue is raised as to the validity of
documents submitted by a party and that party is given an
opportunity to authenticate those documents, its failure
See Mani, op.cit.. 216; and Sandifer, op.cit.. p.
4 6 ILR. p. 272. According to Judge Fitzmaurice:
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.
"Of course the trust Deeds would, if produced, constitute what is
known in Common Law parlance as the "best" evidence, and unless
they could be shown to have been lost or destroyed, it is unlikely
that a municipal court would admit secondary evidence of their
contents, international tribunals are not tied by such firm rules,
however, many of which are not appropriate to litigation between
governments." Ibid.
139.
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to do so should affect the weight accorded such
submissions".™
References to the application of the freedom vested in
international tribunals need not be multiplied."' It is to be
noted, on the other hand, that similar to the situation of
international tribunals with respect to the admission of evidence,
here too, they are bound, in appraising the evidence admitted, by
"general principles of law prevailing in foro domestico relating to
evidence"'^® At the same time, as rightly mentioned by Cheng, since
"the appraisal of evidence is an intellectual process depending
upon the circumstances of each case, any attempt to itemize broad
principles governing such subjective mental activity must perforce
be somewhat hazardous."'^'
5. The Authority to Decide the Standard of Proof
The measure to be accepted in international procedure as the
Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk to Final Award (7
December 1983) Ultrasvstems Incorporated v. Iran p. 2, reprinted in
4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.80, atSO.
It is for international tribunals to decide the degree of
precision required for determination of legal rights. In the Case
Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India), the International Court of Justice said, in spite of the
argument of India to the contrary, that :"The Court is satisfied
that the right of' passage claimed by Portugal has, in the
circumstances, been defined with sufficient precision to enable the
Court to pass upon it." Judgment of 12 April 1960, reprinted in 49
ILR, p.49.
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Ibid.
Bin Cheng, op.cit., p. 308.
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standard of proof is an important issue which needs to be dealt
with in more detail; thus it is discussed in Chapter VIII of the
present study.However, it is to be noted here that, no matter
which measure or standard is applied, it is within the power of
international tribunals to determine it, and in any event that
affects the burden of proof, particularly as the standard of proof
is a subjective measure and therefore subject to the discretion of
the Tribunal. Moreover, the burden of proof is only deemed
fulfilled if and when the evidence produced by claimant is
sufficient to meet the standard of proof determined by the
tribunal.
See. Chapter VIII, 1
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CHAPTER V
RULES OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Rules,of the Burden of Proof
As discussed in Chapters II to IV above, in international
procedure the general aspects of the burden of proof are related to
the principal actors of all judicial or arbitral proceedings, i.e.,
claimant, respondent, and the tribunal. On that basis three general
rules, each reflecting a particular aspect of the burden of proof,
could be identified in international procedure. As will be
discussed hereinbelow, these general rules mainly concern the
allocation of the burden of proof between the parties, including
collaboration of parties in matters of evidence, and the
contribution of international tribunals in that regard. The issues
to be dealt with in this Chapter include identifying those general
rules more expressly, and the question as to which of the rules
applied by international tribunals with respect to the burden of
proof could be characterized as principles of international
procedure.
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1. The Rule actori incumbit probatio
This is the broad basic rule of the burden of proof. According
to this rule, which is rooted in Roman law and is applied in
different legal systems of municipal law as well as in
international procedure, the burden of proof, as a point of
departure, is on the "actori". However, the "actori" is the party
who alleges a fact, not necessarily always the party who instituted
the proceedings. That definition of "actori" provides the rule
actori incumbit probatio with enough flexibility for its smooth
application in the complex international litigations of the world
today. In international procedure, the rule actori incumbit
probatio is not used in the sense of its old rigid Roman law
concept; but rather as a comprehensive rule according to which each
party has to prove its claim or defence.
No doubt, there are differences between the methods, modes,
standards, and quantum of proof acceptable in different municipal
systems, as well as between municipal and international
proceedings. As a general principle, however, it is necessary for
the party who alleges a fact to prove the truth of its claim, if
not accepted by the other party, before the authority which is
charged with the duty to adjudicate the dispute. This rule is so
well-founded in municipal law that it could easily be concluded to
be a generally accepted principle of municipal law which, in
accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the International
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Court of Justice, is a source of international law. Indeed, the
practice of international tribunals, in line with that of national
fora, shows a constant application of the same concept in cases
before them.'
2. The Rule of Collaboration of Parties in Matters of Evidence
As was explained in Chapter III/ the second general rule of
the burden of proof concerns the duty of parties to international
proceedings to co-operate in order to place the facts related to
the disputed issues before an international tribunal. This is a
general obligation of parties which is derived from the idea of
peaceful settlement of disputes. It assists international tribunals
in their efforts to establish the truth of a disputed matter on the
basis of all material facts.
•While the limits and other details regarding this rule may be
subject to argument, the concept itself does not seem to have ever
been challenged. In fact the necessity of collaboration of parties
has been relied upon in order to justify the flexible application
of the rule actori incumbit nrobatio.
In Chapter III examples were mentioned from State practice,
international precedents and legal writers' opinion in support of
the existence and applicability of this rule in international
See, generally. Chapter II, supra,
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procedure. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that as a supplement
to the rule actori incumbit probatio. which emphasizes the
Claimant's role, the rule of collaboration of parties, with
emphasis on the respondent's role, is a principle of international
procedure.
3. The Authority of International Tribunals in Matters related to
Evidence
In international prpceedings, judges and arbitrators are to
take an active role in the proceeding in matters related to
evidence, subject to the condition that it does not affect their
impartiality or the important principle of equality of the parties
before international tribunals. As was explained in Chapter IV, the
liberalism of international law and the inherent flexibility of
international procedure favour the authority of international
tribunals to investigate proprio motu the facts at issue. •
The authority of international tribunals in this regard,
however, inevitably affects the burden of proof. When the tribunal
is on the verge of deciding whether or not the burden of proof with
respect to a particular issue has been met, the effects of the
investigation carried on, or documents and information produced, on
the initiative of the tribunal itself are equally taken into
account along with the proof provided by the parties to the case.
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The authority of international tribunals in matter
evidence, the general aspects of which were discussed in Ch
IV, is a settled rule of international procedure; and althoug
limits may be subject to differences of opinion, the concept i
is not to be challenged.
B. Whether the General Rules on the Burden of Proof are to 1
Considered as Principles of International Procedure
1. Arguments Against and in Favour of the Rule actori incTiml)
probatio
The main criticisms against considering the rules c
burden of proof as principles of international pro^
concentrate on the rule actori incumbit probatio. which plac
burden of proof generally on claimant. These arguments, acc
to which the rule actori incumbit probatio is not applica
international procedure, could be summarized as follows:
a. The difficulty of distinguishing between part-
claimant and respondent in international procedur
b. Simultaneous submission of pleadings by parties ir
international procedure.
c. Silence of the fundamental texts of international
tribunals as regards the burden of proof.
d. Non-technical nature of the rules of evidence in
international procedure.
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e. The duty of parties to co-operate with international
tribunals so as to establish the truth of a case.
Arguments (a) to (c) above were identified by Witenberg as
long ago as 1951.^ Arguments (d) and (s) may be inferred from some
of the decisions of mixed claims commissions where the rule actori
incumbit probatio is criticized.^
a. Difficulty in Distinguishing Between Claimant and Respondent
This argument is built on the fact that international
proceedings are based on the consent of the parties and, therefore,
contrary to municipal law in which the distinction between claimant
and respondent is usually clear, it is difficult or in some cases
probably impossible to distinguish between claimant and respondent
in an international proceeding. For the following reasons, however,
this argument is not an impediment to the application of the basic
rule of the burden of proof:
First, the scope and effect of the question is limited to
those cases between States where their own rights are at stake, and
^ See J.C. Witenberg, "Onus Probandi devant les iuridiction
arbitrales". Revue General de Droit International Public, Tom LV,
1951, P. 325.
^ See. e.g., Parker Case, Mexico-U.S.A General Claims
Commission (1923), RIAA. vol. IV, p. 39, and Pinson Case, French-
Mexican Claims Commission, RIAA. vol. V, pp. 327-466, at 413.
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not to cases they espouse on behalf of their nationals.
International proceedings between States for their own rights
normally constitute only a fraction of the cases adjudicated by
international tribunals, and even in that small portion it is not
always difficult to determine which party is claimant and which is
respondent. Indeed, the argument is limited to a very few cases
between States, and this in itself reduces the strength and effect
of the argument.
In the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, with approximately 4000
cases, only about 100 of the cases involved the rights of the two
States themselves. In most of these cases the claimants and
respondents were quite clearly identifiable. The question of the
difficulty in distinguishing between claimant and respondent might
need to be addressed only in some of the cases involving disputes
on the interpretation or performance of the constituent instirument
of the Tribunal. In fact, in the ten years since the Tribunal
commenced its functions, there has only been one case in which it
was difficult to draw a distinction between the parties. This was
Case Al, through which 4 disputed issues were submitted to the
Tribunal by the Governments of Iran and the United States. Even in
that Case no difficulty arose with regard to the burden of proof,
as each party tried to prove its own position or claim with respect
to each issue,
See generally. Decisions of the Tribunal in Iran United
States. Case A/1, 14 May & 30 July 1982, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
A A -icro r ior\_-iri'7C.T.R. 144-153 & 189-197.
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Second, the basic rule of the burden of proof is not to be
applied only in single-claim cases. In reality, the disputes are
usually more complicated. In each case there are many claims and
counterclaims, in each of which the parties are required to prove
different alleged facts. Accordingly, it is both important and
difficult to determine, on each occasion, on which party the burden
of proof falls. Nonetheless, this has not prevented municipal
tribunals from applying the rule actori incumbit probatio. and
there is no conceivable reason why it should be different with
regard to international tribunals.-
Third, apart from the limited difficulty presumably arising in
some cases from the non-distinction between claimant and
respondent, in principle the allocation of the burden of proof is
not dependent on such a distinction between the parties. Each party
who claims a fact is, apart from its formal position, the claimant
with respect to that fact and has the burden of proving it. The
tendency of international tribunals to treat each of the various
issues of a single case separately also facilitates the allocation
of the burden of proof in these cases.
Moreover, municipal ^tribunals are familiar with the tests
developed to assist the trier of fact in order to decide on each
occasion which party has the burden of proof. These tests are
formulated in fairly simple questions such as : Who will lose if
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the case is not proved? and Who benefits from a change in the
normal state of affairs? The party who loses if the issue before
the tribunal is not proved, or the party who benefits from a change
in the normal state of affairs, is the party who bears the burden
of proof. These tests are neither statutory regulations of
municipal law, nor restricted to national courts. In fact
international tribunals have applied these formulae whenever
necessary.^
b. Simultaneous Submissions
It has also been argued that simultaneous submission of
pleadings in international proceedings leaves no room for the
application of the rule of actori incumbit probatio.^ This
argument, however, is not well-founded. Simultaneous submission of
the pleadings is not an obligatory feature of international
proceedings. Exchange of the memorials and evidence of the parties
5 See, e.g., T.eaal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J,
Judgment of 5 April 1933, 6 ILR, at 101, ("The geographical meaning
of the word 'Greenland', i.e., .the name which is habitually used in
maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as e
ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the
Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is^ to be
attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its
contention").
^ See J.C. Witenberg, otj . cit. In the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal an order of the Tribunal for simultaneous filing of
memorials has been interpreted, by the President of the Tribunal,
to mean that "the Co-Registrars had the authority to withhold a
party's memorial filed in time, until the other party's memorial
had also been received, and should act accordingly." Minutes of the
Tribunal's 8 9th Meeting, paragraph 8. i
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usually does not take place simultaneously, but there are intervals
between receipt of the submission of one party and that of the
other. In fact, unless an order of a tribunal specifically refers
to simultaneous filing, even the requirement that the parties file
their submissions on the same date does not mean "simultaneous
submission".'' It is true that there are cases in which the parties
have agreed, or international tribunals have required them, to
present their pleadings simultaneously; but that is not a settled
rule of international procedure, and in many cases it has not been
applied by international tribunals. In fact the practice of
international tribunals, including those of recent years, proves
that consecutive submissions are more favoured. Even assuming that
simultaneous submission were an established rule of international
proceedings, that would still not prevent the application of the
rule actori incumbit probatio. For even in cases involving
simultaneous submission of pleadings, international tribunals would
be able to apply that rule.
^ In a letter dated 4 December 1984, the Co-Registrars of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, relied upon a memorandum from
the Secretary-General of the Tribunal and the President's
observation reported in paragraph 8 of the Minutes of the 8 9th
Meeting of the Full Tribunal, in order to inform the Agents of Iran
and the United States with regard to the "simultaneous filing" as
follows : "From time to time the parties to cases have raised the
notion of 'simultaneous filing' of documents. This idea seems to
stem from an inference regarding the language of many Orders which
require the parties to submit similar documents on the same date...
Please advise the parties that the inference referred to above
should not be made absent in an order the specific language
referred to in the memorandum."
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c. Silence of the Fundamental Texts of International Tribunals
with Regard to the Burden of Proof
It has further been argued that allocation of the burden of
proof is an important issue, so that had it been a principle
applicable in international procedure there would have been
references to it in the fundamental texts of international
tribunals such as the constituent instruments or compromis of such
tribunals . As further evidence that the rule actori incumbit
orobatio is not applicable in international procedure, the critics
refer to the fact that there has been no reference to that rule in
the Statutes of the PCIJ and ICJ, or in The Hague Conventions.«
Witenberg has effectively responded to this argument.
According to him, if the constituent instruments of international
tribunals are silent in this regard it is because the issue is one
of adjective law.^ Therefore, the silence of the constituent
instruments could not be interpreted as proof that the principle
does not exist. Ever since the publication of "Witenberg's article
in 1951, the practice of international tribunals has confirmed his
conclusions. Further, there are many procedural texts which could
be referred to as incorporating the basic rule of the burden of proof.
10
8 See J.C. Witenberg, op. cit.
' S^ ibid p. 327.
1° See, e.g.. Article 24 of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Rules; Article 24 of UNCITRAL Rules; Article 15 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
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d. Non-technical Nature of the Rules of Evidence in International
Procedure
Another argument which might be advanced, on the basis of the
Parker Case, against the applicability of the rule actori .inmimhit
probatio as a general principle of international procedure is based
on the non-technical nature of the rules of evidence in
international procedure.
It should be noted, however, that while the non-technicality
of the rules of evidence in international procedure' is an
undisputed fact, it does not affect the rule actori incumbit
probatio. For, as explained in Chapter I, though a procedural
matter, the allocation of the burden of proof is a matter of
substantive law as well. Indeed, in the Parker case, the General
Mexican Claims Commission (1923) aimed at rules regarding the
burden of evidence when it referred to the non-technical nature of
the rules of evidence in international procedure.
e. The Duty of Parties in International Proceedings to Co-operate
With International Tribunals so as to Establish the truth of a
Case
A misleading inference one might draw from the Parker Case
Commission (1 January 1987), Wetter, op.cit.. vol. V, p. 123
" See. p. , infra.
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is that the Commission relied on the necessity of co-operation of
parties in matters of evidence before international tribunals, as
a reason for the non-applicability of the rule of onus probandi
incumbit as a general principle of international procedure.
But the flaw of the argument is apparent. As was previously
explained,co-operation of the parties in matters of evidence in
international procedure is itself a main rule of the burden of
proof, and it could be applied together with the rule acton
incumbit onus probandi. Thus, even if under the circumstances of a
given case the adjudicating authority finds it necessary to rely on
the rule of co-operation of parties, that does not generally affect
the applicability of the rule actori incumbit probatio as a primary
rule for allocating the burden of proof.
2. The Cause of the Misunderstanding: The Parker Case
In the preceding pages the arguments in favour of and against
the position that the rule actori incumbit probatio is a principle
of international procedure were discussed. However, it is important
to further point out that occasions on which international
tribunals have taken stands against the principle of burden of
proof are in fact rare. The most renowned case in this regard is
the Parker Case,'^ which was decided by the Mexico-U.S.A. General
See, generally Chapter III and. A (2), supra.
See R.I. A.A. vol. IV, (1926) p. 39.
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Claims Commission (1923), as well as a few other cases that have
approved and quoted that case.'"* Indeed, most of the arguments
against the rule of burden of proof stem from the decision in the
Parker Case, which on its face seems to be contrary to the general
practice of international tribunals.
As has been noted by a commentator, the language used by the
Mexican-United States General Claims Commission in the Parker Case
"has sometimes given rise to the impression that, contrary to the
view generally accepted by international tribunals it gave a
negative answer to the question" of whether international tribunals
admit the existence of any general principles of law governing the
allocation of the burden of proof.Therefore, this examination of
the issue would not be complete without a discussion of the Parker
case.
a. Summary
William A. Parker was an American national engaged as a
typewriter dealer in Mexico City. He had allegedly sold and
delivered typewriters and rendered services for the repairs of
See, e.g., George Pinson Case, (France) v. United Mexican
States, which was decided by the French-Mexican Commission in 1928,
(R.I.A.A, vol.V, pp. 327-466, at 413). Sandifer mentions the
French-Mexican Commission as the only other commission which has
quoted the Parker Case with approval, because of the Pinson Case.
(Sandifer, op.cit., at 129.)
Cheng, op. cit. . pp. 326, 327.
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typewriters to various departments of the Government of Mexico. In
a claim espoused on his behalf by the United States of America
against the United Mexican States, over $ 39,000 was sought as the
remainder of the amount due to Parker.
The Commission dealt with the case in four phases.'^ But only
the second phase of the proceedings, in which the Commission
commented upon different issues of the evidence and burden of
proof, has attracted attention. The proceedings before the
Commission in this phase led to an interlocutory decision in which
a date was fixed for further submissions by the Agents with regard
to the burden of proof.
b. The rule of actori incumbit probatio
In paragraph 6 of its decision the Commission stated, inter
Parker Case, Mexico-U.S.A General Claims Commission (1923),
RIAA. vol. IV, p. 21 et sea.
In phase one, on 2 March 1926, a motion to_ dismiss the case
was overruled when on the face of the record it appeared that
Claimant was an American national (ibid, 21). In phase two, on 31
March 1926, the Commission discussed several grounds on which the
nationality of the claim had been challenged^ but reserved its
decision with respect to ownership of the claim (ibid, 35) . The
Commission at this stage requested the Agents to co-operate in
discovering the facts with respect to the ownership of the claim
and the interests, if any, of the Claimant Parker or others, and to
file evidence in the form of a stipulation of facts signed by both
Agents. In phase three, on 26 October 192 6, the Commission held
that the evidence as to the ownership of the claim was satisfactory(ibid, 67) . In phase four, on 3 December 1926, the Corutiission
awarded the Claimant a certain amount of money plus interest
(ibid) .
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• alia. as follows :
"As an international tribunal, the Commission denies the
existence in international procedure of rules governing
the burden of proof borrowed from municipal procedure. On
the contrary, it holds that it is the duty of the
respective Agencies to cooperate in searching out and
presenting to this tribunal all facts throwing any light
on the merits of the claim presented."'^
This and other similar opinions of the Commission may be
misleading with regard to the burden of proof. The imprecision of
the decision in the Parker case with respect to the burden of proof
has caused a misunderstanding which could have been avoided by
using the proper legal terms.''
The Commission did not, in fact, mean to state that the rule
actori incumbit probatio is inapplicable in' international
procedure. Although the Parker Case should be criticized for not
using the term "burden of proof" correctly, especially in an
opinion which intended to give future guidance to the respective
Agents of the Governments before the Commission for other cases as
well, the whole opinion read together will explain the real
intention of the Commission. The key point is that the Commission
has used the term "burden of proof" not in its real meaning, but
rather in its secondary meaning under Anglo-American law, i.e., the
"burden of evidence". On the other hand, this does not seem
RIAA. vol. IV, p. 39; 3 ILR. p. 415.
" This by itself demonstrates the great responsibility of
members of international tribunals not only with regard to the case
being adjudicated before them, but also for preserving the
integrity of the international adjudicative process as a whole.
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unusual, in view of the time that the decision in the Parker case
was issued. At that time, even within the common law system, many
courts were using the term "burden of proof" not only for its real
sense but interchangeably for the "burden of evidence" as well.^°
Having this in mind, the Commission's opinion taken as a whole
makes more sense, even the sentence which sharply emphasizes that
"the Commission denies the existence in international procedure of
rules governing the burden of proof borrowed from municipal
procedure."
The rules regarding the "burden of evidence" are technical
rules which may vary considerably from one legal system to another
and even among municipal laws within a single legal system.
Therefore, the Commission was right to state that international
procedure has not borrowed these technical rules, which in the
preceding paragraph the Commission clarified as meaning the
technical rules of evidence in the United States or Mexico.
c. The Rule of Collaboration of Parties
In fact, the Commission did not deny the existence of the rule
actori incumbit orobatio in international procedure in its real
sense. What the Commission actually meant, apart from stating the
fact that the technical rules of municipal law with regard to the
burden of evidence are not applicable in international procedure.
20 See. Chapter I (B-1), supra.
266
was to emphasize the other rule of the burden of proof in
international procedure, i.e., the necessity of cooperation of
parties.
To remove any doubt with respect to its real intention, at the
end of the same paragraph 6 the Commission referred to the
applicability of the rule for cooperation of parties before the
Commission while stating the rule actori incumbit probatio as a
general rule. According to the Commission:
"While ordinarily it is encumbent upon the party who
alleges a fact.to introduce evidence to establish it ,
yet before this Commission this rule does not relieve the
respondent from its obligation to lay before the
Commission all evidence within its possession to
establish the truth, whatever it may be."^'
How far "the obligation" referred to by the Commission is
applicable, or to what extent it is on the parties to an
international proceeding to disclose the documents at their
disposal, is subject to argument. The necessity of co-operation
between the parties, however, is not an obstacle to application of
the rule actori incumbit probatio. The Commission itself,.in spite
of the impression one might gain from the first part of paragraph
6, actually acknowledges the existence and applicability of the
general rule of the burden of proof, i.e., actori incumbit
probatio. in international procedure.
RIAA. vol. IV, p. 39; 3 ILR. p. 415.
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3. Equilibrivim as the Main Rule
As previously discussed, with respect to the burden of proof
in international procedure three general rules could be identified:
the rule of actori incumbit probatio, the rule of collaboration of
parties in production of evidence, and the authority of
international tribunals in matters of evidence.
The decision in the Parker Case does not prove that the rule
actori incumbit probatio is not applicable in international
procedure. It demonstrates, however, that it is not the only rule
to be applied with respect to the burden of proof in cases before
international tribunals, either. So, indeed, is the case with the
collaboration rule which was emphasized by the Parker Case and
other cases following its example, and the other general rule,
i.e., the authority of international tribunals in matters of
evidence. None of the three general rules of the burden of proof is
of such a nature that application of one would exclude the other
two.
In fact, it is necessary that in each and every international
proceeding the rule actori incumbit probatio should be applied
along with the collaboration rule and the rule of the authority of
international tribunals in matters of evidence, altogether. In
other words, in a given case the claimant for each material issue
should try to prove its claim to the satisfaction of the tribunal.
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the respondent should co-operate with claimant and the tribunal in
placing material evidence in its possession before the tribunal,
and for its part, the tribunal should be active in applying to the
extent appropriate, proprio motu. its fact-finding power to the
disputed issues in the case.
It is the duty of international tribunals to exercise a
balance in this regard and to lead the proceedings in a way that
while neither of the parties is placed under the impression that it
is proving the positions of the other party, their co-operation as
well as the tribunal's role is carried on smoothly and to the
benefit of justice and truth.
Accordingly, the only overriding rule with respect to the
burden of proof in international procedure is the rule which
results from the application of the three above-mentioned rules,
each to the extent necessary, in an international proceeding. The
proper application of this overriding principle is the main duty of
international tribunal and it is a measure on whose basis their
efficiency could be judged.
PART THREE
PARTICULAR ISSUES CONCERNING
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
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CHAPTER VI : PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
A. General Remarks
presumptions are conclusions drawn from known facts about
unknown facts. The known fact serving as the basis for a
presumption could be either a particular proven fact related to the
case at issue, or a fact which is to be held true indiscriminately
in all cases unless the contrary is proved. This definition is
generally applicable in both municipal and international law.
In the legal literature of the common law countries the word
"presumption" conveys two principal meanings: Either "a conclusion
which must be drawn until the contrary is proved"^ or "a conclusion
that a fact (conveniently called the "presumed fact") exists which
may, or must, be drawn if some other fact (conveniently called the
"basic fact" is proved or admitted."
In civil law countries, too, presumptions are conclusions
- R. cross, Evidence (1979), p.122. "In its first place, the
word presumption is simply employed as a means_ of stating the
effect of the relevant rules with regard to the incidence of the
legal and evidential burdens of proof." Ibid.
2 Ibid. Typical examples of the first sense are "the
presumption of innocence" and "the presumption of sanity". Examples
for the second sense include "the presumption of death arising from
the fact that someone has not been heard of for seven years or more
by those who would be likely to have heard of him." Ibid 123.
also Cornus Juris Secundum, vol. 31A, p. 196 et seq.
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about unknown facts. They are either prescribed by law or drawn by
the courts on the basis of known facts.^ Presumptions prescribed
by law as proof of certain facts are called legal presumptions and
could be relied upon virtually in all claims, including those which
could not be established by testimony of witnesses/ Presumptions
to be drawn by courts are decided on each occasion on the basis of
the specific circumstances of the case at issue. These presumptions
are, in fact, nothing more than inferences drawn by judges. Thus,
they are either referred to as judicial presumptions or simply as
inferences J It is to. be noted, however, that contrary to legal
presumptions, inferences are, at least according to the letter of
the law, of limited probative value in municipal law.®
^ According to Article 1349 of the French Code Civil : " Les
presomptions sont des consequences que la loi ou le magistrat tire
d'un fait connu a un fait inconnu." See also Article 1349 of the
Belgian Code Civil and Article 1321 of the Civil Code of Iran,
which contain similar provisions.
See, e.g.. Article 1352 of the French Code Civil and Article
1323 of the Iranian Civil Code.
^ In French they are referred to as presomptions de fait,
presomptions de simples or presumptions de I'homme. In common law
countries and in international procedure the inferences are also
referred to as circumstantial evidence. It does not, however, seem
appropriate to use circumstantial evidence in place of presumptions
generally, as apparently the former does not include legal
presumptions.
See, e.g.. Art. 1353 of the French Code Civil: "Les
presomptions qui ne sont point etablies par la loi, sont
abandonnees aux lumieres et a la prudence du magistrat, qui ne doit
admettre que des presomptions graves, precises et concordantes, et
dans les cas seulement ou la loi admet les preuves testimoniales,
a moins que I'acte ne soit attaque pour cause de fraude ou de dol."
According to Art. 13 2 4 of the Iranian Civil Code, inferences can be
raised to substantiate the claim only when the lawsuit can be
established by testimony of witnesses, or when it complements other
pieces of evidence.
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In common law countries, in addition to inferences, legal
presumptions too could be established by judicial decisions. Except
for this difference, which results from a dissimilarity in the
sources of law, there seem to be no other major differences as to
the concept of presumption between the legal systems of common law
and civil law countries."^
In spite of the relative harmony of municipal law in this
regard, the status of presumptions in international procedure is
not quite settled.^ Particularly, as will be discussed below, it
is still arguable to what extent legal presumptions exist or are
applicable in international law, if at all, and how far they, as
well as inferences, could affect the burden of proof.
For a view of the situation of presumptions in the laws of
East European countries see, e.g., the comparative study done by
Istvan Sza'szy under the title of International Civil Procedure,
Budapest. 1967, pp. 285-287. "A presumption can be a statutory one
[praesumptio lurls), if the inference is made by the law itself,
and can be a simple presumption {praesumptio homonis) which is in
essence a conclusion made by the court on the basis of experience.
Temporary truth, according to which the judge has to consider,
owing to a provision of law, a certain fact as unconditionally true
until the contrary is proved, is not a presumption. It is
characteristic of all types of temporary truths that they do not
make evidence superfluous, but only facilitate it." Ibid, pp. 285-
286,
^ "By its very nature the law of presumptions belongs
primarily to the realm of municipal law, rather than to
international law... Presumptions cannot...in the present stage of
the development of international law, occupy a role comparable to
that which they play in municipal law." Sandifer, op. cit., pp.141-
142.
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Given the perplexing nature of the issue in municipal law, this
is hardly surprising. In fact, the flexibility of international
procedure in general and the lack of rigid rules with respect to
presumptions in particular has resulted in different approaches and
opinions with respect to presumptions, which even in municipal law,
by itself and without the shortcomings of international procedure,
represent one of the complicated and confusing issues of the law of
evidence.' This should also count for the approach of some legal
writers who, though otherwise very thorough, do no more than
providing a few examples from the practice of international
tribunals, when discussing presumptions.At the same time, it is
to be noted that a thorough study of all aspects of presumptions is
beyond the scope of the present study too, and the discussion below
is to be limited to the study of the effect of presumptions on the
burden of proof and issues directly related to that aspect.
^ "Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the
difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of
presumptions with a sense of hopelessness, and has left it with a
feeling of despair." Morgan, 12 Washington Law Review 255, cited by
Cross, op. cit. . p. 121. According to Sir Rupert Cross the above
passage is "an unduly pessimistic statement, but it has the merit
of drawing attention to the extraordinary perplexity which has
attended, and still attends, the extra-judicial discussion of
presumptions." Ibid.
See. e.g., Yi-ting Chang, Legal Presumptions and
Admissibilitv of Evidence in International Adjudication, in: The
Annals of the Chinese Society of International Law (Taiwan), No. 3,
July 1966, pp. 1-17, which does not deliver as much as the title
promises.
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B. Legal Presumption in International Procedure
1. Applicability
a. The Existence of Legal Presumptions
The existence of legal presumptions in international procedure
has at times been a contested and disputed issue. Some legal
writers in the past have concluded that international law does not
know legal presumptions." Some others, while expressing
reservation in this regard, have rightly found it difficult to
imagine legal presumptions that would shift the burden of proof
before international tribunals.'^ It has been admitted, however, by
many others that international tribunals have recognized and
" "Qu'est-ce a dire, sinon que lorsque les decisions
Internationales parlent de presomptions, elles ne font^ que
commettre un abus d'expression. Dire que le tribunal international
doit presumer la regularity de I'activite de I'Etat c'est dire
qu'il incombe a I'Etat reclamant reparation, - de prouver le fait
internationalement illicite d'ou resulterait la responsabilite
Internationale. Ce n'est pas, ce n'est a aucun titre une
presomption. Et comm.e, par ailleurs, les decisions internationales
n'offrent aucun exemple d'une veritable presomption, ^ il faut
conclure que le droit international ignore en fait la presomptionjuridique." Witenberg, op. cit., pp. 329-330. Though the term la
presumption juridique used at the end of the paragraph suggest a
different conclusion, the fact that in the footnote Witenberg
quotes G. Scelle shows that what he actually meant was legal
presumption.
12 See Arbitral Procedure. Document A/CN.4/18, Rapport par
Georges Scelle, rapporteur special, reprinted in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1950), vol. II.
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applied a number of legal presumptions in their practice.'^
Given the present status of international procedure, the
answer to the question could be different depending on what is
meant by legal presumptions in international law. On one hand,
because of the absence of a supreme law making power in
international law, it could be said that there are no legal
presumptions in international procedure, in the sense that they
exist in municipal law,''* i.e, statutory legal presumptions
applicable in all cases whether or not referred to in the
comTjromis. On the other hand, it is to be noted that, similar to
other aspects of municipal law, the concepts related to
presumptions could not have been used in international procedure
before going through the process of necessary modification and
alteration required by international law.
"International tribunals may recognize certain legal
presumptions as affecting the primary burden of proof, but the
presumptions are so variously stated, and there is such a lack of
uniformity in the circumstances of their application, that no
general rules in the matter can be stated." Sandifer, op. cit. ,
p.141. See also Cheng, op. cit., p.305.
See. e.g., Mazeaud Lecons de Droit Civil Tome I ler vol.,
6e ed. 1980 par Frangois Chabas, p. 437 et sea.
It is not inconceivable to think of situations under which
international tribunals may find it appropriate to apply statutory
legal presumptions of a relevant municipal law. But in those cases
they would be relied upon as a presumption of the applicable
municipal, not international, law.
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Therefore the adjective legal, contrary to Witenberg's view,'®
should not be taken as implying the existence of an imperative law
over and above States, but as referring to what is meant by law in
the realm of international law. Bearing that in mind, then, the
absence of statutory presumptions in international procedure does
not necessarily mean that presumptions comparable to legal
presumptions of municipal law, but not resulting from statutes,
could not be found in international procedure. In fact, a study of
the practice of international tribunals shows that whenever
necessary they have relied on relevant legal presumptions in their
decisions.
.I'epithete de "legal" appliquee aux _ soi-disant
presomptions Internationales serait en toute hypothese inexacte. La
loi, au sens technique, est 1'emanation d'un pouvoir superieur aux
sujets de droit; elle est la prescription imperative d'une force
supreme. Elle n'a done pas place dans les rapports entre Etats._Car
ces rapports ne comportent I'exercice d'aucun pouvoir superieur
commun." Witenberg, op. cit., 3 29.
" see, e.g., Article 42 of the Regulations of Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights which reads as follows: "The facts
reported in the petition whose pertinent parts have been
transmitted to the government of the State in reference shall be
presumed to be true if, during the maximum period set by the
Commission. . . , the government has not provided the pertinent
information, as long as other evidence does not lead to a different
conclusion." The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, refers to this provision
as a "legal presumption", (T.Buergenthal, R.Norris and D. Shelton,
Protecting Human Rights in the Americas, p. 254) . For another
example see Algra and Others v. the^ Common Assembly—of—the
European Coal and Steel Communitv, in which the Court of Justice of
the European Coal and Steel Community concluded that "[t]he
existence of an administrative act creates the presumption of its
validity". Judgement of 12 July 1957, in: 29 I.L.R at 263 .
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b. Sources of Legal Presumptions
The difference between legal presumptions in international and
municipal law, similar to the situation in the legal systems of
common law countries vis-a-vis those of civil law countries, lies
in their sources. As was stated at the outset, the definition that
presumptions are conclusions to be drawn from known facts about
unknown facts holds true in both municipal and international law.
It is to be noted, however, that municipal law and international
law differ as to the known facts to be used as the premise for
legal presumptions. In municipal law, the bases for legal
presumptions are usually statutes. In the field of international
law, to the contrary, legal presumptions can not be created by
enacting statutes; but they usually originate from main sources of
international law as summarized in Article 3 8 of the Statute of the
I.C.J., namely, international conventions, international custom,
and general principles of law.
Examples from the practice of international tribunals in which
general principles of law have been used as premises for legal
presumptions are not wanting. For instance, there are many
precedents for founding rebuttable presumptions on general
principles of law such as good faith and regularity and validity of
acts of sovereigns to International law.^^ In fact, sovereignty of
States is a common and general ground for many presumptions. For
18 See,e.g., Cheng, op.cit., pp. 305-306.
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instance restrictions upon the independence of States cannot be
presumed." Or "a sovereign State ... cannot be presumed to have
made the substance of its debt and the validity of the obligations
accepted by it in respect thereof, subject to any law other than
its own."
In the Corfu Channel Case the International Court of Justice
found that a presumption that a State had knowledge of the unlawful
acts committed in its territory could not be built on the basis of
the principle of sovereignty
See case of the S.S. Lotus. P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p.
18, and Case concerning Riaht of Passage—over—Indian—Territory.
fMerits') , Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, 1 -C-J-
Reports 1960, p. 91.
.qerhian Loans. P.C.I.J.. Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 42. S^
also BraT^ilian Loans, ibid p. 122, ("It cannot be held that the
intention of the borrowing State was to render some law other than
its own applicable as regards the substance of its debt and the
validity of the conditions laid down in respect thereof, unless
there were, if not an express provision to this effect, at all
events circumstances which would irrefutably show that such was its
intention.")
21 "But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the
control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that
State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act
perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should
have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart f^om other
circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor
shifts the burden of proof." Judgement of 9 April 1949, TCJ Reports
1949, p. 18. According to Judge Alvarez, however, "every State is
considered as having known, or as having a duty to have known, of
prejudicial acts committed in parts of its territory where local
authorities are installed; that is not a presumption, nor is it a
hypothesis, it is the consequence of its sovereignty." Corfu
Channel Case (Merits), Individual opinion of Judge Alvarez, I-C.J.
Reports 19 49. p.44.
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Interpretation of treaties, compromis. and contracts is
another field in which presumptions are frequently used. "According
to the most fundamental principle of interpretation", held the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, "the Article in question must be
presumed to be capable of being given meaning and effect as the
expression of the common intention of the parties.
Still in the same field, "[ajccording to what has become known
as the 'principle of subsequent practice', the interpretation in
fact given to an international' instrument by the parties to it, as
a matter of settled practice, is good presumptive (and may in
certain cases be virtually conclusive) evidence of what the correct
legal interpretation is- a principle applied by the Court on
several occasions. It is also a settled general principle of
law, which has been applied frequently by international tribunals
as a presumption, "that a party's attitude, state of mind or
"CBA International PeveloTJment Corporation v. Iran. Award
No. 115-828-3 (16 March 1984), at 6, reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 177-181 at 180. "If- one of the words used gives rise to
ambiguity, such ambiquity must be resolved in favour of the
interpretation most likely to give sensible effect to the Article
taken as a whole." Ibid.
^ Certain expenses of the United Nations, (Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Separate Opinion of Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, I.C.J.Reports 1962. p.201. For a detailed discussion
of the principles of interpretation, and whether the travaux
preparatoires of a multilateral treaty could be invoked against the
parties who have not participated in the negotiations which led to
the drafting of that treaty, see Italian Republic v. Federal
Republic of Germanv, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and
Interests in Germany, Award of 14 November 1959, in : 2 9 ILR 442,
pp. 459-470.
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..intentions at a later date can be regarded as good evidence -in
relation to the same or a closely connected matter- of his
attitude, state of mind or intentions at an earlier date also;
provided of course that there is no direct evidence rebutting the
presumption thus raised."^'*
General principles of law are sometimes relied upon to show
that presuming a fact or a status under, a given circumstance is not
justified." For instance, in the Greenland Case, the PCIJ emphasized
that the Court "must not and cannot presume that the two
Governments concerned might act otherwise than in conformity with
the intentions" officially expressed before the Court.Or, it is
a general rule that renunciation can not be presumed.As another
example, it is a general and well-established principle of law that
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Merits, Separate Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
I.C.J. Reports 19 62, pp. 61-62. In his Opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice
relies on the views of Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case.
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, at p. 866; and
also the Separate Opinion of Judge Basdevant in the Minguiers and
Ecrehos case, I.C.J. Reports 1953, at p. 76 ff. On that basis,
Judge Fitzmaurice concludes that "[sjimilarly -and very important
in cases affecting territorial sovereignty- the existence of a
state of fact, or of a situation, at a later date, may furnish good
presumptive evidence of its existence at an earlier date also, even
where the later situation or state of affairs has in other respects
to be excluded from consideration." Ibid.
South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 48, p. 287.
26 See Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Azevedo, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.96.
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'bad faith can not be presumed'" because good faith is a general
principle which is always to be presumed in international
relations
Presumption of good faith is a general principle which applies
in a wide range of situations. For instance, in Mobil Oil Iran
Inc.. et al v. Iran. the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal found that when
the parties agreed to terminate a suspended agreement through
negotiation, and actively pursued the negotiations but did not
reach an agreement, their failure does not reflect any breach by
either party- of their agreement' to terminate the contract, "since
it must be presumed that the parties had negotiated in good
faith. "29
While legal presumptions in international procedure are mainly
founded on general principles of law, other sources of
international law are also relevant as the bases for legal
" See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. STPain^ ,
(Petren, president; Bolla, De •Luna, Reuter, De Visscher), 6
November 1957, in: 24 I.L.R 101, at 126; and Separate Opinion of
Judge Tanaka, Barcelona Traction Case: Second Phase, in: I.G.J.
Reports 1970. P. 159, 46 I.L.R at 333.
See, e.g.. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I. C. J. ,
Judgment of 20 February 1969, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun,
I.C.J. Reports 1969, P. 102, 41 I. L. R at 117; and Article 31,
Paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
provides consistent with the practice of international tribunals,
that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Award No. 311-74/76/81/150-3 ( 14 July 1987) reprinted in
16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3-59, at 54 (para. 160)
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presumptions in international procedure,
International conventions, as a main source of international
law, could create legal presumptions.^® The effect of international
conventions for providing legal presumptions in international
procedure should be distinguished from the effect of the parties
agreement as to the applicability of a certain presumption in their
dispute.^' The parties' agreement in both municipal and
international law could be a source of legal presumptions, though
subject to different kinds of limitations.^^ In international
proceedings the parties may create or recognize presumptions either
in a convention, compromis, or in the rules of procedure of the
According to Judge Quintana, in his Dissenting Opinion in
the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land: "The
Treaty useful as presumptio juris, has no value as a proof of
Belgian sovereignty over the plots." I.C.J. Reports, p. 257.
As an example for the parties' agreement reference is made
to Article 75 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and
Associated.Powers and Italy, which provides, ,in paragraph 6, that
"rolling stock shall be regarded as having been removed from the
territory to which it originally belonged." According to the
Franco-Italian. Conciliation Commissipn "the presumption^ imposed by
Article 75(6) in connection with rolling stock is not juris et de
jure but juris tantum in view of the clear provision of the
following paragraph (7)":
"The burden of identifying the property as well as that of
proving ownership falls on the claimant Government, and the
burden of proving that the property was not removed by force
or duress shall rest on the Italian Government."
French State Railways Claim, 10 March 1953, in: 2 0 ILR at 488-489.
In municipal law, the limitations on parties' agreement
could arise from the imperative laws and public order; and in
international law, from the obligations resulting from treaties as
well as international public order.
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concerned international tribunal. Except to the extent that it may
reflect an international custom, and unless it is in the form of an
international convention, the effect of the parties' agreement
shall be limited to the particular case.
It is also conceivable that international tribunals may rely
on international customs as legal presumptions, and require the
party claiming a right to the contrary of an international custom
to fulfill the burden of proving its allegation.
Moreover, judicial decisions and the teachings, of the most
highly qualified publicists, referred to in Article 3 8 of the
Statute of the ICJ as "subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law" shall have the same subsidiary effect for
determination of presumptions. Thoughts and publications of
scholars guide and influence the decisions of international
tribunals. But it is in fact through the decisions of international
tribunals that the presumptions are primarily realized and
applied." Besides, once a presumption is recognized by
international tribunals it gains more weight, because it is then in
a judicial decision which itself is a subsidiary source of law and
" See, e.g., European Commission of Human Rights, 10 June
1985, Re Application No. 235/56, Mr. X & Mrs. X. v. German Federal
Republic, 25 I.L.R. at 209, : ("In the opinion of the Commission,
a Party to a Convention which establishes an independent
international tribunal is entitled to presume that the tribunal
will adopt such rules of procedures and will so order its
proceedings as to conform to the recognized standards of the
administration of international justice.")
capable of being referred to
2. Effects on the Burden of Proof
While there is no doubt that, similar to municipal law, the
allocation of the burden of proof in international procedure is
occasionally affected by the application of presumptions, the
question remains as to the extent of such effect. According to
Cheng "...it is legitimate for a tribunal to presume the truth of
certain facts or of,a.certain state of affairs, leaving it to the
party alleging the contrary to establish its contention."
It is to be noted, however, that international tribunals do
not usually disclose their decisions before the end of the
proceedings, i.e., at the stage where there is no more opportunity
left for the party against whom the existence of a fact has been
presumed to prove its contrary. It is, therefore, probably more
realistic to say that presumptions affect the burden of proof in
the sense that in the process of evaluating the evidence, the
tribunal takes into account any presumption applicable in favour of
the proponent and not refuted by the adversary.
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34
^ The importance of decisions of international tribunals in
this regard is not limited to their role with respect to legal
presumptions. Similar to municipal courts, international tribunals
are also to determine the applicable judicial presumptions in any
case before them.
35 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied—^
International Courts and Tribunals (1953), reprinted 1987, p. 304-
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International tribunals may rely on and apply presumptions on
their own initiation. When a party relies on presumptions in order
to discharge its burden of proof the effect is not different but
the other party will have a chance to rebut the presumption by
providing proof to the contrary. Accordingly, while the effect of
presumptions would not be so great as to reverse the burden of
proof, they do relieve the party to whose benefit a relevant
presumption exists, from the duty of initiating the proof, by
creating prima facia evidence in h-is favour. On occasions where the
adverse party is not able to rebut the prima facie-evidence created
by presumption this advantage could prove to be highly valuable, as
it may lead to a ruling in favour of the proponent.^®
Considering the effect of presumptions to be so great as to
shift the burden of proof, as certain legal writers tend to do in
some cases,will amount to giving too much weight to indirect
See, e.g., Iran National Airlines Company v. the Government
of the United States of America, Award No. 333-B8-2 (30 November
1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 187 at pp. 209-210, ("On
Invoice No. 154 219, the Tribunal concludes that the evidence
submitted by the Respondent is sufficient to establish a rebuttable
presumption that payment was made on this invoice. The Claimant has
not submitted any evidence, such as bank records, sufficient to
rebut this presumption. The Tribunal therefore dismisses the claim
based on Invoice No. 154219.")
See, e.g.. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Azevedo, Corfu
Channel Case (Merits^ , I.C.J.Reports 1949. pp. 85-86: ("And so,
without prejudice to the maintenance of the traditional import of
the Word culpa and to avoid the difficulty of proving a subjective
element, an endeavour has been made to establish presumptions that
would simply shift the buren of proof as in the theory of bailment
in which a mere negative attitude -a simple proof of absence of
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evidence and in some cases may lead to unreasonable results. From
a practical point of view, however, the situation where there is
some evidence against a presumption may be more difficult to deal
with than a situation where there is none to that effect. When
there is no evidence at all against a presumption, the adversary
has not been able to discharge either the burden of evidence or the
burden of proof. Thus if the tribunal takes the view that legal
presumptions shift the burden of proof, he fails, since he has not
been able to discharge that burden. He will fail again if the
tribunal takes the other view, that legal presumptions only serve
as providing TPr ima facie evidence in favour of the proponent,
because a non-rebutted prima facie evidence may under some
circumstances be sufficient for discharging the burden of proof.
The situation, however, would be somewhat different where the
presumption is rebutted, since the degree of proof necessary for
discharging a burden of proof is usually more than that which is
necessary for rebutting prima facie evidence provided by the other
party.But as was already discussed, the burden of proof in its
culpa on the part of a bailee -is not sufficient. The victim has
only to prove damage and the chain of causation; and that is enough
to involve responsibility, unless the defendant can prove culpa in
a third party, or in the victim, or force majeure; only these can
relieve him from responsibility.")
See CH. VIII infra.
39 For more explanation on the degree of proof required from
claimant and respondent. See Ch. VIII infra.
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real sense never shiftsand thus the effect of presumptions too
is restricted to the burden of evidence.
Naturally, it always remains for the tribunal to decide on the
admissibility and relevancy of the presumptions relied upon by the
parties in a pending case. As an example, in the Lighthouses
Arbitration, between France and Greece, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration did not find that the presumptions urged by claimant
"in default of any direct proof,... suffice to convince the
Tribunal.
Moreover, application of a presumption should not lead to
unreasonable results. In Iran National Airlines Co. v. United
States, the Respondent Government was relying on the argument that
U.S. regulations and procedures relating to payments in connection
with certain Air Force Form 15 transactions create a presumption
that the sums owed on such invoices had already been paid.
According to the U.S Government that presumption was applicable
because, due to the application of U.S. regulations governing
destruction of past records, it was no longer possible for the
Respondent to produce records of payment for Air Force Form 15
40 See, Chapter I (D) supra, and Lord A.T. Denning,
Presumptions and Burdens, in: 61 Law Quarterly Review, London 1945,
p. 24, at 25.
Lighthouses Arbitration, Claim No. 14, Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 24 July 1956 (Verzijl, President; Mestre, Charbouns),
in; 2 3. ILR, p. 680.
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transactions over three years old/^ The Tribunal, however, did not
accept the U.S. contentions in that regard:
" The Tribunal does not doubt that the timely submission
of invoices supported by AF Form 15s usually results in
payment. The Tribunal decides, however, that the evidence
in this Case is inadequate to justify application of a
presumption of prior payment, which would unfairly shift
the burden of proof back to the Claimant to show that no
payment had been made."
With respect to the issue of whether the effect of
presumptions is limited to questions of law or they may affect the
questions of facts as well, it seems that there is no limitation in
this regard. Presumptions are conclusions drawn from facts either
to other facts or to law, and they could be used and relied upon in
matters of both law and fact. Thirlway argues, however, that "...
international practice does not appear to afford any examples of
presumptions as to states of fact, as distinct from the conclusion
of law to be drawn from facts. This argument is true in the
See Award No. 333-B8-2 (30 November 1987) , op. cit. ,
reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R 187, at 193.
Ibid. In the same Case the Claimant was contending that as
the use and distribution of AF Form 15s was severely controlled by
the Respondent, a mere submission of the Form 15, even -if unsigned,
created liability for payment. But the Tribunal did not accept that
presumption and considered that the Claimant had the responsibility
to ensure that the AF Form 15 was properly signed and that under
the circumstances "any loss incurred due to the lack of
authorization by a U.S. official must be borne by the Claimant."
Ibid, p. 208.
H.W.A. Thirlway, Evidence Before International Courts and
Tribunals, in: Bernhardt(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International
Law [Instalment 1 (1981) p.59]. On that basis, and relying on the
Corfu Channel Case, he concludes that "the principle that a State
is not to be presumed to have acted contrary to international law
does not reverse any burden of proof, but rather increases the
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sense that in international procedure general presumptions of facts
are rare. At the same time, it is to be noted that such a general
presumption of fact, capable of being equally applied in different
cases, would not be any more a presumption of fact, but a
presumption of law based on a repeating fact. In any event, the
issue though a complicated one seems to be without much practical
value. It is probably for these reasons that international
tribunals have relied, in their practice, on certain presumptions
generally and without being concerned with making a strict
distinction between presumptions of fact and presumptions of law."*^
3. Irrebuttable Presumptions in International Procedure
In municipal law, legal presumptions are divided into
rebuttable Ciuris tantum^ and irrebuttable (juris et de iure^
presumptions."*^ But are there any irrebuttable presumptions in
international procedure? This is a delicate question with no firm
answer. If, as was discussed in (l.b) above, the difference between
legal presumptions in municipal and international law lies mainly
weight of that burden..."Ibid.
See, e.g., Mani, op. cit. , p. 208. In municipal law, too,
the division of presumptions into presumptions of law and
presumptions of fact has been criticized; see, e.g.. Cross on
Evidence, op.cit., p. 123 et sea; and Lord A.T. Denning,
Presumptions and Burdens, op. cit. . at 24, where he states that
that division "should be replaced by a division into provisional
presumptions, compelling presumptions, and conclusive
presumptions."
46 See. e.g., Mazeaud, op cit., p. 439 et sea.
289
in their sources, then irrebuttable presumptions too should exist
in international law. In fact, it is not too difficult to find
references to irrebuttable presumptions in the texts issued by
international tribunals/"'
On the other hand, irrebuttable presumptions are imposed upon
litigating parties in municipal law by the laws of States. In
international law, however, where the States themselves are parties
to international litigations, this mechanism can not function.
48
As an example, reference could be made to the Dissenting
Opinion of Dr. Ecer, the Judge ad hoc, in the Corfu Channel Case
(Merits). I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 119-120: ("[i]n international
law there is a presumption in favour of every State, corresponding
very nearly to the presumption in favour of the innocence of every
individual in municipal law. There is a presumptio juris that a
state which alleges a violation of international law by another
State must prove that this presumption is not applicable in some
special case; but it is not possible to combat a presumption of
legal conduct by another presumption.") See also the Advisory
Opinion of 21 June 1971 of the ICJ with respect to Namibia,ICJ
Reports 1971. pp. 274-275,("...the classic instance of the creation
of an irrebuttable presumption in favour of a given intention is,
precisely, where a different course has been proposed but not
followed"); and the Dissenting Opinion of Fitzmaurice,in_iMd at
280-281,("From what this list reveals ... there arises an
irrebuttable presumption... that except in the few cases ... in which
executive or operative powers a'ire specifically conferred on the
Assembly, it does not, so far as the Charter is concerned, have
them.")
See George Scelle, Rapport sur la Procedure Arbitrale,
cit. (Note 12 supra) , at 134 ("Nous pensons egalement qu'en matiere
arbitrale il est difficile d'imaginer des presomptions legales
aboutissant, le cas echeant au renversement de la preuve. Ces
prescriptions sont a base reglementaire et legislative et en
fonction de I'ordre public des differents pays. On voit
difficilement comment un arbitre ou un tribunal ^ad hoc
utiliseraient un systeme de presomoptions rigides incompatible avec
la souplesse de 1'arbitrage episodique. Dans ce domaine, il importe
de laisser aux juges une entiere liberte d'appreciation, selon
I'excellente formule de I'article 1353 du Code civil frangais.")
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Moreover, the freedom of international tribunals in evaluation of
evidence is, among other things, the consequence of the fact
that no evidence with prefixed probative value, including
irrebuttable presumptions, could be imposed upon them.
Perhaps the right answer in this regard is to be found in the
fact that even in municipal law, irrebuttable presumptions are of
a different nature from other legal presumptions. They are not in
fact legal presumptions in the true sense, prescribed on the basis
of the reoccurrence of certain facts or states of affairs under
specific circumstances for the purpose of proof, but rather
conclusions necessitated by the rules of substantive law,
prescribed for purpose of policy and disguised in the form of
irrebuttable presumptions. In other words, when reasons for
prescribing a rule of law in the form of a presumption are other
than and more important than a mere repetition of a reoccurring
fact, then it is necessary that such a legal presumption and its
effect could not be avoided even by contrary proof. However, as it
is usually difficult to distinguish between rebuttable and
irrebuttable legal presumptions on the basis of speculation on
their raison d^etre, in municipal legal systems they are specified
by the law itself, an advantage which is normally not available in
international law.
In this sense some of the substantive rules of international
49 See generally Chapter IV, supra.
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law, too, might be disguised in the form of irrebuttable
presumptions. For instance, as stated by Judge Alfaro in his
Separate Opinion in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear,
the principle of estoppel which is "substantive in character" ...
"constitutes a presumptio juris et de iure in virtue of which a
State is held to have abandoned its right if it ever had it, or
else that such a State never felt that it had a clear legal title
on which it could base opposition to the right asserted or claimed
by another State. Examples for this type of presumptions may
also be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties.^^
Thus, it is right to conclude that there are no true
irrebuttable presumptions in international law, in the sense that
what are called irrebuttable presumptions are in fact the
requirements of substantive rules of international law presented in
50 Cambodia v. Thailand, Merits, ICJ Reports 1962
Ibid, pp. 41-42. "In short, the legal effects of the
principle are so fundamental that they decide by themselves alone
the matter in dispute and its,infraction cannot be looked upon as
a mere incident of the proceedings." Ib'rd.
" See. e.g., Article 46:
"1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by
a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its
internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith." Basic Documents in International Law,
edited by Ian Brownlie, 2nd ed., (1972), P. 251.
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the form of presumptions. Nevertheless, it is equally right to say
that since substantive rules of international law are not subject
to proof to the contrary, when they emerge in the form of
presumptions they are not rebuttable.
As to the effect of an irrebuttable presumption on the burden
of proof, it could be viewed in two ways :
First. similar to other legal presumptions, it creates a prima
facie proof for the party to whose benefit an irrebuttable
presumption exists. But its effect differs from that. of a
rebuttable presumption, in so far as the other party can not rebut
the presumed situation.
Second, it may be easier to depart from the point that legal
presumptions do not shift the burden of proof, but rather shift the
burden of evidence. However, irrebuttable presumptions, as
conclusions required by substantive rules of international law, in
fact affect the allocation of the burden of proof and may either
emphasize the weight of the burden of claimant, or shift the burden
from claimant to respondent, as the case may be^- In other words, if
the rule of international law which is the basis for an
irrebuttable presumption supports the claim, then the burden of
proof shifts from claimant to respondent; but if there is an
irrebuttable presumption against the claim, the burden on claimant
is emphasized and may become impossible to meet.
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C. Judicial Presumptions or Inferences in International Procedure
Contrary to the situation with regard to legal presumptions
the existence of judicial presumptions or inferences in
international procedure can not be disputed. As was stated by the
Inter-Aiuerican Court of Human Rights, "[t]he practice of
international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence,
whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a
decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the
facts. In the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, both Iran and United
States agreed "that the use of presumptions can constitute a
perfectly legitimate method of evaluating the evidence in cases
before the Tribunal"^'*
Inference is a judicial instrument at the disposal of
international tribunals which if applied correctly could facilitate
their functioning.^^ Similar to municipal fora, it is the common
" Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, (T.Buergenthal, R.Norris and D.
Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas, p. 257).
^ Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America,
Decision No.45- A20-FT (26 June 1986), reprinted in 11 Iran-U.S
C.T.R. 271, 276.
"...in international law, circumstantial evidence means
facts which, while not supplying immediate proof of the charge, yet
make the charge probable with the assistance of reasoning."
Separate Opinion of Judge Badawi Pasha, Corfu Channel Case, I•C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 59.
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practice of international tribunals to rely on reasonable
inferences drawn from proven facts in each particular case. The
question, therefore, is rather the situations under which resort to
inferences have been allowed, and whether or not the burden of
proof could be met by reliance on inferences.
Theoretically, the difference between legal presumptions and
judicial presumptions are clear. Legal presumptions express the
state of law, whereas inferences express the state of fact.
Moreover, legal presumptions are usually general and do not need
proof as to their logic and reasonableness; rather, their
applicability to a specific situation needs to be proved. Judicial
presumptions, to the contrary, are related to specific situations
and their reasonableness is subject to the discretion of the
tribunal.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of statutory legal
presumptions in international law, the border between legal
presumptions and judicial presumptions (inferences) is narrow. It
is not always easy to differentiate between legal and judicial
presumptions in international procedure, particularly because of
the confusion added by the practice of international tribunals in
using the terms inference and presumption indiscriminately in order
to refer to inference.^^
For instance an Award of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
issued by the late Professor Michel Virally reads, inter alia, as
follows:
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Hence, while in the present study it has been endeavoured to
mention examples of each category under its own title, it is still
possible that some instances have been either overlooked or are so
discretionary that they could have been mentioned under both.
1. Admissibility
As a renowned example for the admissibility of inferences in
international procedure, reference is to be made to the Corfu
Channel Case, in which the I.C.J. made two important conclusions
with respect to presumptions: first, that a State's knowledge of an
illegal act could not be presumed on the basis of the mere fact of
the control exercised by that State over its territory; and second,
on the other hand, such exclusive territorial control "has a
bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the
knowledge of that State as to such events."" As regards the
latter, the Court, considering the difficulties to be faced by a
victim of a breach of international law in finding direct proof of
facts in the territory of another State, recognized the
admissibility of circumstantial evidence. According to the Court:
"The fact that a party refrained from raising a specific issue in
the negotiations is a strong presumption, indeed, that this party
did not expect to obtain anything on such an issue." Mobil Oil Iran
Inc. . et al. v. Iran, op.cit. , reprinted in 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3-59
at 55 (para. 162) .
" Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949: ICJ Reports
1949, p. 18.
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"Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse
to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This
indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and
its use is recognized by international decisions. It must
be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a
series of facts linked together and leading logically to
a single conclusion."
On the basis of a series of presumptions provided against
Albania, the Court eventually drew the conclusion that the laying
of the minefield "could not have been accomplished without the
knowledge of the Albanian Government."^' Some of the judges,
however, disagreed with the majority of the Court in that respect,
and expressed concerns over the risk of relying too much on
circumstantial evidence in international proceedings-. Judge Krylov,
for instance, doubts "whether, by founding oneself on indirect
evidence, it is possible to conclude that a State is responsible
vis-a-vis another State. He also takes issue with the quality of
the presumptions produced in the case.®'
58 Ibid.
Ibid, p. 22. Some of the facts on the basis of which the
Court inferred the knowledge of the Albanian Government were as
follows: The Albanian Government's notes, the fact that the
Albanian Government, had not made a judicial investigation to
inquire into the events of October 2 2nd, the geographical
configuration of the Bay of Saranda, the method applied and the
time needed for the minelaying operation, and the distance of the
nearest mine from the coast.(See Ibid, pp. 19-20.)
Corfu Channel Case (Merits) , Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Krylov, I.C.J.Reports 1949, p. 69.
"I do not believe that international justice could be
content with indirect evidence of the sort that has been produced
in the present case, which affects the honour of a State, a subject
of international law, and its position in the community of
nations." Ibid. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zoricic in:
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On the other hand, as stated by Judge Azevedo in a cautious
and precise wording, "[i]t would be going too far for an
international court to insist on direct and visual evidence and
refuse to admit, after reflection, a reasonable amount of human
certainty with which, despite the risk of occasional errors, a
court of justice must be content.
In some of the cases before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
where the validity of a contract was in dispute between the
parties, the Tribunal relied on the inference that payments
previously made by the employer to the contractor in relation to
the contract was signified that the parties treated the contract as
being in effect.®^ In the pomerov Case the Tribunal concluded that:
"Even if the Navy's assertions of the invalidity of the
Contract were correct, the Navy conducted itself in a manner
which indicates that it considered the contract to be valid,
by making substantial payments under the Contract, by making
facilities available to Pomeroy Corporation and by accepting
services from it."^
I.e. J. Reports 194-9, pp. 37-3 8; and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Winiarski in: ibid. p. 51.
'^ 2 Corfu Channel Case fMerits) . Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Azevedo, I.C.J Reports 1949, pp. 90-91.
See, e.g., Blount Brothers Corporation v. Ministrv of
Housing and Urban Development et.al., Award No. 74-62-3, p. 13,
reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 225-238 at 231; and Woodward-Clvde
Consultants v. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Award No.
73-67-3, p.11, reprinted in ibid 239.
R.N. Pomerov et.al. v. Iran, Award No. 50-40-3, 8 June
1983, at 17, reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 372-390, at 380.
298
In Ravao Wagner Case, the Tribunal ruled, under the circumstances
of the case, that any objection to the validity of the agreement
in dispute was "put to rest by the Respondent's subsequent
ratification of the agreement in receiving and using the
equipment."®^
Most of the cases referred to above are examples of
affirmative inferences. The result reached through affirmative
inferences may be either positive or negative.But the inference
may also be a negative one," "in that' it seeks to conclude about a
state of affairs because of a failure to deny or rebut it."^^ In
the Nicaragua Case the Court repeatedly relied on this type of
inferences. For instance, the Court accepted the fact of
overflights by U.S. military aircraft because it had not been
denied.
" Ravgo Wagner Eguipment Company v. Star Line Iran Company.
Award No. 20-17-3 (15 December 1982) at 7, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
C-T.R. 411-415 at 414.
As an example, for an affirmative inference expressed in
negative, see Separate Opinion of Judge Quintana, in the
Guardianship Case, I.C.J. Reports 1958, p.108: ("In any case, it is
to be presumed and this is a presumption juris tantum- in. the
absence of any proof to the contrary, that the child's living with
her grandparents, her mother's parents, in the place where she was
born, where she grew up and where her affections are centered, by
no means constitutes a forced residence.")
" Keith Highet, Evidence, The Court, and the Nicaragua Case
in: A.J.I.L. (1987), vol.81. No.1, pp.1-56, at 33.
See ibid, and Nicaragua v. United States of America. Merits,
Judgment of 27 June 1986, Paras. 87-91, I.C.J.Reports 1986. PP. 51-
52.
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Similar to the situation with respect to legal presumptions,
whether one of the parties relies on an inference or the tribunal
itself finds it justified to apply a particular inference, it is
necessary that the basis for that inference in a pending case is
either uncontradicted or proven. For instance, where a valid
contract exists between the parties to a case but the amount of
some of the invoices is in dispute, to rely on an inference against
respondent as to the accuracy of an invoice based on the
respondent's failure to dispute the amount for a lengthy period of
time, it is not enough that claimant proves that he submitted the
invoice to respondent and alleges that no objections were made by
respondent. Even if respondent, too, is unable to show that he has
in fact made an objection, or that he failed to do so because of a
justified excuse, or puts forth some other defence, the tribunal
must still make sure that under the circumstances of the case,
application of such an inference against respondent is right.
As examples of applicatioh of this inference in the practice
of the •Irah-U.S Claims Tribunal see D.I.C. of Delaware,—Inc. and
Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, Award No. 176-255-3, at 27-28 (26
April 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-U.'S. C.T.R. 144 ("The failure to
dispute an account for a lengthy period of time at least places a
burden on TRC to demonstrate that the account was not accurate");
and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award
No. 145-35-3, at 17 (6 August 1984), reprinted in 7 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 188 ("It has not been alleged that ITC objected within a
reasonable time period to Reynolds' statement of account on 31
October 1979 or to the subsequent invoice of 9 November 1979. In
fact, there is no evidence that these specific amounts were
disputed until Claimant indicated that it intended to bring this
claim before the Tribunal. In view of this, the burden is now on
ITC to demonstrate any facts supporting its contentions...").
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Enough attention should also be paid to the limits on the
admissibility of inferences. For instance, the fact that certain
checks are drawn on an account is not, by itself, sufficient to
prove the existence of funds in such account.'"' Or, as was held in
the Starrett Case, "assumption of control over property by a
government does not automatically and immediately justify a
conclusion that the property has been taken by the government
In George Edwards case, the Claimant was seeking the value of some
personal goods allegedly stored in a guest house in Iran. The
Claimant admitted that he had no evidence of their expropriation,
but alleged that from all the surrounding circumstances the
inference could be drawn that the property was in the control of
the Respondent. The Tribunal stated that it could not find
liability on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
concluded that the Claimant had failed to prove the claim of
expropriation; it thereby dismissed the claim for lack of proof.
™ Award No. 117-199-3, 19 March 1984, at 9 reprinted in 5
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 235-242 at 240.
Starrett Housing Corporation, et.al.", " v. Iran ,
Interlocutory Award No,- ITL- 32-24-1, 19 December 1983, at 52
reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122-159 at 155. See also Tippetts,
Abbett, Mc Carthv, Stratton v. Tams-Affa Award No. 141-7-2, 29 June
1984, at 11, reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 219-229 at 225, in
which the same phrase has been repeated and continued as follows:
..such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that
the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it
appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral."
George Edwards v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, et. al. . Award No. 451-251-2 (5 December 1989) , para. 12,
reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.29 0 , 294.
Ibid. para. 13.
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Similarly, in its Judgment in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights did not find the argument of the
Government of Honduras sustainable that "having a criminal record
or charges pending is sufficient in and of itself to find that a
witness is not competent to testify in Court.""''*
Finally, it is to be emphasized that, as was stated by Judge
Spender in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, "[n]o presumption can
be made and no inference can be drawn which is inconsistent with
facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence."''^ Article
1353 of the Code civil of France provides a guideline which could
be useful in international procedure too. According to that Article
the inferences must be weighty, accurate and concordant. The
European Court of Human Rights was probably inspired by that
Article when, in the Irish Case, it stated that "...proof may
follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of
Reprinted in Protecting Human Ricrhts in the—Americas,
OP.cit.. p. 257. "...under the American Convention on Human Rights,
it is impermissible to deny a witness, a priori, the possibility of
testifying to facts relevant to a matter before the Court, even if
he has an interest in that proceeding, because he has been
prosecuted or even convicted under internal laws." Ibid.
75 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand) , Merits, Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender, I^
Reports 1962, p.109. "The evidence adduced refutes the argument in
support of a presumption of her tacit acceptance of Cambodia's
title to sovereignty over the temple area as marked on the Annex I
map." Ibid, Dissenting. Opinion of Judge Wellington Koo, ICJ Reports
1962, p.96.
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fact.
2. Effects on the Burden of Proof
While, as already discussed, legal presumptions have a special
effect on the burden of proof, the effect of inferences in that
respect is not different from that of other types of evidence. In
each particular case, the tribunal should weigh the applicable
inferences in favour of the proponent under the circumstances of
the case; and- then it is to be.determined whether or not the
probative value attributed to inferences is sufficient to meet the
burden of proof. The proponent's duty with respect to inferences,
however, extends to rebutting the inferences which seem appropriate
to be drawn against his claim; and thus it is also for the tribunal
to determine whether or not the proponent has been able to disprove
those inferences
It is obvious that inferences could have an impact on the
burden of proof, as part of the evidence in ' favour of the
proponent, when they complement other types of evidence. The
question arises, however, whether it is possible to meet the burden
of proof in a pending case solely by reliance on inferences.
Ireland v. United Kingdom. 18 January 1987, in: 58 I.L.R.
190 at 264.
See, e.g. , Arthur J. Fritz & Co and Iran. Award No. 426-276-
3, reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., pp. 170-183, at 179, ("It is
the Claimant's burden to disprove this inference and to establish
that the government indeed controlled enough of STSS' members.")
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Contrary to municipal law, in which inferences have a limited
probative value, in international proceedings where international
tribunals enjoy a vast freedom in determining the value of evidence
it is doubtful whether any limitation could be imposed on the value
to be attached to inferences.''® Therefore, while the answer to that
question seems to be aff irmative,''' that does not mean that
international tribunals have a completely free hand in that
respect. In fact, every care should be taken not to minimize the
necessary standard of proof by relying unnecessarily on inferences,
particularly, where production of other types of evidence is
possible.
Even in cases where an international tribunal has admitted
circumstantial or indirect evidence because of the impossibility of
In his Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Traction Case,
Judge Bustamante states that: "I admit that it might perhaps be
possible to arrive at a conclusion on the basis merely of
inferences or deductions forming part of a logical process, but not
on the basis of duly proven facts." I.C.J. Reports 19 64, P. 84; 46.
ILR. p. 91.
See., e.g. , Lockheed Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 3 67-829-
2( 9 June 1988), reprinted in 18 Iran-U.S-. C.T.R-; at 308 ("58. The
Tribunal notes' that Lockheed offered in writing to repair the minor
discrepancies at issue for an estimated price of U.S. $20,000.00.
This offer was explicitly accepted in writing by the IAF._ The
communications referred to above and the invoice constitute
sufficient contemporaneous, although circumstantial, evidence to
establish a rebuttable presumption that these repairs were carried
out.
59. The lAF has submitted no evidence to support its assertion that
the repairs were not carried out. Therefore, the Tribunal accepts
this Claim and awards Lockheed U.S. $22,039.00.")
See the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, in: T.Buergenthal, R.Norris
and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas, at 255.
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production of direct proof, due to the nature of a claim/' it has
been emphasized that they "may be considered, so long as they lead
to conclusions consistent with the facts''.®^
The fact that factual presumptions should be drawn on
reasonable bases was emphasized in the Grenier Claim before the
Italian-United States Conciliation Commission (1959) . In that case
the Agent of the United States tried to discharge the Claimant's
burden of proof with the assistance of a presumption to the effect
that the goods in question were requisitioned by the Italian
authorities or otherwise lost or destroyed as a result of the
war." The Commission held, however, that there was no logical
basis which would justify the acceptance of the claimant's
" 124. The Commission's argument relies upon the
proposition that the policy of disappearances, supported or
tolerated by the Government, is designed to conceal and destroy
evidence of disappearances. When the existence of such a policy or
practice has been shown, the disappearance of a particular
individual may be proved through circumstantial or indirect
evidence or by logical inference. Otherwise, it would be impossible
to prove that an individual has been disappeared."
"126. The Court finds no reason to consider the Commission's
argument inadmissible. If it can be shown that there was an
official practice of disappearances in Honduras, carried out by the
Government or at least tolerated by it, and if the disappearance of
Manfredo Velasquez can be linked to that practice, the Commission's
allegations will have been proven to the Court's satisfaction, so
long as the evidence presented on both points meets the standard
of proof required in cases such as this."
"131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially
important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of
repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress any
information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of he
victim." Ibid.
Ibid.
30 I.L.R. at 455.
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presumption, and that the claim must be rejected since the claimant
had failed to meet its burden of proofJ84
In the Corfu Channel Case, the climax among those few examples
in which the ICJ evaluated the value of inferences as conclusive
and sufficient to meet the burden of proof, the Court rightly
emphasized that "[t]he proof may be drawn from inferences of fact,
provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.
Similar to other aspects of the law of evidence, international
tribunals possess a wide range of discretion with regard to
inferences, including the power to infer from a set of facts a
different conclusion from that of the party providing it,'® or to
make reasonable assumptions in the absence of any specific evidence
^ According to the commission:
"A presumption is an inference that an act has been committed or
that a fact exists and it is based on circumstances that usually
attend such an act or fact. In the case at bar there is no logical
basis which would allow the Commission to infer that the remaining
lots of paper in question were requisitioned or destroyed as a
result of the war. Any number of things, including the
possibilities suggested by the claimant, might have happened to the
paper. However, the Commission is not in possession of any evidence
which would justify its acceptance of the claimant's presumption or
explanation to the exclusion of any other possibility. The fact
that the Italian Government requisitioned a portion of the paper
does not necessarily lead one to presume that it also requisitioned
the remainder." Ibid, pp. 455-456.
85
86
Corfu Channel Case (Merits), ICJ Reports 1949, p. 18.
For instance, in Arakel Khaietoorians, et al. v. Iran, the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal concluded that the purchase of two burial
vaults by claimants indicated "at most an intention to have his
final resting place be in the United States" and that it did not
contrary to claimant's contention "indicate an intention not to
return to Iran..." (Award No. 504-350-2, 25 January 199.1, para. 17.)
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from the parties.This power needs to be applied very cautiously
and with delicacy; otherwise it may easily lead to questionable
results.
In a case before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the respondent
relied on the fact that it had not paid the full amount of any of
the claimant's invoices, in arguing that its interpretation of the
contract was correct.'^ In spite of the fact that the claimant had
not made any reference to the unpaid balance in its subsequent
invoices or any objection to the reduced payment, the Tribunal
ruled that "such omissions do not negate the presumption that the
full amounts of the invoices are still payable."®' Relying in this
regard on its previous practice that "in the absence of
contemporaneous objections or disputes invoices or payment
documents presented during the course of the contract are presumed
to be correct",^" the Tribunal found that respondent had failed to
rebut the presumption that the amounts invoiced were properly due
" See, e.g., Seismograph Service Corporation v. NIOC, Award
No. 420-443-3 para. 301', reprinted" in 22 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.at 80-81:
("...in.the absence of any specific evidence on this point, the
Tribunal deems it reasonable to assume that the profit generated by
the Crew Three Property, would be one. third of the stated value of
Contract 340...")
See Houston Contracting Company v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, et al.. Award No. 378-173-3, 22 July 1988, reprinted in 20
Iran-U.S. C.T.R, at 24.
89 Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 24-25. For the previous examples of the Tribunal's
practice in this regard see cases quoted in note 81 supra.
and payable
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Under the circumstances of the case, however, the Tribunal
could equally have accepted the respondent's argument instead of
that of the claimant. The Tribunal could have inferred, from the
absence of any contemporaneous objection to the non-payment on the
part of the claimant, that claimant either was not entitled to, or
did not have any objection to non-payment of, the unpaid amounts of
the invoices, thereby leaving the burden of proof on the claimant.
Such a conclusion would have been in accord with the practice of
the Tribunal and the underlying principle of inference to which the
Tribunal referred in favour of the claimant.
While the case referred to above demonstrates the vast degree
of flexibility that international tribunals may exercise on their
own discretion with respect to the issue of judicial inferences,
there still remain some examples which are not justifiable. A
striking example in this regard from the practice of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal is the Daley Case,^^ in which the Tribunal simply
relied on an unsubstantiated inference in order to accept the
claimant's allegation that he had owned an expensive watch which he
claimed to have been confiscated.
Ibid, p. 25.
Leonard and Mavis Daley, a claim of less than US $ 250,000
presented by the United States of America, and The Islamic Republic
of Iran. Award No. 360-10514-1, 20 April 1988, reprinted in 18
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 232.
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Claimants were seeking compensation, among other things, for
several items of jewelry, gold coins, $1000 bills, and a Rolex
watch. The Tribunal rightly started with the fact that "the
Claimants must bear the burden of proving possession, expropriation
and value of the items..." and went on to reject the claim for all
items, except for the watch, because there was no evidence and the
claimants were not able to establish their possession.'^ But, with
respect to the watch, which seemed to be an equally baseless claim,
the Tribunal reasoned differently, for no obvious reason:
"In contrast, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence to make a judgment on the possession
of Mr. Daley's watch. A specific brand, Rolex, is
mentioned and the Tribunal finds that it is probable that
Mr. Daley, like the majority of business people, would
possess and wear a watch in the normal course of events,
as he stated in evidence that he was in the habit of
doing. In addition, the description is sufficient to
determine that the value he places on the watch, U.S. $
800, appears entirely reasonable."'"^
There was considerable circumstantial evidence in the case,
including "the fact that the claimants [had] successfully
discharged the burden of proving only one tenth of their claim",
casting doubts on the veracity of the claimants and on the validity
Ibid. paras. 30-32.
Ibid, para. 32.
Ibid 243. Because of this situation, "and in view of the
costs incurred by the Respondent", the Tribunal in fact penalized
the claimants for bringing so many unsubstantiated claims, so that
although the claimants prevailed in some of their claims the
Tribunal considered it appropriate to award costs of arbitration to
the Respondent. See ibid.
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of their claims. Nevertheless, embarking on an irrelevant premise -
that the majority of business people usually wear a watch - the
Tribunal accepted the uncorroborated statement of Mr. Daley that he
owned a watch, determined it to be a. Rolex because that was the
brand name Mr. Daley had been able to mention, and accepted the
value he had placed on the watch because it would appear reasonable
for a Rolex watch.
In sum, it is to be concluded that inference is a useful means
for evaluating the parties claims, which facilitates the duty of
international tribunals in determining whether or not the burden of
proof has been met. It is the prerogative of international
tribunals in each given case to determine whether inferences are
sufficient for satisfying the burden of proof. The power of
internationals tribunals in exercising inference is not restricted
to inferences relied upon by the parties, but they are empowered to
draw their own inferences from the parties arguments and evidence.
Furthermore, in cases where the probative value of inferences is
determined to be conclusive, its effect on the burden of proof
would be similar to that of direct evidence, and no particular
issue would arise in this connection.
Generally speaking, presumptions affect the burden of proof in
so far as they create a prima facia evidence or proof in favour of
the party who benefits from it. Presumptions relieve the party to
whose benefit a presumption exists from providing proof for the
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presumed fact at the initial stage and thus affect the burden of
evidence as well.
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CHAPTER VII
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF COLLABORATION OF PARTIES
A. PRACTICE OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
1. Introduction
The duty of parties to co-operate in placing material evidence
before international tribunals is a rule aimed at yielding
practical results. In fact, the ultimate purpose of the rule is to
enable the tribunal to base its decision on as many facts and as
much evidence concerning the disputed issues as possible. Thus, the
viability of the rule depends on how in practice it has been
adhered to by the parties. It is equally important to study how it
has been applied by international tribunals in complex litigations.
Accordingly, it seems that it is not enough to concentrate
only on cases where negative inferences have been drawn against a
party for failing to comply with an international tribunal's order.
Amore thorough study of the practical aspects of the collaboration
of parties should include other aspects of the problem, including
how in practice the problems arising from non-compliance with the
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rule have been dealt with under different circumstances.
It may also be more useful, for practical reasons, to
concentrate on the practice of a single multi-case tribunal in
order to provide a relatively full account of different cases dealt
with by a single body, rather than studying isolated examples from
different international tribunals which have been constituted under
different circumstances.
For this purpose the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal seems to be a
good example. It reflects recent practice. Moreover, its Rules of
Procedure, like those of many other international tribunals, do not
specifically provide that a party should furnish evidence needed
and requested by the adversary. According to a general provision
embodied in Article 24 (3) of the Tribunal Rules, however, "[a]t
any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may
require the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other
evidence within such a period of time as the tribunal shall
determine." In practice, the Tribunal has had to face and deal with
the issue of non-production of evidence in a number of the cases
before it.
The following examples from the practice of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal demonstrate its general approach to the issue. The
approach of the Tribunal in this respect, as will be discussed
later, is not always the same and not necessarily consistent.
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2. William Shashoua v. Iran '
This is one of the first cases in which the question of co
operation of the parties in presenting evidence surfaced and gained
prominence as the central issue, in a way that affected both the
proceeding in and outcome of the case.^
The case was brought on November 1981 by William Stanley
Shashoua, a United States citizen, against the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and its agencies and instrumentalities,
including the Ministry of Commerce, as a result of the alleged
expropriation of the claimant's property.^ According to claimant,
"the Respondents' actions during and subsequent to the 1979 change
of the Iranian Government in 1979 constituted a wrongful taking of
his property, namely, his 100% ownership interest in three Iranian
joint stock companies: Shabdiz S.A., Klapto S.A,, and Ranica S.A.
The assets of these companies included real property, inventory and
bank accounts."'^ The relief sought by claimant included
compensation for the confiscated assets, valued by claimant to be
at least U.S. $ 6,156,028, and lost profits. Claimant further
' Case No. 69, Chamber One, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
^ This case did not lead to an award by the Tribunal and
consequently is not reported. Thus, while the references are
inevitably limited to the particulars of the original documents, a
more detailed account of the case is provided herein.
^ Statement of Claim (filed on 17 November 1981) p. 1.
Claimant's Pre-Hearing Conference Statement (filed on 25
October 1982) p. 1.
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sought interest, costs and attorneys' fees.^
In their Statement of Defence, respondents, inter alia. denied
the claimant's allegations and asserted that neither the
Government, nor any of its agencies or instrumentalities, had
exercised any sort of control over the companies, and that the
companies had not been subject to any nationalization or
expropriation.^ At a later stage the respondents also filed several
counter-claims against claimant for debts allegedly owed to Iran by
Shabdiz S.A., one of the three companies.'' In turn, the claimant
replied to the Statement of Defence and, mainly on jurisdictional
grounds, denied any liability with respect to the counterclaims.®
Thereafter, by an Order dated 15 September 1982, the Tribunal
requested the parties to appear before Chamber One of the Tribunal
for a pre-hearing conference. The parties were informed by the
Tribunal that they were to be prepared to discuss the items
indicated in the guidelines annexed to the Tribunal's Order and
that any written submission concerning the aforesaid matters should
be filed with the Tribunal at least 14 days in advance of the
^ Ibid, pp. 1-2; Statement of Claim p. 10.
^ Statement of Defence (filed on 20 April 1982), pp. 4-5.
Statement of Counterclaim (filed on 26 July 1982) ,
generally.
® Claimant's Reply to Statement of Defense and to Statement
of Counterclaim (filed on 30 August 1982), generally.
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conference.'
In a pre-hearing conference statement filed on claimant's
behalf, his counsel discussed the items indicated by the Tribunal,
including item (d) of the annex to the Tribunal's Order, which
related to "whether any further documents or written statements,
including any reply or rejoinder, are requested by the arbitrating
parties or required by the arbitral tribunal. Under item (d) the
counsel for claimant stated that at that time claimant did not
intend to submit or ask for additional legal memoranda, and then
advised the Tribunal of claimant's intention to ask for production
by respondents of certain information and documents.'^
' Order dated 15 September 1982.
Ibid, Annex to the Order.
" The issue was put before the Tribunal by counsel for the
claimant in the following terms: _
"It is the intention of Claimant to request the Tribunal, at the
Pre-Hearing Conference on November 9, to exercise its document
production- powers under Article 24 of- the Tribunal Rules.
Specifically, Claimant will request an Order requiring Respondents
to produce for inspection and.copying by Claimant, and by a neutral
Expert duly, appointed by the Tribunal as set forth in paragraph G
below, all documents and records in their care, custody or under
their control relating directly to the subject matter of this
dispute. This will include, among other things, the corporate books
and records of the three Iranian companies, all of which remain in
Tehran at the present time and are completely inaccessible to
Claimant. It will also include all official governmental records
directly relating to the creation, operation and corporate standing
of the three companies, all banking records of these companies, and
all documents or records constituting or relating to tax returns
and assessments and Social Security premiums of Shabdiz S.A. for
the years 1972 to the present time." Case No. 69, Claimant's Pre-
Hearing Conference Statement (filed on 25 October 1982) p. 6.
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In order to persuade the Tribunal, the counsel for claimant
based his request for production of evidence on Article 24 of the
Tribunal Rules and "the principle of international law that
relevant and material evidence which is in the possession or under
the peculiar control of a respondent state must be produced by the
respondent" .
Article 24 of the Tribunal Rules, upon which counsel for
claimant relied, consists of three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 states
the basic rule for allocation of the burden of proof by providing
that "[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts
relied on to support his claim or defence." Paragraph 2 authorizes
the Tribunal to require a party to provide "a summary of the
documents and other evidence which that party intends to present in
support of the facts in issue set out in his statement of claim or
statement of defence." Paragraph 3 of Article 24, which seems to be
more relevant here and is presumably the particular section
referred to by counsel for claimant, provides as follows:
"At any time during. the arbitral proceedings the arbitral
tribunal may require the parties to produce documents,
exhibits or other evidence within such a period of time as the
tribunal'shall'determine."
12 Ibid, pp. 6-7. The counsel for claimant further advised the
Tribunal of another request in conjunction with the request for
production of evidence by respondents. He stated; "Claimant will
further request the entry of an appropriate order, under Article
26, paragraph 1 of the Tribunal Rules, requiring the preservation
by sll parties of all such documents, books and records and
restraining any party from destroying, secreting, defacing or
otherwise altering such materials pending resolution of this case."
Ibid.
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Apparently, the above paragraph does not specify the situation
under which the Tribunal may require a party to produce specific
documents at the request of the other party. Nonetheless, it is
still arguable whether or not the general power granted in this
paragraph to the Tribunal, to require the parties to produce
evidence, also envisages or implies that the Tribunal is empowered
to order a party to produce the documents needed by the other
party.
On the other hand, the request for production of evidence
(which was repeated again after the pre-hearing conference, in a
submission filed on 2 December 1985 by the counsel for claimant),
was more similar to "discovery" as intended under American law, and
was thus too general.'^
Under the circumstances, the Tribunal was presumably
confronted with a very delicate situation. On the one hand, it was
not expressly empowered to order respondents to produce the
numerous documents asked for by claimant, and in fact given that
the Tribunal was then in the early years of its work granting
such a request would trigger hundreds of similar requests from
other American claimants on the ground that they had no access to
their documents left in Iran. On the other hand, if the claimant's
allegation was true then the evidence requested by claimant was in
fact in respondents' possession, and it would not be fair to
See, Chapter 3, supra.
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deprive claimant of his rights simply, because he did not have
access to his documents. However, how would the Tribunal know that
claimant's allegation was not totally baseless, unless claimant
could produce at least some prima facie evidence; and how could
claimant present any evidence at all, given that he was claiming
that all the evidence he needed had been left in Iran.
Eventually, the Tribunal adopted a sensible and cautious
approach that adequately accommodated claimant's probable rights,
without committing the Tribunal or exceeding its power. Normally
the communications between the Tribunal and parties take place
through Orders. In this case, however, instead of issuing an Order
which would probably have caused complications at later stages,
Judge Lagergren"^ in his capacity as Chairman of Chamber One wrote
a letter to counsel for claimant. By that letter the Chairman
informed the counsel that after considering his requests for
production of evidence. Chamber One had found it difficult at that
time to issue an Order on the basis of the requests presented, for
the following reasons: First, that the claimant's request for an
Order did not indicate what efforts, had 'been made to obtain the
documents in question "through other channels"-, and second that the
requests for production of certain categories of evidence "are very
general in nature in that they do not specify the documents
At the time, the other members of Chamber One of the
Tribunal were Dr.M. Kashani (Iran) and Howard M. Holtzmann (United
States).
comprised by the request
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II IS
The reasons mentioned in the Chairman's letter are in fact two
important and general requisites for a request for production of
evidence by the adversary. But that was not all the letter had to
say. The Chairman's letter also stated that the Chamber had
discussed the matter with the Agent of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and that the Agent had given assurances that the Iranian
authorities would assist the claimant in obtaining the necessary
documents, provided that the documents were in the possession of
the Iranian authorities or otherwise accessible to them. Further,
the claimant was advised to submit a request for production of
documents directly to the Agent.
Further, to make sure that claimant would ask only for
relevant documents, the Chairman's letter listed certain specific
documents and information, which in the view of the Tribunal
appeared to be of particular interest in the case, and instructed
that the request be limited to those items.'''
In compliance with the above-mentioned letter of the Chairman,
on 11 April 1983 the counsel for claimant wrote a letter to the
Letter dated 10 March 1983
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting that the
respondents furnish, "on an expedited basis, authenticated, true
copies" of all documents listed in the letter.^® The documents
listed in the counsel's letter corresponded, with slight
differences, to those referred to in the Chairman's letter.
For more than two years the Tribunal received no information
as to whether or not the request for documents had been complied
with or whether claimant intended to pursue its claim. Therefore,
on 29 May 1985, the Tribunal issued an order in which, after
summarizing the history of the case as far as it' related to the
production of evidence, it ordered the claimant to file a statement
by 28 June 1985:
"(a) indicating whether any response was received to the
letter of Claimant's counsel of 11 April 1983; and, if so,
submitting a copy of such response and of any documents or
information received; and
(b) stating whether Claimant intends to pursue its
claim."
The Tribunal's order ended by informing the claimant that if no
statement was received by the indicated date, the Tribunal would
assume that the claimant did not intend to pursue its claim.
The counsel for claimant filed a copy of the letter with the
Tribunal on 13 April 1983.
" Order dated 29 May 1985 (filed on 31 May 1985).
Ibid. By the time that this Order was issued, as a result
of Judge Lagergren's resignation. Prof. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel had
succeeded him as President of the Tribunal and Chairman of Chamber
One.
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Before the expiry of the time-limit fixed by the Tribunal,
counsel for claimant filed a statement with the Tribunal explaining
that as of that date no responses had been received from the Agent
of Iran or from the respondents themselves, and stating claimant's
wish to continue to pursue his claims in the pending proceeding.
The counsel for claimant also explained that claimant had
"attempted without success to obtain documents and information
described in counsel's letter of April 11, 1983 from other sources,
including contacts with persons in Iran and the methodical review
of Tehran newspapers. The counsel, stating again that it is a
widely accepted principle of international arbitration that
relevant and material evidence in the possession of a respondent
State must be produced, concluded as follows:
"This principle, combined with the demonstrable absence of any
willingness on the part of the Respondents to cooperate with
Claimant's April 11, 1983 request to produce documents and
information without a formal Tribunal order, justifies the
exercise of this Tribunal's power to compel production under
Article 24 of the Tribunal Rules.
After receiving the claimant's submission,•by an order dated
3 July 1985, the Tribunal invited the respondents to. file their
comments to the claimant's submission with respect to the request
for production of documents. In a letter filed on 16 September
1985, the date fixed by the Tribunal as the deadline for
Claimant's Statements Regarding Status of Document
Production Request (filed on 24 June 1985).
-2 Ibid.
Ibid.
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respondents' comments, the Agent stated that the burden of proof
was on claimant and < that in principle respondents were not
obligated to produce documentary evidence in favour of the
claimant. It was further stated in the letter that nevertheless,
respondents in good faith would try to produce any evidentiary
material to which they might have access. The letter ended by a
request for a five-months extension of the time-limit.^'*
In spite of the fact that in the above letter the Agent of
Iran was promising that the requested documents would be presented
by the respondents in five months' time, the Tribunal again did not
commit itself or respondents, and merely extended the time limit
within which the respondents were invited to file their comments to
the claimant's submission.
Finally, on 2 0 December 1985, the Iranian Ministry of Commerce
filed the respondents' Comments to the Claimant's Submission,
accompanied by 8 6 exhibits containing most of the documents
requested by claimant. The documents presented by respondents,
however, did not indicate any government interference, in the
management of the three companies. Moreover, the documents relating
to the immovable properties claimed by claimant to be part of the
assets of the three companies revealed that they had all been
previously sold by the authorized signatory of these companies. In
Letter from the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
Chamber One (filed on 16 September 1985).
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their comments, respondents also emphasized that no measure
affecting the rights of claimant had been taken, and raised the
issue that as the shares of the three companies in dispute were in
the form of "bearer shares" they were the property of the bearer
thereof, and under the circumstances of the case and the claimant's
inability to provide the share certificates, it was doubtful that
claimant ever owned them or, assuming he owned the shares for some
time, he had not transferred them to others.
Thereafter, the Ti^ibunal. requested the claimant to file a
response to the respondents' submission. On ' 12 March 1986 the
counsel for claimant filed a letter entitled "Notice of Withdrawal
from Prosecution of Claims and Request for a Voluntary Dismissal of.
Case." In that submission it was stated that the documents produced
by respondents were not complete, that they confirmed certain
elements of claimant's case which had previously been disputed by
the respondents, that documents relating to minutes of meetings
held after the time that claimant allegedly had left Iran for the
last time, which recited the presence of claimant at these
meetings, had been fabricated by third persons without claimant's
knowledge, and that "transactions in which the property of the
companies was purportedly encumbered or transferred after his
departure from Iran [were] fraudulent and without legal effect."
Nevertheless, at the end of the letter it was stated that
"marshalling the evidence necessary to disprove the facts alleged
by the documents [was] beyond the logistical and financial
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resources of Claimant" and that he was "prepared to accept the
practical futility of pursuing his claims further" and requested
that Case No. 69 be dismissed in its entirety. ^
By its Order of 13 March 1988, the Tribunal informed the
parties that it intended to terminate the case unless the
respondents by 16 May 1988 raised justifiable grounds for objection
in accordance with Article 34 of the Tribunal Rules, respondents
first showed some hesitation in giving their assent to termination
of the case, and two times asked for an extension of the time limit
"in order to study the facts and position of their counterclaims in
a more precise and careful manner. Thereafter, however,
respondents did not ask for any further extension, nor did they
file any comments or objection to claimants' request for
withdrawal. Consequently, on 2 October 1986, Chamber One of the
Tribunal finally terminated the proceedings in case No. 69,
pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Tribunal Rules.
" Notice of Withdrawal From Prosecution of Claims and Request
for a Voluntary Dismissal of Case.'
Letter from the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
Chamber One (filed on 16 May 1986).
" Case No. 69, the Tribunal's Order dated 2 October 1986.
Article 34 (2) of the Tribunal Rules provides as follows: "If,
before the award is made, the continuation of the arbitral
proceedings becomes unnecessary or impossible for any reason not
mentioned in paragraph 1, the arbitral tribunal shall inform the
parties of its intention to issue an order for the termination of
the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to
issue such an order unless a party raises justifiable grounds for
objection."
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A study of the above case demonstrates some of the questions
and problems that a request for production of evidence by the
adversary may introduce to the proceeding. It also shows the
prudence and flexibility with which international tribunals must
handle requests for production of evidence, as they are not
empowered to force an unwilling party to produce documents.
While in this particular case the claimant's request primarily
caused delay and uncertainty, when the documents requested by
claimant were finally filed by respondents, this expedited the
proceedings and lead to the withdrawal of the case.
3. Embassy Cases
In a number of cases before the Tribunal, the United States as
respondent asked for production of evidence by Iran- Among these
were claims brought before the Tribunal by the Government of Iran
against the United States of America on the basis of the monetary
obligations of the former United States Embassy in Tehran.^* In
These Claims include: 1. Claims Nos. B-2, B-3, B-13, B-16,
B-18, B-2 0 and B-21 brought by Iranian customs authorities
concerning certain goods which were imported temporarily into Iran
for trade exhibitions and thus were exempted from Iranian customs
duties. However, the United States Embassy had guaranteed that it
would itself pay those duties and related penalties if the goods
were not re-exported, and according to Iran those goods were in
fact not re—exported. 2. Four other claims which involved
allegations that the Embassy failed to pay for particular goods and
services as follows; claim No, B-4 for gasoline and diesel fuel
delivered to the Embassy; claim No. B-6 for liability ^of the
Embassy for certain, airport charges; claim No. B-11 for failure of
the Embassy to pay certain invoices for ' passenger tickets or
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these cases, prior to the submission of statements of defence the
United States filed a petition with the Tribunal for an order
directing the production of evidence by Iran.^'
a. The Request for production of Evidence
In its petition the United States explained, inter alia, that:
"The best, and in many instances the only, United States
records of the transactions in question were kept at the
United States Embassy in Iran. Those records have been
unlawfully taken by Iran and if they still exist, are now in
the custody or control of the Government of Iran."^°
The United States further argued that it was unable to respond
fully to those claims without access to its own records and that
the claims might not be fairly adjudicated without those records
since the United States might be ignorant of available defenses or
counterclaims,^'
The request of the United States was unique in two aspects:
First the records at issue, if they existed, were in fact the
property of the United States Government and "hence inviolable from
interference by Iran in accordance with Article 24 of the Vienna
carriage of goods; and claim No. 44 for certain telephone,
telegraph, and cable charges. (See. generally. Statements of Claim
in the above cases.)
"Petition of the United States for an Order Directing the
Production of Documents" filed on 19 April 1982 in all the eleven
cases referred to in No. 1.above.
Ibid. p. 3.
Ibid, p. 5.
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convention on Diplomatic Relations. Second, as was argued by the
United States, the International Court of Justice in the Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
had held that, by seizure and retention of the archives of the
United States Embassy in Tehran, the Government of Iran had
violated Article 24 of the Vienna Convention.
The United States invoked Article 24 (3) of the Tribunal Rules
as an article which "authorizes the Tribunal to issue orders for
the production of documents or other evidenceand, in order
to persuade the Tribunal, it referred to the benefits of production
of the Embassy records. According to the United States, production
of the records would enable the United States " to clarify the
facts and narrow the issues in its Statement of Defense",, and it
"might also permit the United States to identify its just
liabilities and thereby facilitate settlement of some of these
claims.
Based • on these arguments, the United States requested the
Tribunal to "direct the Government of Iran to produce to the United
States all United States Embassy documents and records relevant to
the [pending] claims which [were] in the Government of Iran's
Ibid.
Ibid; and I.C.J. Reports 1980, 3, 29-37
3^ Ibid p. 6 .
3^ Ibid.
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custody or control and to suspend any further proceedings with
respect to these claims, including any obligation of respondents to
file Statements of Defense, until those records [were] produced.
b. Claimants' Response
After receiving the petition, the Tribunal invited the
claimant in each individual claim to file a response to the
petition and vacated its previous Order, if any, with respect to
the filing of the statement of defence."
Claimants, i.e., different agencies of the Government of Iran,
filed similar responses wherein they denied involvement in or
possession of the alleged records and documents by that
GovernmentAccording to claimants, Article 24 of the Tribunal
Rules would not apply, and the burden of proving the existence of
documents at the Embassy, and that they were neither transferred to
other places nor shredded by the Embassy personnel before the
Embassy was occupied, remained on the United-States.Furthermore,
claimants consideredthe request of the United States to be
contrary to Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the Government of
36 Ibid p. 7.
" See. e.g.. Tribunal's Orders dated 6 July 1982 in Cases
No. B-4 and B-18.
See, e.g.. Memorials filed by Claimants on 12 August 1982
in Cases No. B-4, B-18 and B-44.
" Ibid.
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the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria according to which
the United States was obligated, inter alia, not to bring any claim
arising out of "injury to the United States property or property of
the United States nationals within the United States Embassy
compound in Teheran after November 3, 1979". With regard to
Articles 24 and 25 of the Vienna Convention, which have been
invoked by the United States, claimants responded that as the
disputes between Iran and the United States had finally been
resolved through the signing of the Algiers Declarations of 19
January 1981, any reference to Articles 24 and 25 would contradict
the spirit of the Declarations and the raison d'etre of the
Tribunal, and was an attempt to politicize the Tribunal's
proceedings and divert attention from the validity of the claims/"
Claimants further argued, inter alia, that it was customary for
embassies to send regular reports covering their financial affairs
and transactions to their home countries, with supporting papers
and documents, and that the invoices at issue were mostly issued
long before the occupation of the Respondent's Embassy. Claimants
concluded their responses by requesting the Tribunal to reject the
respondent's request for production of evidence."*'
c. Further Memorials of The United States
^0 Ibid.
Ibid.
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On 15 November 1982 the United States filed two submissions to
the Tribunal; a joint response to claimants^ reply to the petition
for production of documents/^ and a statement of defence in each
individual case/^
In the joint response, the United States responded to the
objections made to its petition by Iran, provided affidavits from
United States diplomatic and trade officials to prove that the
requested documents were kept only in Tehran, and explained that
the reasons for the request for documents were entirely practical.
It was also stated that the United States had "not located any
relevant case authorities that would condition an arbitrating
government's obligation to make full disclosure of relevant
evidence in its possession on proof that the evidence at one time
was in existence."''^ In conclusion, the United States again
requested that the Tribunal grant its petition for an order
directing Iran to produce documents.''^
Response of the United States to Reply to Petition for
Production of Documents (filed on 15 November 1982 in Cases No. B-
2, B-13, B-18 and B-20 in Chamber 2, B-3 and B-21 in Chamber 3, and
B-16 in Chamber 1) .
See, e.g.. Statement of Defense of the United States and
Request for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction filed on 15 November
1982 in Case No. B-18.
Response of the United States, (Note 42 supra) . p. 5.
Ibid.
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In the statements of defence the United States argued, inter
alia, that the Tribunal should dismiss the claim because it did not
fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Later, on 3 March 1983, in
some of the cases at issue the United States filed a Supplement to
the petition for directing production of documents to include
claimant's own records/® In the Supplement, the United States
renewed its previous request and argued, relying mainly on the
Parker Case, that Iran was under an obligation to produce evidence
in its possession; it then requested the Tribunal to direct Iran to
produce the United States Government documents as well as its own
records
d. The Tribunal's Pronouncement
After submission of further memorials by the parties, the
Tribunal dismissed some of the claims brought against the Embassy
for lack of jurisdiction/® It was stated in those Awards that
while the United States had initially filed a petition for
production of evidence by Iran, that petition had been superseded
by the filing by the United States of a request for dismissal for
See, e.g.. Case No. B-44, Supplement to Petition of the
United States for an Order Directing Production of Documents (filed
on 3 March 1983).
Ibid.
S^, e.g., Award No. 267-B18-2 (13 November 1986), reprinted
in 13 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 161-163; Award No. 127-B3-3 (17 April 1985),
reprinted in 8 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 89-92; and Award No. 105-B16-1 (24
January 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 94-96.
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lack of jurisdiction/'
As to the remaining claims, on 9 December 1986 Chamber Two of
the Tribunal finally issued Orders requesting Iran to produce
copies of relevant documents left in Iran. After referring to the
United States' petition and Iran's reply, the Tribunal's Order
stated as follows :
"In order to ascertain what, if any, documents of the
Respondent relating to the subject matter of this case
remain in existence, the Tribunal hereby requests the
Claimant to file by 25 February 1987 any information and
copies of all relevant documents left in Iran by the
Respondent. The Tribunal will thereafter issue such
orders as many be necessary for the further conduct of
the proceedings.
After requesting an extension of deadline, Iran filed
submissions in response to the Tribunal's Order, wherein it stated
that it was not in possession of Respondent's alleged evidentiary
materials. Further, it was stated in Iran's submission in Case No.
B-4 that "without being under any obligations in this regard and
solely in an attempt to demonstrate its good faith, and in
deference to the. Tribunal's Order, it once again carried out
investigations and even made enquiries from the relevant
sources."^' In Case No. B-44, Iran submitted that "there exist no
See. e.g.. Award No. 267-B18-2, paras. 2 and 3, reprinted
in 13 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 161, 162; and Award No. 268-B20-2, paras. 2
and 3, reprinted in 13 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 164, 165.
Orders dated 9 December 1986, in Cases No. B-4 and B-44.
Case No.B-4, Claimant's Memorial filed on 2 June 1987 in
"Response to Order Dated 3 March 1987", p. 1.
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Other documents but those presented to the Tribunal and a
considerable number of unpaid telephone and telex bills that are in
the possession of the Telecommunication Company of Iran that the
Claimant could deliver to the Respondent ...
e. Cases No. B-4 and B-44
On 15 September 1987, after considering the claimants'
response in Cases No. B-4 and B-44 and in view thereof, the
Tribunal issued Orders for submission of statements of defence. In
these Orders the Tribunal reserved its right to request production
of evidence, and pointed out that the circumstances of the case
would be taken into account in its final decision. The relevant
part of the Tribunal's Order reads as follows:
"[W]ithout prejudice to the Tribunal's right to request
further searches for or^ production of documents, the
Respondent shall file by 30 November 1987 its Statement of
Defence on the basis of all the documents and evidence
available to it. In accordance with Article 25 (6) of the
Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal will take into account all the
circumstances of the Case, when assessing the evidence
presented to it."^^
Thereafter, further pleadings of the parties were scheduled,
and they were submitted subsequently in accordance with the normal
practice of the Tribunal. However, in 1989, at the stage where the
parties were to file their final evidence and brief, both cases
Case No. B-44, Claimant's Response to Order dated 3 March
1987 (filed on 25 May 1987), p. 4.
Tribunal's Orders dated 15 September 1987 in Cases No. B-4
and B-44.
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were settled through negotiations.^'* Consequently, the Tribunal did
not ask claimants again for any further search or production of
evidence requested by the respondent. Nor did it find the
opportunity to address the issue in its final awards, since they
happened to be awards on agreed terms. It is conceivable,
however, that the approach adopted by the Tribunal in its Orders
dated 15 September 1987 with respect to the issue of production of
evidence, namely, implied rejection of the United States request
for production of evidence, on the one hand, and putting Iran under
notice for a possible request by the Tribunal for production of
evidence in a later stage of the proceedings, on the other hand,
might have had a bearing on the settlement of the case by the
parties.
4. Case No. B-55
Case No. B-55 was brought by Iran against the United States
for the amounts allegedly due to claimant for use of a leased
telegraph channel between Tehran and Ankara, a leased telephone
line from Tehran to Ankara, and a telephone in Tabriz used by the
United States Mission.
With respect to the last Claim, the United States included in
^ See memorials and evidence submitted by the parties in
Cases No. B-4 and B-44.
See Awards No.
465-B44-2 dated 24 January 1990. [ Not reported].
447-B4-2 dated 22 November 1989 and
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its Statement of Defence a request for an Order that Iran be
directed by the Tribunal to produce all documents relating to the
alleged telephone bill. The arguments put forward by the United
States in support of its request were similar to those mentioned in
its requests in the aforementioned cases brought against the United
States Embassy.^®
In response to the request of the United States, claimant
stated that the only relevant documents as regards the use of a
telephone line were the bills, that those bills had been sent to
the subscriber, and that in order to remove any ambiguity claimant
would attach duplicate copies of the bills to its Replication.
However, the United States was not satisfied, and in its
Rejoinder^^ it reminded the Tribunal that the United States was
unable to respond to the claim regarding the Tabriz telephone
"because all relevant U.S. records would be found at the Mission in
Tabriz or at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran", but the Tribunal had not
yet acted on the request for production of evidence. The United
States further stated that it still required its records and that
the "question of whether such records should be produced should be
resolved in advance of the merits, and would appropriately be
56
57
58
See supra.
Case No. B—55, Replication in Response to Statement of
Defence, filed on 3 March 1983, pp. 17, 55.
Case No.B-55, Rejoinder and Request for Prehearing
Conference, filed on 4 October 1983, p. 2.
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addressed at the Pre-hearing conference."^'
In their further memorials and submissions, the parties
repeated their respective positions, but no Order concerning the
production of evidence requested by the United States was issued by
the Tribunal. In its Award which was finally issued after a hearing
session on 19 December 1989, the Tribunal referred to the argument
of the United States concerning the necessity of production of
evidence it had asked for, but did not address the issue
specifically. In paragraph 56 of the Award, the Tribunal first
summarized the position of the United States as follows:-
"The United States argues that, had the Claimant provided the
records of the Consulate as the United States had requested
the Tribunal to order, it would have been able to prove that
all telephone charges due on its telephone lines had been paid
and to prove further that the telephone number at issue was
not one used by the U.S. Consulate. However, it contends that,
even without those records, it is able to show that the
invoices do not reflect services provided to the U.S.
Consulate.
Then on paragraph 7 2 of the Award the Tribunal held that the
evidence before it did not suffice to award the amount claimed.
According to the Tribunal:
"The fact that the subscriber's name on the invoices submitted
by the Claimant is "American Missionary" is in itself
insufficient to establish liability of the United States.
There is no other evidence in the record that would support
such a holding. The Claimant has failed to meet its burden of
proof and to show to the Tribunal's satisfaction that the
telephone line at issue belonged to the U.S. Consulate in
Tabriz or on which other grounds charges should be
332.
Ibid, p. 3 .
Award No. 457-B55-1, reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 320,
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attributable to the United States Government. The Tribunal
therefore dismisses this Claim."®'
The reason that the Tribunal did not find it necessary to
discuss the circumstances of non-production of documents was,
obviously, that it was able to dismiss that part of the claim on
the basis of the insufficiency of evidence.
5. Levitt Case 62
a. Facts
In this case claimant, an American building contractor, had
presented a claim on behalf of a corporation named International
Construction Co. (ICC), seeking, inter alia, compensation for the
work that ICC had allegedly done but not been paid for, and for
equipment allegedly expropriated by Iran.'63
In the Statement of Claim, filed on 11 January 1982, the
claimant asserted that in late 1979 ICC's Tehran office was
ransacked by individuals acting under the direction of respondents.
The claimant contended that on that occasion all records, documents
and bank statements were either destroyed or confiscated, and that
Ibid 337.
" William J. Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resources of Iran, et.al.. Award No. 520-
210-3, 29 August 1991, reprinted in — Iran-U.S. C.T.R.— [Not yet
reported].
63 Ibid, at 4.
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as a result he did not possess copies of the relevant contracts and
evidence. He suggested that the respondents had access to the
confiscated documents.'^
On 6 September 1982 the claimant filed, inter alia, a
Discovery Request, asserting that respondent's statement of Defense
and Counterclaim made clear that they were "in possession of many,
and perhaps all, of the documents that are material to this case."
The claimant further stated that during previous negotiations in
October 1981, a representative of respondents had promised to
provide him with copies of the contract and all other pertinent
documents.
The Tribunal directed the respondents to be prepared to
respond to the claimant's request for discovery of documents in the
Pre-hearing Conference which was to be held on 12 October 1982. On
1 November 1982 the claimant filed a report stating that at a
subsequent meeting, held at the Tribunal's suggestion, "the
Claimant's counsel had provided the respondents' attorney with a
list of documents that the Claimant desired", and that the
respondents' counsel had promised that the Ministry would "produce
all existing documents requested in items 1-9 and 11-12."^
" Ibid, at 5-6.
" Ibid, at 6.
66 Ibid, at 6- 7.
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On 16 November 1982 the Tribunal issued an Order for
Production of Evidence requiring the Ministry to submit, inter
alia, "all available documents listed in Annex A to this Order,
which documents have been referred to in the Respondents'
submissions indicated in the Annex.
On 16 March 1983 the respondents filed, in response, a copy of
the contract and certain new exhibits. The response also included
a general comment on the Order, to the effect that unless the
claimant specified the subject and reference numbers of the
letters, documents and papers it was requesting, it would be
impossible to fulfill such requests. The respondents further stated
that complying with the Order would be too burdensome and costly
for them.^^
By motions filed on 25 April 1983 and 9 June 1983, the
claimant requested the Tribunal to direct the respondents to comply
fully with the Order for Production of Evidence. On 20 June 1983,
the Tribunal directed the respondents to file "those documents
which have not already been submitted in accordance with the Order
of 16 November 1982 to the extent that such documents are available
to Respondents or under Respondents' control.""^'
" Ibid, at 7,
Ibid, at 8
Ibid.
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On 28 September 1983 t)ie Agent of Iran informed the Tribunal
that in spite of its investigations, the Ministry had not been able
to obtain any further documentation. "On 18 October 1983 the
Claimant requested the Tribunal to order the Respondents to specify
what actions they had taken in response to the Tribunal's Order for
Production of Evidence."'"'
After the Ministry filed a Memorial, on 3 November 1983 the
Tribunal issued another Order regarding the production of
documents. According to the Tribunal, the explanation offered by
the Ministry was not adequate for determining whether the
Ministry's failure to provide all of the listed documents was
justified under the circumstances."^'
On 9 November 1983 the Ministry noted in a Memorial that it
had "extremely collaborated" in submitting all available documents
requested by the claimant. In its Reply to the Order of 3 November
1983, filed on 9 January 1984, the Ministry contended that it had
complied with the Order of 16 November 1982, and went on to provide
various explanations with respect to the items requested by the
Tribunal. In a further Memorial filed on 8 March 1984, the
Ministry asserted once again that it had no further documents at
Ibid.
Ibid, at 9
Ibid.
its disposal.
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On 12 August 1986 the claimant repeated its request that the
Tribunal order the respondents to comply with the Orders for the
production of documents He further claimed that "additional
records relating to ICC were taken when the Foundation for the
Oppressed (Bonyad Mostazafan) on 30 July 1982 confiscated the files
of ICC's lawyer in Tehran. Attaching a affidavit by ICC's Iranian
lawyer to this effect, the Claimant argued that the Respondents
should produce these files as well."^^ On 19 September 1986 the
respondents objected to the claimant's request.
On 31 March 19 87 the Tribunal finally issued an Order in which
it was concluded that the Ministry had not fully complied with the
Tribunal Order of 3 November 1983. On that basis the Tribunal asked
the Ministry either to submit the documents listed in the Order, or
to explain why a certain document could not be submitted."^® As
regards the files allegedly confiscated by the Foundation for the
Oppressed, however, the Tribunal did not grant the claimant's
request because the Foundation was,not a party to the case.
Ibid, at 10.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, at 11.
^ Ibid.
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On 26 May 1987 the respondents stated, in a Reply, that they
had complied with the Orders of the Tribunal, and that the
production of more evidence was an impossible task for them.''®
b. The Parties' Contentions
The claimant maintained that "it would work a gross injustice
if respondents were permitted to profit from their flagrant
violations of the Tribunal's Discovery Orders so as to defeat Mr.
Levitt's legitimate claims." The claimant further suggested that
"the Tribunal must draw a negative inference from the Respondents'
alleged failure to produce documents in their possession and that
it should award to the Claimant 'a default judgment in the full
amount to [his] claim.
The respondents, on the other hand, while agreeing that a
party's failure to submit documents may warrant an adverse
inference, asserted as a condition that such failure or contempt
must be "substantiated by the Tribunal through supporting
evidence." According to the respondents, the claimant had failed to
produce any such evidence, and presentation of certain documents by
the respondents did not imply that further documentation was
available for submission.
Ibid, at 11.
Ibid, at 25.
80 Ibid, at 25-26.
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c. The Tribunal's Findings
As a preliminary matter, the Tribunal found it necessary to
determine whether the respondents had complied with its Orders for
the production of evidence. For that purpose, the Tribunal set out
the details of the numerous Orders it had issued for production of
documents, the documents which the respondent had been requested to
be produce, and the respondents' reaction or inaction with respect
to each group of documents whose production had been requested by
the Tribunal.^'
The Tribunal noted, inter alia, that both counterclaims that
the respondents filed on 8 March 1984 and 22 April 1986 included
documentary evidence not previously submitted. The Tribunal further
recalled that in its last production Order, dated 31 March 1987, it
had put the respondents on notice that the Tribunal "remains free
to draw appropriate conclusions from the Ministry's compliance with
its Orders concerning production of documents.
Finally, the Tribunal found that "the Respondents [had] failed
to submit the majority of the documents requested and [had] done so
without supplying adequate reasons for this failure. The
Tribunal further emphasized that:
Ibid, at 25-28.
Ibid, at 27.
Ibid, at 28.
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"the requested documents were ones that [the Respondents]
had referred to in their own pleadings. Their often
contradictory and evasive explanations suggest deliberate
non-compliance rather than an inability to produce. The
introduction by the Respondents of exhibits not
previously filed in support of their counterclaims lends
further support to this suggestion."^
Relying on its previous precedents, the Tribunal concluded that an
adverse inference could be drawn from the respondents' failure to
submit evidence at their disposal. On that basis, while rejecting
the claimant's request for a "default judgment", the Tribunal
decided to "interpret the incomplete record with respect to the
claim and the counterclaims in- the light of the Respondents'
failure to comply with the Tribunal's production Orders.
At the stage of weighing the evidence, the Tribunal referred
to Article 24 of the Tribunal Rules, in noting generally, as an
initial observation, that "the Respondents' failure to comply with
its production Orders . . . does not relieve the Claimant of his
obligation to muster all the evidentiary support at his
disposal.
Moreover, in determining the appropriate amount of costs to be
awarded to the claimant, the Tribunal took account of the
respondents' failure to comply with the Tribunal's Orders for
^ Ibid, at 28.
Ibid, at 29.
Ibid, at 50.
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production of evidence. The Tribunal observed that the respondents'
failure in that respect "had caused the expenditure of far higher
costs of arbitration than would otherwise [have] been necessary."
On that basis the Tribunal awarded the claimant U.S. $ 75,000, an
amount higher than that usually awarded in other cases, as
"compensation for its extra costs.""
6. George Edwards Case
This was a claim for compensation, in one part of which the
claimant alleged that due to the acts by the Government of Iran,
several contracts of F. E. Associates with other companies in Iran
were breached.
While the claimant asserted that he left behind in Iran
almost all of his business records, rather than asking for
production of documents by the other party, he suggested that "the
Respondents [were] subject to inferences being drawn against them
if they [failed] to offer proof in rebuttal of the Claimant's
assertions.
However, although it was "mindful of the difficulties faced
87 Ibid. at 58.
George Edwards and The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, et al. . Award No. 451-251-2, 5 December 1989, at para. 1,
reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 290.
89 Ibid at 293 (para 11)
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by the Claimant in producing evidence", the Tribunal held that
"where there is no evidence that the Respondent came into actual
possession of the document in question, the Tribunal cannot shift
the burden of proof in this fashion."'" That part. of the claim was
consequently dismissed for lack of proof.''
7. INA Corporation Case
This was a claim for compensation for the expropriation of
claimant's 2 0% shareholding in Bimeh Shargh, an Iranian insurance
company.'^ The main defence of the respondent government was that
Shargh had a negative net worth, and it submitted as proof an audit
report prepared by Amin & Co., a firm of accountants practicing in
Iran, showing losses for Shargh company at the date of
nationalization.
The claimant, INA corporation, challenged the evidentiary
value of the Amin report by arguing that there was not sufficient
"information as to the basis of the Amin valuation, the principles
on which it was undertaken and the documents and data on which it
Ibid. See also H. A. Spaldinq, Inc. and Ministry of Roads
and Transport. Award No. 212-437-3 (24 Feb. 1986), reprinted in 10
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 22, at 31.
91 Ibid.
INA Corporation v. The Government of The Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (13 August 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 373-384.
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was based" had been submitted to the Tribunal."
In spite of the fact that the Tribunal required production of
the material which had been made available to Amin & Co. /, no such
material was filed in response. The only explanation later offered
by the respondent, at the Hearing of the case, for not complying
with the Tribunal's Order was that it was too voluminous. The
Tribunal nevertheless decided to admit the Amin Report as evidence
but to take, account of the lack of supporting documentation in
assessing its evidential weight.'"*
In its Award, the Tribunal pointed out that "[t]he report's
numerous references to special rules and directives of CII [Central
Insurance of Iran] also make it impossible for the Tribunal to
judge the validity of the valuation techniques used. The Respondent
has furnished neither the texts of such rules and directives nor
the underlying documents, although it was ordered to do so."®^ The
Tribunal did not find the respondent's statement that the requested
documents were "voluminous" convincing, particularly inasmuch as it
had been raised only at the Hearing and without giving any
"indication of the actual amounts of material involved or any
•description of the alleged problems which prevented submission of
'3 Ibid at 377.
Ibid.
95 Ibid at 382.
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the materials by the Respondent or their inspection by INA."'®
"In assessing the evidentiary weight of the Amin report", the
Tribunal found it necessary to "draw negative inferences from the
Respondent's failure to submit the documents which it was ordered
to produce."^'' Further, the Award went on to state that "the Amin
report is so qualified and limited, and so influenced by
unexplained, specially adopted (and not generally accepted)
accounting techniques, that it cannot be considered to reflect the
value of Shargh at the time of nationalization.
Thus, while it is true that in this case the negative
inference drawn by the Tribunal from the respondent's failure to
produce certain documents affected the evidentiary value of the
Amin report by casting doubt on its underlying documents, it can be
argued that this was not the only reason for rejecting the results
arrived at in that report. The Tribunal would not have needed to
examine all the underlying documents used for the preparation of
the report. In fact, that would have been contrary to the purpose
of providing expert witnesses, particularly as the credibility of
the firm had not been seriously challenged. But the Tribunal had to
take note of the fact that it was mentioned in the report itself
that it had been prepared in accordance with certain directives of
Ibid.
^ Ibid.
Ibid.
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Central Insurance of Iran and not in accordance with generally
accepted principles of accounting. This reference, aggravated by
the fact that those directives were not furnished to the Tribunal
by the respondent, damaged the value of the report.
8. Shinto Case
This was a claim filed by the United States of America against
Iran, on behalf of an American national, for certain amounts in
compensation and benefits owed to him under an employment contract
• QQ
with SKBM, an Iranian company."
In order to clarify the issue of whether or not SKBM was a
controlled entity of the respondent government, during the Hearing
in the case the Tribunal directed the respondent to submit certain
documents relating to the issue of control of SKBM, including the
original Order listing the names of the shareholders whose assets
had been expropriated. The Tribunal later issued an Order repeating
the same request for production of evidence. 100
While it did submit other documents required pursuant to the
order, the respondent informed the Tribunal that it could not
Hidetomo Shinto v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No.
399-10273-3, 31 October 1988, reprinted in 19 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 321-
331, at 322.
100 Ibid 327.
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locate the official expropriation Order, due to the fact that its
file number had not been supplied.'®' However, claimant submitted
a supplemental memorial and a copy of the official Order issued by
the Office of the General Public Prosecutor, which the Tribunal
previously had requested the respondent to supply.
Since the claimant's submission had not been previously
authorized, the Tribunal had to deal with the issue of its
timeliness. Noting that the official Order filed by the claimant
had initially been requested from., the .respondent, the Tribunal
found that the document, though provided by the claimant long after
the close of the Hearing, should not be rejected as new evidence
not previously requested by the Tribunal.
This case shows that a request for production of evidence, and
in fact for compliance with the duty of collaboration, may
indirectly provide some opportunities to the other party to further
elaborate its defence and to produce additional documents. Further,
if the documents requested from one party are made available to the
Tribunal through a different source, the Order of the Tribunal will
have been fulfilled. Or, if the claimant is able to provide the
documents requested from the other party, he should do so, and in
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 3 28 (para. 30)
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practice parties usually do.'°^
B. Sanctions For Non-Production of Evidence
1. General Remarks
As discussed in Chapter III above, collaboration of parties
before international tribunals with respect to production of
evidence is a general principle of the law of international
procedure, referred to in many constituent instruments, compromis,
and decisions of international tribunals.
Xt is well—known, on the other hand, that international
tribunals usually lack the power to compel the presence of a
witness or production of particular evidence and information by the
parties concerned.'®^ It is true that in the field of international
The Tribunal's jurisprudence with respect to production of
evidence is not limited to the cases discussed above. For another
example of the Tribunal's practice in this regard s^, e.g.. The
Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States. Case No. Bl, Full
Tribunal, Claims 2 & 3, where the United States requested the
Tribunal to order Iran to provide documents and facts for the U.S.
Counterclaim. In the same case, Iran also requested the Tribunal to
order the United States to provide information regarding payments
previously made by Iran, because Iranian documents were destroyed
during the revolution and it therefore had no access to them.
(Claim 2 & 3, Doc. No. 843, filed on 18 February 1991.)
Situation envisaged under Article 48 of the Rules of
Procedure of the EC Court, according to which witnesses who fail to
appear before the Court after being duly summoned are subject to a
pecuniary penalty, is an exception deriving from the special nature
of the EC Court.
104
352
law, it is not necessarily imperative to provide specific
sanctions, or to envisage punishments for noncompliance, in order
to ensure the fulfillment of every obligation. It is also true that
with respect to the duty of collaboration in matters of evidence,
in itself the existence of the rule solves the problems to a large
extent. Agents of States usually cooperate with international
tribunals, and there are many instances where, in fact,
international tribunals have expressed their satisfaction at their
efforts in fulfilling this duty. There are, however, instances
where the parties do not comply with this rule, or where
differences of opinion arise as to the applicability of the rule or
its scope.
Non-production of evidence may occur under three different
circumstances:
First, a party refuses to participate in the proceedings and
consequently fails , without showing a justifiable cause, to submit
his claim or defence as well as evidence due to. be filed with the
tribunal on a fixed date.
Second, a party who is participating in the proceedings and,
in the normal course of exchange of pleadings, has been invited by
the tribunal to produce documentary evidence, fails to produce
evidence that it wants to rely on in the proceedings, without
showing sufficient cause.
Third, a party fails to submit to the tribunal certain
specific evidence either requested by the other party and ordered
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by the tribunal to be filed, or requested by the tribunal proprio
motu.
The first situation, i.e., non-appearance before international
tribunals, is an ever-increasing problem that affects the
efficiency of international tribunals. This situation has been
envisioned in Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice and the Court has been faced with this situation
frequently, including the merits phase of the Nicaragua case. 106
The second situation is usually dealt with under the rules of
procedure of the concerned tribunal. For instance, the rules may
allow the tribunal to make its award, in such a situation, on the
basis of the documents and information before it.
107
The third situation is also problematic for international
tribunals. Failure to comply with the order of the tribunal to
provide specific documents may cause complications in the
106
107
"...[T]he respondent State has not appeared during the
present merits phase of the proceedings, thus depriving the Court
of the benefit of its complete and fully argued statement regarding
the facts. The Court's task was therefore necessarily more
difficult, and it has had to pay particular heed ... to the proper
application of Article 53 of its Statute." Nicaragua v. United
States of America, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, Para. 57,
I.C.J.Reports 1986, P. 38.
See, e.g.. Article 28 (3) of the UNCITRAL Rules, and
Article 28 (3) of the Rules of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, on the basis of which many Orders have been issued by the
said Tribunal in different cases.
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proceedings and difficulties in its decision making process,
without any precise solution being necessarily provided in its
rules.
While in a general sense the first and second situations are
related to the duty of parties to co-operate with international
tribunals, the third situation is the one directly related to the
duty of collaboration of parties regarding the burden of proof.
Thus the discussion in the present Section, like that in Section A,
is based on that situation.
2. Different Approaches
a. Ignoring the Failure of a Party
Depending on the circumstances involved, international
tribunals have accorded different kinds of treatment to instances
of non-compliance with their orders for production of specific
documents. When faced with non-production of evidence by a party,
some tribunals have tried, to the extent possible, to base their
decisions on uncontested evidence and on grounds other than those
relating to the documents in dispute. Apart from being in
conformity with the character of an international tribunal that
deals with the claims of Sovereigns, such an approach has other
advantages. It avoids discussion of whether evidence may have been
withheld deliberately in proceedings involving Sovereigns. It also
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prevents the tribunal from being too formalistic and from basing
its decisions on inferences drawn from non-production of a specific
piece of evidence rather than on other direct evidence available on
record.
It should be noted, however, that this approach is not always
practicable. The lack of other reliable evidence on record, or the
importance and materiality of the documents exclusively available
to one party but not produced before the tribunal, may warrant a
determination on the issue. Moreover, there might be a provision in
"tjie 27^1102 of procedure of the tribunal to direct it otherwise. In
such circumstances, as will be discussed below, international
tribunals have resorted to other mechanisms.
b. Taking Formal Note
Article 49 of the Statute of the ICJ employs a different
approach, in that it empowers the Court to take formal note of any
refusal regarding production of documents or explanations required
by the Court. The Court, however, has been prudent in applying the
power entrusted to it under Article 49. In the Corfu Channel case,
where the Agent of the United Kingdom declined, on the ground of
"naval secrecy", to produce the documents requested by the Court,
the Court stated as follows:
"It is not therefore possible to know the real content of
these naval orders. The Court cannot, however, draw from
this refusal to produce the orders any conclusions
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differing from those to which the actual event gave
rise."
The observation of the Court in the Corfu Channel case should be
regarded as a requisite in drawing any inference from non-
production of evidence requested by an international tribunal.
Taking note of the failure of a party to co-operate with the
tribunal by production of evidence is envisioned, inter alia, in
Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Economic. Community (1957)'°^ and Article 18 (2) of the Model Rules
on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission
and General Assembly (1958)."°
Article 3 3 (3) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) of ICSID, using the same format
provided in the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, adds that the
I.C.J. Reports 1949. P. 32.
109 See protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Economic Community of 17 April 1957, reprinted in: Dispute
Settlement in Public International Law, op..cit.. p. 375. See also
Article 15 of the Statute of the East African Common Market
Tribunal (Annex VIII), Treaty for East African Co-operation of 6
June 1967, reprinted in ibid, p. 481.
The same provision exists in Article 15 of the Draft
Convention of the International Law Commission on Arbitral
Procedure. For the texts of both the Draft and the Model Rules,
respectively, see the Report of the International Law Commission.
Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session,
Supplement No. 9, Document A/2456 p. 9-11, and the Report of the
International Law Commission. Official Records of the General
Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 9, Document A/3859 p.
5-8.
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Tribunal shall take note of the failure of a party and "of any
reasons given for such failure."'"
In any event, while taking formal note of the failure of a
party to produce evidence is a stronger measure than ignoring the
non-production of evidence, it is vague by itself insofar as it
does not clearly specify the actual action that the tribunal may
take after taking formal note of such a failure. Nevertheless, as
international tribunals usually deal with States, the possibility
that the tribunal will take formal note may per se suffice to
encourage the parties to provide the Court with the documents or
explanations required.As for the ICSID Arbitration Rules, on
the other hand, the duty of the tribunal to take note of reasons
given for the failure of a party to provide a piece of evidence
required by the tribunal implies that the tribunal may, inter alia,
base its determination on the issue and its impact on the parties'
positions on the reasons provided for such a failure. As suggested
by one commentator, it could also be argued that "since the [ICJ)
has no compulsory powers in the matter, the only sanction for non-
production is the adverse effect it may have on the case of - the
111
112
See ICSID Regulations and Rules, reproduced in: J. Gillis
Wetter, The International Arbitral process. Vol. IV, p. 522.
For instance in the case of the Permanent Court of
International Justice "[n]o case arose in which it was necessary
for the ... Court to exercise its power to take formal note of a
refusal to produce a document." J.L.. Simpson and Hazel Fox,
International Arbitration; Law and Practice, London (1959), p. 202.
358
party concerned...""^
c. Drawing Negative or Adverse Inferences
i) The Rule
Some other tribunals, however, have occasionally taken a more
radical approach in this respect. They have interpreted the act of
non—production of specific documents, believed to be at the
disposal of a party, as a sign that the documents not produced
would be prejudicial to the position of that party. On that basis,
some international tribunals have drawn a negative or adverse
inference against a party who has not produced evidence exclusively
at its disposal in an international proceeding.
Drawing a negative or adverse inference against a party is a
measure which may have radical effects on the proceedings. On the
basis of the practice of mixed claims commissions, however, some
commentators have concluded that international tribunals "can
appropriately in certain cases draw reasonable inferences from the
non-production of available evidence or from the unsatisfactory
Sir. Gerald Fitzmaurice, 2 The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice (1986), at 129. However, according
to Sir Gerald, "it is to be presumed that no party would refuse
production except for bona fide reasons of state security or high
policy." Ibid.
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explanations of failure to produce evidence."''^ In the Parker
case, the Mexico-U.S.A. General Claims Commission of 1923 stated,
inter alia, that "where evidence which would probably influence
[the Commission's] decision is peculiarly within the knowledge of
the claimant or of the respondent Government, the failure to
produce it, unexplained, may be taken into account by the
commission in reaching a decision.""^ The rule that reasonable
adverse inferences may be drawn from a party's failure to produce
relevant documents in its sole possession was applied in several
other decisions of the same Commission."^
Generally speaking, however, not much support can be found, in
the form of affirmative provisions in the rules of, procedure, or
comoromis, of international tribunals, for their power to draw
negative or adverse inferences. Most of the rules of procedure are
silent on this issue. Some of them, such as Article 69 of The Hague
Convention of 1907,"^ and Article 49 of The Statute of the ICJ,
-114 F. Nielsen, International Law Applied to—Reclamations ,
Mainly Cases Between the United States and Mexico, (1933), pp. 66
67.
115 Parker Case. Opinions, Mexico-U. S. A. General Claims
Commission of 1923, 35, 39-40 (1927).
See, e.g., Hatton Case. Opinions, 6, 10 (1928); Kalklosh
Case. Opinions, 126, 130 (1929); Melczer Mining Co. Case, Opinions,
228, 233-234 (1929); Klino Case. Opinions, 36, 44-46 (1930).
Article 69 of The Hague Convention of 1907 provides, with
respect to the arbitral procedure before the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, as follows: "Le tribunal peut, en outre, requerir des
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provide solutions which are not incompatible with, or in fact may-
result in, drawing negative inferences. Some other rules give the
tribunal enough flexibility to act according to the circumstances
of each different case, including, presumably, drawing negative
inferences. For instance, the Rules of Procedure of the European
Nuclear Energy Tribunal provides, in its Article 34, that "[w]here
a party fails to produce evidence which in the opinion of the
Tribunal is relevant to the proceedings and which such party is in
a position to produce, the tribunal shall take this fact into
account in its decision.
On the other hand, it may be argued that drawing negative
inferences from the failure of a party to produce evidence
exclusively at its disposal need not necessarily be envisioned in
the compromis or rules of procedure of an international tribunal,
and that it is within the power of international tribunals to draw
inferences from the conduct of parties with respect to production
of evidence. In other words, insofar as drawing negative inference
for non-production of evidence is not prohibited in the rules or in
any other relevant document of an international tribunal, the
agents des Parties la production de tous actes et demander toutes
explications necessaires. En cas de refus, le Tribunal en prend
acte." Reprinted in Dispute Settlement in Public International Law.
op. cit. p. 13.
Rules of procedure of the Tribunal of December 11, 1962,
reprinted in: ibid. p. 530.
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tribunal is free to draw negative inferences from a failure to
produce evidence exclusively at the disposal of a party
The practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal confirms this
view. There is no reference to the issue of drawing an adverse or
negative inference in the constituent instruments of the Tribunal
or its rules of procedure. Nevertheless, on some occasions the
Tribunal has drawn a negative inference against a party who has not
produced documents exclusively available to it. 120
Drawing negative inferences from non-production of evidence is
not limited to instances where a party declines to produce certain
evidence requested by the tribunal. The tribunal may draw negative
inferences from the unexplained failure of a party to produce
certain pieces of evidence, in the possession of that party, that
would have been helpful for the defence or claim of the same
party.'21
119 See, e.g., Durward v. Sandifer, Evidence Before
International Tribunals, op. cit., p. 153.
120 See Section,A supra.
See, e.g., Arakel Khai etoor ians, et.al. v. The Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et. al.. Award No. 504-350-2 (25
January 1991), para. 18, reprinted in 26 Iran-US. C.T.R. 37, 42,
where the Tribunal stated as follows with respect to the dominant
and effective nationality of the claimants:
"In addition, the evidence suggests that Arakel spent substantial
amounts of time in Iran after 1971. Arakel admits visiting Iran as
late as December 1979, and his significant business and personal
interests make numerous earlier visits likely. These suggestions
that Arakel continued to spend significant amounts of time in Iran
make his failure to submit into evidence a copy of his Iranian
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In conclusion, it should be mentioned that, as a mechanism for
encouraging the parties to produce evidence and for minimizing the
inconvenience resulting from one party's deliberate withholding of
material evidence, drawing negative inferences is recognized by-
international tribunals as a rule. International tribunals, being
usually unable to compel the production of evidence, have under
some circumstances drawn an adverse inference against a party
withholding evidence or information in its exclusive possession and
not sharing it with the tribunal. However, this approach has been
favoured more by mixed claims commissions than by international
tribunals dealing solely with the claims of States in their own
rights. Moreover, the extent of the applicability of this rule in
international procedure, as well as the conditions and limits
thereof, is an important feature of the rule that should not be
ignored.
ii) Limits and Conditions for Drawing Adverse Inferences
It would be over-simplifying the issue to assume that the
problem of non-production of evidence could be solved, in every
given case, by drawing adverse inferences against the party that
has failed to provide evidence in its exclusive possession. As
demonstrated in the discussion of cases referred to in Section A of
passport particularly telling, since his passport would document
his entries into and departures from Iran".
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the present Chapter, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been more
successful in cases where it has tried to solve the problem by
using its good offices to encourage a party to produce documents.
The Tribunal has normally shown patience and tolerance in cases
where the documents requested by one party were at the disposal of
the other. The Tribunal has usually tried to refrain from resorting
to measures such as making an adverse or negative inference against
a party, and has endeavoured itself to solve the problem of
production of evidence by finding practical solutions. In order to
achieve that purpose, when necessary the Tribunal has shown more
flexibility, such as by extending the deadlines for production of
required documents, and by rescheduling the remainder of the
parties' submissions.
The rationale for the Tribunal's cautious approach is
apparent. An award based on negative inferences would be more open
to criticism than an award issued on the basis of the evidence
submitted to the Tribunal. Further,, there is no specific reference
to the authority of. the Tribunal to draw adverse inferences against
a party in its constituent instrument or its rules of procedure.
Thus, the Tribunal would naturally be careful not to apply that
measure unnecessarily, and would draw adverse inferences only when
such an approach would be compelling and would stand up to outside
scrutiny.
Moreover, drawing negative inferences would not be practical
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in all cases. For instance, in the William Shashoua case'^^ the
Tribunal did not draw an adverse inference against the respondents
with respect to the numerous documents unsuccessfully requested by
the claimant, for had it done so, a significant part of the
reasoning of the Tribunal would have had to be built on such an
inference. The actual outcome of the case proved that drawing
negative inferences against the respondents would have led to
unrealistic results. When, after a prolonged delay, the respondents
finally filed the documents requested by the claimant, it became
obvious that the claimant's partners had sold the property for
which the claimant was seeking compensation, and thus the claimant
subsequently withdrew the case.
While a claimant usually asks for some assistance from the
respondent, the situation might occur in an inverted form as well.
In the Embassy Cases, the United States, i.e., the respondent in
the case, contended that the documents necessary for its defence
were at the Embassy compound, under the control of Iran, i.e., the
claimant. The United States in fact requested to have access to its
own documents. On the other hand, the United States would have had
to prove to the Tribunal that the documents were certainly in the
Embassy in the first place, and that they were still available
there.
In conclusion, the requisites on the basis of which
122 See Section A supra.
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international tribunals have occasionally drawn negative inferences
could be summarized as follows:
- The tribunal must be sure that the requested document is at
the disposal of the other party.
- The claim of the claimant must otherwise appear substantial,
i.e., the claimant should have made a prima facie case.
- The party against whom negative inferences are drawn should
have been given enough time and opportunity to produce that
evidence.
- Explanations provided by a party as reasons for not
producing the requested documents should be taken into
account.
- Governments might have difficulties arising from their laws,
national security needs or policies, etc. Thus, an
international tribunal would be more cautious in drawing
negative inferences against a government.
- The documents requested and not produced must be relevant
and material to the proceedings.
- Drawing adverse inferences does not mean that the claim of
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the other party need not be proved. A negative inference has
a limited scope of application, and may in fact not have any
practical effect on the proceedings. It is only at the stage
of the evaluation of evidence that the tribunal takes negative
inferences into account, and the degree of their effect is
subjective. If the tribunal is able to base its decision on
other documents and grounds, it should do so.
Collaboration of parties is a rule whose ultimate objective is
to enable the tribunal to base its decision on as much evidence as
possible. Thus, applying sanctions such as taking note or drawing
reasonable adverse inferences with respect to the documents not
provided by a party is not the main objective. Such measures are
more useful for the tribunal as a mechanism to encourage the
parties to provide more information and documents, than as a factor
in the evaluation process. Under the circumstances of a given case,
drawing adverse inferences may be impossible or may lead to
contradictory or unrealistic results.
By providing the tribunal with all the evidence at their
disposal, on the other hand, the two parties can make it possible
for the tribunal to decide the case not on the basis of the
procedural rules but. on the basis of facts. Thus, international
tribunals presumably endeavour to encourage the parties to be
forthright in providing evidence, and would resort to measures such
as making adverse inferences against a party only as a last resort
367
and under special circumstances.
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CHAPTER VIII
STANDARD OP PROOF
A. Introductory Remarks
\
As was discussed in Chapter 4 above, international
tribunals may be called upon to determine, among other things, the
weight of the evidence before them;' and in that respect they are
not usually bound by strict rules of evidence but enjoy
considerable freedom. Nevertheless, in spite of the freedom of
international tribunals in evaluation of evidence, there still must
be a measure against which the value of each piece of evidence as
well as the overall value of the evidence in a given case should be
weighed and determined.
Moreover, justice requires that different issues within and
among cases before a particular international tribunal be treated
equally as far as the evaluation of evidence is concerned. Applying
different criteria may do injustice and is susceptible of being
viewed by the parties as a sign of partiality. Therefore, from this
point of view, too, it is necessary to determine a measure to be
' See also, e.g.. Article 25 (6) of the Rules of the Iran
United States Claims Tribunal.
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applied equally in all cases. This measure or criterion, on the
basis of which the adjudicating body ultimately determines whether
or not the burden of proof in a given case has been met, is called
the standard of proof.
On the one hand, the standard of proof is based on the
principle of actori incumbit probatio, because the party who
carries the burden of proof is required to convince the tribunal of
the truthfulness of his claim. It is, on the other hand, equally
based on the principle of the authority and duties of international
tribunals with respect to evidence in matters before them, because
it is the tribunal that should decide whether or not the proponent
has succeeded in proving its claim to the satisfaction of the
tribunal.
The scope of the standard of proof, considered broadly, may be
formulated in the question, "how should the burden of proof be
discharged?" This question covers a wide range of issues related to
the details of production, admissibility and evaluation of
evidence, such as time, place, order, language, and type of
evidence to be produced. However, since some of these issues have
been discussed in previous Chapters, the discussion in this Chapter
will focus on the most important issue within the above-mentioned
general question — i.e, that of the standard of proof in its
restrictive sense, namely the quantum or degree of proof.
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Perhaps it is easier to find a general definition for the
standard of proof in municipal legal systems than in international
procedure. In England, for instance, the celebrated definition
comes from Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions where,
referring to the degree of cogency required for discharging the
burden of proof in a civil case, he says :
"That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable
degree of probability, but not so high as is required in
a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the
tribunal can say: 'we think it more probable than not',
the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are
equal, it is not."^
Even if the apparent lack of any such general definition in
international procedure could be attributed to the flexibility of
international tribunals in matters related to evaluation of
evidence, the fact that the standard of proof is usually not
discussed by international tribunals is not justifiable. Even
ongoing institutions which have adjudicated numerous international
claims have normally refrained from providing a comprehensive
discussion in this regard, or from explaining the underlying
standard they have applied in their decisions.^ Nevertheless, in
some instances international tribunals have had to face this
question.in order to provide a general guideline in relation to the
^ Cross on Evidence, op. cit., p. 110.
^ See e.g. Scherina Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran. Award No. 122-38-1, Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk (18
April 1984), pp. 2-3, reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 374, 375 ("It
is regrettable that the Tribunal has never discussed the standard
of proof it imposes on parties").
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evidentiary requirements of the cases before them/
The difficulty of dealing with the question of what is an
acceptable standard of proof before international tribunals arises
from the fact that in the final analysis the issue, being a
subjective measure, is discretionary and subject to human
judgement. Consequently, what is acceptable for one person is not
necessarily the same for another. The solution found long in
municipal law in this regard is to rely, as a measure, on what is
called a reasonable man judgement. Assuming that the same measure
could be applied in international law, a hypothetical reasonable
man ^ might encounter three different situations with respect to
the degree of proof in a given case :
First, there is no evidence at all or it is so meager that it
can be ignored.
Second, the evidence produced in the case is so decisive and
fully convincing that it proves beyond doubt the assertion of
the claimant.
See, e.g., Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, Case No. 36, Chamber One, Order of 20 December 1982,
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 4 55; and General Motors
Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 94, Order of
21 January 1983, reprinted in 3 Iran-U.-S. C.T.R. 1.
^ As regards the qualifications of the reasonable man, it might
be argued that an average layman would be a good example. But,
considering the fact that in international proceedings the triers
of fact are usually professional judges or arbitrators, it seems
that with respect to the standard of proof, the hypothetical
reasonable man has to have the qualifications of a judge or
arbitrator in an international proceeding, and to possess the
ability to analyze and digest the evidence about which he should be
informed in the case.
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Third, the evidence produced is neither meager nor decisive,
but its cogency could be categorized as lying somewhere
between the first and second situations.
Obviously, the first and second situations are not difficult to
deal with, since they present two extreme and clear-cut cases. In
the first situation the evidence could easily be characterized as
insufficient, and in the second situation as conclusive, leading
respectively to a dismissal or acceptance of the claim. The third
situation, however, is the one that needs, all the attention and
skills of the reasonable man or, in fact, the judge or arbitrator
in an international proceeding. For it requires a determination of
the question of what degree of proof, short of being conclusive,
may still be acceptable for satisfying the burden of proof.
B. Prima Facie Evidence
1. What is Prima Facie Evidence ?
Starting from the lowest degree of proof which could easily be
characterized as insufficient evidence and moving upwards, the
first notable stage is the one which in legal literature is
referred to as nr-ima facie evidence. This is an inevitable stage
for distribution of the burden of proof,^ without which there will
^ Even those scholars who believe that "[t]here is, in general,
a degree of unhelpfulness in the argument concerning the burden of
proof" have had to admit that "some prima facie distribution of
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be no case to require the respondent's answer. In fact, before
international tribunals, any quantum of proof lower than prima
facie evidence may cause a ruling against the proponent with
respect to the issue at question, or even dismissal of the case
through the simple reasoning that claimant has failed to establish
even a prima facie case.
For instance, in the Pomerov case the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal rejected the defence of the Iranian Navy because, "by
failing to establish even a prima facie case for contract breach",
the Navy had not met its burden of proof on defence.'' The same
practice had previously been adopted by the Italian-United States
Conciliation Commission.^ It is also the practice of commissions of
inquiry of international organizations to require the complainant
to provide prima facie evidence. The European Commission of Human
Rights, too, has rejected many applications because the applicants
were unable to provide prima facie evidence of the violation of a
right protected by the European Convention of 1950 for the
burden of proof there must be." Case of Certain Norwegian Loans
(France v. Norway) . Judgment of .'6 July 1957, Opinion of Judge
Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports 1957, P. 39, 24 ILR at 797.
Award No. 50-40-3 (8 June 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R, pp. 372-386, at 382. See also Pomerov Corporation v.
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 51-41-3 (8
June 1983), reprinted in Ibid, pp. 391-400, at 399.
^ See, e.g., Batchelder Claim. 26 July 1954, in 22 ILR at 866
("...the Commission must reject the claim for household effects and
other personal property..., for the reason that the claimant has
failed to make even a prima facie case with regard to the loss of
such property or to the causal connection between the war and the
loss").
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.® Furthermore,
according to the Commission of Inquiry of the International Labour
Organization, "[u]nless the complainant Government makes a prima
facie case it would appear to be entirely within the discretion of
the Organization whether to pursue the matter further. IllO
Prima facie evidence, being a vague term the meaning of which
is usually taken for granted in international procedure, can not
easily be defined precisely. However, it has generally been defined
(e.g., by the Mexican-U.S. General Claims Commission) as evidence
"which, unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to maintain the
proposition affirmed.A general definition such as that
® See. e.g., Re Application No. 89/55 (X^ v. German Federal
Republic! . 16 Dec. 1955, in: 24 ILR 363; and Re Application No.
107/55 (X^ V. Belgium), 29 May 1965, in: Ibid 367.
Complaint by the Government of Ghana Concerning—the
Observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention. 1957 TNo. 1051 , in: .35—ILR 325. It was also
pointed out that: "While the Commission considers that the. extent
of its inquiry in this case has been fully justified by the
importance of the issues at stake, it does not consider that it
should be assumed that so full an inquiry is called for as a matter
of course in the absence of the submission by the complainant of
substantial evidence or a strong prima facie case that there has
been a failure to give effect to the provisions of the Convention."
Ibid. p.326 . See also Complaint bv the Government—of Portugal
concerning the observance bv the Government—Qf—Liberia—^f—the
Forced T.f^bnur Convention. 1930 fNo. 291, in which the Commission
found it important to place on record its concurrence in the above-
mentioned view expressed by the Ghana-Portugal Commission. (3.6—ILR
at 395.)
Mexican-U.S.A. General Claims Commission, Lillie S. Klinq
ru.S.A.1 V. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A., p. 585.
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mentioned above, or any other like it,'^ however, hardly solves the
problem,. It only emphasizes the importance of the subjective
element inherent in the issues related to the standard of proof,
and at best it replaces the question with another one, i.e., what
is the evidence which, unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient
to maintain a claim ?
Nonetheless, it appears that there is not much controversy on
the definition of prima facie evidence, and the above definition
seems to have remained generally uncontested. The reason perhaps is
not- that the above definition meets with uniform approval, but
rather that it is not possible to provide a comprehensive
definition for the issue. The real definition of what constitutes
prima facie evidence is only to be inferred from the practice of
international tribunals, which in turn seems to vary from case to
case.
With respect to the practice of international tribunals in
this regard, different examples may be referred to. In the CBS case
the arbitral tribunal found that "... Respondents have made out a
prima facie case that the entries on the reconciliation statement
"Prima facie evidence is evidence which is sufficient to
establish a fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
but is not conclusive." D.M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Lav,
at 987 (1980).
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are correct."'^ Sums "invoiced in the ordinary course of business
and accompanied by substantial, adequate documentation" has been
found to be nr-ima facie payable, "except for that portion of the
fee attributable to amounts disallowed by the tribunal herein."
Similarly, a passport has been held to be prima facie evidence of
citizenship by birth irrespective of its date of issue.
In a commercial arbitration before the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) , the tribunal held that an award of the ICC
previously issued in another case in which some of the parties were
13 cRS Incorporated v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, et al.. Award No. 486-197-2 (28 June 1990), para. 42,
reprinted in 25 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 131, 145. "In the absence of any
contradicting evidence or a challenge by the Claimant, the Tribunal
accepts the figures contained therein and will adjust the amount
owed to the Claimant accordingly." Ibid.
Development and Resource?^ Corporation v. The Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Award No.
485-60-3 (25 June 1990), para, 137, reprinted in 25 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 20, 52.
14
15 gee at fred Haber. P. A. , a claim of less than US $250,000
presented by the United States of America v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran. Award No. 437-10159-3 (4 September 1989), reprinted in 23
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 133, 135 ("As to Mr. Haber's passport, the
Tribunal notes that the passport states that Alfred Haber was born
in New York on 19 June 1939. Irrespective of the passport's date of
issue, this constitutes at least prima facie evidence of his United
States citizenship by birth. The Respondent has not rebutted this
evidence." S^, also, R.N. Pomeroy v. Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Award No. 50-40-3, p. 11 (8 June 1983), reprinted
in 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 372, 377.
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involved constituted prima facie evidence.'^ As an example of the
practice of international commissions of inquiry in this regard,
reference could be made to the Complaint by the Government of
Portugal Concerning the Observance by the Government of Liberia of
the Forced Labour Convention, in which the Commission of Inquiry of
the International Labour Organization regarded "the successive
reports of the Committee of Experts and the Conference Committee on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, referred to in
the complaint, as constituting the necessary evidence to establish
a prima facie case."'"'
Under some circumstances international tribunals have
preferred to explain what, in their view, is not prima facie in the
context of the particular case before them. This normally happens
when the evidence is insufficient for a finding in favour of the
proponent. An example of this is the Corfu Channel Case, in which
the I.C.J. held that "...the mere fact of the control exercised by
a State over its territory and waters...by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility
nor shifts the burden of proof.
Textron Inc. fU.S.A.), et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.
Case No. 3693/AS/JRI/HV, Interim Award No.3, ICC Court of
Arbitration.
" 36 ILR (1968) at 395.
16 ILR at 157. See also Alan Craia v. Ministrv of Energy of
Iran, et al.. Award No. 71-346-3, 2 September 1983, reprinted in 3
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 280, at 288; and American Housing v. The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.. Award No. 117-
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In certain other instances international tribunals have failed
to substantiate their reasons for finding that a certain amount of
evidence constituted prima facie evidence. Their findings in this
regard are sometimes as general as the prima facie evidence itself,
not even explaining the evidence on the basis of which they have
decided. For instance, the arbitral tribunal in the Rockwell case
accepted the claimant's evidence as prima facie evidence in the
following words:
"Considering the evidence in its entirety, the Tribunal
concludes that, subject to some adjustments, the Claim
for invoices through August 1979 is sufficiently
substantiated, reasonably documented, and conclusive.
Rockwell has, therefore, at a minimum established a prima
facie case for payment of the invoices."
Finally, it is to be noted that in some pronouncements of
international tribunals there are references to "strong prima facie
evidence", but that obviously does not render any meaning more than
what the term itself indicates.
199-3 17 March 1984, Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk,
T-eariAted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 242, at 245. also Levis and
Levis V. FP.ciP.ral Republin of Germany (Merits) , Arbitral Commission
^^"Property, Rights and Interests in Germany, Third Chamber(Lagergren, Arndt, Phenix) , 9 June 1959, in 28_ILR at 523, where it
was rightly held that mere allegations are not to be considered
prima facie evidence.
15 Rockwel] International Systems, Inc. v. The Government of
The Islamic Republic of Iran . Award No. 438-430-1 (5 September
1989), para. 141, reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 150, at 188.
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2. Is prima facie Evidence an Acceptable Standard of Proof?
The answer to the question of whether prima facie evidence is
an acceptable standard of proof before international tribunals
depends on the effect of the prima facie evidence on the burden of
proof. If prima facie evidence is capable of discharging the burden
of proof it is an acceptable standard; otherwise it is not.
a. Effect of prima facie Evidence
Two different effects are conceivable for prima facie
evidence: its effect can be inevitable, or else only probable. Its
primary effect is on the burden of evidence. Wherever provided,
facie evidence shifts the burden of evidence from the
proponent to the other party. This is the effect in all instances.
Before this stage the adverse party is not bound to respond to the
case, and its silence may prove to be sufficient. But after one
party has provided prima facie evidence it has in fact discharged
its burden of evidence, and it is not required to carry its burden
of proof any further before the other party rebuts the prima facie
evidence already established by the proponent. This is apparently
the rule followed by both international tribunals and some
municipal courts.Witenberg explains the different approaches
See, e.g. , Jet Line Services Inc. v. M/V MARSA EL HARIGA et
United States, District Court of Maryland, 27 November 1978, in
6 3 ILR, at 220 ("...this court is able to find that defendant has
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taken by French law and English law in this regard:
"Au fond ce qui incombe au demandeur c'est moins de
prouver completement le fait que d'en donner un
commencement de preuve, d'en fournir une "representation
premiere", ce que les Anglais appellent une "prima facie
evidence". Telle est, du moins, la solution anglaise.
Alors que la loi frangaise impose au demandeur de
prouver, purement et simplement, sans attenuation, la loi
anglaise ne lui impose que de commencer a prouver : ce
qu'on appelle "the right to begin".
The secondary effect of prima facie evidence is in fact
dependent on the action of the adversary in the case, and whether
or not it succeeds in introducing elements of doubt with respect to
the claimant's T3rima facie case. If the adversary rebuts the prima
facie evidence, then undoubtedly the burden of evidence will shift
back to the proponent, and it has to carry its burden further. But
the question arises as to whether the tribunal should accept the
prima facie evidence provided by the proponent as sufficient for
discharging the burden of proof, if the adversary does not respond
to the claim or its defense is not strong enough to rebut the prima
produced such nrima facie evidence.of immunity and that plaintiff,
then faced with the burden of going forward, has failed to produce
evidence establishing that sovereign immunity should not be
granted"). .
J.C. Witenberg, "Onus Probandi devant les juridiction
arbitrales". Revue Generale de Droit International Public, Tome LV,
1951, p. 324. 'A party' - dit la formule classique - 'who makes an
allegation must always introduce some evidence to support it'.
C'est le principe general, commun au droit anglais et fran9axs.
Mais le droit anglais va se separer un peu du^ droit frangais pour
le surplus. En effet, la formule se poursuit ainsi: 'But as soon as
the party who makes an allegation has adduced some evidence which
prima facie supports his allegation, the burden shifts to^ his
opponent.' Ibid, quoting Wilshere, The Outlines of Procedure in an
Action, London, 1923, p. 136.
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facie evidence.
International tribunals have often accepted claims on the
basis of prima facie evidence. By way of example, reference could
be made to the Lockheed case, in which discussion of the merits of
one of the claims focused on the.question whether Lockheed had
performed the services it claimed to have performed during the
third and fourth quarters of 1978.^^ With respect to the claim
concerning the third quarter, the Tribunal did not face any
particular problem since Lockheed's evidence, unrebutted by any
evidence to the contrary, was sufficient to establish its claim.
With respect to the fourth quarter, however, the evidence was not
as strong. Nevertheless, on the grounds that "Lockheed [had]
presented its bill in writing four times within seven months of
completing the fourth quarter services" and that there was "no
evidence that the lAF complained or protested contemporaneously
about the validity of any of the requests for payment or the
authenticity of the daily attendance records", the Tribunal
Lockheed Corporation v. The Government of Iran, The Iranian
Air Force, et al. , Award No. 367-829-2 (9 June 1988) para. 94,
reprinted in 18 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 292, at 318.
Ibid, para. 95. The Tribunal noted that Lockheed timely
delivered a request for payment (together with "daily attendance
records... approved by the respective lAF officials to substantiate
the amount invoiced" to the Iranian Air Force(lAF), in response to
which "the lAF timely paid the 50 percent rial portion of the
invoice. in accordance with the contractual stipulation that one
half of any amount due under the contract was to be paid in rials
and the other half in dollars." Ibid.
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concluded that Lockheed had established a prima facie case for its
claimed fourth-quarter paymentThe Tribunal then decided the
claim in favour of the claimant on the basis of the same prima
facie evidence."
As another example, in Time, Inc. v. Iran, after accepting
that "the approval of [some] invoices in the total amount... by the
appropriate officials of [the Respondent] establishes a prima facie
claim for that amount", the Tribunal held that "in the absence of
persuasive evidence that such approval was erroneous ... the claim
for these invoices is valid...
In the Tnternatjonal Tecbninal Products case, with respect to
a counterclaim of the Iranian Air force for alleged deficiencies in
spare parts and test equipment which claimant was obligated to
provide, the Tribunal ruled that "the packing lists supplied by
[Respondents], as substantiated by testimonial evidence of
Claimants' witnesses at the Hearing, constitute prima—facie
Ibid, para. 96.
25 Ibid, para. 97. The reasoning of the Tribunal was as
follows: "The lAF presents no evidence that these services were not
rendered and rests its defense on the assertion that Lockheed has
not proved its claim because it has not submitted in evidence the
daily attendance records. Lockheed's explanation that these records
were left in Iran is credible, and, in any event, this argument is
inadequate to rebut Lockheed's prima facie case, and the Tribunal
therefore accepts the claim for the fourth quarter of 1978.' I^.
Time. Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 139-166-2 (29 June 1984), at
4-5, reprinted in 7 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 8, at 11.
26
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evidence that the parts listed were shipped to the United
States. Then, on the basis of the prima facie evidence,
strengthened by the claimants' failure to produce bills of lading
or any other evidence of reshipment of those parts to Iran, the
Tribunal held "Claimants liable to [Respondents] for the full value
of the parts returned to the United States..."^®
In Alfred Haber, P.A., a small claim presented by the United
States of America against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Tribunal found that Mr. Haber's passport, in which it was stated
that he was born in New York, constituted prima facie evidence of
his United States' citizenship by birth, and then concluded as
follows:
"Applying the standards developed in its practice, the
Tribunal finds that, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, the evidence submitted by Haber is sufficient
to establish that it is a United States national as
required by the Claims Settlement Declaration."^'
In Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat. the Tribunal found that
the documents provided by the Claimant, "buttressed by the credible
International Technical Products Corporation, et al. v. The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.. Partial Award
No. 186-302-3 (19 August 1985) at 92, reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 10, at 28.
Ibid, 29. See also CBS Incorporated v. The Government of The
Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. , Award No. 486-197-2 (28 June
1990), para. 42, reprinted in 25 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 131, 145.
Award No. 437-10159-3 (4 September 1989) , reprinted in 23
I^sn-U.S. C.T.R. 133, 135. See also, e.g., Cal-Maine Foods Inc. v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 13 3-3 4 0-
3, p. 8 (11 June 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 52, 57-58.
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testimony at the Hearing", constituted the prima facie evidence as
to his continuous ownership of the claim, and then stated that
"[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, that evidence is
decisive.
In international procedure the question whether prima facie
evidence is acceptable as a standard of proof sometimes appears in
the guise of the question whether the probative value of the
evidence adduced in a given case is sufficient for it to be
considered prima facie evidence. In other words, the vagueness and
flexibility inherent in the definition of prima facie evidence,
combined with the discretionary power of international tribunals in
qualifying a certain amount of evidence as such, sometimes leads to
different conclusions, within a body of international arbitrators
or judges, as to whether the evidence in question is sufficient for
it to be accepted prima facie. A vivid example in this regard is
T. Case Companv v. Iran, in which the majority of Chamber One of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal did "not find the available evidence
sufficient, even in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to
support the conclusion that the non-payment of the debts [by two
Iranian private companies to the Claimant] was due to the acts of
the Government of Iran."^' Taking into account the possibility that
Award No. 35-219-2, 30 March 1983, reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S,
C.T.R. 232, at 238-239.
Award No. 57-244-1, 15 June 1983 , reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S,
C.T.R. 62, at 65.
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other factors, enumerated in the Award, might have contributed to
that effect, the Tribunal rejected the claims. The American
member of the Chamber, however, dissented from that Award on the
ground that the evidence provided by the claimant (consisting of
testimony by witnesses and a telex "that had been sent by one of
the witnesses confirming the facts to which he testified") was,
according to him, "sufficient to constitute prima facie proof of
the facts alleged...""
Nevertheless, it may be argued that, while prima facie
evidence is enough to- set the wheels in motion, and is the stage at
which a mere silence or denial by respondent may not necessarily be
sufficient, it is not always a proper standard of proof before
international tribunals.In some municipal jurisdictions, prima
facie evidence is accepted as the required standard for satisfying
the burden of proof. In international proceedings, however, where
the possibility of appeal or other recourse against decisions of
international tribunals do not usually exist, it is necessary that
Ibid.
" Dissent of Howard M. Holtzmann, 27 July 1983, reprinted in
3 Iran-U.s. C.T.R. 56, at 71.
In Lockheed Corporation v. The Government of Iran, the
Iranian Air Force, et al.. Award No. 367-829-2 (9 June 1988) which
was discussed supra, the Iranian arbitrator, who dissented to the
Award, criticized the majority, inter alia. for expecting the
respondent to prove the nonexistence of the services alleged by the
claimant, and for placing emphasis on prima facie evidence.
According to him, this was "further evidence of the weakness of the
Claimant's position." See Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of
Seyed Khalil Khalilian, 8 July 1988, para. 36, reprinted in 18
Iran-U.s. C.T.R. 324, at 342.
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the standard of proof be selected more carefully, and set at a
higher level.^^
In the Parker Case, while explaining its views with respect
to the rules of evidence and the burden of proof, the Mexican-
United States General Claims Commission rightly rejected the
contention that "evidence put forward by the claimant and not
rebutted by the respondent must necessarily be considered as
conclusive. On the other hand, the Commission also pointed out
that "when the claimant has established a prima facie case and the
respondent has offered no evidence in rebuttal the latter may not
insist that the former pile up evidence to establish its
allegations beyond a reasonable doubt without pointing out some
reason for doubting.
Consequently, it is not accurate to say that establishing
prima facie evidence shifts the burden of proof, since it would
mean that the duty of the claimant to discharge the burden of proof
would be fulfilled by a mere showing of a prima facie case, and
that from that stage it would be the duty of the respondent to
See, e.g., Sandifer, Evidence Before International
Tribunals, op.cit., at 169-170.
Parker Case, 4 P.. I. A. A. at 39 (1926). For a discussion on
other aspects of the Commission's views in this case s^ Ch. V
supra.
" Ibid. See also Order of 20 Dec 1982 in Case No.36, Flexi-
Van Leasing Inc. and Islamic Rp.publ ic of Iran, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. C.T.Ro 455.
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disprove the claimant's allegation.On the other hand, as was
explained, it is the established practice of international
tribunals not to require the proponent to provide more than prima
facie evidence at the beginning of the proceedings and before the
respondent has put forward any reasonable doubt. Therefore,
probably a balance could be struck by saying that international
tribunals may, rather than must, accept that the proponent satisfy
its burden of proof by providing prima facie evidence, and that it
is within their discretion to determine whether or not to accept
prima facie evidence as the standard of proof in a given case.
b. Effect on Jurisdiction Distinguished
As regards the jurisdictional issues, however, it has been
suggested that the jurisdiction of international tribunals is not
to be established by prima facie evidence, and that it requires a
degree of proof higher than that.
For instance, in their Joint Dissenting Opinion in South West
Africa Cases, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice, having stated that
For an example of confusion in this regard see. e.g.,
Textron Inc. fU.S.A.) , et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. Case No.
3693/AS/JRI/HV, Interim Award No.3, ICC Court of Arbitration, which
concluded that a former, related award of the ICC must have the
value of prima facie evidence with respect to some aspects of the
case, and then stated as follows: "Procedurally, this award shifts
the burden of proof: it is no longer Claimants who have to proof
[sic] the incurred costs, but it is Defendant who has to prove the
non-accuracy of the sums awarded to JHP, if Defendant challenges
the results of the final award or at least some parts of it, as
reserved in the finding sub lit.c above."
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"the burden of establishing the jurisdiction of the Court lies on
the party asserting it, and [that] this must be established
conclusively," went on to conclude that it was "for the Applicants
to show that the Mandate is beyond reasonable doubt a 'treaty or
convention in force' for the purposes of Articles 35 and 37 of the
Statute. According to them, "quite apart from any question of
onus of proof, a duty lies upon the Court, before it may assume
jurisdiction, to be conclusively satisfied - satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt - that jurisdiction does exist.
The practice of the two world courts in this respect has been
summarized as follows by Judges McNair, Basdevant, Klaestad and
Read, in their Dissenting Opinion on the Ambatielos Case;
"[B]efore declaring a state to be bound to submit a
dispute to the decision of an international tribunal, the
Permanent Court and the present court_ have always
considered it necessary to establish positively, and not
merely on prima facie or provisional grounds, that the
state in question had in some form given its consent to
this procedure."
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal took a more flexible approach in
Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, Judgment
of 21 December 1962, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sir Percy
Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.e.J. Reports 1962, P. 473, 37
ILR at 115.
Ibid. "It rests also upon the simple fact that no onus lies
upon the Respondent State to disprove the past and present treaty
character of the Mandate or of Article 7. The onus lies upon the
Applicants of establishing that character beyond reasonable doubt,
since this goes to the root of jurisdiction. The duty lies equally
upon the Court of being affirmatively satisfied to that effect.
Ibid 474.
41 I.C.J. Reports, 1953, p. 29.
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this regard in its important and unanimous Decision on Issue II of
Case No. In that part of the Case the Tribunal had been
requested to define, inter alia, "the extent to which the Tribunal
must establish that it has jurisdiction" for recording a settlement
agreement reached between a United States claimant and Iran, as an
Award on Agreed Terms in accordance with Article 3 4 of the UNCITRAL
RulesRecalling the undisputed fact that the basis of its
jurisdiction had been determined by Iran and the United States in
the Algiers Declarations, the Tribunal concluded that "if requested
to make an Award on Agreed Terms, the Tribunal will make such
examination concerning its jurisdiction as it deems necessary."''^
This view, which was reiterated a few years later by the Full
Tribunal, with different members, in another interpretive dispute
with respect to the Algiers Declarations between the two
governments,'*^ was probably the best general answer that could have
been provided under the circumstances. As was stated by the
Tribunal:
"[I]t would be neither appropriate nor feasible to
establish, in abstracto, without reference to the
situation in any particular case, a general rule
concerning the extent of the examination as to
jurisdiction that may be needed, given the large variety
of situations in which matters of jurisdiction may arise
Case No. A1 (Issue II), Decision No. DEC 8-Al-FT, (17 May
1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 144-153.
Ibid. 152.
^ Ibid.
See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America,
Decision No. DEC 45-A20-FT at para. 15 (10 July 1986), reprinted in
11 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 271, at 276.
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and the detailed nature and complexity of the provisions
on jurisdiction in the Algiers Declarations."
As another aspect of the importance of prima facie evidence,
it is also to be noted that, in the event that an international
tribunal is forced to decide on issues of urgent nature before the
completion of pleadings and before it can determine its
jurisdiction properly, the absence of prima facie evidence is
considered by international tribunals as a sign of lack of
jurisdiction at that stage. For instance, it has been the practice
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to consider requests for interim
measures, "without prejudicing its final decision on jurisdiction",
only "in cases where it is satisfied that there is at least a prima
facie showing that it has jurisdiction over the substantive claim
pending before it."'^^ As was emphasized in the Component Builders
Case, "[o]ne requirement for the issuance of interim measures is
that there be, at least prima facie, a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal might be founded.
Decision No. Dec 8-Al-FT, op.cit. , and Decision No. Dec 45-
A2 0-FT, OP.cit.
47 Flour Corporation v. The Government of The Islamic Republic,
of Iran. Interim Award No. ITM 62-333-1 (7 August 1986), p.3,
reprinted in 11 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 296, at 297. also Bendone-
Derossi International v. The Government of The Islamic Republic of
Iran, Interim Award No. ITM 40-375-1 (7 June 1984), pp.3-4
reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 130, 131-132.
48 Component Builders. Inc. et al. v. The Islamic Republic Of
Iran, et al., reprinted in 8 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 216, 220.^ "Claimants
have submitted evidence of their U.S. nationality which, if not
specifically rebutted, constitutes evidence sufficient to support
a finding by the Tribunal that Claimants in fact have the requisite
nationality." Ibid.
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C. Different Standards of Proof
As was discussed in the previous section, under some
circumstances prima facie evidence may be accepted as the minimum
amount of proof required to discharge a burden of proof; but any
quantum of proof lower than that degree has been rightly considered
by international tribunals as insufficient, and been rejected.
Further, even in cases where prima facie evidence could be
acceptable, its utility is limited to instances where it remains
unrebutted. Consequently, given the fact that in many cases the
amount of evidence adduced by the parties exceeds the level of
prima facie evidence, there must be a more comprehensive standard
to be used wherever the prima facie standard is not applicable.
On the other hand, in order to pinpoint a specific degree of
proof to be agreed upon as the acceptable standard of proof before
international tribunals, it is hardly possible to provide an
objective account of the different degrees of belief to which human
minds may be susceptible. Thus, the generally known bench marks
available in this respect are not numerous. In fact, apart from
prima facie evidence, there remain only two other important
measures: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires a high
degree of cogency, and preponderance of evidence, meaning evidence
higher and greater in weight.
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1. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The nature and field of activity of each particular
international tribunal as well as the circumstances of each given
case are, apparently, among the major factors that affect the
determination of the degree of cogency required for discharging the
burden of proof. Thus, while proof beyond reasonable doubt seems to
be too high a standard, it has been applied under special
circumstances by international tribunals. It is to be noted,
however, that similar to municipal law where a high standard such
as proof beyond reasonable doubt is applied in trying defendants on
criminal charges,in international proceedings, too, this
standard is normally applied where civil claims having the same
nature, tort claims or quasi-criminal allegations are involved.
A good example in this regard is the Irish Case in which, in
evaluating the evidence it had obtained, the European Commission of
Human Rights applied the measure of proof "beyond reasonable doubt"
In England, for instance, the degree of cogency requiredfor
discharging the burden of proof in criminal cases has been defined
by Lord Denning, in Miller v. Minister of Pensions, as follows: "It-
need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of
probability. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the
community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the
course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to
leave only a remote possibility in his favour, ^ which can be
dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in
the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
nothing short of that will suffice." Cross on Evidence, —Pit. ,
p. 110
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as its standard of proof.According to the Irish government, this
was "an excessively rigid standard for the purposes of the . . .
proceedings", but the respondent Government disputed that
contention and asked the European Court to follow the same course
as the Commission.^' The Court, too, agreed with the Commission's
approach regarding the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt",
and adopted the same standard for evaluating the evidence itself.
A key point to be noted, however, is that the question before the
Court was the existence or absence in Northern Ireland of practices
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention concerning prohibition
against torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.
Even so, probably taking into account the difficulty faced by the
claimant in meeting such a high standard, the Court added that
"such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong,
clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact."^^
The fact that in at least some cases international tribunals
should adopt a high standard of proof has been confirmed by the
I.C.J. as well.-"- As a recent example, reference can be made to a
Ireland v. United Kingdom fIrish Case), European Court of
Human Rights, 18 January 1978, in 5 8 ILR at 264.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
"A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would
require a high degree of certainty that has not been reached here."
I.C.J. Reports. , 278.
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judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where the
Court's concern for selecting an applicable standard of proof was
illustrated in the following words:
"The Court cannot ignore the special seriousness of
finding that a State Party to the Convention has carried
out or has tolerated a practice of disappearances in its
territory. This requires the Court to apply a standard of
proof which considers the seriousness of the charge and
which, notwithstanding what has already been said, is
capable of establishing the truth of the allegations in
a convincing manner."^'*
The same standard has been applied, occasionally and under
special circumstances, by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. For
instance, In Oil Field of Texas, where Respondent contended that
the Lease Agreement on which the claimant's claim was based was
unenforceable because it had been procured by bribery and
collusion, the Tribunal concluded as follows:
"The burden is on [Respondent] to establish its defence
of alleged bribery in connection with the Lease
Agreement. If reasonable doubts remain, such an
allegation cannot be deemed to be established."^^
It is to be noted, however, that in the above-mentioned case, which
seems to be among the rare instances where the Tribunal has
referred to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that
standard is relied upon only passively, ie., not for accepting a
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, reprinted in_T. Buergenthal, R.
Norris and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas, p.
255.
55 Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 258-43-1 (8
October 1986), reprinted in 12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 308, 315.
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claim on that basis but for rejecting a defence which contained the
charge of forgery.
It has also been suggested that the jurisdiction of
international tribunals should be proved conclusively and beyond
reasonable doubt. For instance, in their Joint Dissenting Opinion
in West Africa Cases, Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, discussing "[t]he duty of the Court itself to be
satisfied that jurisdiction is conclusively established" concluded
as follows:
"If a reasonable doubt -and still more if a very serious
doubt, to put it no higher- is revealed as existing,
then, because of the principle of consent as the
indispensable foundation of international jurisdiction,
the conclusion would have to be reached that jurisdiction
is not established. In short, the doubt would, according
to the normal canons for the interpretation of
jurisdictional clauses, have to be resolved against the
existence of jurisdiction."^^
2. Preponderance of Evidence
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is, presumably, the favorite
standard of proof with international tribunals since it relieves
them of the task of searching for other standards which may be
appropriate in the context of a given case. Unfortunately, it is a
See also the example quoted from the I.C.J. in Note 53,
supra.
" South West Africa Cases, 1962 (Ethiopia v. South Africa;
Liberia v. South Africa), Judgment of 21 December 1962, Joint
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962, PP. 473-474, 3 7 ILR at 115.
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luxury that the party who carries the burden of proof in
international proceedings cannot always afford. It may happen that
in some cases access to evidence that would prove a claim
conclusively is not easy, or not possible at all; or that it is
excessively costly or time-consuming to procure such evidence.
Thus, it is neither realistic nor practical for international
tribunals to insist on receiving proof beyond reasonable doubt,
indiscriminately, in all the cases before them. As stated by
Lauterpacht, "the degree of burden of proof thus to be adduced
ought not to be so stringent as to render the proof unduly
exacting.
As a result of the above considerations, international
tribunals have traditionally often had to be content with a lesser
but more flexible degree of proof, which is often referred to as
the preponderance of evidence. For instance, it was argued by the
American arbitrator in the Pereira—Associates case that "[a]
claimant does not have the burden of proving its claim to an
absolute certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt. It need only
58 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans rFrance v. Norway), ICJ,
Judgment of 6 July 1957, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht,
T.r-.T. RP.ncrts 1957. 39-40, 24_ILR at 797. also P
Yeaaer v. Tha Tslaml^ Rpniihl Ic of Iran. Award No. 342-10199 1 (2
November 1987), Para. 54, reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92, 108,("The Claimant is entitled to appropriate monetary compensation.
The Tribunal determines the amount on the basis of the value o e
goods at the time when the loss occurred, taking into account the
purchase price and the normal rate of depreciation. The burden of
proof in this respect is on the Claimant, but no unreasonable
standards may be applied.")
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establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence,"^'
The preponderance of the evidence, as a standard of proof,
should be applicable from the stage that a prima facie case
provided by the proponent is rebutted by the adversary. In
practice, however, this distinction is not necessarily observed. In
its Award in the Combustion Engineering case. Chamber two of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal found that Claimant had established a
prima facie case that required a response from the Respondents, and
then concluded as follows :
"The Respondents have criticized the sufficiency of the
Claimants' evidence, but they have not rebutted it with
their own contemporaneous evidence.... Weighing all of
these factors, the Tribunal concludes that [Claimant] has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it paid
its SIO contributions."^®
Preponderance of evidence, though meaning generally evidence
greater in weight in comparison with the evidence adduced by the
other party, does not always imply a standard less than that of
conclusive proof. In applying this standard, an international
tribunal should weigh the evidence proffered by both parties, and
William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Islamic Republic of
iJ^an, Award No. 116-1-3 (Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk)
(March 19, 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 230, 231. "The
decision by the Tribunal to reject some portions of Claimant's
claim suggests that the Tribunal placed too heavy a burden on
Claimant to establish its claims. The Claimant introduced more than
sufficient evidence to establish those elements of claims rejected
by the Tribunal. The Tribunal's decisions on these elements, in my
view, are contrary to the weight of the evidence." Ibid.
Combustion Engineering, Inc. , et al. v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, et al., Award No. 506-308-2 ( 18 February 1991), para. 70,
reprinted in 26 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 60, 79-80.
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the facts judicially noted by the tribunal itself, in order to
determine the party in whose favour the more weighty evidence is
available.
Complaints about the standard of proof applied by an
international tribunal are commonly among the grounds adduced in
separate and dissenting opinions of judges or arbitrators. In the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, for instance, American arbitrators have
usually complained that the standard adopted has been too heavy,
and Iranian arbitrators have usually complained that it has been
too light. In Ficherina Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
the American arbitrator criticizes the Tribunal because in his
view, "the Tribunal has either weighed the evidence incorrectly or
has imposed on Claimant an unduly strict standard of proof..." As
another example, in the Sea-Land case" the standard applied by the
Tribunal in some aspects of the case was characterized by the
American arbitrator as "a virtually impossible burden of proof
61 scherina Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award
No. 122-38-1, Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk (18 April
1984), pp. 2-3, reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 374, 375.
62 Sea-Land Service. Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Ports and Shipping Organization, Award No. 135-
33-1, 20 June 1984, p. 33, reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp.
149-175, at 173.
" Op.cit., Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to
Award on the Claims and Concurring as to Dismissal of
Counterclaims, p. 6, reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R, pp. 175 218,
at 178. For more examples see, generally, Systems
Incorporated v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 27-84-3, 4
March 1983, Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, reprinted
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 114-123; and Ultra Systems—Incorporated v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 89-84-3, 7 December 1983,
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3. Discretion of the Tribunal
Notwithstanding the difficulties of specifying the different
degrees of belief which may strike human minds, international
tribunals have not confined themselves strictly to the above-
mentioned standards, i.e., preponderance of evidence and proof
beyond reasonable doubt. To the contrary, whenever necessary, they
have combined them or adopted other standards justifiable under the
circumstances of a. given case.^ As stated by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, "[t]he
standards of proof are less formal in an international legal
proceeding than in a domestic one." "The latter", noted the Court,
"recognize different burdens of proof, depending upon the nature,
character and seriousness of the case.""
Reference in this regard must also be made to Article 53 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice which provides,
inter alia, that in cases where one of the parties does not appear
Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 80-82.
^ See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, Judgment of 2 9 July 19 88, reprinted in
T.Buergenthal, R. Norris and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in
the Americas, p. 255 ("international jurisprudence has recognized
the power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely, although it
has always avoided a rigid rule regarding the amount of proof
necessary to support the judgment.")
" Ibid.
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before the Court, the Court "must ... satisfy itself, not only that
it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also
that the claim is well founded in fact and law." This Article of
the Statute of the Court, although applicable to cases where one of
the parties is absent, implies that this is a kind of standard of
proof which can be applied by the Court in other cases as well.
"Well founded in fact and law" is not, however, a standard of proof
in the sense, that "preponderance of evidence" is. It is rather
comparable to the type of standards of which "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" is an example. Nevertheless, "well founded in
fact and law" could be used as guidance in determining the standard
of proof, as well as in combination with other standards.
What constitutes a given standard of proof to be applied by an
international tribunal is ultimately subject to its sole
discretion. Needless to say, similar to other aspects of
international procedure, the standard applied by a given tribunal
should be adopted with due regard to the generally accepted trends
in the practice of major international tribunals. It is to be
emphasized, however, that there are limits to the freedom of
international tribunals in this regard, and that the standard of
proof to be chosen by international tribunals in each given case
should be appropriate and reasonable under the prevailing
circumstances of that case.
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D. Effects of Difficulties
1. Measures Usually Applied by International Tribunals
The party who carries the burden of proof, though responsible
for discharging that burden, cannot be expected to provide
documents or information which are not at his disposal and to which
he cannot have access. On the other hand, exempting claimants from
proving their allegations on the basis of excuses such as
difficulty in providing proof, apart from being susceptible to
misuse in some instances, may result in injustice to their
adversaries, who would be put under an unjustified burden to prove
that the claims of the proponent, or his excuses for not providing
evidence, are untrue. Thus, it should be interesting to see how
international tribunals have reconciled these two contradictory
concerns in their practice, and whether or not, and to what extent,
in difficult circumstances they have shown flexibility'with respect
to the burden and the standard of proof.
A study of the practice of international tribunals shows that
in cases where a party has genuinely encountered problems beyond
his control in securing evidence, his hardship has somehow been
taken into account. However, as it is hardly conceivable that the
disadvantages resulting from difficulties encountered by either of
the parties in procuring evidence can be completely removed by
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international tribunals, the efforts of international tribunals in
this regard have ben fruitful in only some cases and even there
only to a limited extent.
A further hypothetical limitation may arise in situations
where, due to difficulties in producing evidence, a party is not
even able to convince the tribunal that he is facing problems in
procuring evidence for proving his claims. On the other hand, it is
for the tribunal to decide whether or not a party is genuinely
encountering problems beyond his control in securing evidence. This
is a decision which in some cases may be difficult to make, and may
lead to different opinions by the members of the same tribunal.
For instance, in Sola Tiles Case^^, a claim for damages for
the alleged expropriation of the assets2
of an Iranian corporation, the majority of the Tribunal found that
the claimant was facing difficulties in providing proof, and
concluded as follows:
"While the Claimant must shoulder the burden of proving the
value of the expropriated concern by the best available
evidence, the Tribunal must be prepared to take some account
of the disadvantages suffered by the Claimant, namely its lack
of access to detailed documentation, as an inevitable
consequence of the circumstances in which the expropriation
Sola Tiles. Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Award No. 298-317-1, 22 April 1987, reprinted in 14 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 223-243.
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took place.""
On the other hand, in his Dissenting Opinion (dated 8 March 1988)
to the award, the Iranian arbitrator disagreed with the majority of
the Tribunal who operated on the assumption that the claimant was
in a disadvantageous position with respect to production of
evidence, and therefore could not be expected to submit the best
evidence in support of his claim.®® According to the dissenting
arbitrator,
"the available evidence in the case strongly [indicated]
that the Claimant was entirely capable of submitting
sufficient documentary evidence but intentionally
withheld it — finding it detrimental to his case— on
the pretext that he lacked access to the said evidence."
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One of the measures used by international tribunals, in cases
where production of evidence proves to be extremely difficult, is
to refrain from insisting on direct evidence which is normally
required in order to discharge the burden of proof. For instance,
as is well-known, in the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ allowed the
United Kingdom to rely on indirect evidence as proof of her claims
since the sovereignty of Albania over its territories would make it
67 Para. 5 2 of the Award, ibid at 238.
Dissenting Opinion of Mohsen Mostafavi, 9 March 1988,
reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 243-250 at 246-247.
Ibid, at 247. On the basis of the foregoing he concluded
that "rather than release the Claimant from his obligation to
provide further evidence", the Tribunal should have used "his
withholding of evidence against him." Ibid.
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difficult to provide direct evidence. According to the Court, "the
exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its
frontiers has a bearing on the methods of proof available to
establish the knowledge of that State" as to events occurring in
its territory.™ "By reason of this exclusive control", said the
Court, "the other State, the victim of a breach of international
law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise
to responsibility."^"
In the Rockwell case, as another example, the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal explained a situation which, in its view, justified the
application of a lower standard of proof as follows.
"Prima facie evidence must be recognized as a
satisfactory basis to grant a claim where proof of the
facts underlying the claim presents extreme difficulty
and an inference from the evidence can reasonably be
drawn. This is particularly true where the difficulty of
proof is the result of the respondent's failure to raise
objections in a timely manner and in such a way that the
claimant could adequately establish its Claim. In such a
case, a lower standard of proof is acceptable."
Another measure, not too different from allowing the proponent
to rely on indirect evidence, is to take into account the
proponent's difficulties in obtaining evidence at the stage of
™ Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949: ICJ Reports
1949. p. 18, 16 ILR 157.
Ibid.
"^2 Rockwel] International Svstems. Inc. v. The Government of
The Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 438-430-1 (5 September
1989), paras. 141- 142, reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 150, 188.
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evaluation of the evidence. As stated by the British-Mexican Claims
Commission, "the weighing of outside evidence . . . may be influenced
by the degree to which it was possible to produce proof of a better
quality. "'^9
According to the Commission, "where it is obvious that everything
has been done to collect stronger evidence and where all efforts to
do so have failed, a court can be more easily satisfied than in
cases where no such endeavour seems to have been made."
The practice of international tribunals, on the other hand,
shows that there are two main conditions for applying a more
lenient standard of proof on the basis of the difficulties
encountered by the proponent in securing evidence:
First, It must be noted that, even in cases where as a result
of special circumstances the difficulty of supplying proof has been
obvious, arbitral commissions have been careful not to let this to
"lead to a state of affairs where mere allegations submitted by a
In re Odell. 13 May 1931 (at p. 63), in: 6 ILR 424.
Ibid. It is also interesting to note that nevertheless, in
the case in question, .the Commission concluded that it "cannot
believe that it would have been impracticable to produce at least
some corroboration of the statements of the claimant." Ibid. For an
example of the practice of municipal law in this regard, see, Kiihn
V. Custodian of Enemy Property, Norway, Supreme Court, 8 September
1951, where although the claimant "could not prove that he had
definitely lost his German nationality, partly owing to technical
difficulties in obtaining the relevant documents in Germany after
the end of hostilities", it was held unanimously by the Court "that
the probability that a decree for loss of German nationality had
been issued was so great that the Court could not with safety base
a decision on the assumption that Kiihn on May 9, 1945, was a German
national." 18 ILR 262-3.
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complainant ... may be acceded as prima facie evidence.
Apparently, the basic rule of the burden of proof cannot be
totally ignored even in cases where the proponent is facing
difficulties in producing his evidence. In a case before the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal in which the claimant chose, on the ground of
his alleged concern for the safety of other people, not to provide
the Tribunal with the information which was material for his case,
the Tribunal dismissed the case, finding it necessary to remind him
of "the truism that.a man may have a good case, but if he cannot
prove it, he cannot prevail."^®
Second, it is equally important to note that when the
difficulty in producing evidence arises from the act of the
See Levis and Levis v. Federal Republic of Germany,(Merits), Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in
Germany, Third Chamber (Lagergren, Arndt, Phenix), 9 June 1959, in
2 8 ILR at 523.
Dallal V. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Award No. 53-149-1,
10 June 1983, reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 10, 17. According to
the Tribunal, the claimant's "reticence to provide information
about the character of the transaction cannot be sufficientlyjustified by his alleged concern for the safety of relatives and
business connections in Iran, since it had been quite possible for
him to give further details -e.g. regarding time and money spent by
him for the project- without revealing the identity of his
relatives and business connections." Ibid. The American member of
the Chamber, however, dissenting from the Award, argued that a
different evidentiary approach by the Tribunal would have been
possible because, according to him, the claimant had established
his case and was "under no further burden to explain his dealings
unless the Respondents first put in evidence facts that would
establish a defense." Dissent of Howard M. Holtzmann, 27 July 1983,
Ibid.
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proponent itself, it can not be invoked as an excuse.""
2. Documents in Possession of the Adversary
What should be done where it is established that the
difficulty which the party who carries the burden of proof
encounters in producing evidence arises from the fact that
documents necessary for proving his case are in the possession of
the other party? On the one hand, the burden of proof rests on the
proponent, and it is not for the adverse party to prove the claims
brought against him. On the other hand, collaboration of parties in
matters of evidence is a principle of international procedure.
1
Thus, based on the distinct circumstances of the cases before them,
different solutions have been applied by international tribunals in
this regard. But it is important to note that whenever faced with
such situations, international tribunals have usually refrained
from getting involved in such issues in the first place unless this
is absolutely necessary and, in any event, have endeavoured to
avoid basing their awards and judgments on the consequences
resulting from such difficulties.
In cases where the documents in question are alleged to be in
^ See, e.g., Mary Ann Turner Case, Mexico-U.S.A. General
Claims Commission, 23 July 1927, where the plea of Mexico as to the
impossibility of producing certain records because they were
destroyed by American naval forces failed, since on the basis of
the documents before it, the Commission held that the records in
question "apparently had been mislaid or destroyed by Mexican
officials." 4 ILR 483.
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the possession of the adversary, but no proof to that effect is
provided, international tribunals have on that account usually-
shown no flexibility with regard to the standard of proof, and have
rejected the claim. An extreme measure was suggested by some
claimants in cases before the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal, to the
effect that the difficulty faced by the proponent in producing
evidence should shift the burden of evidence as well as the burden
of proof to the other party, which might be in a better position to
provide the desired documents and information. In the George
Edwards Case, for instance, the claimant alleged that he had left
behind in Iran almost all of his business records, and suggested
that "the Respondents are subject to inferences being drawn against
them if they fail to offer proof in rebuttal of the Claimant's
assertions. However, although it conceded that it was "mindful
of the difficulties faced by the Claimant in producing evidence",
the Tribunal held that "where there is no evidence that the
Respondent came into actual possession of the document in question,
the Tribunal cannot shift the burden of proof in this fashion. II79
George Edwards and The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, et al.. Award No. 451-251-2, 5 December 1989, at para. 11,
reprinted in 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 290, at 293.
Ibid. See also H. A. Spalding, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and
Transport. Award No. 212-437-3 (24 Feb. 1986), reprinted in 10
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 22, at 31 ("Both Mr. Kashani and Mr. Spalding
allege that all of the records that were kept in Tehran are now in
the custody and control of the Iranian Government,.... Although it
might be reasonable to assume Iranian Custody and control of
documents of a company of which Iran assumed control following the
Iranian Revolution, that is not a natural assumption in the case of
an individual operating apparently alone as to whom there is no
allegation that his business was expropriated. Therefore even
though Claimant's Tehran records are no longer available to
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Occasionally, under special circumstances, where it is clear
that the proponent is not able to provide a particular piece of
evidence or information because it is obviously being held by the
other party, the proponent has been exempted from providing that
particular evidence or information. But such incidents are not so
common as to be relied upon as a general rule. For instance, in the
Lighthouse Arbitration between France and Greece it was held that
the claim must succeed, despite the paucity of evidence.
According to the Tribunal, under the circumstances of the case, "it
would be unreasonable, and contrary to law, to require of the firm
strict proof of the amounts which it lost under this head; it is
rather for the Greek Government to provide now the necessary
information.
In some instances, international tribunals have drawn a
negative inference against a party for non-production of evidence.
A detailed examination of this measure is provided in Chapter VII
of the present study and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to
say that occasions when international tribunals draw negative
inferences in this regard are normally limited to circumstances
where a party has failed, without justification, to produce into
Claimant it does not follow that they are available to Respondents
and that inferences therefore may be drawn against them").
Claim No. 6,- Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2 4 July 19.56,
2 3 ILR 677.
Ibid. 678.
411
evidence the documents proved to be in his sole possession and
required by the tribunal/^
3, Voluminous, Time—Consuming' and Costly Evidence
A different aspect of the problems arising from hardship in
production of evidence has been manifested in the arbitral
proceedings in cases before the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal,
especially with respect to that provision of its constituent
instrument, i.e., the Claims Settlement Declaration, which requires
that claimants should be "nationals of United States"'^ (as defined
in the said instrument)
For more details in this regard s^ Chapter VII, supra.
83 See Article II, para. 1 of the Claims Settlement
Declaration, 19 January 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 9.
Article VII of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides,
inter alia, as follows:
"1. A 'national' of Iran or of the United States, as the case may
be, means (a) a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or the
United States; and (b) a corporation or other legal entity which is
organized under the laws of, Iran or the United States or any of its
states or territories, the-District, of Columbia or the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, if,' collectively, natural persons who are citizens
of such country hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such
corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its
capital stock.
2. 'Claims of nationals' of Iran or the United States, as the case
may be, means claims owned continuously, from the date on which the
claim arose to the date on which this Agreement enters into force,
by nationals of that state, including claims that are owned
indirectly by such nationals through ownership of capital stock or
other proprietary interests in juridical persons, provided that the
ownership interests of such nationals, collectively, were
sufficient at the time the claim arose to control the corporation
or other entity...."Ibid 11.
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At an early stage of the work of the Tribunal, the wide
difference of opinion between the parties in the Flexi-Van case, as
to how much and what type of evidence should be provided by the
claimant corporation for the purpose of proving its nationality,
led Chamber One of the Tribunal, which had been requested by the
parties to rule on the question, to issue an evidentiary Order in
this regard.®^ The guidelines laid down by the Tribunal in this
Order, and amplified later in the General Motors case^®, served
later as a model in many other cases in which publicly held
corporations had to prove, inter alia, that more than 50 per cent
of their shares belonged to American natural persons, and that they
had continuously owned the claim from the time it arose until 19
January 1981, when the Algiers Declarations were concluded.
Finding the method proposed by the respondent too difficult to
apply to a company with millions of shares and numerous
shareholders, the Tribunal stated that:
"In these circumstances, it must be recognized that it is
neither possible nor necessary to require submission, as
the Respondent proposes, of detailed evidence such as
either passports,"birth certificates or certified copies
of naturalization documents for each of the thousands of
individuals who collectively own, directly or indirectly,
more than 50% of the capital stock of Flexi-Van
See Order of 15 December 1982, Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 36, Chamber One,reprinted in
1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 455.
See General Motors Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Case No. 94, Chamber One, Order of 21 January 1983, reprinted in 3
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 1.
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Corporation.
As another particular difficulty arising from requiring
"submission of voluminous lists of the names and addresses of all
shareholders", the Tribunal referred to the fact that "the identity
of shareholders of United States publicly-traded corporations is
safeguarded to protect confidentiality."^* The Tribunal then set
out the excessive burden that respondent's proposals would impose
on the parties and the Tribunal, as follows:
"The burden on the Claimant would be to attempt to gather
such evidence, much of which is not in its possession;
the burden on the Respondent"would be to review it; and
the burden on the Tribunal would be to receive and
evaluate it. It is not possible for the Tribunal to
estimate the amount of time which would be needed by the
parties and itself to accomplish such tasks,
likely that any such requirement would significantly
delay the arbitral proceedings in this and many other
Cases."®'
Relying on the practice of the Mexican—United States General
Claims Commission and the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States, the Tribunal noted that when faced with similar
problems in the past, other tribunals "have required what they
considered to be sufficient evidence and from that have drawn
reasonable inferences."®® Finally, the Tribunal concluded as
follows:
Flexi-Van Case, Order of 15 December 1982, 1 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 457.
Ibid.
Ibid.
'0 Ibid.
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"The type of evidence to be submitted by a Claimant
depends on the circumstances of each particular case, as
viewed by the Chamber. In this case, the evidence
described below will, Prima facie. be considered
sufficient as to corporate nationality.... Respondent
will be free to offer rebuttal evidence. From the
totality of such evidence the Chamber will draw
reasonable inferences and reach conclusions as to whether
the Claimant was, or was not, a national of the United
States . . . . "
It is to be noted that the Tribunal invoked two important
grounds in justification of its decision in this regard: principles
of international law, and its own Rules.Nevertheless, the Flexi-
Van Order was severely criticized by the Iranian Member of the
Chamber, who felt strongly that the Tribunal had acted contrary to •
the well-established rule regarding the burden of proof, i.e.,
actori incumbit onus probandi." It is equally important to note
that the relatively flexible approach adopted by the Tribunal in
its guidelines for proof of the nationality of publicly held
corporations in the Flexi-Van and General Motors cases were not
extended to other related issues such as the question of the amount
of proof required to establish that a corporation is wholly owned
by another corporation. With respect to those issues, the Tribunal
91 Ibid 458.
"It is within the power of the Chamber to do this based on
accepted principles of international law and also upon the
provisionally Adopted Tribunal Rules which state that:
The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence
offered.
Article 25, paragraph 6." Ibid
See Dissenting Opinion of Member Mahmoud M. Kashani
Regarding Order of 15 December 1982, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 463-482, at 464.
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rightly refused to accept the "indirect and uncertain indications"
permitted in the Flexi-Van Order, in lieu of conclusive evidence
available to claimants.
4. Difficulty Arising from the Absence of a Party
The difficulties referred to above are the ones faced mainly
by the parties in their production of evidence. Another type of
difficulty in determining and applying the standard of proof, with
which international 'tribunals, rather than the parties,
increasingly have to deal, arises from the absence of one of the
parties to the proceedings. The importance of the presence and
participation of parties in determining the disputed facts in an
international arbitral or judicial proceeding is obvious and the
difficulties arising from non-appearance of a party have been
emphasized by international tribunals as well.'^
In spite of these difficulties, however, the standard of proof
is not to be affected in such cases; i.e., the absent party should
neither benefit nor be prejudiced, as far as the standard of proof
9'* See International Ore & Fertilizer Corporation, Interore
Corporation of Saudi Arabia, et al. v. Razi Chemical Company Ltd.,
Award No. 351-486-3 (29 February 1988), reprinted in 18 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 98.
See, e.g.. Military and Paramilitarv Activities in and
against Nicaragua fNicaraqua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment of 27 June 1986, Paras 57, 59, I.C.J.Reports 1986, PP. 38-
40 .
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is concerned, by mere reason of his absence. The issue has been
specifically addressed by Article 53 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice which provides, inter alia. that in
cases where one of the parties does not appear before the Court,
before deciding in favour of the claim of the other party, the
Court "must ... satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction
in accordance with Articles 3 6 and 37, but also that the claim is
well founded in fact and law." As was stated by the Court in the
Nicaragua case, "[t]he use of the term 'satisfy itself in the
English text of the Statute (and in the French text the term
's'assurer') implies that the Court must attain the same degree of
certainty as in any other case that the claim of the party
appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the nature of the case
permits, that the facts on which it is based are supported by
convincing evidence."®^
On the other hand, the obligation so imposed on the Court by
paragraph 2 of Article 53 of its Statute has affected the
meaningful application of the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same
Article, which provides that in cases where "one of the parties
does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the
other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its
claim". As stated by Verhoeven "[s]ous le pretexte de respecter son
§ 2, c'est pratiquement le § 1 de 1'article qu'abondonne sa
jurisprudence, le droit du demandeur d'obtenir que ses conclusions
96 Ibid, para. 29, I.C.J. Reports 1986. P. 24.
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lui soient adjugees etant, a 1'experience, parfaitement
theorique.
In international commercial arbitrations, too, the absence of
one party does not affect the standard of proof. In the Liamco
case, for instance, in spite of the fact that the arbitration
proceeded in default of the respondent, the sole arbitrator based
his Award "only upon such facts as were satisfactorily proved by
the Plaintiff."-!93
Joe Verhoeven, Le Droit. Le Judge et La Violence, Les Arrets
Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis, Revue General de Droit. International
Public, No. 4 (1987), P. 1196.
Libyan American Oil Company fLiamco') v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, Mahmassani, Sole Arbitrator, 12 April 1977,
in 62 ILR at 181.
I. The Concept
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of the "burden of proof" in international
procedure is nearer to that of civil law countries, where the term
is used solely to refer to the duty of the parties to a proceeding
to prove their allegations, than to that of common law countries.
The particular procedure under Anglo-American rules of evidence,
called also "burden of proof", according to which the judge rules
on the sufficiency of evidence at an early stage of the
proceedings, is neither known nor applied in international
procedure. It is to be. emphasized, however, that the concept of
"burden of proof" carries its own particular meaning in the context
of international law. Flexibility and generality of international
procedure, the vast authority of international tribunals in
determining the value of evidence, and the discretion of
international tribunals in determining the satisfactory standard of
proof, are among the criteria that distinguish the international
procedure, including the rules of burden of proof, from municipal
procedures.
Of the many legal principles which might be invoked as
underlying the application of the concept of the burden of proof,
most apply in municipal law as well. These include: the principle
of impartiality of the adjudicating body, the principle of private
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application, and the principle of party control over the
proceedings. The simple rule of logic that a disputed claim cannot
be accepted without proof, however, removes the need to seek other
foundations for application of the concept.
A distinction should be made between the burden of evidence
and the burden of proof. The burden of proof is discharged by means
of presentation of pleadings and evidence. Yet, the burden of
evidence is a distinct concept, whose satisfaction does • not
necessarily discharge the burden of proof. Usually, some provisions
of the rules of international tribunals are devoted to regulating
the presentation of evidence by the parties. As stated by the
International Court of Justice, these provisions "are designed to
secure a proper administration of justice, and a fair and equal
opportunity for each party to comment on its opponent's
contentions.
Pleadings and evidence are two general means of discharging
the burden of proof. While the unsupported statements of parties
cannot be accepted as evidence, pleadings as a whole are not to be
ignored in determining whether a party has been able to discharge
the burden of proof. Accordingly, the burden of proof should be
defined, without differentiating between evidence and pleadings, as
the obligation of parties to prove their claims and defenses to the
' Nicaragua v. United States of America. Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, Para. 31, I.C.J.Reports 1986. P. 26.
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satisfaction of the relevant tribunal.
The principle of nura novit curia applies to some extent in
international procedure. Thus, like municipal law, the scope of the
burden of proof is usually limited to issues of fact, and the law
need not be proved before international tribunals. An international
tribunal is deemed to take judicial notice of international law.
However, there are some exceptions. "Municipal law" has to be
proved by the party relying on such a law in an international
proceeding. Within the domain of international customary law too,
the principle of iura novit curia is not fully operative. It is the
duty of international tribunals to know general or international
customs. When a party relies on an alleged "local custom", on the
other hand, the existence of that custom has to be proved. Further
limitations may be applicable before international arbitral
tribunals depending on the circumstances of each tribunal.
The applicability of -iura novit curia in international
procedure, on the other hand, does not stop the parties from
discussing issues of law or expressing their positions in that
respect. Nor is it an obstacle for international tribunals to take
account, when appropriate, of the views and positions of the
parties. International tribunals, however, are not normally
entitled to dismiss a case on the ground that the issues of law
have not been proved by the parties.
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2. The Duty of Claimant
In each litigated case three main actors are actively
involved: claimant, respondent and the judge or arbitrator who is
to decide the case. Each of these actors plays a particular role
with respect to the burden of proof, and it is the aggregate effect
of their roles altogether that eventually determines whether or not
the burden of proof has been met in a given case. Accordingly, the
main aspects of the burden of proof include the roles played by
those three actors.
Onus probandi actori incumbit. This is the basic rule of the
burden of proof. According to this rule, the party who makes
allegations regarding a disputed fact or issue bears the burden of
proving such fact or issue. This rule places the brunt of the
burden of proof on claimant. This is a principle which is generally
recognized and accepted in different legal systems and in
international law. There are, of course, differences between
international law and municipal laws of different countries. For
instance, in municipal law the burden of proof should usually be
discharged in accordance with the law and through the means
prescribed by the law. Or, the method of interpreting the rule may
be different, from country to country and from court to court. But
such differences do not alter the fact that they all have one point
in common, namely that the burden of proof falls on the party
alleging a disputed fact. The basic rule of the burden of proof.
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i.e., the duty of claimant to discharge the burden of proof, has
been applied by different international tribunals. The same rule
applies with respect to negative propositions, so that the party
alleging a negative fact bears the burden of proving it.
In fact, in spite of dramatic changes and developments in the
way of life and their impact on international relations, the old
Roman adage incumhit tprobatio still holds as the magic word
to start with, in considering the practice of both municipal and
international fora concerning the burden of proof. It should be
emphasized, however, that the applicability of the rule stems from
the flexibility built into it by the interpretation of the term
"actor" as signifying not only the party who sets the wheels of the
proceedings in motion, but equally the party who claims a fact.
Indeed, this is a main difference between the concept of the burden
of proof today and that of Roman times.
Saying that each party to a proceeding should- prove what he
claims might seem to be a mere statement of the obvious. But there
are cases in which it is difficult to determine who is claimant
with respect to each issue, and what has been claimed. In these
instances the rule provides a valuable guideline, on the basis of
which different situations may be decided. It is to be noted, on
the other hand, that the application of the rule is not always free
of complications, and there are instances in which the allocation
of the burden of proof between parties becomes a major point of
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contention in an international litigation.
The basic rule of the burden of proof may be stated
differently, as is usually done in civil law countries; that is,
the party who claims to the contrary of an existing or acquired
situation which is in favour of the other party bears the burden of
proof. In some countries the notion of burden of proof stems from
another general principle, according to which everybody is presumed
to be free of liability until proved otherwise. Thus, each party
should prove the facts and contentions which it puts forward, and
there is no difference between claimant and respondent in that
regard.
3. Effects of Presumptions
The party who carries the burden of proof is not obliged to
discharge his burden solely by providing direct evidence. In
international procedure, indirect evidence may also be admitted
insofar as it leads to reliable and reasonable conclusions
compatible with the facts. Thus, both legal presumptions and
judicial presumptions (or inferences) have been applied in
international procedure.
However, a distinction should be made between legal
presumptions in international procedure and in municipal law. In
international procedure general principles of law constitute the
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main source of presumptions, whereas in municipal law, the law of
the land is the source of the probative value of presumptions,
consequently, it is obligatory in municipal law to attach to
certain presumptions the specific probative weight envisaged by the
law, but the situation is not the same in international law.
Moreover, in international procedure the existence of the legal
presumption on which a party relies should be proved.
The rule actori incumbit probatio is affected by the operation
of presumptions in the sense that, in the process of evaluating of
evidence, the tribunal takes account of any presumptions applicable
in favour of the party which carries the burden of proof and not
refuted by the other party.
Generally speaking, presumptions affect the burden of proof
insofar as they create prima facia evidence or proof in favour of
the party who benefits from it. Presumptions relieve the party to
whose benefit a presumption exists from the duty of providing proof
for the presumed fact at the initial stage, and thus affect the
burden of evidence as well. In international procedure,
presumptions are not immune to defenses that may establish the
opposite of the presumed facts.
Thus, presumptions do not reverse the burden of proof on a
given issue. Rather, they relieve the party to whose benefit a
presumption exists from initiating proof, by creating prima facie
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evidence in its favour. That situation, however, may per se have
the effect of reversing the burden of proof on occasions where
there is no evidence against the presumption in question, since
this may lead to a ruling in favour of the proponent.
As regards inferences, on the other hand, their effect is not
different from that of other types of evidence. In cases where an
international tribunal determines that the probative value of
certain inferences is conclusive, their effect on the burden of
proof-would be similar to that of direct evidence, and they would
not display any particular distinguishing feature.
4. The Role of Respondent
The broad basic rule of the burden of proof, according to
which each party has to prove its own claim or defence, is not the
only rule to be applied with respect to the burden of proof in
international procedure. The idea of peaceful settlement of
disputes before international tribunals is largely based on the
notion of co-operation of the litigant parties in different aspects
of the proceedings, including the administration of proof.
The supreme aim of international proceedings is indeed to
preserve peace by establishing justice and truth. Thus, while the
party who initiates a proceeding bears the burden of proving his
claim, the other party has certain duties as well. The adversary is
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expected to co-operate, to an extent, with claimant in order to
discover the truth. This rule complements the rule acton incumbit
Erobatio, and as in the case of the latter rule, both parties can
benefit from it with respect to their claims and defenses.
The duty of parties to co-operate in placing material evidence
before international tribunals is emphasized, inter alia, in the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Rules prepared by the
International Law Commission. This duty has also been reflected in
the decisions of international tribunals. Some commentators have
cynically expressed doubts about the extent of the applicability of
this rule in international proceedings. While in each case the
extent of application of rules depends on the circumstances of the
case and its nature, etc., a study of cases before different
international tribunals shows that in many instances, if not
always, the rule has been adhered to by the litigating States.
It is to be emphasized, however, that it is not the objective
of the rule to relieve claimant of his duty to meet the burden of
proof. The respondent's duty of collaboration does not commence
until such time that claimant presents the documents at his own
disposal. The rule of collaboration is not to be imposed on a party
unnecessarily. If claimant is able to prove its case without any
assistance from respondent, it should do so. Further, the duty of
collaboration does not engage an obligation on the respondent's
part, to respond to a request for discovery in its American law
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sense.
The duty of parties to co-operate in good faith in matters of
evidence does not shift the burden of proof, as it is not the
purpose of the rule to relieve claimant of his obligation to prove
his claims. It is only after the claimant has apparently done his
best and all in his power to secure evidence, and has actually
produced some prima facie evidence in support of his case, that the
duty of respondent to produce the evidence exclusively in his
possession commences.
An obvious weakness of the rule is that its application
largely depends on the respondent's participation in the
proceedings. One of the consequences of the respondent's failure to
appear before an international tribunal would be that the
collaboration rule becomes largely inapplicable. At the same time
the major problem in that regard is that international tribunals do
not have any specific sanctions at their disposal by which to force
an unwilling party to produce information and documents, even if
that party is taking part in the proceedings.
Nevertheless, the lack of specific measures by which to force
the parties to collaborate does not affect the credibility of the
collaboration rule as a general rule of international procedure. In
the realm of international law, not all rules are supported by
specific sanctions such as those provided for under the complicated
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and technical rules of evidence of municipal law. Nor, on the other
hand, would all States refuse to observe a rule of international
procedure simply because there are no sanctions against such a
refusal.
5. Sanctions for Non-Production of Evidence
The practice of international tribunals shows that States have
generally co-operated in placing the material evidence before the
relevant tribunal. The fact that the rules of procedure of
international tribunals do not usually express this rule in rigid
forms, or provide specific sanctions for violation thereof,
conforms to the nature of the rule. As a task to be fulfilled in
good faith, either the rule will be complied with willingly or else
it will not be possible to force it upon States at all.
Consequently, international tribunals have shown much tolerance and
flexibility in applying this rule, and in dealing with instances of
non-conformity to it.
On the other hand, as international tribunals are usually
unable to 'compel the production of evidence, under some
circumstances they have drawn an adverse inference against a party
withholding evidence from the tribunal. This approach, however, has
been favoured more by mixed claims commissions than by
international tribunals dealing solely with the claims of States in
their own rights. It should also be emphasized that "collaboration
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of parties" is a rule whose purpose is to enable the tribunal to
base its decision on as much evidence as possible. Thus, applying
sanctions such as taking note of a party's failure to provide
documents, or drawing reasonable adverse inferences therefrom, is
not the main objective. Rather, these measures may be more useful
for international tribunals as a threat in order to encourage the
parties to provide more information and documents, than as
sanctions per se. Under the circumstances of a given case, drawing
adverse inferences may not be possible at all, or may lead to
contradictory results. Providing the tribunal with all the evidence
at the disposal of both parties, on the other hand, would make it
possible for the tribunal to decide the case on the basis of facts
rather than inferences. Thus, international tribunals endeavour to
encourage the parties to provide evidence willingly, and would
resort to measures such as making adverse inferences against a
party only as a last resort and under special circumstances.
6. Authority and Duties of International Tribunals
The judge or arbitrator in an international proceeding must be
impartial, and he is thus prohibited from providing evidence in
favour of or against either of the parties. They are however
usually vested with a considerable authority to investigate,
proprio motu, the facts at issue. This authority of international
tribunals affects the burden of proof, because, as an inevitable
consequence of the application of the fact-finding power of the
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tribunal, the party who carries the burden of proof may find his
task either easier or more difficult, as the case may be.
The authority of international tribunals with respect to the
burden of proof includes the authority to schedule the production
of pleadings and evidence by the parties, and the authority to
accept or refuse further pleadings and evidence. The fact-finding
power of international tribunals could be applied through numerous
measures. The most comprehensive among these measures is the power
to ask the parties, in the course of both the written and oral
phases of the proceedings, to furnish relevant documents and
information at their disposal.
International tribunals are also empowered to examine the
witnesses and ask them general or specific questions. They also
have the power to determine what kind of persons qualify as
witnesses, and who could be heard as a witness and who not.
Naturally, they have to determine the proper weight to be given to
the statements of each witness under the circumstances of a given
case. Such is also the case for expert witnesses, whose presence is
increasingly becoming a feature of international proceedings.
Descente 1es lieux or visit to the place is another
measure available to international tribunals for their proprio motu
investigations. It is more common, however, to refer the technical
issues of a case to independent experts appointed by the tribunal.
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In some instances, international tribunals are empowered to make
inquiries from third parties not involved in the case. This measure
may provide some additional information regarding the facts at
issue, and may also affect the determination of the burden of
proof. "Judicial notice" is another measure available to
international tribunals, through which they take notice of some of
the facts that need not be proved in a proceeding, thereby
providing valuable assistance to the party who carries the burden
of proof.
More important, however, in deciding whether or not a party
has been able to satisfy the burden of proof, international
tribunals have the authority to determine which party carries the
burden of proof. This is an inherent authority which is necessary
for the functioning of the tribunal and the process of evaluating
of evidence.
Another important area where international tribunals enjoy
authority is the "admissibility and evaluation of evidence". The
fact that international tribunals are free from technical rules of
evidence applied in municipal law provides them with a wide
authority in determining the admissibility of evidence.
International tribunals have applied this power flexibly and have
found it justified to receive every type and form of evidence, but
to attache to each such kind of evidence the probative value it
deserves under the circumstances of a given case. Thus, absent an
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agreement of the parties to the contrary, there is usually no
ground for excluding a particular type of evidence. Consequently,
"evidence" has found a more extended sense in international
procedure than what it usually denotes in municipal law.
The general rule of admissibility of evidence before
international tribunals relieves the party who submits the evidence
from proving its admissibility, thereby placing the burden of proof
on the party challenging the admissibility of evidence to prove on
specific grounds that it is not admissible.
Nevertheless, there are instances in which international
tribunals have exceptionally refrained from accepting evidence
submitted by the parties. Late filed evidence is one ground for
such refusal; occasionally, international tribunals have refused to
take account of the evidence on the ground that it has been filed
late in the proceedings, at a stage where either it is prejudicial
to the fundamental principle of equality of the parties, or it has
been produced in order to cause an undue delay in the proceeding.
Evidence and information obtained through settlement
negotiations is usually not to be used in any pending or future
litigation. Thus, under some circumstances this may provide a
ground for inadmissibility of evidence before international
tribunals.
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Evidence which could be characterized as time-barred, such as
evidence of facts occurring after the close of the proceedings, may
also be inadmissible under special circumstances. It is also
arguable whether or not evidence obtained by or through violation
of international law is admissible.
Freedom of international tribunals in admission of evidence
does not imply that all evidence produced by the parties or
obtained by the tribunal proprio motu shall have the same weight.
International tribunals are free to determine the probative value
to be given to each piece of evidence available to them. This power
provides them, with considerable discretion with respect to the
value to be attached to the statements of the witnesses, expert
witnesses, independent experts, and the interested parties
themselves, including Sovereigns and the assertions of their
officials.
7. Standard of Proof
Further, an international tribunal both enjoys an authority
and is under an obligation to decide the proper standard of proof
to be applied in a case or cases before it. The evidence in favour
of the position of a party is weighed against what is considered by
the Tribunal as the standard of proof, in order to determine
whether or not the burden of proof on that issue has been satisfied
by the contending party. The standard of proof is a subjective and
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discretionary measure, subject to human judgment.
Under some circumstances international tribunals have applied
the measure of "prima facie evidence" as constituting an acceptable
standard of proof. But prima facie evidence, being defined as
evidence which if not contradicted is sufficient to create a
reasonable belief as to the truthfulness of the claim, cannot
always be applied as the proper standard of proof. In fact, here
too, it is the privilege of an international tribunal to decide
whether or not, and in which cases, to accept prima facie evidence
as a standard of proof. The issue of jurisdiction of international
tribunals, however, may be regarded as an exception, since usually
it cannot be established by prima facie, evidence alone, stronger
proof being needed.
"Proof beyond reasonable doubt", although a high standard, has
occasionally been applied by international tribunals under special
circumstances. While this standard has been favoured more by courts
and commissions dealing with humanitarian issues, other
international tribunals, too, have applied it whenever appropriate.
The most common standard applied by international tribunals,
however, is the "preponderance of evidence", which generally means
evidence greater in weight than that adduced by the other party.
Yet it must be emphasized that what constitutes a given
standard of proof is ultimately subject to the sole discretion of
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the international tribunal seised of a given case. To some extent,
international tribunals take account of the extraordinary
difficulties which may be encountered by a party in proving his
contentions. They might do so either by allowing the contending
party to rely on indirect evidence, accepting a lower standard of
proof such as prima facie evidence, or taking the proponent's
difficulties in obtaining evidence into account at the stage of
evaluation of the evidence. However, under no circumstances can
mere allegations be accepted as proof, and no account can be taken
of self-imposed difficulties.
8. General Rules of The Burden of Proof
As was discussed in Chapters II to IV, the general aspects of
the burden of proof are related to three principal actors of every
judicial or arbitral, proceeding, i.e., the claimant, respondent,
and tribunal. On that basis three general rules, each reflecting
the impact of one of the three actors, could be identified in
international procedure, as follows :
a. The rule of actori incumbit probatio is the broad basic
rule of the burden of proof according to which each party, apart
from its procedural position as claimant or respondent, has to
prove its claims and contentions. This rule applies generally in
both municipal and international fora. At times, arguments have
been raised against the applicability of the basic rule of the
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burden of proof as constituting a general rule of international
procedure. These arguments, which rely on issues such as the
difficulty of distinction between claimant and respondent in an
international procedure, simultaneous submission of pleadings by
the parties and the non-technical nature of the rules of evidence
in international procedures, are mostly based on the arguments put
forth in some decisions of the Mexico-U.S.A. General Claims
commission of 1923, and more particularly in the Parker case.
A study of the practice of international tribunals reveals,
however, that the above and other similar arguments are not well-
founded insofar as they concern the burden of proof, and that they
have not impeded the application of the broad basic rule as to the
allocation of the burden of proof. Further, a close study of the
Parker case shows that the Commission itself did not deny the
existence and applicability of the rule actori incumbit probatio in
international procedure. The preliminary opposite impression one
might get from a reading of the decision in the Parker case arises
from the lack of precision in the terminology used therein for the
burden of proof. The fact that the Commission relied upon the other
rule of the burden of proof in international procedure, namely, the
rule of collaboration of parties, does not imply that the principle
of nnu<. r^robanHi .r-t-or-i incumbit is not applicable in international
procedure.
b. The second general rule of the burden of proof in
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international procedure concerns the duty of parties to co-operate
in placing before the related tribunal the facts relevant to the
disputed issues. This obligation stems from the idea of the
peaceful settlement of disputes in international law, and the
objective of enabling international tribunals to base their
decisions on as many facts and as much information in the case as
possible.
As a general rule of international procedure, this rule has
been adhered to by States and has been supported by legal writers.
As a supplement to the rule actori incumbit probatio. which
emphasizes the claimant's role, the rule of collaboration of
parties emphasizes the respondent's obligation to produce documents
in an international procedure.
c. The third general rule of the burden of proof, which
reflects the role of international tribunals in that respect, is
the authority of international tribunals in matters related to
evidence. The fact-finding authority of international tribunals and
their power to determine which party carries the burden of proof,
and also their discretion and freedom in admitting, weighing and
evaluating evidence is a settled rule of international procedure.
While the scope and limits of the authority of international
tribunals in that respect may be subject to differences of opinion,
the concept itself and its impact on the burden of proof cannot be
challenged.
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d. As previously discussed, with respect to the burden of
proof in international procedure, three general rules could be
identified: the rule of actori Incumbit probatio. the rule of
collaboration of parties in production of evidence, and the
authority of international tribunals in matters of evidence. It is
to be emphasized, however, that none of the three general rules of
the burden of proof alone suffices for a determination of whether
the burden of proof in. a given case has been discharged by the
party who carries it. In fact it is necessary that the three
general rules be applied together in every proceeding. None of the
three general rules of the burden of proof is of such a nature that
application of one would necessarily alleviate the need to resort
to the others.
This is, in fact, a further characteristic of the concept of
burden of proof in international procedure. Generally speaking,
while in international procedure the main actors with regard to
burden of proof are the same as municipal law, and the same formula
applies in both, the nuances are different. Consequently, since the
rule of collaboration applies forcefully, the duty of the party who
carries the burden of proof in international procedure is
altogether easier than in some municipal laws. General lack of
"discovery" in international law, on the other hand, makes the duty
of the claimant sometimes more difficult. The fact that decisions
of international tribunals are normally final and there is no
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recourse to appeals, gives more prominence to the role of
international tribunals with respect to the issue of the burden of
proof, and may affect the approach of the judge or arbitrator in
that regard.
Accordingly, if one has to choose only one rule with respect
to the burden of proof in international procedure, it must be the
rule which results from the application of the three above-
mentioned general rules, each to the extent necessary, in an
international proceeding. The proper application of this overriding
principle is the main duty of international tribunals, which must
find the appropriate solution for each given case on the basis of
the facts and in conformity with justice, and it is a measure on
which basis their efficiency could be judged.
The supreme aim of international proceedings, in spite of the
fact that the outcome of the proceedings in some cases might seem
unjust, is indeed the preservation of peace through establishing
justice and truth. Thus, it is the duty of international tribunals
to exercise a balance with regard to the issue of burden of proof,
and to lead the proceedings in such a way that while neither of the
parties is placed under the impression that it is proving the
positions of the other party, their co-operation as well as the
tribunal's role is carried on smoothly and to the benefit of
justice and truth.
440
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. GENERAL SOURCES
International Court of Justice; Reports of Judgments, Advisory
Opinions and Orders fl.C.J. ReportsK 1947-1990.
PCIJ, Series A, Collection of Judgments; Nos. 1-2 4.
PCIJ, series B, Collection of Advisory Opinions; Nos. 1-18.
PCIJ, series A/B, Judgments, Orders and Advisory Opinions; Nos. 40-
80.
Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIMl/ 19 vols, New York,
United Nations.
International Law Reports (ILR) , 1932 to date, _83_vols, Lauterpacht
(ed.), Cambridge, Grotius Publications Limited.
Iran- U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports fIran-U.S. C.T.R.), 1981-1991,
26 vols, London, Grotius Publications Limited.
2. BOOKS, ARTICLES AND REPORTS
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed.
1990).
Brownlie, Ian., (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law. 2nd
ed., (1972)
Buergenthal, T., R. Norris, and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights
in the Americas.
Cappelletti, Mauro and Bryant G. Garth, Introduction - Policies,
Trends and Ideas in Civil Procedure. in International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI, Ch. 6.
Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals, London, (1953), reprinted in 1987,
Grotius Publications.
Cleary, Edward W. and J.W. Strong, Evidence; Cases, Materials,
Problems, 3rd ed., (1981).
Collection of Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1328-1342, vol. 2,
Keyhan Legal Archive, Tehran 13 53 (in Persian).
Compernolle, J. Van, Arbitrage dans les Relations Commerciales
Internationales; Questions de Procedure. Revue de Droit
International et de Droit Compare (Institut Beige de Droit
441
Compare), No. 2 (1989).
Cour International de Justice, Actes et Documents Relatif—a
Organisation de la Cour, No. 4, (1978).
Cross & Wilkins, Outline of the Law of Evidence, 5th ed., London
1980.
Cross, Sir Rupert, Cross on Evidence, 5th ed., London 1979.
Dalloz: ReTPertoire de procedure civil.
Dalloz; Repertoire de Droit International, Tome II, Paris 1969,
David, Rene & John E.G. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World
Today, 2nd. ed. (1978).
Delvolve, Jean-Louis, Arbitration in France.
Denning, Lord A.T., Presumptions and Burdens, in; 61 Law Quarterly
Review, London 1945.
Dieryck, Christian, Procedure et Movens de Preuve dans 1^Arbitrage
Commercial International, Revue de 1'Arbitrage, No. 2 (1988).
Doehring, Karl, Mavrommatis Concessions cases, in: Bernhardt (ed.),
Encyclopedia of public International Law [Instalment 2
(1981)].
Dolzer, Rudolf, Mixed Claims Commissions in: Bernhardt (ed.).
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [Instalment 1
(1981)].
Feller, A.H., The Mexican Claims Commissions 1923-1934 (New York,
1935) .
Fitzmaurice, Gerald, II The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice(1986).
General Assembly Resolution, Doc. A/CN.4/113, 6 March 1958.
Herzog, Peter and Martha Weser, Civil Procedure in France (The
Hague 1967)
Heydon, J.D., Cases and Materials on Evidence, London 1975.
History of European Civil Procedure,, International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law, vol. xvi, Ch. 2.
Holtzmann, Howard M. and Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, The Hague
(1989) .
442
Hudson, M., The Permanent Court of International Justice (1943).
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI,
Ch. 1, Ch. 6 and Ch.7.
Jafari Langaroudi, M.J., Encyclopedia of Islamic Judicial Sciences,
Tehran (1981), (in Persian).
Jafari Langaroudi, M.J., Islamic Law, Tehran (1979), (in Persian).
James, F. and G.C. Hazard, Civil Procedure, 2nd ed., Toronto 1977.
Kaplan, Benjamin and Kevin M. Klermont, Ordinary Proceedings in
First Instance : England and the United States, in
Khan, Rahmatullah, Iran-United ^ States Claims Tribunal:
Controversies, Cases and Contribution (1990) .
Lillich, Richard B. and Burns H. Weston, International Claims:
Their Settlement bv Lump Sum Agreements (1975)
Lillich, Richard B. International Claims: Their Adjudication by-
National Commissions (1962).
Ludes, F.J. and F.J. Gilbert, Corpus Juris Secundum, A Complete
Restatement of The Entire American Law, vol. 27 Discovery and
vol. 31A, Evidence.
Mahmasani, Subhi, The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Persian
translation from original Arabic by E. Golestani), also in
English translation by Farhat I Ziadeh, Leiden (1961).
Mani, V.S., International Adjudication : Procedural Aspects (1980).
Mazeaud, Lecons de Droit Civil Tome I ler vol., 6e ed. 1980 par
Frangois Chabas.
Mohaghegh Damad, Seyyed Mustafa, Ayeen Dadrasi [Civil Procedure],
in: Great Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 2 (in Persian).
Motoulsky, Principes de Realization Methodigue du Droit—Prive,
these, Lyon, 1947.
Nielsen, F., International Law Applied to Reclamations,—Mainly
Cases Between the United States and Mexico, (1933).
Oellers-Frahm, Karin and Norbert Wuhler, Dispute Settlement in
Public International Law: Texts and Materials, Publication of
Max Plank Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg (1984).
443
Product Liability in Europe; A Collection of Reports prepared for
a Conference held in Amsterdam in September 1975, under the
auspices of the Association Europeene d'Etude Juridiques et
Fiscales.
Puttkamer, Ellinor van, Peace Treaties of 1947, in: Bernhardt (ed) ,
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [Instalment 4
(1982)].
Rapport de la Commission du Droit International. Assemblee
Generale, Documents officiels: Treizieme Session, Supplement
No. 9 (A/3859).
Reisman, Michael and Eric E. Freedman,_ The _Plaintiff s^ Dilemma;
Illegally Obtained Evidence And Admissibilitv In International
Adjudication. A.J.I.L., 1982, No. 4, pp. 737-753.
Report of the International Law Commission. Official Records of the
General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 9, Document
A/2456.
Rigaux, Frangois, Droit International Prive. Tome 1, Theorie
generale, Deuxieme ed. refondue (1987).
Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court,
rev. ed., 1985.
Rouard, Pierre, Traite Elementaire de Droit Judiciaire Prive, I^a
Procedure Civile, Tome Quatrieme, Les Preuves (1980).
Sabi, M. , Code of Civil Procedure of Iran, (translation from
Persian to English),
Saleh, Samir, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab-Middle East;—A
Study in Shari^'a and Statute Law, London (1984) .
Sanders, Pieter, Uncitral's Project for a Model Law on Commercial
International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 2, Interim
Meeting Lausanne, May 9-12 1984;
Sanders, Pieter, Commentary on Uncitral Arbitration Rules, ICCA
Yearbook vol. 11-1977, pp. 172-219.
Sandifer, Duward V., Evidence Before International Tribunals, rev.
ed., 1975.
Scelle, George, Rapport sur la Procedure Arbitrale, Document
A/CN.4/18, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1950), vol. II.
Schlochauer, H.J., Jay Treaty (1794), in ; Bernhardt (ed.).
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [Instalment 1
(1981)].
444
Schmitthoff, Clive, Schmitthoff^s Export Trade, The Law—and
Practice of International Trade, 7th ed.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, Conciliation Commissions Established
Pursuant to Art. 83 of Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, in:
Bernhardt (ed) , Encyclopedia of Public International—
[Instalment 7 (1981)].
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, German Interests In Polish Upper Silesia
Cases, in: Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [instalment 2 (1981)].
Simpson, J. L. and Fox, Hazel, International Arbitration; Law and
Practice, London (1959).
Stein, p. A., Civil Procedure, in: Introduction to Dutch Law for
Foreign Lawyers (1978), Ch. 14, 231-263.
Szaszy, Istyan, International Ciyil Procedure, Budapest 1967.
Thirlway, H.W.A., Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals,
in: Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law
[Instalment 1 (1981).
Thirlway, H.W.A., Dilemma Or Chimera? — Admissibilitv Of Illegally
Obtained Eyidence In International Adjudication, A.J.I.L.,
1984, vol. 78, pp. 622-641.
Thirlway, H.W.A., Evidence Before International Courts ^id
Tribunals in: Bernhardt (ed.) , Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [Instalment 1 (1981)]
UNCITRAL Yearbook, vol. VI:1975 and vol. VII: 1976.
Vafai, Gholam H., Commercial Laws of the Middle East; Iran, Civil
Code, Oceana Publications Inc, 1982.
Verheyden-Jeanmart, N., Droit de la Preuve, Larcier, Bruxelles,
1992.
Verhoeven, Joe, La reconnaissance Internationale dans la pratique
contemporaine, 1975.
Verhoeven, Joe, Arbitrage entre Etats et entreprises etranqeres:
des regies specifiaues?, Revue de I'arbitrage, 1985.
Verhoeven, Joe, Le Droit, Le Judge et La Violence, Les—Arrets
Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis, Revue General de Droit International
Public, No. 4 (1987).
Verzijl, J.H.W., The Jurisprudence of The World Court.
Vescovi, Enrique, Ordinary Proceedings in First Instance: Iberian
Peninsula and Latin America, in: International Encyclopedia of
445
Comparative Law, vol. XVI, Ch. 6.
Walker, D.M., The Oxford Companion to Law, (1980).
Wengerek, Edmund, Ordinary Proceedings in First Instance; Socialist
Countries, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,
vol. XVI, Ch. 6.
Westberg, John A., International Transaction and Claims Invoivinq
Government Parties; Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal (1991).
Wetter, J. Gillis, The International Arbitral Process, vols IV and
V.
Witenberg, J. C., La Theorie des Preuves Devant Les Juridiction
Internationales,, Recueil des Cours 1936 II.
Witenberg, J.C., Onus Probandi devant les iuridiction arbitrales.
Revue Generale de Droit International Public (Paris), Tome LV,
1951.
Wiihler, Norbert, Ambatielos Case, in ; Bernhardt (ed.).
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [Instalment 2
(1981)].
